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• stem cell-derived gametes
• private umbilical cord blood banking
• international trade in human organs
• biobanks such as the US Precision Medicine Initiative
• direct-to-consumer genetic testing
• health and fitness self-monitoring
Although these technologies often prioritise individual choice, the original
ideal of genomic research saw the human genome as ‘the common heritage
of humanity’. The authors question whether personalisedmedicine actually
threatens this conception of the common good.
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1Introduction
donna dickenson, britta van beers and sigrid
sterckx
1.1 What Is Personalised Medicine?
Hippocrates famously advised physicians that it is more important to
know what person the disease has than what disease the person has.
So it might well be thought that all good medical practice is persona-
lised, and that there is nothing new about that. But the phenomenon
that has been widely presented as a paradigm shift in medicine – and
which is our concern in this volume – is both more specific and more
general.
In the specific sense, personalised or precision medicine builds on the
achievements of genomic science, aiming to offer doctors and patients
more sophisticated tools ofmolecular profiling to identify and treat genetic
variants implicated in disease risk and treatment. Pharmacogenetics, prob-
ably the most advanced arm of personalised medicine, aims to minimise
adverse drug reactions and produce better responses by tailoring pharma-
ceutical regimes in cancer care and other branches of medicine to the
patient’s individual genome. For example, the application of whole-
genome sequencing to the care of a patient with early onset breast and
ovarian cancer but no significant family history revealed unsuspected
genetic defects, enabling clinicians to change her treatment plan from
bone marrow transplantation to successful targeted chemotherapy.1
Outside oncology, treatment for the liver disease hepatitis has been suc-
cessfully personalised to avoid the worst side effects for patients whose
genetic variation makes them more responsive to a lower drug dosage.2
The discovery of a ‘Goldilocks’ gene affecting patients’ inflammatory
1 Daniel C. Link et al., ‘Identification of a novel PT3 cancer susceptibility mutation through
whole-genome sequencing of a patient with therapy-related AMI’ (2011) 305 Journal of the
American Medical Association 1568–76.
2 Amy Maxmen, ‘Pharmacogenetics: playing the odds’ (2011) 474 Nature S9–S10.
1
response to tuberculosis could be crucial, particularly in the Third World,
in determining who will contract the disease and who would benefit from
steroids.3
Such is the sense captured in the following description:
Precision medicine is an approach to disease treatment and prevention
that seeks to maximize effectiveness by taking into account variability in
genes, environment and lifestyle. Precision medicine seeks to redefine our
understanding of disease onset and progression, treatment response, and
health outcomes through the more precise measurement of molecular,
environmental, and behavioral factors that contribute to health and dis-
ease. This understanding will lead to more accurate diagnoses, more
rational disease prevention strategies, better treatment selection, and the
development of novel therapies. Coincident with advancing the science of
medicine is a changing culture of medical practice and medical research
that engages individuals as active partners—not just as patients or
research subjects.4
This is the goal underpinning the announcement made by President
Obama in January 2015 of a $215 million Precision Medicine
Initiative (PMI), coupled with plans to recruit a million participants
into the accompanying ‘PMI-Cohort’ programme. As a junior sena-
tor, Obama had already championed the bill that was to become the
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act 2007, remarking: ‘We are
in a new era of the life sciences, but in no area of research is the
promise greater than in personalized medicine.’ In these initiatives
the language of individualisation was powerfully dominant, despite
the ‘rhetorical reform’ implicit in the change of nomenclature from
‘personalised’ to ‘precision’ between the 2007 statute and the 2015
initiative.5 In the words of the White House statement accompanying
the PMI announcement:
Until now most medical treatments have been designed for the ‘average
patient’. As a result of this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, treatments can
3 Linda Wijlaars, ‘“Goldilocks” gene response to TB suggests best treatment’ (6 February
2012) Bionews.
4 PrecisionMedicine Initiative (PMI)Working Group Report to the Advisory Committee to
the Director, NIH, The Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program – Building a Research
Foundation for 21st Century Medicine (2015), September 17, p. 1. See also Maya Sabatello
and Paul S. Appelbaum, ‘The precision medicine nation’ (2017) 47(4) Hastings Center
Report 19–29.
5 Eric Juengst, Michelle L. McGowan, Jennifer R. Fishman et al., ‘From “personalized” to
“precision” medicine: the ethical and social implications of rhetorical reform in genomic
medicine’ (2016) 46 Hastings Center Report 21–33.
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be very successful for some patients but not for others. Precision
Medicine, on the other hand, is an innovative approach that takes
into account individual differences in people’s genes, environments,
and lifestyles.6
1.2 The Personalisation of Medicine and the Common Good
However, this emphasis on individualisation – ‘Me Medicine’, as one
of us has termed it7 – is controversial, despite Hippocrates’ dictum.
To begin with, it is extremely unlikely that completely individualised
treatments are ever going to be feasible. Many commentators and
clinicians acknowledge that the best aspiration is to deliver diag-
noses and treatments stratified into patient groups by genomic
science:
I don’t think that we can ever, ever become truly personal and truly
individualized . . . [T]he way I look at personalized medicine is whereby
we can stratify patient groups respective of ancestry, ethnicity, into indi-
viduals who are more likely to respond using novel technologies . . .
So I see a way of being able to subphenotype individuals in the way they’re
going to respond to drugs, and that’s what I see as personalized medicine.
So I don’t see it as individual.8
The term ‘stratified’ medicine, however, lacks the powerful appeal of
‘personalised’ medicine, with its promises of greater individual choice
and patient empowerment. These claims have been made most
explicitly by the direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing sector,
in which firms offer customers whole- or partial-genome sequencing
analyses of their risks for particular diseases. As one firm put it,
‘We use the latest science and technology to give you a view into
your DNA, revealing your genetic predisposition for important
health conditions and empowering you with knowledge to help
you take control of your health future.’9 Direct-to-consumer genetic
testing is the self-proclaimed vanguard of the personalised medicine
movement, with leading proponents advocating a proactive approach
6 Quoted in J. Patrick Woolley, Michelle L. McGowan, Harriet J. A. Teare et al., ‘Citizen
science or scientific citizenship? Disentangling the uses of public engagement rhetoric in
national research initiatives’ (2016) 17(33) BMC Medical Ethics, pp. 7–8.
7 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
8 A senior editor of a genomics journal, interviewed in Juengst et al., ‘From “personalized” to
“precision” medicine’, p. 23.
9 Navigenics advertising, quoted in Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 32.
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to individual health that stresses the importance and validity of DTC
tests in taking control of one’s own health.10
But are these promises of empowerment illusory? ‘The weakness of
“personalized genomic medicine”, as a promissory label for what
genomics might bring to health care, is that it promises more than
genomics can actually deliver – both in terms of increased patient
empowerment and in terms of the individualization of care.’11
Perhaps personalised medicine might even diminish patient choice
by denying patients treatments which they would like to have but to
which they are unlikely to respond. Or it might leave that decision
more firmly in the hands of physicians and genetic counsellors, oper-
ating on the pharmacogenetic ethos of ‘the right treatment for the right
patient at the right time’. But the inevitable corollary is ‘the wrong
treatment for the wrong patient at the wrong time’, conceivably mean-
ing ‘no treatment’ for patients whose genomic profiles make them less
likely to respond.12
Rationing decisions such as these are only the start of the ethical and
social issues arising from personalised medicine. Interpreted broadly,
personalised medicine can encompass a whole gamut of new biotechnol-
ogies, united mainly by their common emphasis on patient choice and
empowerment. As a prominent example, ‘enhancement technologies’,
such as neurocognitive stimulation techniques, brain–computer inter-
faces, drugs to improve mental functioning, and, most controversially,
germline genetic modification, can be seen as a form of personalised
medicine. They are typically predicated on the individualistic ethos of
‘being the best Me I can possibly be’.13
Yet the original ideals behind the rise of genomic medicine were
communitarian, not individualistic: they symbolise ‘We’ rather than
‘Me’ Medicine. This ‘We’ may refer to a variety of concerns: our
genetic relatedness, ideals of solidarity and distributive justice, or
global public goods such as the genetic commons. The ideal of the
genome as the common heritage of humanity permeates the inter-
national scientific community’s 1996 ‘Bermuda statement’, which
declares: ‘All human genome sequence information from
a publicly funded project should be freely available in the public
10 E.g. Francis Collins, The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalized
Medicine (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2010).
11 Juengst et al., ‘From “personalized” to “precision” medicine’, p. 30.
12 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 72.
13 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 113.
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domain.’14 Likewise, article 1 of the 1997 UNESCO Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights stipulates:
‘In a symbolic sense, the human genome is the common heritage of
humanity.’
Does personalised medicine undermine and threaten this concep-
tion of the ‘common good’? If more resources are dedicated to preci-
sion medicine, for example, will less attention be paid to public
health?15 That could be counterproductive in overall population
terms, bearing in mind that it was public health initiatives such as
improved sanitation and screening that radically improved lifespan
figures in the twentieth-century Western world by lessening the inci-
dence of contagious disease.
This phenomenon is not ‘merely’ historic; nor is it limited to
infectious disease. ‘Most of the recent successes in cancer care have
resulted from the traditional public health measures of screening, early
detection and smoking reduction as well as some immunologic
therapies.’16 Even two of the most prominent ‘poster children’ for
genomic medicine, the BRCA1/2 genes implicated in some breast
and ovarian cancers and the discovery of specific cystic fibrosis muta-
tions responsive to recently developed drugs, have arguably had less
effect than ‘We Medicine’. ‘Although well-deserved recognition has
accompanied these genetic discoveries, neither has been a significant
factor in the substantial reduction in mortality from the two target
diseases during the past 25 years. The commitment to screening
technology and adherence to best practices has proven far more
important to the lives of affected patients.’17 More broadly, it has
been argued that a solidarity-based ‘We Medicine perspective’ could
allow us to formulate better policies in areas ranging from palliative
care to organ donation.18
14 HUGO (Human Genome Organization), Summary of Principles Agreed at the
International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing (‘Bermuda Statement’)
(London: Wellcome Trust, 1996).
15 W. Burke et al., ‘Extending the range of public health genomics: what should be the
agenda for public health in an era of genome-based and “personalized”medicine?’ (2010)
12 Genetics in Medicine 785–91.
16 Michael J. Joyner and Nigel Paneth, ‘Seven questions for personalized medicine’ (2015)
314(10) JAMA 999–1000, p. 999.
17 Ibid.
18 Barbara Prainsack, ‘The “We” in the “Me”: solidarity and health care in the era of
personalized medicine’ (2018) 43(1) Science, Technology and Human Values 21–44.
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1.3 Digital Health and Personalised Medicine
All these developments regarding personalised medicine need to be seen
in connection with the digital health (or e-health) revolution. In 2017 the
digital health industry was already worth US$25 billion globally.19 Digital
health includes diverse technologies, e.g. automated algorithm-based
decisional support systems, mobile health apps (m-health) monitoring
health-related behaviours, remote consultations (or ‘telemedicine’) and
Electronic Health Records (EHRs). Staggeringly, 153,000 m-health apps
have been released since 2015, bringing the worldwide total to 320,000.20
For most of these technologies, robust governance is lacking.21
These technologies also result in an increasing ‘pile’ of Big Data.
Increasingly, as in other contexts (not only businesses but also election
campaigns, for example), in healthcare, too, attempts are made to link
disparate data sets at the individual person level. New kinds of data
collection, linkage and analysis are expected to profoundly transform
clinical medicine, public health and epidemiology.
In her hugely impressive article in The Lancet on ‘The art of medicine’,
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin analyses the impact on current-day medi-
cine of the Cartesian concept of the human body as a machine. Although
this model has resulted in unquestionable benefits from the biomedical
sciences, she adds this caveat:
[I]t also underlies the belief that the goal of medicine is to somehow
eliminate human vulnerability. Because contemporary biomedical
sciences ask questions oriented to that end, it is not surprising that their
responses tend to sustain medical practices that are directed to produce
cures. Of course, we cannot emphasise enough the importance of curing
human diseases. But excessive emphasis on this goal runs the risk of
disregarding those things that cannot be cured, such as disabilities and
chronic illnesses. This goal also underscores the emphasis on individual
solutions to problems that might best be addressed by attending to social
and economic aspects, and hence the common lack of attention given to
public health solutions.22
19 ‘Does mobile health matter?’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 2216. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(17)
32899–4.
20 IQVIA, ‘The growing value of digital health in the United Kingdom: evidence and impact
on human health and the healthcare system’ (7 November 2017). www.iqvia.com/insti
tute/reports/the-growing-value-of-digital-health (Accessed 11 February 2018).
21 Rishi Duggal, Ingrid Brindle and Jessamy Bagenal, ‘Editorial: Digital healthcare: regulat-
ing the revolution’ (2018) British Medical Journal 360:k6. doi:10.1136/bmj.k6.
22 Immaculada de Melo-Martin, ‘The art of medicine – Vulnerability and ethics: consider-
ing our Cartesian hangover’ (2009) 373 The Lancet 1244–45.
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Promises of ever more cures where none were previously available can be
found throughout the ‘personalisedmedicine’ rhetoric, to an increasingly
embarrassing extent, as explained powerfully by Stanford epidemiologist
John Ioannidis:
I have had great excitement about the prospects of omics, big data,
personalized medicine, precision medicine, and all. Much of my effort
has been to put together these efforts with rigorous statistical methods and
EBM (Evidence-Based Medicine) tools. But I am tired of seeing the same
overrated promises recast again and again. For example, several years ago
I gave an invited lecture at a leading institution on the danger of making
inflated promises in personalizedmedicine. Right after my talk, everybody
rushed to hear the launch of a new campaign, where the leader of the
institution singled out this unique historic moment: that institution
would single-handedly eliminate most major types of cancer within
a few years. Several years have passed, and none of these cancer types
have disappeared. I recently tried to find the name of that campaign online
but realized that this institution has launched many similar campaigns.
Which among many was the unique historic moment that I happened to
be at? Multiply this by thousands of institutions, and there are already
millions of unique historic moments where cancer was eliminated.
The same applies to neurologic diseases and more. I do not understand
why academic leaders and politicians need to make such self-
embarrassing announcements now and then.23
1.4 Me Medicine vs We Medicine
To examine these wide-ranging and global questions, this volume brings
together an international array of scholars from various disciplines,
including law, bioethics, anthropology and sociology, to exchange ideas
on the tensions between Me Medicine and We Medicine.
One of the recurring questions in the contributions to this book is what
Me and We exactly mean in this context. As various authors argue,
personalised medicine gives rise to new conceptions of the self and the
communal. What kind of concept of the person is implied by the notion
of personalised medicine: a geneticised self, quantified self, potential self,
fictional self, consumer self? And what is the nature of community and
the common good implicit in We Medicine: collective morality, social
solidarity or rather new types of commons, such as ‘genome-commons’
(e.g. the human genome as common heritage of mankind), ‘bio-
23 John Ioannidis, ‘Evidence-based medicine has been hijacked: a report to David Sackett’
(2016) 73 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 82–6.
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commons’ (e.g. sharing DNA samples) and ‘data-commons’ (e.g. promo-
tion of early data disclosure and release)?24
Moreover, many of the chapters offer reflection on the causes of the
spectacular rise of the rhetoric of personalised medicine. One of us has
argued25 that four possible explanations can be distinguished, with some
emerging from further analysis as more plausible than others. These four
explanations also resurface in most of the chapters and can be charac-
terised as follows.
A first possibility is that the personalisation of healthcare is rooted in
a more general sense of threat and contamination in society. For exam-
ple, the fear of contamination can be recognised in the growing lack of
confidence in public health resources. Second, the popularity of products
and services in the field of Me Medicine, such as DTC tests, could be
understood against the background of a broader trend towards narcis-
sism and a fixation on the self. Third, it seems likely that corporate
interests also fuel the fascination for personalised medicine. The highly
lucrative and still expanding market in products and services based on
personalised medicine suggests a correlation between the emergence of
personalised medicine on the one hand, and the rise of neoliberal politics
and the privatisation of most domains of life on the other. Last, the
rhetoric surrounding personalised medicine alludes to a celebration of
personal choice, personal empowerment and personal autonomy. From
this perspective, the belief in personalised medicine as the new panacea is
intimately connected to modern society’s belief in the ‘sacredness of
personal choice and individualism’.26
These four hypotheses have engaged the attention of many of our
contributors, allowing a more sophisticated and multi-disciplinary ana-
lysis of the phenomenon of personalised medicine to be united under
a shared framework. In the next section we summarise each of their
contributions separately.
1.5 Overview
In their chapter, ‘Personalised Medicine and the Politics of Human
Nuclear Genome Transfer’, philosopher and bioethicist Françoise
24 Bartha M. Knoppers and Vural Özdemir, ‘The concept of humanity and biogenetics’ in
Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias andWouter Werner (eds.),Humanity across International
Law and Biolaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
25 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, pp. 10–29.
26 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 24.
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Baylis and feminist political scientist Alana Cattapan offer an important
contribution to the debate on the governance of human nuclear genome
transfer, commonly (but incorrectly) known as ‘mitochondrial replace-
ment’. This emerging reproductive technology aims to provide women
who are genetic carriers of certain mitochodrial diseases with the possi-
bility of reproducing without passing on their mitochondrial DNA to
their offspring. The result would be the creation of ‘three-parent babies’,
with genetic material from two women and one man. In their thought-
provoking analysis Baylis and Cattapan argue that the rise of human
nuclear genome transfer should be understood as part of the current
movement towards the personalisation of healthcare; as such, they claim,
it deserves a critical examination. They subsequently argue against the
implementation of this technology by fruitfully engaging with
Dickenson’s aforementioned four possible explanations for the rise of
personalised medicine. According to Baylis and Cattapan, Dickenson’s
first explanation resurfaces in the context of human nuclear genome in
the shape of a fear of genetic contamination of one’s familial DNA,
against which this technology would offer protection. They then engage
with Dickenson’s second hypothesis – narcissism and bowling alone – by
highlighting how an important part of this technology’s appeal rests on
a short-sighted prioritisation of genetic relatedness above all other inter-
ests. As to Dickenson’s third explanation, Baylis and Cattapan describe
how the fertility industry’s huge commercial interests are steering the
development and marketing of this reproductive technology. Finally,
they argue that ‘the sacredness of personal choice’ has also clearly affected
the reception of human nuclear genome transfer. The rhetoric surround-
ing this technology emphasises the right to have genetically related
children who are free of mitochondrial disease, and obfuscates the risks
that are at stake, such as the intergenerational effects of altering the
genome.
Extending the scope of personalisedmedicine beyond genomic science
into an unexpected and novel area, bioethicist Heidi Mertes applies the
concept to ‘Stem Cell-Derived Gametes and Uterus Transplants’.
Although both of these experimental techniques are far from being
mainstream, they implicitly rely for their justification on the conven-
tional view of ‘reproductive autonomy’ as a personal right.
The sacredness of personal choice and the importance attached to genetic
parenthood chime with this view. Likewise, the hypothesis that ‘Me
Medicine’ derives its popularity from a fear of threat and contamination
also seems to be supported by fear of third-party involvement in the
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formation of a family, Mertes suggests. However, she concludes that ‘it is
far from obvious that the desire for genetic or gestational parenthood can
trump considerations for the welfare of the future child and for the safety
of the other parties involved (in the case of uterus transplantation), or
that it can justify resource allocation to these new reproductive technol-
ogies.’ She ends her analysis by exploring what measures a less indivi-
dualistic approach to infertility might entail: one rooted in the
‘We Medicine’ concept of the common good.
Reproductive ethics is also the concern of Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta,
a sociologist who works on reproductive and genetic technologies from
a gender perspective, in her original and important study combining
media analysis, interviews and participant observation: ‘Personalising
Future Health Risk through “Biological Insurance”: Proliferation of
Private Umbilical Cord Blood Banking in India’. Private cord blood
banking epitomises ‘Me Medicine’ in its ostensible concentration on
the individual’s future well-being, rather than the collective’s health,
which is better served by public banks. In India, however, public banks
are few and far between, whereas private banking is very much on the
rise. Gupta provides extensive detail on the Indian private cord blood
industry – potentially the largest supplier in the world – along with
interview results from patients and doctors alike. Locating the private
cord blood phenomenon not only within the ‘Me Medicine’ framework
but also in the literature on risk theory, Gupta documents the construc-
tion of a new kind of patient: the ‘at-risk’ individual who needs a form of
personalised medicine from birth: the moment when cord blood is taken.
A different dimension of the tensions between We Medicine and Me
Medicine is explored in the chapter, ‘Combating the Trade in Organs:
Why We Should Preserve the Communal Nature of Organ
Transplantation’ by Kristof Van Assche. Van Assche, who is a legal
expert on organ donation and transplantation, offers a powerful and
highly critical examination of recent proposals to introduce elements of
free market economics into systems of organ donation. Even if organ
selling is still banned in most legal systems, ‘as altruistic kidney donation
symbolizes We Medicine at its noblest’,27 the call for a regulated market
in organs is becoming louder in reaction to the continuing shortage in
organs. Van Assche’s ardent defence of the existing altruistic system rests
on two lines of argumentation. His first argument is that a regulated
organ market is likely to lead to the exact opposite of what proponents
27 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 72.
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hope to achieve. As a result of the inability to control all market transac-
tions, such a system cannot prevent organ patients from accessing black
markets for organs, either in their own country or abroad. Moreover,
a regulated market may crowd out altruistic organ donation. Finally, he
stresses the problematic account of autonomy that underlies proposals to
allow individuals to sell their organs. In the second part of his chapter,
Van Assche expands his critical analysis of regulated markets in organs
by connecting the issue with the debate on the commodification of the
human body and by engaging with different theories of property. He
argues that both utilitarian and Lockean theories of property fail to
properly justify property rights in organs. Conversely, according to Van
Assche, only personhood theories of property are able to recognise the
grave immaterial harms at stake in organ vending.
In her chapter on one of the greatest global challenges in the twenty-first
century, Alzheimer’s disease – an untreatable disease whose prevalence
and financial and social consequences are reaching epidemic proportions –
legal scholar Robin Pierce addresses the We/Me Medicine aspects of
research and development of diagnostic tests and therapeutic treatments.
It may well be that Alzheimer’s disease is in fact an umbrella term covering
a range of separate diseases, some of which have a genetic cause while
others do not. Until the cause of and possible treatments for the disease are
discovered, research and development clearly falls into the We Medicine
category, even though some of the diagnostic tests being developed are so
complicated and expensive that their widespread deployment could cur-
rently only be considered to belong to the realms of research and Me
Medicine. However, as Pierce powerfully explains, there is a danger that
any cures which are developed would be applicable to and affordable by
only a small minority. Thus, the development of such cures by commercial
entities risks being Me Medicine only. Indeed, ‘When There Is No Cure:
Challenges for Collective Approaches to Alzheimer’s Disease’ shows that
public pressure may be necessary to ensure that cures are developed for
more than just a ‘favoured few’: without deliberate consideration through-
out the R&D and translational process, collective approaches to the
Alzheimer’s crisis may lose ground to commercially more profitable indi-
vidualised approaches.
In his chapter, ‘Lost and Found: Relocating the Individual in the Age of
Intensified Data Sourcing in European Healthcare’, Klaus Hoeyer, who
specialises in anthropology and medical science and technology studies,
investigates the implications of ‘data sourcing’. To an increasing extent,
health data are created, collected, curated, stored and used for diverse
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purposes. Denmark is the primary example described in this chapter
because the Danish government prescribes a form of solidarity that
Hoeyer associates with We Medicine: people deliver data in the process
of receiving, or in exchange for, publicly financed healthcare; and the
data can be used for research that promotes the common good. Thanks
to the use of personal identity numbers in all encounters with public
services, Danish health data can be combined with data on socio-
economic and educational status from employers and tax authorities.
Denmark takes a more radical approach to the facilitation of research
than the other Nordic countries: since 2014, Danish citizens can no
longer opt out from being contacted by researchers wanting further
information from them. Hoeyer considers the rights and wrongs of
establishing such comprehensive national public health and social
information databases, based on what boils down to ‘conscription’ of
personal data. Moreover, these data registries are increasingly used by
the government to attract international investment in the Danish
pharmaceutical industry. Hoeyer argues that the Danish registries
hold great promise for the development of new therapeutic treatments
and the improvement of current ones, for example, by allowing the
identification of unknown side-effects of drugs. Although identifying
some Me Medicine aspects in the Danish approach, he concludes that
its We Medicine associated benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
Nonetheless, a key task is to ensure that the collective goods do not
become redirected into private pockets and that collectives help each
other to counter individual risks.
In their chapter, ‘Presuming the Promotion of the Common Good by
Large-Scale Health Research: The Cases of care.data 2.0 and the 100,000
Genomes Project in the UK’, philosopher and bioethicist Sigrid Sterckx,
social scientist Sandi Dheensa and patent attorney Julian Cockbain offer
an analysis of recent efforts by the UK government to expand the
possibilities for collecting health-related data from UK citizens.
The first part of their chapter consists of an examination of the political
statements, official reports and legal documents used by the government
to introduce both care.data and the 100,000 Genomes Project.
In the second part, they build on this analysis to identify several ethically
highly problematic aspects of these recent initiatives, such as their under-
lying consent model. One of the most striking findings of the authors’
ethical analysis is that the UK government tries to promote its policy by
appealing to what are essentially We Medicine values. However, as the
authors argue, upon closer inspection it emerges that behind this thin
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layer of obfuscatory language hides a Me Medicine approach to health
data, rooted in what, essentially, is a neoliberal political agenda.
In their chapter, ‘My Genome, My Right’, sociologist Stuart Hogarth,
patent attorney Julian Cockbain and bioethicist Sigrid Sterckx consider
the claim that people have the right to access their genomic data, e.g.
using direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies such as 23andMe,
and that that right extends to the use (and publication) of such data in
any desired way. In effect, the claim is to an ownership right that corre-
sponds to the central libertarian claim to self-ownership of the body and
all body material. The authors, however, argue that the libertarians
conflate a right to ownership of material, a rivalrous good, with a right
to own information, a non-rivalrous good to which others may also
legitimately claim control rights since genetic information is shared
with relatives, at least. Accordingly, while the authors propose a human
right to access personal genetic information, subject to regulatory control
to ensure counselling where appropriate, they argue that, to protect the
rights of others, not least to privacy, the person has no right to publish
their ‘own’ genetic data. The ‘Me Medicine’ of personal control is
trumped by the ‘We Medicine’ of privacy.
‘“The Best Me I Can Possibly Be”: Legal Subjectivity, Self-Authorship
and Wrongful Life Actions in an Age of “Genomic Torts”’, written by
legal scholar and philosopher Britta van Beers, demonstrates the neces-
sity of a legal perspective on personalised medicine. This chapter demon-
strates how the ‘person’ in personalised medicine is connected with the
legal understanding of a ‘person’ as a bearer of legal rights and respon-
sibilities. However, this emphasis is changing. In her analysis of new
types of legal claims that affect the law’s understanding of the ‘person’,
van Beers focuses on the emerging area of ‘genomic torts’. Who, if
anyone, is liable to compensate the children or their parents if children
are conceived and born with disabling conditions that could have been
detected or predicted before birth, or sometimes even before conception?
Should responsibility lie with the physician who fails to offer appropriate
tests, the parents who, knowingly or not, allow pregnancy to go to term,
or society in general? Recently, two forms of legal action have come into
focus: wrongful birth (an action against the physicians by the parents)
and wrongful life (an action against the parents by the children). Britta
van Beers investigates two different interpretations of a wrongful life
claim (a right not to be born or a right to be born in a different body) and
explains why both are problematic. Interestingly, she also discusses the
potential effects that recent developments in gene-editing, such as the
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CRISPR-Cas9 technique, may have on wrongful life actions. Moreover,
gene-editing and preimplantation diagnostics run the risk of enhancing
parental antenatal and pre-conception obligations and of transforming
the responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the handicapped child from
being a societal responsibility into a personal one. The analysis under-
taken by van Beers clearly shows why wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims are emblematic of a Me Medicine approach to regulation, i.e. an
approach that views the legal issues involved in reproductive medicine as
disputes between individuals about personal rights and entitlements, and
why we should be concerned about the radically individualistic model of
self-authorship that underlies this approach.
In their innovative chapter, ‘I Run, You Run,We Run: A Philosophical
Approach to Health and Fitness Apps’, philosopher Marli Huijer and
design researcher and philosopher Christian Detweiler focus on self-
tracking technologies as a new kind of Me Medicine. Also known as
Quantified Self or Personal Informatics, these popular applications osten-
sibly reflect the individualistic enhancement ideal of ‘becoming the best
Me I can possibly be’.28 However, Huijer and Detweiler question whether
these technologies do actually empower individuals. A Foucauldian ana-
lysis, they argue, might instead suggest that ‘there is concern that perso-
nal informatics technologies submit their users to disciplinary forces that
seduce or force the individual to take responsibility for their own health’
as a means of governing the self, a form of voluntary self-surveillance.
By expanding the scope of what counts as personalised medicine and
sceptically questioning its rhetoric of individual choice and empower-
ment, the authors offer an unexpected counter-analysis to the prevalent
optimistic discourse on precision medicine.
Similar concerns are further developed from a psychoanalytical per-
spective by philosopher of science Hub Zwart in his chapter,
‘The Molecularised Me: Psychoanalysing Personalised Medicine and
Self-Tracking’. The emergence of wearable tracking devices can be seen
as a ‘second revolution’, bringing together paradigm shifts in computer
technology and genomic sequencing. A ‘quantified self’ has emerged:
what Zwart calls ‘a digital version of the superego’. Self-knowledge in this
new context links to but transcends narcissism: as Zwart puts it, ‘Self-
tracking devices purport to provide access to our molecularised uncon-
scious.’ Supposedly, these developments transform us all into proactive
and empowered bio-citizens, reducing physicians to mere assistants or
28 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 113.
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managers and promoting the ideal of citizen health science. But do they
actually represent a new form of surveillance like Jeremy Bentham’s
panopticon? – what Zwart calls ‘a ubiquitous electronic panopticon,
a molecularised version of the super-ego, the voice of conscience of the
terabyte age’. Like Huijer and Detweiler, Zwart is concerned that this
enhancement-orientated form of MeMedicine actually forces a powerful
new form of discipline on its users, rather than increasing their
autonomy.
Each chapter in this book in its own way offers a critical exam-
ination of the grand claims made by the ‘evangelists’ of personalised
medicine. Does personalised medicine truly bring about a revolution
in medicine by offering tailor-made medical treatment? Can this new
approach indeed do justice to patients’ biogenetic uniqueness and as
such empower them to make better-informed choices about their
health? Which values and interests are championed by Me
Medicine’s promissory discourse, and which are neglected? And
how can the sudden rise and wide appeal of personalised medicine
be explained?
As both the disciplinary richness of the chapters and the wide variety
of themes with which they engage indicate, the increasing dominance of
Me Medicine approaches over We Medicine approaches is also inti-
mately connected to other developments, such as the hegemony in
bioethics and biolaw of the principle of autonomy,29 the dominance of
rights discourse at the cost of attention for more collective interests,30 the
commodification of the human body31 and human reproduction,32 and
29 For critical discussions of the primacy of autonomy in bioethics in the context of
genomics, see, inter alia, Bartha M. Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick, ‘Human genetic
research: Emerging trends in ethics’ (2005) 6 Nature Reviews Genetics 75–9; Michael
J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Engineering (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2007); Heather Widdows, The Connected Self. The Ethics and
Governance of the Genetic Individual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
30 Mary A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York, NY:
Free Press, 1991); Costas Douzinas, ‘The paradoxes of human rights’ (2013) 20(1)
Constellations 51–67.
31 Margaret J. Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body
Parts, and Other Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996);
Donna Dickenson, Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, 2008).
32 Michele Goodwin (ed.), Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Britta van Beers, ‘Is Europe “giving
in to baby markets?” Reproductive tourism in Europe and the gradual erosion of existing
legal limits to reproductive markets’ (2014) 23(1) Medical Law Review 103–34.
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the datafication of healthcare.33 One of the aspirations of this book is also
to contribute to academic reflection on these important themes.
Moreover, although it is true that the chapters in this book generally
focus onMeMedicine’s more problematic aspects, it would be too easy to
conclude that the book’s central message is that personalised medicine is
bad news and that efforts in this field should therefore be abandoned.
Instead, it is our hope that, by exploring the frictions between Me
Medicine and We Medicine, between individual choice and the common
good, this book can fuel and stimulate the debate about personalised
medicine and enable its participants to come to a more balanced under-
standing of the interests and values at stake.
33 Jonathan H. Chen and Steven M. Asch, ‘Machine learning and prediction in medicine –
Beyond the peak of inflated expectations’ (2017) 376 (26) New England Journal of
Medicine 2507–9; K. A. Oye, G. Jain, M. Amador et al., ‘The next Frontier: Fostering
innovation by improving health data access and utilization’ (2015) 98 (5) Clinical
Pharmacology & Therapeutics 514–21.
16 donna dickenson et al.
2Personalised Medicine and the Politics of Human
Nuclear Genome Transfer
françoise baylis and alana cattapan
2.1 Introduction
In the autumn of 2016, media outlets around the world reported the first
live birth of a healthy child following the experimental use of human
nuclear genome transfer (so-called mitochondrial replacement).1 This
novel technology involves the transfer of the nucleus from the egg of
one woman into the enucleated egg of another woman. It is often referred
to as ‘three-person IVF’ or ‘three-parent IVF’ because the technology
requires use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and results in the creation of
a human with DNA from three individuals.
In this first case, the aim was to avoid the birth of a child with Leigh
syndrome – a rare, fatal neurological disorder caused by dysfunctional
1 Gina Kolata, ‘Birth of baby with three parents’ DNA marks success for banned technique’
(27 September 2016) The New York Times, sec. Health, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/
health/birth-of-3-parent-baby-a-success-for-controversial-procedure.html;
Jessica Hamzelou, ‘World’s first baby born with new “3 parent” technique’ (2017) New
Scientist, www.newscientist.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-
new-3-parent-technique. Much has been written criticising the description of human
nuclear genome transfer as ‘mitochondrial replacement therapy’, ‘mitochondrial manip-
ulation’ or ‘mitochondrial donation’. These terms variously suggest that the technology
involves the replacement of mitochondria, when the technology actually involves the
transfer of the nucleus from the egg of one woman into the enucleated egg of another
woman. As Nisker explains, ‘mitochondrial replacement’ is a camouflage term that works
to buttress support for the technology, framing it entirely as therapy for mitochondrial
disease, rather than presenting it, more controversially as a germline modification. See
JeffNisker, ‘The latest thorn by any other name: Germ-line nuclear transfer in the name of
“mitochondrial replacement”’ (2015) 37(9) Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada
829–31; Françoise Baylis, ‘Human nuclear genome transfer (so-called mitochondrial
replacement): Clearing the underbrush’ (2017) 31(1) Bioethics 7–19; Erica Haimes and
Ken Taylor, ‘Sharpening the cutting edge: Additional considerations for the UK debates on
embryonic interventions for mitochondrial diseases’ (2017) 13(1) Life Sciences, Society and
Policy.
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mitochondrial DNA. Using a technique known as maternal spindle
transfer, the nucleus was removed from the unfertilised egg of the
woman carrier of Leigh syndrome and transferred to the enucleated
unfertilised egg of a woman with healthy mitochondrial DNA.
The reconstructed egg was then fertilised and transferred to the uterus
of the woman who provided the nucleus. The embryo was created by
a team of researchers in the United States led by Dr John Zhang, and
a child was born in Mexico in April 2016 to a Jordanian couple.2
The birthplace was chosen because of the absence of legislation governing
the use of this technology.3
Soon after, the procedure started to be profiled as a specialised
reproductive technology, not only for women at risk of having children
with a mitochondrial disease, but also for women experiencing inferti-
lity. In January 2017, a child created using pronuclear transfer (another
nuclear genome transfer technique) was born in Ukraine as part of
fertility treatment.4 In February 2017, the United States National
Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine issued a report that
endorsed the use of human nuclear genome transfer under specified
conditions and made mention of its potential future use for age-related
fertility treatment.5 Later, in June 2017, Zhang announced that his new
start-up company Darwin Life would provide human nuclear genome
transfer to older infertile women (between the ages of 42–47) as a way of
prolonging natural fertility at a cost of between US$80,000 and
120,000.6 According to Zhang, ‘Everything we do is a step toward
2 John Zhang et al., ‘Live birth derived from oocyte spindle transfer to prevent mitochon-
drial disease’ (2017) 34(4) Reproductive Biomedicine Online 361–8. www.rbmojournal
.com/article/S1472-6483(17)30041-X/pdf.
3 Hamzelou (see footnote 1). At the time, the only country with clear legislation permitting
human nuclear genome transfer (referred to as mitochondrial donation) was the United
Kingdom. This technology was legalised in 2015 for the sole purpose of preventing ‘the
transmission of serious mitochondrial disease from a mother to her child’.
4 Henry Bodkin, ‘Three-parent baby born to infertile couple in world first’, The Telegraph,
18 January 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/01/18/three-parent-baby-born-
infertile-couple-world-first; Michelle Roberts, ‘IVF: First three-parent baby born to infer-
tile couple’, BBC News, 18 January 2017, sec. Health, www.bbc.com/news/health-
38648981.
5 Anne Claiborne, Rebecca English and Jeffrey Kahn, Mitochondrial Replacement
Techniques: Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations, ed. National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine et al. (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2016).
6 Emily Mullin, ‘The fertility doctor trying to commercialize three-parent babies’ (13 June
2017)MIT Technology Review, www.technologyreview.com/s/608033/the-fertility-doctor-
trying-to-commercialize-three-parent-babies.
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designer babies’.7 And with this statement, Zhang crystallised the status
of human nuclear genome transfer as personalised medicine –
a technology that can readily be customised to meet individual desires.
In this chapter, we reflect on the emergence of human nuclear genome
transfer as a form of personalised medicine akin to private umbilical cord
blood banking and direct-to-consumer genetic testing. We do so using
the framework developed by Donna Dickenson in Me Medicine vs
We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common Good.8 Herein,
Dickenson identifies four possible reasons (hypotheses) for the rise in
personalised medicine: (1) threat and contamination, (2) narcissism and
‘bowling alone’, (3) corporate interests and political neoliberalism and,
finally, (4) the sacredness of personal choice.
As applied to human nuclear genome transfer, the framework trans-
lates as follows: (1) For women at risk of having children with mitochon-
drial disease, there is the threat of serious (sometimes fatal) illness to
potential offspring. As well, there is the risk of familial genetic contam-
ination with the use of third-party eggs, which is one of the proposed
alternative ‘treatments’. This risk applies not only to women at risk of
having children with a mitochondrial disease, but also to women with
age-related infertility. (2) For both groups of women there is the widely
touted ‘need’ for genetically related children vested in a selective under-
standing of the importance of nuclear DNA. (3) There is disproportion-
ate (nearly exclusive) attention to the personal interests of families and
children yet to be born with nary a word about the corporate interests
being served. And (4) reproductive choice is championed as
a fundamental right that undergirds women’s right to avail themselves
of nuclear genome transfer. In closing, we briefly comment on the
implications of human nuclear genome transfer as a form of personalised
medicine, drawing attention to the consequences for our genetic and
reproductive futures.
2.2 Me Medicine, We Medicine and the Governance
of Biotechnologies
InMeMedicine vs We Medicine, Dickenson critically examines the move
to personalised medicine. This is a relatively new approach to healthcare
centred on the customisation of treatment based on a patient’s predicted
response to particular interventions. The tailoring of treatment occurs
7 Ibid. 8 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine.
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through a combination of available medical and genetic information,
including population-based studies of genomics, that can determine the
likelihood that people of certain ages, genders and ethno-cultural back-
grounds, who have engaged in certain behaviours, will get certain dis-
eases, and may react in discrete ways to relevant interventions.
In her critique, Dickenson challenges the underlying assumption that
for too long medicine has relied on a ‘one size fits all approach’ to
healthcare that fails to account for the particular patient.9 In so doing,
she focuses on biotechnologies that have been lauded as revolutionary
personalised medical interventions as evidence of a move away from
medicine as a collective endeavour with an eye to the public good to
medicine as a private, personalised encounter that is primarily (if not
exclusively) responsive to individual needs and desires. Dickenson’s aim
is to expose the changing sociocultural priorities that have enabled the
emergence of personalised medicine. These priorities include increased
concern about threat and contamination, increasing narcissism and
a move away from communal identity, the ascendency of a neoliberal
politics and a commitment to personal choice above all other logics of
decision-making.
First, regarding threat and contamination, Dickenson addresses
a range of ways in which individuals come to perceive themselves as
vulnerable and begin to look inward for medical solutions. There is, for
example, the perception that communal medical resources like the blood
supply may be limited and less safe than individual resources and repo-
sitories. This perception has given rise to the practice of storing one’s
own blood in private blood banks, not only to ensure ready access but
also to avoid the risk of contamination. As well, and most relevant in the
context of ‘treatment’ for mitochondrial disorders, there is the perception
that potential genetic anomalies might be addressed most effectively by
genetic screening and expensive, targeted genetic and genomic technol-
ogies. As to the latter, threat takes on yet another meaning, insofar as the
rising costs of healthcare mean that many focused genetic and genomic
technologies very likely will only be available privately and thus will be
inaccessible to those without significant economic resources. Targeted
technologies, developed with public funding in the name of benefiting
the many, thus become an exclusive benefit for the wealthy.
Second, on narcissism, Dickenson highlights the possibility that the
emergence of personalised medicine is closely linked to an indulgent,
9 Ibid., 10.
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self-involved view of the world, a ‘narcissistic culture’ in which indivi-
duals worry about their health and well-being, and seek to maximise
personal interests over shared interests (i.e. the interests of the collective).
Dickenson does not explicitly link this narcissism to the ascendency of
neoliberalism, but she does identify the increased focus on the individual
and on personal responsibility for health as contributing factors in the
rise of personalised medicine.
Third, on neoliberal politics and corporate interests, Dickenson points
to the ever-growing, entanglements of biomedical science and corporate
interests as a site of concern, especially as public resources are increas-
ingly repurposed for private profit. She argues that the use of publicly
funded scientific research to advance corporate interests results in the
privileging of technologies and pharmaceuticals that generate the highest
market value over those that might result in greater health benefits for
a broader public.
Fourth and finally, in ways closely intertwined with the other three
priorities, Dickenson identifies the primacy of autonomy – the ‘sacred-
ness of personal choice’10 – as contributing to the emergence and accep-
tance of personalised medicine. According to Dickenson, in recent years
there has been an overemphasis on autonomy in medicine and this has
undermined the possibility of addressing other equally important ethical
principles such as the principle of social justice.
Taken together, Dickenson’s critiques of personalised medicine high-
light a broader concern about the shrinking state and the increasing
understanding of individuals as the primary site of political intervention.
On this view, the public sector looks to corporations to establish the
agenda for biomedical and biotechnological advancements, leaving the
state and its citizens to ‘shoulder the risks for the private sector’.11
The move toward personalised medicine may be beneficial in many
ways, but as Dickenson identifies, it is informed by politics that shift
our attention and our efforts away from thinking about medicine as
a public good.
2.3 Mitochondrial Diseases and the Emergence of Human
Nuclear Genome Transfer
Genes are subunits of DNA and there are two kinds of DNA. There is
nuclear DNA (nDNA), located in the nucleus of the cell, and there is
10 Ibid., 10. 11 Ibid., 180.
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DNA in mitochondria (mitochondrial DNA or mtDNA), found in the
material that surrounds the cell’s nucleus. MtDNA is largely responsible
for cellular function. Whereas nDNA is inherited from both parents,
mtDNA is only passed down from mothers to their children (both sons
and daughters).
Mitochondrial diseases (sometimes referred to collectively as mito-
chondrial disease) are a group of heterogeneous disorders caused by
mutations in mtDNA.12 Because mtDNA mutations are many and var-
ied, mitochondrial diseases are notoriously difficult to diagnose.
The onset of medical problems may occur early in life or in adulthood,
and symptomsmay range frommild to very severe. Functions of the body
that might be affected also vary widely, including the brain, nerves and
muscles, heart, liver, ears, eyes, kidneys and pancreas, with several organs
or systems typically affected.13
The contemporary history of disease caused by dysfunctional mtDNA
begins with the discovery of Luft disease. In a groundbreaking 1962
paper, a Swedish team of researchers led by Rolf Luft described an
unusual case in which a patient, a woman in her thirties, had an
unexplained, extraordinarily high metabolic rate. From the age of
seven, she had been sweating profusely, was thirsty and hungry all the
time, and was exceptionally tired. Building on their research on mito-
chondrial function,14 Luft and his team established that dysfunctional
mtDNA could be the cause of disease. Since then, there have been
several important advances in knowledge about mitochondrial disease.
And in 1988, two critical papers confirmed that mutations in mtDNA
could cause cellular dysfunction, and subsequently disease.15 By 2010,
more than 250 different types of mtDNA mutations had been
12 Maurizio Moggio et al., ‘Mitochondrial disease heterogeneity: A prognostic challenge’
(2014) 33(2) Acta Myologica 86–93; Patrick F. Chinnery, ‘Mitochondrial disorders over-
view’ in Roberta A. Pagon et al. (eds.), GeneReviews (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington, Seattle, 1993), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1224.
13 Ainsley J. Newson, Stephen Wilkinson and Anthony Wrigley, ‘Ethical and legal issues in
mitochondrial transfer’ (2016) 8(6) EMBO Molecular Medicine 589–91.
14 Lars Ernster, Denis Ikkos and Rolf Luft, ‘Enzymatic activities of human skeletal muscle
mitochondria: A tool in clinical metabolic research’ (1959) 184Nature 1851–54; Rolf Luft
et al., ‘A case of severe hypermetabolism of nonthyroid origin with a defect in the
maintenance of mitochondrial respiratory control: A correlated clinical, biochemical,
and morphological study’ (1962) 41(9) Journal of Clinical Investigation 1776–1804.
15 I. J. Holt, A. E. Harding and J. A. Morgan-Hughes, ‘Deletions of muscle mitochondrial
DNA in patients with mitochondrial myopathies’ (1988) 331 Nature 717–19; Douglas
C. Wallace et al., ‘Mitochondrial DNA mutation sssociated with Leber’s hereditary
optic neuropathy’ (1988) 242(4884) Science 1427; see also Dorothy R. Haskett,
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identified.16 At the present time, there is no treatment for mitochon-
drial disease other than the management of symptoms.17
In the 1990s, researchers in the United States led by Jacques Cohen
developed a fertility treatment they called cytoplasmic transfer. This tech-
nology involved injecting the non-nuclear contents of a cell (i.e. the
cytoplasm) from one woman’s egg into the egg of an infertile woman
undergoing IVF. The first successful birth following human cytoplasmic
transfer was reported in 1997.18 By 2001, Cohen’s research team had fifteen
live births – about half of the estimated number of such babies born
worldwide.19 Available preliminary data suggested that the transfer of
mitochondria might work to prevent offspring from getting some forms
of heritable mitochondrial disorders. At this time, the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) informed Cohen and his team that they
needed an investigational new drug exemption to continue their research.
Then, in 2002, the FDA determined that additional preclinical data was
needed before further clinical trials could proceed. These decisions by the
FDA effectively stopped the practice of cytoplasmic transfer.
Since then, three different techniques for conducting human nuclear
genome transfer have been developed. Maternal spindle transfer and
pronuclear transfer are two of these techniques, both of which involve
the transfer of the nucleus from one woman’s egg into the enucleated egg
of another woman. A third option is polar body transfer, involving either
the transfer of the first polar body into an enucleated unfertilised egg or
the transfer of the second polar body into an enucleated fertilised egg.
The primary benefit of these transfers is that woman with dysfunctional
mtDNA might be able to have genetically related children who may not
suffer from mitochondrial disease.
In the case of maternal spindle transfer (which involves the transfer of
a nucleus from the egg of one female into the enucleated unfertilised egg
‘Mitochondrial diseases in humans’ (2014) The Embryo Project Encyclopedia, http://
embryo.asu.edu/pages/mitochondrial-diseases-humans.
16 Helen A. L. Tuppen et al., ‘Mitochondrial DNA mutations and human disease’ (2010)
1797(2) Biochimica et Biophysica Acta – Bioenergetics 113–28; Shoukhrat Mitalipov
and Don P. Wolf, ‘Clinical and ethical implications of mitochondrial gene transfer’
(2014) 25(1) Trends in Endocrinology and Metabolism 5–7.
17 Lyndsey Craven et al., ‘Mitochondrial DNA disease: New options for prevention’ (2011)
20(R2) Human Molecular Genetics R168–174.
18 Jacques Cohen et al., ‘Birth of infant after transfer of anucleate donor oocyte cytoplasm
into recipient eggs’ (1997) 350(9072) Lancet 186–7.
19 Jason A. Barritt et al., ‘Mitochondria in human offspring derived from ooplasmic
transplantation’ (2001) 16(3) Human Reproduction 513–16.
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of another), early attempts occurred around 2000, when scientists in
China reported that they were able to transfer nuclei between the egg
cells of mice, resulting in viable offspring.20 Then, in 2012, a team in
Oregon led by Shoukhrat Mitalipov reported that the same was possible
in rhesus macaques.21
In the interim, work continued with human embryos. In 2003, a team
of researchers from China led by John Zhang reported that five human
embryos had been transferred to the uterus of a woman being treated for
infertility following pronuclear transfer. Although three embryos were
successfully implanted, there were no live births.22 In 2005, a team from
Newcastle University in the United Kingdom obtained a license to con-
duct research on nuclear genome transfer using human embryos.23
In 2010, they reported that the technique was possible in human
embryos, and again successfully applied for a research license, observing
embryo growth for six to eight days.24 Finally, in March 2017, the
Newcastle team received a license to carry out human nuclear genome
transfer (referred to asmitochondrial donation) on a case-by-case basis.25
In conjunction with this license, the Newcastle team (along with the
Newcastle-upon-Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust) also received
funding for a five-year clinical trial to track the health outcomes of
children conceived following nuclear genome transfer.26 As yet, no live
20 Min-KangWang et al., ‘In vitro fertilisation of mouse oocytes reconstructed by transfer of
metaphase II chromosomes results in live births’ (2001) 9(1) Zygote 9–14.
21 Masahito Tachibana et al., ‘Mitochondrial gene replacement in primate offspring and
embryonic stem cells’ (2009) 461(7262) Nature 367–72; Masahito Tachibana et al.,
‘Towards germline gene therapy of inherited mitochondrial diseases’ (2013) 493(7434)
Nature 627–31; Hyo-Sang Lee et al., ‘Rapid mitochondrial DNA segregation in primate
preimplantation embryos precedes somatic and germline bottleneck’ (2012) 1(5) Cell
Reports 506–15.
22 John Zhang et al., ‘Pregnancy derived from human nuclear transfer’ (2003) 80 Fertility
and Sterility 56; John Zhang et al., ‘Pregnancy derived from human zygote pronuclear
transfer in a patient who had arrested embryos after IVF’ (2016) 33(4) Reproductive
Biomedicine Online 529–33.
23 Lyndsey Craven et al., ‘Research into policy: A brief history of mitochondrial donation’
(2016) 34(2) Stem Cells 265–7.
24 Lyndsey Craven et al., ‘Pronuclear transfer in human embryos to prevent transmission of
mitochondrial DNA disease’ (2010) 465(7294) Nature 82–5.
25 HFEA Statement on Mitochondrial Donation, 15 March 2017, www.hfea.gov.uk/about-us
/news-and-press-releases/2017-news-and-press-releases/hfea-statement-on-mitochondrial
-donation.
26 Katie Forster, ‘First “three-parent babies” to be born this year as licence approved for new
fertility technique’ (16 March 2017) The Independent, www.independent.co.uk/life-style
/health-and-families/health-news/three-3-parent-babies-latest-licence-approved-ivf-fertility
-technique-hfea-dna-mitochondrial-a7632916.html; Clive Cookson, ‘UK researchers secure
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birth has been announced by the Newcastle team. Meanwhile, as dis-
cussed above, in September 2016, John Zhang announced the birth of
a child in Mexico via maternal spindle transfer to avoid mitochondrial
disease, and in January 2017, news reports emerged that a child conceived
via pronuclear transfer had been born in the Ukraine, as part of fertility
treatments.27
Human nuclear genome transfer has been positively described as the
‘poster child’ for personalised medicine28 given the relatively rare inci-
dence of mitochondrial diseases, their heritability (and therefore their
ties to genetic testing) and the need for new interventions that look
beyond contemporary practices. Further, as argued in subsequent sec-
tions, when examined with reference to Dickenson’s four possible
hypotheses for the rise in personalised medicine – threat and contamina-
tion (Section 2.4), narcissism (Section 2.5), corporate interests and poli-
tical neoliberalism (Section 2.6) and the sacredness of personal choice29
(Section 2.7) – the relationship between human nuclear genome transfer
and personalised medicine becomes clear.
2.4 On Threat and Contamination: The Potential Eradication
of Mitochondrial Disorders
In Me Medicine vs We Medicine, Dickenson describes how understand-
ings of threat and contamination inform the uptake of personalised
medicine. In her view, the rise of personalised medicine is bound up
with the desire to control one’s fate – and more specifically, to take
responsibility for one’s health – because the threats and risks of contam-
ination are too many and too overwhelming not to do so. By way of
illustration, in her discussions of cord blood banking and retail, mail-
order genetics, she identifies the ways that threat of potential disease is
often reimagined as promise of a cure, or hope to avoid disease
altogether.
In the case of human nuclear genome transfer, the technology repre-
sents the promise of healthy children, a future unburdened by concern
licence for “three-parent” baby procedure’ (16 March 2017) Financial Times, www.ft.com
/content/a4c7e0ba-0a41-11e7-ac5a-903b21361b43.
27 Bodkin, ‘Three-parent baby born to infertile couple in world first’; Roberts, ‘IVF’.
28 Marni J. Falk, Alan Decherney and Jeffrey P. Kahn, ‘Mitochondrial replacement techni-
ques – implications for the clinical community’ (2016) 374(12) The New England Journal
of Medicine 1103–6.
29 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, 10.
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for the effects of mitochondrial anomalies on one’s descendants, and
protection from the genetic contamination of one’s familial DNA (one’s
‘blood line’) were it otherwise necessary to use third-party eggs to con-
ceive a child. The link between these hoped-for benefits and human
nuclear genome transfer is tenuous, however, for at least three reasons.
First, most mitochondrial disorders are the result of anomalies in
nDNA for which human nuclear genome transfer is irrelevant. Only
15–20 per cent of mitochondrial disorders occur as a result of mutations
in mtDNA.30
Second, few women with dysfunctional mtDNA who might benefit
from the technology are likely to do so. Estimates from the research team
at Newcastle suggest that if all women in the United Kingdom between
the ages of 15 and 44, at risk of transmitting mitochondrial disease, were
to avail themselves of nuclear genome transfer, about 150 births a year
might be positively affected.31 The fact is, however, that not all such
women will choose to use this technology. For example, some at-risk
women may not want children, and among those at-risk women who do
want children, some may prefer less risky ways of family-making (albeit,
ways that preclude genetic-relatedness). There are, for example, risks
associated with the IVF that is required to achieve a pregnancy following
human nuclear genome transfer. These risks are in addition to those
associated with pregnancy for women with mitochondrial disease.32
Moreover, it is important to note that some women who are at risk of
transmitting mitochondrial disease will not know they are at risk (and
therefore would not be thinking of nuclear genome transfer when mak-
ing reproductive choices). Among such women are those who are asymp-
tomatic carriers, who will not know that they are likely to pass on
mitochondrial mutations until after they have had a child with
a mitochondrial disease.33 Further, if human nuclear genome transfer is
offered as a matter of private-for-profit medicine, the number of poten-
tial beneficiaries likely will be small, as few women will be able to
30 Salvatore DiMauro and Guido Davidzon, ‘Mitochondrial DNA and disease’ (2005) 37(3)
Annals of Medicine 222–32.
31 Gráinne S. Gorman et al., ‘Mitochondrial donation – How many women could benefit?’
(2015) 372(9) New England Journal of Medicine 885–7; Cathy Herbrand, ‘Mitochondrial
replacement techniques: Who are the potential users and will they benefit?’ (2017) 31(1)
Bioethics 46–54.
32 Rebecca E. Say et al. ‘Mitochondrial diseases in pregnancy: A systematic review’ (2011)
4(3) Obstetric Medicine 90–4.
33 Herbrand, ‘Mitochondrial replacement techniques’; Baylis, ‘Human nuclear genome
transfer (so-called mitochondrial replacement)’.
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purchase the technology.34 It follows that potential benefits will accrue to
a very small number of people, the threat of mitochondrial disease will
continue, and the chance of achieving the promise of a future without
mitochondrial disease will be slim. As such, the potential benefits of
human nuclear genome transfer are vastly overestimated.
Third, among those women whomight use the technology, there is the
risk of genetic drift,35 whereby dysfunctional mtDNA is carried over to
the healthy enucleated egg. As a result, mitochondrial disease might
nonetheless continue in the family. In April 2017, Zhang and his team
published the details of the first birth following maternal spindle transfer
to avoid the transmission of Leigh syndrome. In this case, some dysfunc-
tional mtDNA was transmitted to the child. The hope (expectation) is
that, given the relatively small number of mtDNA mutations, the child
may not display any symptoms of mitochondrial disease, but this is
unknown.36
Finally, there is one other way in which the language of threat in
debates about human nuclear genome transfer mirrors debates in perso-
nalised medicine. In her discussion of cancer, for example, Dickenson
examines the complex two-faced nature of threat, whereby would-be
patients must weigh the threat of disease against the threat of
treatment.37 In the case of nuclear genome transfer, the threat of mito-
chondrial disease must be weighed against the unknown threat of using
this novel technology. Debates about its use in both the United Kingdom
and the United States have circled around the risks of intervening, and
the risks of not doing so. Ultimately the decision to proceed with human
nuclear genome transfer in both of these countries – albeit tentatively –
suggests that the risks of experiencing mitochondrial disease are, from
the perspective of clinician-scientists and some prospective end-users,
34 Considering these factors, the potential 150 births per year in the United Kingdom that
might be positively affected by the use of human nuclear genome transfer is a very high
estimate. Françoise Baylis has suggested that the maximum benefit would be fewer than
22 births per year. See Baylis, ‘Human nuclear genome transfer (so-called mitochondrial
replacement)’.
35 Mitsutoshi Yamada et al., ‘Genetic drift can compromise mitochondrial replacement by
nuclear transfer in human oocytes’ (2016) 18(6) Cell Stem Cell 749–54.
36 Sara Reardon, ‘Genetic details of controversial “three-parent baby” revealed’ (6 April
2017) 544(7648) Nature News 17. See also Louise A. Hyslop et al., ‘Towards clinical
application of pronuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA disease’ (2016) 534
(7607), Nature 383–6.
37 Erica Haimes and Ken Taylor, ‘Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers
in UK debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease’
(2015) 33(4) Monash Bioethics Review 360–78.
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greater than the risks of the technology. This is problematic, however,
given that there are other ways in which to avoid mitochondrial disease,
and given that nuclear genome transfer is neither treatment nor cure.38
On contamination, the purported benefit of human nuclear genome
transfer is that familial nDNA is uncontaminated by third-party nDNA
as this technology only requires the use third-party mtDNA. This per-
ceived benefit rests on the belief that, while mtDNA is important, the
traits that ‘constitute the core of genetic relatedness in terms of physical
and behavioural characteristics’ are in the nDNA and it is this DNA that
ought not to be contaminated by third-party genetic material. On this
view, donor mtDNA is not a contaminant, it is a genetic ‘treatment’ for
a disorder that does not yet exist, in a person not yet conceived.
2.5 On Narcissism: Human Nuclear Genome Transfer
as a Much-Needed Technology
Dickenson’s second hypothesis, on narcissism, is directly relevant to the
emergence of human nuclear genome transfer as personalised medicine.
Here, Dickenson explores the rise of a ‘narcissistic culture’ that privileges
the realisation of individual desires and its implications for biotechnol-
ogies. Medical interventions are justified because they may help patients
achieve the life that they want.
Nuclear genome transfer is not a lifesaving technology insofar as there
are no living persons to be ‘saved’ by this technology. The potential
benefit of this technology is the benefit of a new life free of mitochondrial
disease – a benefit to people yet to be conceived, and their families. This
benefit could more easily and assuredly be achieved by other means,
however, including adoption, co-parenting, use of eggs provided by
a third party, or conceiving naturally and using prenatal genetic testing
and abortion. The usual objection to these reproductive strategies, how-
ever, is that all but the last strategy do not ensure the birth of genetically-
related children. This objection makes explicit the prioritisation of
genetic relatedness (through nDNA) above other important factors.
The desire to engage in biological, genetic reproduction can readily be
understood as a form of narcissism: a desire to see oneself in the world,
quite literally as a love of one’s own reflection.
38 Nuclear genome transfer is neither treatment nor cure as it does not treat a person with
dysfunctional mtDNA, but rather aims to ensure the birth of a different person, hopefully
one that who will not have dysfunctional mtDNA. See Tina Rulli, ‘What is the value of
three-parent IVF?’ (2016) 46(4) Hastings Center Report 38–47.
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The perceived ‘unique and special’ value of one’s own nDNA fuels the
rhetoric around a perceived ‘need’ rather than a ‘want’ or desire for
human nuclear genome transfer.39 Proponents of this technology do
not merely perceive its use as desirable, but rather as imperative because
having genetically related children is positioned as superior to having
non-genetically related children. This perception is well entrenched in
popular culture and has been leveraged effectively by those who insist
that human nuclear genome transfer responds to an important need, not
merely a desire.
The view that human nuclear genome transfer is imperative to both
ensure genetic relatedness and to ensure that children with certain
genetic anomalies are not born raises important concerns about the
rights of people with disabilities. While mitochondrial anomalies some-
times result in fatal diseases, some people with dysfunctional mtDNA live
very fulfilling lives, albeit with some measure of disability. The idea that
people can and should use human nuclear genome transfer to avoid
genetically transmitted disorders is likely to have been influenced by
the life-shortening, very challenging nature of many of the relevant
disorders. However, the suggestion that mitochondrial anomalies need
to be eradicated is informed by assumptions about what kinds of lives are
worth living (see ‘The Best Me I Can Possibly Be’, Van Beers’ chapter in
this volume). If nuclear genome transfer becomes widely available, there
may be increased pressure on women to use the technology to ensure that
their children do not experience mitochondrial disorders. Women who
cannot afford nuclear genome transfer or its alternatives (i.e. adoption;
assisted reproduction using third-party eggs), but wish to bear children,
may one day be chastised as irresponsible for not having prevented the
birth of children with mitochondrial disease. As Dorothy Roberts points
out, poor women and women of colour will be increasingly compelled to
use certain reproductive and genetic technologies to conceive ‘the chil-
dren that the state believes would be less of a burden on it’.40
Further, the desire to use nuclear genome transfer to select out certain
genes in order to produce genetically related children hinges on
a paradoxical view of genetic relatedness. On this view, some genes (i.e.
those located in the nucleus of the cell – nDNA) are relevant to genetic
relatedness, while other genes (i.e. those located in the mitochondria –
39 Baylis, ‘Human nuclear genome transfer (so-called mitochondrial replacement)’.
40 Dorothy Roberts. Webinar on Gene Editing and the Future of Reproductive Justice,
13 June 2017. See www.geneticsandsociety.org/multi-media/gene-editing-and-future-
reproductive-justice.
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mtDNA) are not. It is not obvious, however, why genetic relatedness
associated with nDNA should be thought of as more important than
genetic relatedness associated with mtDNA. The selective nature of the
desire for a certain kind of genetic relatedness is based on a complex
conflation of genetics, kinship, eugenics and disability.
2.6 On Political Neoliberalism: Balancing Public
Costs with Potential Benefits
Dickenson’s third, and most convincing, hypothesis explaining the rise of
personalisedmedicine is the ascendency of neoliberalism as a sociopolitical
ethos. Here, she suggests that, although proponents of personalised med-
icine emphasise the potential health benefits to a small number of patients,
the truly significant benefits, namely profits, accrue to pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms. This marks a transfer of public resources to private
corporations, as the knowledge developed in publicly funded university
systems comes to be commercialised and resold to the public for a profit.
This is evident in the case of most pharmaceutical research, and particu-
larly in the field of pharmacogenetics, which aims to develop targeted
pharmaceutical interventions for disorders based on research derived
from publicly funded genetic databases. The disproportionate emphasis
on potential health benefits to patients also works to obscure the significant
and often disproportionate risks downloaded to other parties, including
already marginalised groups such as women, racialised people and people
experiencing socioeconomic disadvantage.
In the case of human nuclear genome transfer, a great deal of public
resources (derived from university budgets, charitable trusts and public
research councils) have contributed to its development.41 It is none-
theless the private-for-profit fertility industry that will capitalise on
these investments. This marks a transferring of ‘public wealth’ to private
corporations, through the development of biotechnologies in universities
that are eventually owned by private individuals and corporations, and
paid for a second time by the public, either when they access care through
the public healthcare system or through individually purchased private
healthcare services.
The stated goals of relevant researchers – to avoid mitochondrial
disease and to ensure the safe use of human nuclear genome transfer
41 Ewen Callaway, ‘UK sets sights on gene therapy in eggs’ (26 January 2012) 48(7382)
Nature News 419.
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when and where it is used – are important. At the same time, the public
costs of developing technological interventions for this relatively rare
group of disorders have been high, particularly given that claims about
how human nuclear genome transfer will save money overall by reducing
the incidence of catastrophic, expensive-to-treat mitochondrial disorders
are overstated. As noted above, a very small number of people are likely
to use human nuclear genome transfer to avoid mitochondrial disease,
and the technology addresses disorders in people not-yet-conceived that
can otherwise be avoided.
Here, it is perhaps worth noting that human nuclear genome transfer
is poised to become widely available as a highly profitable technique for
age-related infertility. This use of nuclear genome transfer is currently
banned in many countries, including the United Kingdom, where the
technology is only allowed under license for the prevention of mitochon-
drial disease. Yet, as noted above, in June 2017, Zhang began marketing
human nuclear genome transfer explicitly for age-related infertility,42 for
which he has since been reprimanded by the FDA.43 Nonetheless, heri-
table genetic modification is touted by many as the new horizon of
(highly profitable) commercial infertility treatments, and the legal and
regulatory frameworks being developed for the use of human nuclear
genome transfer for mitochondrial disease are paving the way.
In addition to the transfer of public funds to the private sector, a core
feature of neoliberalism is the redistribution of risk and vulnerability.
The children conceived following nuclear genome transfer and their
families are one key group, but important risks are also borne by the
women who provide the third-party eggs used in nuclear genome trans-
fer – the so-called ‘mitochondrial donors’.44 The process of providing
42 Mullin, ‘The fertility doctor trying to commercialize three-parent babies’.
43 The reprimand, issued as a letter to Zhang’s company, Darwin Life, was based on Zhang’s
creation of a ‘genetically modified embryo’ within the United States (followed by its
exportation to Mexico). Both the marketing and export of the technology contravened
elements of the FDA’s regulations. The FDA also made clear that it would not be engaging
in the pre-investigational new drug (IND) meetings necessary to approve a new drug,
device or technology as it will not do so for interventions ‘that involve “a human embryo . . .
intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification”’. Letter to
Dr John Zhang fromMary A.Malarkey, Director of the Office of Compliance and Biologics
Quality, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research of the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), 4 August 2017. www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/
UntitledLetters/UCM570225.pdf.
44 Françoise Baylis, ‘The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents’ (2013) 26
Reproductive Biomedicine Online 531–34.
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eggs for human nuclear genome transfer (and the research that has
informed its development) is time-consuming and invasive, including
medical screening, daily hormonal injections for approximately four
weeks, monitoring and transvaginal surgical extraction. Like egg provi-
sion for IVF, egg provision for human nuclear genome transfer also
involves considerable risks, the most significant of which is hyperstimu-
lation of the ovaries. Severe ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome can
result in respiratory distress, blood clots, stroke, kidney failure and
ovarian rupture resulting in haemorrhage. If untreated, it can be life-
threatening or fatal.45
By and large, the contributions of the women who provide the egg cells
(from which the nucleus is removed in order to receive the nDNA of
another woman who hopes to conceive a child without a mitochondrial
disorder) are ‘rendered invisible’.46 This was certainly the case, for
example, in the United Kingdom in the media and policy debates that
preceded the legalisation of human nuclear genome transfer (referred to
as mitochondrial donation).47 Egg providers were generally viewed as
minimal contributors to the process, and peripheral to the conception of
the offspring. Future risks were typically understood in terms of potential
harms to the children yet to be conceived of the technology, and the
unknown risks of altering the human genome. And although the lan-
guage of the ‘three-parent baby’ and ‘three-person IVF’ was (and con-
tinues to be) widely used, when egg providers were explicitly mentioned
in the parliamentary debates as part of a genetic triad, it was largely to
dismiss their contributions by referring to how few genes were involved
45 Selma Mourad, Julie Brown and Cindy Farquhar, ‘Interventions for the prevention of
OHSS in ART cycles: An Overview of Cochrane Reviews’ in Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2017); Joint Society of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists of Canada-Canadian Fertility Andrology Society Clinical Practice
Guidelines Committee et al., ‘The diagnosis and management of ovarian hyperstimula-
tion syndrome’ (2011) 33(11) Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 1156–62;
The Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, ‘Ovarian
Hyperstimulation Syndrome’ (2008) 90(S1) Fertility and Sterility. See also
Vanessa Gruben, ‘Women as patients, not spare parts: Examining the relationship
between the physician and women egg providers’ (2013) 25(2) Canadian Journal of
Women and the Law 249–83; Alison Motluk, ‘Is egg donation dangerous?’ (2012) 46
Maisonneuve 26–33; Kanna Jayaprakasan et al., ‘Estimating the risks of ovarian hyper-
stimulation syndrome (OHSS): Implications for egg donation for research’ (2007) 10(3)
Human Fertility 183–7.
46 Haimes and Taylor, ‘Rendered invisible?’
47 See also Donna L. Dickenson, ‘The commercialization of human eggs in mitochondrial
replacement research’ (2013) 19(1) The New Bioethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal of
Biotechnology and the Body 18–29.
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(mtDNA contains 37 genes), and how few of a child’s personal charac-
teristics, including personality, intelligence and appearance, might be
affected by these genes.48
The risks and rewards of using human nuclear genome transfer were,
and continue to be, understood in terms of moving science forward to
address mitochondrial disease. The rhetorical construction of nuclear
genome transfer has focused almost exclusively on future risks – to
would-be offspring and to the human genome – positioning moving
forward with nuclear genome transfer (as well as other new genetic
technologies) as a step that biomedical science can and should take, albeit
with caution. The real risks to women providing eggs are ‘vanished’,49
presenting human nuclear genome transfer as relatively benign.
2.7 The Right to Choose Human Nuclear Genome Transfer
Dickenson’s fourth and final hypothesis explaining the rise of persona-
lised medicine is the primacy of autonomy. In recent years, in the context
ofWestern medicine, the principle of autonomy has come to be narrowly
understood in terms of informed choice. In time, in both subtle and not
so subtle ways, this principled commitment has morphed into what
Dickenson refers to as the ‘sacredness of personal choice’.50 Here, choice
and entitlement become one: patients should be able to get what they
want. On this view, once there are reasonable assurances (preferably
through clinical trials) that a novel technology is safe (and hopefully
effective) the only remaining issue regarding the ethical use of the
technology is freedom of choice.
The privileging of personal choice above all is particularly apparent in
the case of human nuclear genome transfer. It is widely argued that if
women at risk of transmitting mitochondrial disease to their offspring
want to use nuclear genome transfer in the hope of having genetically
related children free of mitochondrial disease, they should be able to
choose to do so (even when safer and more effective alternatives are
available). In response to media queries about the first birth via maternal
spindle transfer in Mexico, the clinic responded that ‘patients come
48 Haimes and Taylor, ‘Rendered invisible?’ 371.
49 Dickenson, ‘The commercialization of human eggs in mitochondrial replacement
research’; Donna L. Dickenson, ‘The lady vanishes: What’s missing from the stem cell
debate’ (2006) 3(1–2) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 43–54.
50 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, 10.
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first’.51 In the context of limited research about the short- and long-term
effects of human nuclear genome transfer, the absence of any kind of
regulatory oversight and a move across international borders to avoid
professional, regulatory or legal ramifications, this statement provides
clear evidence of the ‘sacredness of personal choice’.
This narrow focus on personal choice is worrisome insofar as the
prioritisation of patient desires may culminate in the acceptance and
widespread use of technologies with complex, intractable, intergenera-
tional effects. The alteration of the genome for the eradication of mito-
chondrial disease may quickly give way to its use for other reasons. If, in
time, Zhang’s plans to use maternal spindle transfer for age-related
infertility are widely implemented, it is possible that nuclear transfer
from one woman to another will become mundane, and women will
take for granted that they will be able to conceive easily at an older age,
using the eggs of another woman. Technologies that enable conception at
an older age are already occurring through the use of donor eggs and the
proliferation of egg freezing technologies, but the possibility of using
human nuclear genome transfer in order to have a genetically related
child (with the mtDNA of another woman) may enable women to make
reproductive decisions even later than egg freezing currently makes
possible.
Even more worrisome, however, is Zhang’s statement that his work is
‘a step toward designer babies’.52 The potential that human nuclear
genome transfer (in conjunction with other technologies like CRISPR-
Cas9) may be used to engage in the selection of particular genetic traits
and unfettered alteration of the genome is of particular concern.
Consider, for example, the potential for class-based genetic stratification
that may subsequently emerge. This could have critical implications for
social justice in future generations. Of particular interest, though, are the
ways in which contested practices are normalised, as occurred, for exam-
ple, in the case of prenatal genetic testing for genetic anomalies. Initially,
these tests were simply made available to women for the detection of
‘serious genetic disorders’, but increasingly women are expected to use
these tests to avoid not only ‘serious genetic disorders’ but also a range of
anomalies, some of which are not seriously harmful. And while the
emergence of human nuclear genome transfer for the creation of
51 Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, ‘Unanswered questions surround baby born to three parents’
(27 September 2016) Science|AAAS, www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/unanswered-
questions-surround-baby-born-three-parents.
52 Mullin, ‘The fertility doctor trying to commercialize three-parent babies’.
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‘designer babies’ may still be distant, the ‘sacredness of personal choice’
may mean that, once it is available, people will be able – and compelled –
to use it, no matter the societal outcomes.
2.8 Conclusion
Human nuclear genome transfer is profiled by its proponents as
a reproductive technology aimed at helping specific women with dys-
functional mtDNA to have genetically related children free of mitochon-
drial disease. From this view, which effectively positions the technology
in the realm of personalised medicine, human nuclear genome transfer is
similar to other reproductive technologies insofar as it is up to eligible
women (alone or with their partners) to decide if they want to partake.
To this end, human nuclear genome transfer is distanced from any
assessment of whether it serves (or could serve) the common good.
As Dickenson’s framework on the emergence of personalisedmedicine
elucidates, the successful positioning of human nuclear genome transfer
as a form of personalised medicine is possible because of a number of
cultural and societal features. First, there are the ways in which fear of
mitochondrial disease as a threat to children not yet conceived has been
used to allay fears about potential threats to the human genome (even
though very few people at risk of having children with mitochondrial
disease will benefit from human nuclear genome transfer). Second, there
is the oft-repeated claim that, as compared with available alternatives for
childbearing and childrearing, human nuclear genome transfer better
responds to a (potentially narcissistic) desire to perpetuate certain genes
and to ensure a genetic relationship with one’s child. Third, human
nuclear genome transfer involves a great deal of potential profit for
corporate interests while downloading the financial costs of development
to the public, and the risks of engagement to egg providers, the women
seeking to use the technology and children yet to be conceived. Finally,
like other forms of personalised medicine, the emphasis is on the choices
of individual patients – in this case, personal reproductive choices – to
the exclusion of broader considerations of social justice.
In closing, the emergence of human nuclear genome transfer as a form
of personalised medicine is consistent with other efforts to undermine
the idea of the human genome as something ‘we all hold in common’.53
This involves a shift from thinking about the human genome as a site of
53 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, 193.
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shared interest – a genetic commons – to one of personal property
focused on one’s descendants, and a desire to produce genetically-
related offspring. And so it is that contemporary debates about the use
of human nuclear genome transfer have pitted collective interests in
preserving the integrity of the genome against its overt manipulation,
in the name of helping individuals realise personal reproductive desires
including the potential mitigation of serious mitochondrial disease.
As the use of human nuclear genome transfer inches towards broader
genomic alterations and ‘designer babies’, the framing of this technology
as a matter of individual choice, and of personalised medicine that is part
of the new bioeconomy, must be weighed substantively against the costs
for our genetic and reproductive futures.
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3Stem Cell-Derived Gametes and Uterus
Transplants
Hurray for the End of Third-Party Reproduction! Or Not?
heidi mertes
3.1 Introduction
Although third party reproduction has become increasingly accepted, it
remains a last resort and a suboptimal option for most people, which is
often only taken into consideration when reproduction with one’s own
gametes or own womb has proven to be impossible.1 The paradigmatic
cases for people who cannot become genetic or gestational parents/
mothers are people who lack (functional) gametes and women who
lack a uterus, either from birth or due to disease. In an effort to make
genetic and gestational parenthood possible for these two groups,
research is being conducted aimed at deriving gametes from stem cells
matched to the patient and clinical trials are ongoing for uterus trans-
plantation. Both are examples of what Donna Dickenson has called ‘Me
Medicine’: medical interventions focusing on individual interests rather
than on the common good.2 However, are these also worrisome examples
of Me Medicine? And is an alternative, WeMedicine, approach possible?
3.2 The Science
3.2.1 Stem Cell-Derived Gametes
In order to produce gametes in vitro containing the genetic material of
the patient, several steps are needed, which are all technically difficult and
1 Elia Wyverkens, Veerle Provoost, An Ravelingien et al., ‘The meaning of the sperm donor
for heterosexual couples: confirming the position of the father’ (2015) 56 Family Process
203–16.
2 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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at present experimental. First, a stem cell line needs to be createdmatching
the patient’s genome. This can currently be done in two ways. The first
technique – called somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or ‘therapeutic
cloning’ – involves the transfer of the cell nucleus of a somatic cell of the
patient (e.g. a skin cell) into an enucleated egg cell. The egg cell will then
erase the epigenetic marks on the nuclear DNA, and on activation an
embryo can be grown which is genetically identical to the patient (not
taking the mitochondrial DNA into consideration). When this embryo
reaches the blastocyst stage (after five days), the inner cell mass can be
extracted and cultured, resulting in an embryonic stem cell line.
The second technique is direct reprogramming, resulting in induced
pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells). In this scenario, somatic cells are reverted
to their embryonic state by adding a small number of specific factors,
a technique for which the Nobel prize in physiology/medicine was
awarded to Sir John Gurdon and Shinya Yamanaka in 2012. Once
a stem cell line has been established containing the DNA of the patient,
gametes (ideally sperm or egg cells, or precursors of those cells) need to be
derived from those stem cells. In themousemodel, significant progress has
been made in the last decade, resulting in the creation of functional sperm
cells in vitro, which produced live offspring in 2016.3 Before transferring
this science to clinical trials in humans, much research remains to be done
regarding the safety of the procedure. Given the profound manipulations,
the residual risks for the children who are conceived with these stem cell-
derived gametes due to genetic, epigenetic, transcriptomic and imprinting
problems are likely to remain higher than for the established option of
donor conception, even after preclinical animal and embryo research.
Moreover, follow-up over several generations will be necessary in order
to confirm that the technology is really safe.
3 Karin Hübner, Guy Fuhrmann, Lane K. Christenson et al., ‘Derivation of oocytes from
mouse embryonic stem cells’ (2003) 300 Science 1251–6; Yayoi Toyooka,
Naoki Tsunekawa, Ryuko Akasu et al., ‘Embryonic stem cells can form germ cells in
vitro’ (2003) 100 Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences of the United States of
America 11457–62; Niels Geijsen, Melissa Horoschak, Kitai Kim et al., ‘Derivation of
embryonic germ cells and male gametes from embryonic stem cells’ (2004) 427 Nature
148–54; KarimNayernia, Jessica Nolte, HansW.Michelmann et al., ‘In vitro-differentiated
embryonic stem cells give rise to male gametes that can generate offspring mice’ (2006) 11
Developmental Cell 125–32; Katsuhiko Hayashi, Sugako Ogushi, Kazuki Kurimoto et al.,
‘Offspring from oocytes derived from in vitro primordial germ cell-like cells in mice’
(2012) 338 Science 971–5; Quan Zhou, Mei Wang, Yan Yuan et al., ‘Complete meiosis
from embryonic stem cell-derived germ cells in vitro’ (2016) 18 Cell Stem Cell 330–40.
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3.2.2 Uterus Transplantation
Unlike stem cell-derived gametes, uterus transplantation is already in the
phase of clinical trials. After unsuccessful clinical trials in Saudi Arabia
and Turkey, several children have been born thanks to uterus transplan-
tation in a Swedish clinical trial involving nine patients, and recently the
first birth in the US was reported in the media.4 A uterus transplantation
involves an extensive surgical procedure for both the donor and the
recipient. Donor surgery typically lasts between 10 and 13 hours and
recipient surgery between four and six hours (there does not seem to be
a learning curve yet).5 One reported donor complication is ureterovagi-
nal fistula (one case). Postoperative recipient complications include
thrombosis or infections, which led to the removal of the transplanted
uterus in two cases, pleural fluid (which was spontaneously resorbed) and
a haematoma (requiring blood transfusion).
After the transplantation, the recipient needs to take immunosuppres-
sive drugs in order to avoid rejection. Johansson et al. report rejection
episodes in five of seven recipients (some had multiple rejection
episodes).6 All but one were classified as mild and all rejection episodes
were without clinical symptoms. Immunosuppression implies that
patients are more susceptible to, for example, viral infections and certain
cancers. For the foetus, several immunosuppressive regimens are con-
sidered to be safe,7 although caution and follow-up are warranted as there
is still a great deal of conflicting evidence.8
All officially reported deliveries were preterm Caesarean sections.
In the first case reported, the mother developed pre-eclampsia in the
4 Mats Brännström, Liza Johannesson, Hans Bokström et al., ‘Livebirth after uterus
transplantation’ (2015) 385 The Lancet 607–16; Mats Brännström, Hans Bokström,
Pernilla Dahm-Kähler et al., ‘One uterus bridging three generations: First live birth after
mother-to-daughter uterus transplantation’ (2016) 106 Fertility and Sterility 261–6;
Alexandra Sifferlin, ‘Exclusive: First US Baby Born After a Uterus Transplant’ (2017)
Time, Published 1 December 2017. Available at: http://time.com/5044565/exclusive-first-
u-s-baby-born-after-a-uterus-transplant/
5 Mats Brännström, Liza Johannesson, Pernilla Dahm-Kähler et al., ‘First clinical uterus
transplantation trial: A six-month report’ (2014) 101 Fertility and Sterility 1228–36.
6 Liza Johannesson, Niclas Kvarnström, Johan Mölne et al., ‘Uterus transplantation trial:
1-year outcome’ (2015) 103 Fertility and Sterility 199–204.
7 Lisa A. Coscia, Serban Constantinescu, JohnM. Davison et al., ‘Immunosuppressive drugs
and fetal outcome’ (2014) 28 Best Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics & Gynaecology
1174–87.
8 Giuseppe Benagiano, Laurens Landeweerd and Ivo Brosens, ‘Medical and ethical con-
siderations in uterus transplantation’ (2013) 123 International Journal of Gynecology &
Obstetrics 173–7.
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32nd week of pregnancy; in the second case, the delivery was preterm due
to cholestasis.9 The weight of the children was low due to the preterm
birth, but – fortunately – well within the average weight range for their
gestational age.
A category of patients with absolute uterine factor infertility who
might benefit from uterus transplantation are patients with Mayer–
Rokitansky–Küster–Hauer (MRKH) syndrome, with congenital absence
of uterus and vagina. This syndrome is also oftentimes accompanied by
renal problems such as kidney malformation, single kidneys or pelvic
kidneys, which can cause additional risks during pregnancy and delivery:
for example, pre-eclampsia. Eight out of the nine patients in the Swedish
clinical trial are MRKH patients.10
In short, we can say that although there is proof of principle that it is
possible to deliver a healthy baby after a uterus transplantation, these are
high-risk pregnancies which require invasive surgical procedures for the
patient and the healthy research participant (the uterus donor). In other
words, it is not a proof of principle that uterus transplantation is safe.
Attempts have beenmade to use a uterus from a deceased donor (in order
to avoid harming at least one of the participants in these experiments),
which has both advantages and disadvantages from a technical perspec-
tive. At the time of writing, there have been several successful transplants
from deceased donors, but no live births have been reported.11
3.3 Why DoWe Transplant Uteri? Why DoWe Attempt to Make
Eggs and Sperm in Vitro?
Uterus transplantation and in vitro gametogenesis are not among the
usual examples of personalised or ‘Me’ medicine, which is often identi-
fied with genomic medicine (see the introduction to this volume). Yet
they certainly fit within the broader paradigm: they are very individua-
listic solutions for very personal desires. Also, as will be argued below,
although research in these areas may further the interests of individual
9 Brännström, Johannesson, Bokström et al., ‘Livebirth after uterus transplantation’;
Brännström, Bokström, Dahm-Kähler et al., ‘One uterus bridging three generations’.
10 Brännström, Johannesson, Dahm-Kähler et al., ‘First clinical uterus transplantation trial:
A six-month report’.
11 Omer Ozkan, Munire Erman Akar, Ozlenen Ozkan et al., ‘Preliminary results of the first
human uterus transplantation from a multiorgan donor’ (2013) 99 Fertility and Sterility
470–6; Giuliano Testa, Tiffany Anthony, Gregory J. McKenna et al., ‘Deceased donor
uterus retrieval: A novel technique and workflow’ (2017) American Journal of
Transplantation. doi: 10.1111/ajt.14476.
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patients, the balance in terms of overall healthcare benefit may turn out
to be negative rather than positive. It is therefore unsurprising that the
four possible drivers of personalised medicine (at the expense of
We Medicine), as discerned by Donna Dickenson, can also be applied
to the contexts of gamete derivation and uterus transplantation: (1)
threat and contamination, (2) narcissism and ‘bowling alone’, (3)
corporate interests and political neoliberalism, and (4) the sacredness
of personal choice.
First, threat and the fear of contamination can be linked to fear of third
party involvement in the formation of a family. In the case of adoption,
parents may wonder if the child has been psychologically damaged by
being abandoned by its parents. In the case of surrogacy, parents may he
worried about the impact of the behaviour of the women carrying their
child (Does she drink alcohol? Does she eat healthily? Does she take folic
acid?) and about the possibility that there may be an emotional bond
between her and their child. In the case of donor conception, parents may
worry about the donor being perceived as the ‘real parent’ or about ‘flaws’
in their children due to the donor’s contribution.
Second, narcissism and bowling alone are reflected in the importance
that is attached to genetic parenthood. This is not only important in the
context of stem cell-derived gametes, but also plays a role in the enthu-
siasm surrounding uterus transplantation, as surrogacy (which is the
only alternative option if a genetic link is to be established) is not an
available alternative in many countries. As mentioned, in Sweden, where
the successful clinical trial for uterus transplantation is taking place,
surrogacy is prohibited. In Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming
Biotechnology for the Common Good, Dickenson links narcissism with
the ‘genetic mystique’ (giving DNA a soul-like status) and genetic deter-
minism (believing that we are determined by our genes).12 These phe-
nomena may indeed do much of the explanatory work of why people
think it is so important to pass on their genes to their children and why
they want to avoid genes from strangers entering ‘their’ gene pool.
Third, corporate interests might reinforce the technological imperative
of moving these new technologies to the clinic as fast as possible. Offering
the newest technology to patients can be perceived by the latter as a sign
of excellence, of being a state-of-the-art clinic. We will, however, not
discuss this element any further.
12 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 15.
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Finally, the sacredness of personal choice is very prominent in this
debate. Under the flag of reproductive liberty or reproductive autonomy,
it is insinuated that everyone has the right to have genetically related
children and that every woman has the right to gestate her own children
(if at all possible). If one accepts this premise (which sounds deceptively
self-evident to many) and if one takes as a given that, for some people,
the only option of granting this right is by uterus transplantation or
gamete derivation, then it logically follows that people have the right to
have access to uterus transplantation and stem cell-derived gametes.
These three reasons why uterus transplantation and SCD gametes
are so welcome – the avoidance of third party involvement, the impor-
tance of genetic and gestational parenthood and the emphasis on repro-
ductive rights – will be further elaborated on in the following sections.
3.4 Threat and Contamination: ‘Third Party Reproduction is
Problematic’
There are different ways of making this argument, somemore convincing
than others.
First, some people question the morality of any kind of third party
reproduction in favour of the traditional family unit (one father and one
mother). This can be based on a number of grounds, both religious and
secular. Some religions equate sperm donation with adultery or claim
that third party involvement in reproduction violates the holy union
between husband and wife and the sacred act of conception.
The Catholic Church and Sunni Muslims, for example, do not approve
of donor conception.13 On the secular side, objections that donor con-
ception is unnatural and concerns for the welfare of the future child are
voiced, as third party reproduction would, for example, impact on their
identity formation.14
Second, for the parents, the involvement of an outsider in the creation
of their family can be emotionally troubling. The romantic image of
creating a new individual by joining characteristics of two partners into
13 Marcia C. Inhorn, ‘Making Muslim babies: IVF and gamete donation in Sunni versus
Shi’a Islam’ (2006) 30 Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 427–50; Julie H. Rubio, ‘Family
ties: A Catholic response to donor-conceived families’ (2015) 21 Christian Bioethics
181–98.
14 Amanda J. Turner and Adrian Coyle, ‘What does it mean to be a donor offspring?
The identity experiences of adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications
for counselling and therapy’ (2000) 15 Human Reproduction 2041–51.
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one and/or of carrying a partner’s child to term is shattered, which may
result in a sense of failure. Moreover, the donor presents a threat to the
family unit and more specifically to the legitimacy of the parental role of
the ‘social parent’, or is at least perceived as such.15 This fear is possibly
even greater in jurisdictions where donor anonymity has been lifted.
Surrogacy may involve the fear that the surrogate will become emotion-
ally attached to the child and claim a parental role. Also, it is difficult for
a couple to start bonding with their child before birth and the intended
parents may disagree with the surrogate about permissible lifestyle habits
or more profound decisions regarding the pregnancy (such as
a reduction of a multiple pregnancy, for example).
Third, the practical implications of third party reproduction have
proven to be an ethical minefield. Concerns for exploitation and com-
modification are linked to oocyte donation and surrogacy, there is fierce
ongoing debate worldwide about the acceptability of donor anonymity,
there have been sporadic reports of custodial battles, abandoned and
stateless children and of embryo trading, there are concerns about sperm
donors transmitting genetic diseases, etc.16
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that many research efforts are
aimed at methods to avoid third party involvement in reproduction.
However, while uterus transplantation and in vitro gametogenesis
avoid some of the objections to surrogacy and donor conception men-
tioned above, it does not logically follow that they are more acceptable
and less problematic, as they present their own ethical concerns, primar-
ily in terms of safety, as mentioned above. Also, even if – under certain
15 Wyverkens, Provoost, Ravelingien et al., ‘The meaning of the sperm donor for hetero-
sexual couples’.
16 Nicole Bromfield and Karen Smith Robati, ‘Global surrogacy, exploitation, human rights
and international private law: A pragmatic stance and policy recommendations’ (2014) 1
Global Social Welfare 123–35; I. Glenn Cohen, ‘Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity’ in
Leslie Francis (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016); Donna Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 2nd ed.), pp. 65–87; Anders Hansen,
‘Danish sperm donor passed neurofibromatosis on to five children’ (2012) 345 British
Medical Journal (Online) e6570; Mark Henaghan, ‘International surrogacy trends: How
family law is coping’ (2013) 7(3) Australian Journal of Adoption. Available at: www.nla
.gov.au/openpublish/index.php/aja/article/view/3188; Barry J. Maron, John R. Lesser,
Nelson B. Schiller et al., ‘Implications of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy transmitted by
sperm donation’ (2009) 302 Journal of the American Medical Association 1681–4; Usha
R. Smerdon, ‘Crossing bodies, crossing borders: International surrogacy between the
United States and India’ (2008) 39 Cumberland Law Review 15–85; Stephen Wilkinson,
‘The exploitation argument against commercial surrogacy’ (2003) 17 Bioethics 169–87.
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circumstances – they would be the better option to achieve the goal of
parenthood as compared to third party reproduction (or in some jur-
isdictions the only legal option), that does not automatically legitimise
them, as will be discussed below.
3.5 Narcissism and ‘Bowling Alone’: ‘Genetics/Gestation is Very
Important’
Both genetics and gestation tend to be portrayed in terms of basic human
needs, rather than in terms of personal desires. This portrayal makes it
easier to argue for investments in reproductive medicine in general and
paves the way for greater acceptance of costly high-tech innovations in
this domain, as has been remarked by Françoise Baylis and Alana
Cattapan in the context of human nuclear genome transfer.17
A first way of addressing the claim that genetics and gestation are
very important in family relationships is to refer to family function-
ing. However, family functioning in families created through third
party reproduction has been reported to be well within the normal
range.18 Moreover, even in those cases where family functioning is
affected, or where higher levels of stress and anxiety are reported, one
can wonder whether this is due to the absence of the genetic/gesta-
tional link in itself or due to the narratives that accompany alternative
ways of family creation. For example, it is very unlikely that the
absence of a genetic link would have any effect on family functioning
as long as the parents were unaware of the fact that they are not the
genetic parents of the child (e.g. after an IVF mix-up). As previously
argued, genetic parenthood is not the objective, biological concept that
it once was or that we take it to be, as illustrated by debates over who
the genetic parents of clones would be and whether mitochondrial
transfer really generates ‘three-parent babies’. Also, although it is
unsurprising from an evolutionary perspective that we have
a preference for raising genetically related children, this does not
17 Françoise Baylis, ‘Human nuclear genome transfer (so-called mitochondrial replace-
ment): Clearing the underbrush’ (2017) 31 Bioethics 7–19. Also see the chapter in this
volume by Françoise Baylis and Alana Cattapan, ‘Personalised Medicine and the Politics
of Human Nuclear Genome Transfer’.
18 Susan Golombok, Jennifer Readings, Lucy Blake et al., ‘Families created through surro-
gacy: Mother–child relationships and children’s psychological adjustment at age 7’ (2011)
47 Developmental Psychology 1579–88; Lucy Blake, Vasanti Jadva and Susan Golombok,
‘Parent psychological adjustment, donor conception and disclosure: A follow-up over 10
years’ (2014) 29 Human Reproduction 2487–96.
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explain why we legitimise this evolutionary urge: why a genetic link to
our children should matter.19
Note that the latter question only becomes relevant when other issues
are in the balance, for instance, safety for the resulting children. If I have
an irrational, evolutionary urge to have genetically related children and
I harm no-one in the process of pursuing that urge, there is not
a problem. This changes when I request a medical treatment that puts
other individuals in harm’s way (e.g. a uterus donor) or that has a higher
chance of resulting in the birth of a child with a disability than available
alternatives (e.g. conception with SCD-gametes as opposed to donor
gametes). In these cases I will need to back up my desire with good
reasons, justifying why the (moral) benefits of gratifying my desire for
a genetic child outweigh the (moral) disadvantages. While acknowled-
ging that the absence of genetic parenthood – when desired – can lead to
a decrease in subjective well-being and to a sense of loss of purpose in life,
and that this suffering can justify public funding of medical interventions
such as IVF, it does not necessarily justify the risks involved in reproduc-
tion with SCD-gametes or in uterus transplantation.
Concerning the importance of gestational parenthood, a first observa-
tion is that essentialist discourse about what it means to be a mother
tends to incorporate pregnancy. However, this is but one possible dis-
course, which is challenged by adoption and ‘queer motherhood’.20
Moreover, a simple but strong counterargument against the belief that
pregnancy is of such great importance that it would justify the introduc-
tion of uterus transplantation into the clinic is that the male half of the
world’s population is not capable of bearing children and yet, this is not
problematised at all. We do not regard the father as being less of a parent
because he does not gestate children, so consistency demands that
a mother who does not gestate her children is not regarded as less of
a parent either. One might reply that gestation is not a crucial facet of
parenthood, but that it is a crucial facet ofmotherhood. Indeed, it is right
that not gestating deprives a woman of a facet that is typical of mother-
hood. However, does this deprivation carry much moral weight? And if
so, why? A woman who delivers her child through a Caesarean section
instead of a natural birth is also deprived of a typical feature of
19 Heidi Mertes, ‘Gamete derivation from stem cells: Revisiting the concept of genetic
parenthood’ (2014) 40 Journal of Medical Ethics 744–7.
20 Elisabeth A. Suter, Leah M. Seurer, Stephanie Webb et al., ‘Motherhood as contested
ideological terrain: Essentialist and queer discourses of motherhood at play in
female–female co-mothers’ talk’ (2015) 82 Communication Monographs 458–83.
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motherhood, but one would think that the other aspects of parenthood
and motherhood easily trump this missing feature. The same can be said
about gestation: is the experience of pregnancy really worth risking
prematurity, pre-eclampsia or thrombosis? Moreover, on a more prac-
tical note, the experience of a pregnancy with a transplanted womb as
compared to one’s own womb differs significantly as the nerves are not
connected and therefore the pregnant woman will not feel much of the
foetal movements or contractions.
In short, it is far from obvious that the desire for genetic or gestational
parenthood can trump considerations for the welfare of the future child,
for the safety of the other parties involved (in the case of uterus trans-
plantation) or that it can justify resource allocation to these new repro-
ductive technologies.
3.6 Sacredness of Personal Choice: ‘Everyone Has the Right to
Reproduce’
The most straightforward answer to this claim is that the right to repro-
duce is a liberty right instead of a claim right, which therefore does not
amount to a duty on society to accommodate that right. This counter-
argument is well rehearsed in the legal and ethics literature on reproduc-
tive medicine.21 Moreover, rights are always to be balanced against other
people’s rights, for example, the right not to be harmed. Both in the case
of uterus transplantation and of gamete generation, there is a trade-off
between the prospective parents’ desire for (genetic/gestational) parent-
hood on the one hand and the welfare of the donor, recipient and
resulting children. In transplantation medicine, living organ donation
always involves invasive surgical procedures on healthy people without
a direct benefit to the donor. This appears to violate the physician’s oath
to ‘do no harm’, but in many jurisdictions, this infraction is accepted in
cases where the donor provides her informed consent and when the
intervention can save the life of the recipient. However, in uterus trans-
plantation, the bar is set lower: the transplant is not aimed at the survival
of the recipient or a profound increase in her quality of life.
21 Carter J. Dillard, ‘Rethinking the procreative right’ (2007) 10 Yale Human Rights and
Development 1; John A. Robertson, ‘Embryos, families, and procreative liberty: The legal
structure of the new reproduction’ (1985) 59 Southern California Law Review 939–1041;
Laura Shanner, ‘The right to procreate: When rights claims have gone wrong’ (1995) 40
McGill Law Journal 823–74.
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Besides concerns for the donor’s welfare, respecting reproductive
autonomy does not mean that doctors should always cater to patient
demand, especially in domains as emotionally charged as reproduction.
Infertile women have previously been reported to be particularly vulner-
able to the appeal of the technological imperative.22 For many women, it
is important for their peace of mind that they ‘did everything they could’,
regardless of the clinical, financial and emotional repercussions, almost
as if they do not want to abandon a child that is waiting somewhere to be
brought into existence. It is therefore all too easy for physicians to say that
the procedure is legitimised by the patient’s informed consent, as the
validity of that informed consent can be seriously contested and as the
establishment of high risk pregnancies, even with a woman’s consent, can
hardly be considered as good clinical practice. Several authors have
referred to the danger of the therapeutic misconception, both in the
minds of doctors/researchers and patients/participants, in the context
of uterus transplantation clinical trials.23 Ideally, the prime motivation of
participants in clinical trials should be to advance knowledge about the
safety and feasibility of new medical procedures. However, in the context
of uterus transplantations, this requirement is completely unrealistic.
The primary motivation for women to participate in these clinical trials
is their desire to gestate a baby and become a parent. There are no clinical
trials set up recruiting women without a desire for motherhood, merely
studying survival of the graft, and it would be very unlikely that such
trials would be approved by ethics committees. The therapeutic miscon-
ception is therefore not a misconception in the sense that the aim – even
in the clinical trials – is primarily therapeutic. Yet it remains important
that participants are warned that while a therapeutic benefit is possible
and aimed at, it is not likely and that they may end up worse off after
completion of the trial than they were before.
One can also legitimately wonder whether the welfare of the future
child has received adequate consideration in the ongoing clinical trials of
uterus transplantation. Despite the births of several healthy children, it
22 Judith C. Daniluk, ‘“If we had it to do over again. . .”: Couples’ reflections on their
experiences of infertility treatments’ (2001) 9 The Family Journal 122–33;
Tjeerd Tymstra, ‘“At least we tried everything”: About binary thinking, anticipated
decision regret, and the imperative character of medical technology’ (2007) 28 Journal
of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology 131.
23 Kavita Shah Arora and Valarie Blake, ‘Uterus transplantation: The ethics of moving the
womb’ (2015) 125 Obstetrics & Gynecology 971–974; Arthur L. Caplan,
Constance M. Perry, Lauren A. Plante et al., ‘Moving the womb’ (2007) 37 Hastings
Center Report 18–20.
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might be only a matter of time before a baby gestated in a transplanted
uterus suffers lifelong consequences of prematurity or other pregnancy
complications linked to the transplant. Some might invoke the non-
identity problem24 to argue for a very low threshold of well-being in
the case of stem cell-derived gametes: the resulting children are not
harmed as they would not have existed without this technology, unless
if their lives are not worth living (the wrongful life standard). Technically
speaking, this argument does not apply in the context of uterus trans-
plantation. The future children growing from the transferred IVF-
embryos have better prospects if they are carried to term by a healthy
gestational carrier, than if they are carried to term in a transplanted
uterus (although this interpretation was challenged by John
Robertson25). They can therefore be said to be harmed – or at least put
into harm’s way – by being the subject of an experimental procedure.
Despite the non-identity problem (in the case of SCD gametes), other
ethical principles give reason for a cautious approach when risks for the
future children are present. First, when aspiring parents need to choose
between twomodes of conception, all other things being equal, it is better
to choose the one that is most likely to result in healthy children (i.e. they
should choose those children who are most likely to suffer the least),
although it is not necessarily immoral to take limited risks in regard to the
future child’s well-being.26 Second, it has been argued that the most
appropriate welfare standard for future children is the ‘reasonable wel-
fare standard’, meaning that ‘[t]he provision of medical assistance in
procreation is acceptable when the child born as a result of the treatment
will have a reasonably happy life’.27 Third, physicians and parents have
a shared responsibility regarding the welfare of the children who are
created by means of assisted reproduction. The physician therefore needs
to make his or her own assessment of the harms and benefits involved for
all parties. After decades of successful efforts to make pregnancy and
childbirth safer for both mother and child, uterus transplantation and
reproduction by stem cell-derived gametes seem to be a step back, rather
than a step forward.
24 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
25 John A. Robertson, ‘Impact of uterus transplant on fetuses and resulting children:
A response to Daar and Klipstein’ (2016) 3 Journal of Law and the Biosciences 710.
26 Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, ‘The moral obligation to create children with the best
chance of the best life’ (2009) 23 Bioethics 274–90.
27 Guido Pennings, ‘Measuring the welfare of the child: In search of the appropriate
evaluation principle’ (1999) 14 Human Reproduction 1146–50.
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Importantly, it is dishonest to weigh the efforts and risks for mother,
child and donor against the birth of a healthy baby. The healthy live
births that are reported are not the only attempts made to establish
pregnancies through uterus transplantation. The hardship endured by
all the couples in the clinical trial whose desire for a child was not met
should therefore also be taken into account. This new innovation may
provide hope to many involuntarily childless women with uterine factor
infertility, but for most of them – and even many of the ones who have
access to the technology – this hope will turn out to be false hope, and for
some of them, their adventure may end in tragedy in case of serious
morbidity. This is a factor that should also be incorporated into the
equation and that is easily forgotten in the excitement of a success story.
Also, on a more speculative note, the fact that there is a proof of
principle that women without a uterus are able to gestate their child,
but that this treatment option is out of reach for the great majority of
women, may hinder the coping process of that majority and lead to
additional frustration. Therefore, if the group of patients as a whole is
considered, the cost–benefit analysis may turn out to be very grim.
The same reasoning would apply for patients ‘needing’, but not having
access to, SCD-gametes. In the latter context, it has been noted that by
developing the technology of in vitro gametogenesis, needs are being
created for categories of people that currently are not labelled as infertile
(such as same-sex couples or postmenopausal women), but at the
same time these needs are not met.28 Paradoxically, a focus on reproduc-
tive liberty may therefore lead to a frustration of that same liberty.
3.7 The Common Good and We Medicine
Moreover, as repeatedly pointed out by Dickenson,29 an increased focus
on individual rights in biotechnology and bioethics has diverted atten-
tion away from the common good.While this is not – and should not be –
an either–or story, it is interesting to consider how we might approach
the given problem (grief caused by the inability to achieve genetic/gesta-
tional parenthood) from a common good perspective. In any case, taking
a broader perspective does notmean that the personal suffering caused by
28 Anna Smajdor and Daniela Cutas, ‘Will artificial gametes end infertility?’ (2015) 23
Health Care Analysis 134–47.
29 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine; Donna Dickenson, ‘The common good’ in
Roger Brownsword, E. Scotford and K. Yeung (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law,
Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 135.
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infertility should be minimised. It has been well established that people
who are faced with a diagnosis of infertility suffer tremendously. As an
indication: the same degree of depression is reported in infertility
patients as in cancer patients.30 The no-treatment option is not an option.
People who suffer from infertility should receive appropriate care.
However, this does not equate to giving them what they want (a baby),
regardless of the risks, efforts and of whether society can afford it. If we
take a step back and look at infertile people as a group, they may be very
ill served by constantly confirming and thereby reinforcing the idea that
one is only ‘truly’ a mother if one has gestated her own child and that one
is only ‘truly’ a parent if one is a genetic parent. Many people are excellent
parents to children whom they did not gestate and who did not spring
from their genes. I am not only referring to third party conception here,
but also to adoption, foster care, stepparents and even involved aunts and
uncles. Moreover, many people lead a perfectly happy and satisfying
child-free life. In terms of well-being, there have been numerous studies
showing that there is no positive correlation between having children and
happiness or life satisfaction.31 The message that genetics and gestation
are not necessary components of parenthood and that parenthood is not
a necessary requirement for a meaningful life should receive adequate
attention, despite the fact that patients are unreceptive to this message.
Let us not forget that, at present, a large percentage of women who get on
the ART-rollercoaster end up childless (e.g. for US patients receiving IVF
with their own gametes in 2014: 30 per cent of patients below 35,
42 per cent of patients between 35 and 37, 59 per cent of patients between
38 and 40, 78 per cent of patients between 41 and 42 and 93 per cent of
patients above 42 years are unsuccessful32). All these women and their
partners balance several years between hope and despair and are left
empty-handed. It is often only at this point of their journey – if at all –
that they will get the message that life is possible without (genetically
related / personally gestated) children, after years of receiving the oppo-
site message.
30 Alice D. Domar, Patricia C. Zuttermeister and Richard Friedman, ‘The psychological
impact of infertility: A comparison with patients with other medical conditions’ (1993) 14
Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynaecology 45.
31 Thomas Hansen, ‘Parenthood and happiness: A review of folk theories versus empirical
evidence’ (2012) 108 Social Indicators Research 29–64.
32 Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, ‘National Summary Report’. Available at:
www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?reportingYear=2014
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Thus, if we look at the group of infertile people, are they really helped
by ever new options that provide hope for all, but only a child for the
happy few? Perhaps we need a new approach, whereby we content
ourselves with the idea that we attempt to satisfy the desire for parent-
hood within certain safety limits and within certain financial constraints
and that those who fall outside these limits are helped in a different way.
Specifically, this would mean helping them find out what it is they are
looking for in genetic parenthood or gestational parenthood and try to
accommodate these desires in a different, safer, manner and/or by help-
ing them cope with infertility.
3.8 Conclusion
Faced with the hope and hype surrounding stem cell-derived gametes
and uterus transplantation, we need to stop and wonder whether the goal
of assisting people in their reproductive endeavours is blinding us to the
‘collateral damage’ that it is causing. If fertility clinics are really interested
in helping all infertile people, the right approach is not to invest in high-
tech solutions that are likely to remain elite-medicine for many years and
help only a limited number of people. Rather, efforts are needed to
replace Me Medicine by We Medicine when possible. One way of
doing this is by critically questioning the beliefs on which the patient
request is based, rather than accommodating and thereby confirming and
reinforcing them. It should be brought to patients’ attention that genetics
and gestation are not essential elements of parenthood; that third party
reproduction is not necessarily problematic or inferior; that the desire for
genetic and gestational parenthood or an appeal to reproductive auton-
omy does not automatically justify the risks of uterus transplantation and
reproduction through SCD gametes; and that parenthood is not
a necessary requirement for a happy, meaningful or satisfying life.
Although changing people’s beliefs takes time, tackling these myths will
in the long run have a bigger chance of reducing the suffering of people
faced with infertility than reinforcing them.
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4Personalising Future Health Risk through
‘Biological Insurance’
Proliferation of Private Umbilical Cord Blood Banking in India
jyotsna agnihotri gupta
4.1 Introduction
In her bookMe Medicine vs We Medicine, 1 Donna Dickenson expresses
her concern that Me Medicine is eclipsing We Medicine, ‘so that we’re
losing sight of the notion that biotechnology can and should serve the
common good’. In her view ‘it would be wrong to prioritize personalized
health technologies at the expense of public health measures, which have
brought us comparative freedom from the ill health that plagued our
ancestors. I see a pattern here – not only a similarity among all the
apparently disparate forms of personalized medicine but also a familiar
political formula: “private good, public bad”’.2 There are two unchal-
lenged assumptions, she writes, ‘that “individual” is better than “social”
and that we are on the cusp of a “true revolution in medicine” to make it
more individualized’. She is sceptical whether these are justified.3
Dickenson voices the need for ‘a disinterested and balanced critique of
personalised medicine’s origins, the commercial interests that lie behind
it, and the dynamics of its marketing’, as what she terms ‘retail therapy,
that is medical treatment . . . conceived as consumer goods’.4 This is
imperative as ‘. . . what may look like innocent individual consumer
choices will shape how we as a society assure our health and that of future
generations’.5
One of the examples Dickenson uses to illustrate this concept of ‘Me
Medicine vs We Medicine’ is that of the increasing proliferation of
1 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
2 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 3 Ibid., p. 4. 4 Ibid., p. 4. 5 Ibid., p. 3.
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private umbilical cord blood (UCB) banks. Inspired by Dickenson’s
work, I discuss the proliferation of private UCB banks in India.
I identify the strategies used by private UCB banks to recruit pregnant
women and explore what this means for pregnant women’s decision-
making, as UCB banks lay the onus for the future health and treatment of
their child on them, and the factors and actors and values used to
influence their decision whether to bank or not. I establish that private
UCB banks in India are driven by corporate interest and political neo-
liberalism (two of the four phenomena mentioned by Dickenson as
possible explanations for the rise of ‘Me Medicine’) while offering
‘choice’ to pregnant women.
4.2 Umbilical Cord Blood Banking
In the late 1980s and early 1990s scientists began to realise the impor-
tance of blood from the human umbilical cord and placenta as a rich
source of haematopoietic stem cells which can be harvested and cryo-
preserved for transplantation to treat certain blood cancers and immune
system disorders.6 The first public and private UCB banks were estab-
lished in the USA in 1993.7 During the 1990s, most developed nations
organised public systems for the collection of cord blood, which were
built over previous bone marrow registries or blood collection services.
The public systems are based on donation of cord blood for research and
therapy on an ‘allogeneic’ (self-to-other) rationale, i.e. on the transplan-
tation of cord blood from a related or unrelated tissue-matched donor to
an immunologically compatible host. The first transplant from an unre-
lated donor was carried out in 1993.8 In this system supposedly altruism
and the solidarity principle prevail.
Since 2000, with the emergence of regenerative medicine as a new field
of hope, the ‘promissory’ value of UCB has gained importance and
spurred the rapid development of the private commercial sector.9
These services offer collection, processing and private storage of UCB
6 Pablo Rubinstein, ‘Why cord blood?’ (2006) 67 Human Immunology 398–404.
7 Catherine Waldby, ‘Umbilical cord blood: From social gift to venture capital’ (2006) 1(1)
Biosocieties 55–70.
8 Paul Martin, Nik Brown and Andrew Turner, ‘Capitalizing hope: The commercial devel-
opment of umbilical cord blood stem cell banking’ (2008) 27 (2) New Genetics and Society
127–43.
9 Nik Brown, Alison Kraft and PaulMartin, ‘The promissory pasts of blood cells’ (2006) 1(3)
Biosocieties 329–48; Nik Brown and Alison Kraft, ‘Blood ties – Banking the stem cell
promise’ (2006) 3/4 Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 313–27.
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just for the child’s own future use or its family members’: in other words,
autologous donation. Sometimes, cord blood is banked with a clear
intention of using it for a family member already suffering from
a disease that may need bone marrow or transplant.
To date, there have been few documented cases of autologous use of
cord blood, and even in these few cases, the utility of the autograft is still
dubious,10 while over 25,000 patients have been cured with allogeneic
transplants.11 But private banks, which define themselves as ‘family
banks’, advertise their services through their websites on the Internet
and base their discourse on the autologous possibility, defining the stored
sample as ‘a “self-repair kit” for your child’ (www.stemcytefamily.com/
cord_blood), and qualifying the private preservation of cord blood as
a form of ‘biological insurance for your child’, and as a ‘once in a lifetime
opportunity to preserve a biomedical resource that could be a lifesaver for
your child and other family members’. But importantly, more than
offering an actual, therapeutic service, the commercial sector has grown
through the selling, overall, of something immaterial: expectations of the
future development of autologous transplantation.
4.3 State of the Art: Public and Private Initiatives in Umbilical
Cord Blood Stem Cell Banking in India
India is an emerging economy, where both public and private initiatives
in stem cell research exist and are proliferating, riding on the second
wave of globalisation in the biomedical and IT industry. In the public
sector their primary purpose is the creation of an inventory of UCB units
for allogeneic use. The first private UCB bank in India was opened in
Chennai, in South India, by LifeCell in 2004. The last decade has seen the
establishment of several private UCB banks. The leading private players
in cord blood banking in India include LifeCell International, Reliance
Life Sciences, Cryobanks International India (now known under the
name Cryoviva India), Cryo Stemcell Karnataka, Cordlife Sciences,
Stem One, International Stemcell Services and CryoSave India.
CryoSave, established in 2000, headquartered in Switzerland, claims to
have banked samples from over 70 countries on six continents.
It launched its operation in India in December 2008 and set up stem
10 Karen Ballen, ‘Challenges in umbilical cord blood stem cell banking for stem cell reviews
and reports’ (2010) 6(8) Stem Cell Review and Reports 8–14, p. 8.
11 Karen Ballen, ‘Update on Umbilical Cord Blood Transplantation’ (2017) 6 F1000Research
1556. doi:10.12688/f1000research.11952.1.
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cell storage banks in the country. In October 2017 Cryo-Save India
signed a formal agreement with LifeCell International for formal
transfer of all of its 18,000 cryopreserved umbilical cord units and
corresponding customer agreements to LifeCell. LifeCell’s storage
facilities in Chennai (South India) and Gurgaon (North India) cur-
rently house more than 270,000 samples of preserved UCB and tissue
stem cell units.12 A new entrant in the UCB banking market is the
Singapore-based firm Cordlife Group Limited, which has a pan-India
presence. Relicord (Reliance Life Sciences Stem Cell Banking services)
has established what they claim is south Asia’s first, most advanced and
completely automated stem cell enriched umbilical cord blood reposi-
tory. This is the first cord blood repository in the world to be accorded
a license by an official regulatory authority, the Food and Drug
Administration of the Government of India, and is accredited by the
American Association of Blood Banks. According to the Association of
Stem Cell Banks of India, over 1.6 million units of cord blood are
stored in 15 private banks.13
Many UCB banks also have a hybrid model, operating both a private
and a public bank, such as Relicord (Reliance Life Sciences), Jeevan Stem
Cell Bank (until 2012), South Korean Histostem Co. Ltd and StemCyte
India Therapeutics Pvt Ltd, which is a joint venture between StemCyte
Inc. USA, Apollo Hospitals Enterprises Ltd and Cadila Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. Histostem Co. Ltd is a South Korean, US-based Biotechnology firm.
Its main divisions are cell therapy research, a public cord blood bank for
transplantation, and family cord blood banking providing stem cells for
transplant surgeons globally. The distinction between public and private
banks is not quite clear as public banks fund themselves by selling cord
blood units to other banks on a global scale.14 Most cord blood banking
companies and research centres have formal tie-ups with prestigious
hospitals in big cities in India. In India UCB transplantation is in its
infancy. There are very few reports of applications in case of acquired and
constitutional haematological disorders and none for metabolic
12 Times News Network, 11 October 2017.
13 www.womensweb.in/articles/cord-blood-banking-in-india. Accessed 5 January 2018.
14 Nik Brown, Laura Machin and Danae McLeod, ‘The immunitary bioeconomy: The
economisation of life in the international cord blood market’ (2011) 30 Social Science
and Medicine 1–8; Christine Hauskeller and Lorenzo Beltrame, ‘Hybrid practices in cord
blood banking. Rethinking the commodification of human tissues in the bioeconomy’
(2016) 35(3) New Genetics and Society 228–45; Dickenson, Property in the Body.
personalising future health risk 55
disorders. By 2011, around 13 cases of thalassaemia had been treated
using UCB transplantation.15
Of India’s population of nearly 1.3 billion, nearly 70 per cent live in
rural areas where basic healthcare services are unavailable, inadequate or
inequitably distributed, with class and literacy/education being impor-
tant factors determining access to medical settings. Only 60 per cent of
rural women and 86 per cent of urban women receive antenatal check-
ups.16 Of the approximately 26 million births a year 60 per cent of
deliveries still take place at home under the supervision of trained and
untrained birth attendants (50:50 ratio) (www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
india). India is in a transitional phase from home-based deliveries to
institutional deliveries. Most of the UCB banks are located in urban
metropolises. According to Asim Ghazi, Director of Marketing at
Cryobanks International, ‘Counsellors sit in birth centres, any place
where births take place. UCB collection centres have been set up also in
small towns’.17
Umbilical cord blood has become a commodity in the international
‘bioeconomy’ which is flourishing by commodifying body parts,
tissues and fluids.18 With the increase in medical tourism to India,
the country could be the largest potential supplier of UCB in the
world; 600,000 are potential customers.19 The UCB banking market is
worth US$750 million per year. India has a major share of the
projected market.20 However, the global ‘immunitary bioeconomy’
rewards rareness of the blood type rather than size of the supply.21
India has ethnic diversity in terms of Aryan, Dravidian and
Mongoloid populations.
Cord blood is collected after the umbilical cord has been clamped before
being cut during the process of giving birth. This can be done either while
15 David McKenna and Jayesh Sheth, ‘Umbilical cord blood: Current status & promise for
the future’ (2011) 134 (3), Indian Journal of Medical Research 261–69.
16 M. B. Agarwal, ‘Umbilical cord blood transplantation: Newer trends’ (2006) 54 Journal of
the Association of Physicians of India 143–47, p. 144.
17 Nancy Singh, C(h)ords of Life (2010), www.chillibreeze.com/articles_various/Umbilical-
cord-banking-in-India-310.asp. Accessed 20 December 2012.
18 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine; Dickenson, Property in the Body.
19 Singh, C(h)ords of Life.
20 Shashank S. Tiwari, The Ethics and Governance of Stem Cell Clinical Research (2013) PhD
Thesis, University of Nottingham, Institute for Science and Society, www.eprints
.nottingham.ac.uk/14585/1/602957. Accessed 20 September 2016.
21 Brown et al., The immunitary bioeconomy.
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the placenta remains attached to the uterine wall (in utero), or after
delivery of the placenta (ex utero). UCB stem cells can be banked in
a private, public or hybrid bank. According to Dr P. Srinivasan, Chairman
of the Jeevan Stem Cell Bank in Chennai, ‘Availability or the willingness of
people to donate for public storage is not a problem, but it is the funds
required for collecting, testing and storing the units that will be the limiting
factor’.22 On average it costs between 75,000–90,000 Indian rupees (approxi-
mately US$1,200–1,500)23 to collect and process cord blood; these costs are
covered by the public cord blood bank. Public banks charge approximately
170,000 rupees for each sample released for transplant. A limited number of
hospitals offer public donation. Many clients and even clinicians are not
aware of the existence of public UCB banks, as they do not advertise
aggressively.
For the most part, donating UCB to a public bank does not cost
the family anything. The obstetrician/gynaecologist doing the collec-
tion may charge a small fee, which in some cases may be covered by
medical insurance. Private UCB banks, however, charge a fee for
collection, processing and storage of UCB. The cost of banking per
umbilical cord at a private bank is approximately 75,000 Indian
rupees all-in, or a one-time payment of 27,000 rupees for enrolment
and processing fees plus 3,000 rupees per year for 21 years. Various
options are available, such as only cord blood stem cells preserva-
tion, cord blood stem cells and cord tissue, cord blood stem cells
and 1 million cord tissue stem cells harvested and preserved, and
cord blood stem cells and 50 million cord tissue stem cells harvested
and preserved, with the price going up to 119,900 rupees (promo-
tional flyer LifeCell). Another fee is often charged when a sample is
removed for testing or treatment. Stem cells derived from the UCB
are initially to be stored for 21 years, after which the individual
would get to decide about further storage of her/his cells. Some UCB
banks offer ‘pocket-friendly payment options’ (payment in
instalments).24
Undoubtedly, this is a huge sum of money for the vast majority of
Indians who live on less than US$2 per day. However, there is a sharp
growth in the numbers of the Indian middle class, which has reaped the
benefits of globalisation and the neo-liberal market economy in India.
22 R. Prasad, ‘Public cord-blood banking becomes a reality in Chennai,’ The Hindu,
1 January 2009.
23 Exchange rate of approximately US$ 1 = 64 INR. 24 Cryobanks information leaflet.
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This category looks to the West for inspiration in lifestyle; these are
the main targets of the UCB banks. Celebrities such as Bollywood
film stars and cricketers (who often serve as role models and ‘brand
ambassadors’) were some of the first parents who banked the cord
blood of their newborns and have since been followed by many
other well-to-do parents who see it as rational and responsible
behaviour and an investment in the future health of their progeny
and perhaps of the whole family.
UCB banking is advertised as a kind of personal biological life insur-
ance for your child (as one bank puts it) based on the expectations of
a future development of ‘autologous’, or self-to-self, transplantation.
Viewing the promise of cord blood stem cells as a form of biological
health insurance, about 5 per cent of parents now bank their newborn’s
cord blood, with about 80 per cent of that going to private banks for the
child’s/family’s own possible use and about 20 per cent going to public
banks.
UCB banking is poised to grow in the years to come for three
reasons: a) more and more cord banking companies are operating
actively; b) more Indians are increasingly aware of this facility and
are keen on ensuring their child’s lifelong health (although, relatively
speaking, it is a miniscule proportion of the large Indian popula-
tion); and c) the process of UCB banking has been granted regula-
tory approval. A high growth rate is expected, but it is subject to
various factors such as successful stem cell research, government
policy, etc. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and
the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) established Guidelines for
Stem Cell Research and Therapy in 2007. ‘These cord blood banking
guidelines, which became effective in 2012, are applicable to cord
blood units intended for autologous and allogeneic use and are
designed to provide a framework for facilities to obtain a license to
manufacture and distribute cord blood in India. The guidelines out-
line the collection, processing, testing, storage, banking, and release
requirements for umbilical cord blood’.25 These guidelines were
revised in October 2017.26
25 www.aabb.org/advocacy/regulatorygovernment/ct/international/Pages/india.aspx.
Accessed 15 September 2016.
26 ICMR and DBT, National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research (New Delhi: Indian Council
for Medical Research and Department of Biotechnology, October 2017).
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4.4 Approach
4.4.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
In addition to Dickenson’s concept of ‘Me Medicine vs We Medicine’,
I will discuss the marketing of UCBwithin the framework of ‘risk’ theory,
and concepts such as ‘manufactured risk’ and ‘risk society’.27 There is
a construction of a new kind of patient, the ‘at-risk individual’ who needs
‘personalised medicine’.
4.4.2 Research Methodology and Methods
This chapter is based on pilot research and reflects work in progress. It is
part of a study on the proliferation of private UCB banking in India.
Qualitative research methods, such as literature research for theoretical
understanding of the issue and analysis, and fieldwork were adopted.
Initially, an analysis of media coverage on UCB banking was done to map
the field. Also, promotional material of UCB banks (including informa-
tion on websites), was collected and scrutinised.
Empirical research using qualitative research methods, including
semi-structured interviews, was conducted in phases in Delhi and its
suburban towns (Noida and Gurgaon), in February 2010, February 2011,
October 2012, February 2013 and November 2013, with various stake-
holders such as: (a) directors and managers of private UCB banks, (b)
gynaecologists and (c) pregnant women. Interviews with women were
conducted to assess their knowledge, attitude and willingness to bank.
Twenty-five interviews were conducted in the gynaecology department
of Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, a private charitable hospital in Delhi. Also,
eight interviews with women who had delivered recently were conducted
by telephone. This had to do with the fact that these women were too
busy at work and/or with the care of the newborn, and apparently could
not spare time for the researcher’s visit, but they were prepared to answer
a few questions on the telephone while the baby slept. These respondents
were identified using a snowball approach. Besides this, two participant
27 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (New Delhi: Sage, 1992);
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Anthony Giddens,
The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); Anthony Giddens,
‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62(1) Modern Law Review 1–10; Deborah Lupton, Risk
(London: Routledge, 1999); Nikolas Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’ (2001) 18(6) Theory,
Culture and Society 1–30; John Tullock and Deborah Lupton, Risk and Everyday Life
(London: Sage, 2003).
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observation sessions at antenatal clinics attended by 10 and 18 pregnant
women, respectively, in Delhi and Noida were held.
4.5 Laypersons’ Knowledge Regarding UCB Banking
From time to time the print media covers developments in science and
technology, including stem cell technology in the science section of
newspapers or in the economics section mentioning growth figures of
corporations. There are only a few studies28 on the social and ethical
aspects of developments and applications of stem cell research in general,
or on UCB banking in particular in India29 from the viewpoint of
(prospective) clients/donors. Information on advances in medicine and
therapies is available through the media to people with higher education
levels and access to the Internet, or through gynaecologists andmaternity
departments of some hospitals.
Health risk perception is dependent on knowledge and access to
information, which often correlates with (higher) economic status in
the Indian context. Genetic literacy is not only a complex issue for the
(semi-)literate, but even for the educated. Due to a lack of public infor-
mation and discussion on UCB banking one does not know what the
knowledge base regarding UCB banking is among laypersons.
The perceived use of UCB as a source of stem cells may affect parents’
willingness to bank.
4.6 Strategies of Private UCB Banks to Recruit Potential Clients
Various strategies are used by private UCB banks to enrol clients. Direct-
to-consumer advertising via the Internet is one of the primary sources of
information on UCB banking and recruitment. Another important
source comprises flyers, leaflets and posters which are distributed in
gynaecology/maternity wards of hospitals to recruit ‘mothers-to-be’ as
prospective clients. Private UCB banks offer free antenatal classes at
28 Aditya Bharadwaj, Local Cells, Global Science: The Proliferation of Stem Cell Technologies
in India (London: Routledge, 2009); Tiwari, ‘The ethics and governance of stem cell
clinical research’.
29 Diksha Pandey, Simar Kaur and Asha Kamath, ‘Banking Umbilical Cord Blood (UCB)
Stem Cells: Awareness, Attitude and Expectations of Potential Donors from One of the
Largest Potential Repository (India)’ (2016) 11(5) PLoS One e0155782. doi:10.1371/jour
nal.pone.0155782; Prasanna Patra and Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, ‘Following the
banking cycle of UCB in India: The disparity between pre-banking persuasion and
post-banking utilization’ (2016) 35(3) New Genetics and Society 267–88.
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private hospitals/gynaecology clinics comprising pre- and post-natal care
advice, viz. exercises during pregnancy to ease labour during childbirth,
nutrition and dietary advice, and answering frequently asked questions
about pregnancy during interactive sessions attended by pregnant
women and their husbands or other family members. At the end of the
session refreshments are served and information kits (containing bro-
chures, DVDs and CDs) are distributed (source: participant observation
by researcher).
Some companies also distribute exciting gifts and freebies to all expec-
tant parents attending the antenatal classes.30 Appointments are made
for home visits to make presentations and hand over information and
cord blood collection kits. In the opinion of one of my interviewees,
‘Private UCB banks chase prospective clients rather aggressively to make
an appointment for a home visit’ (A.C. interview 2011). The companies
offer attractive deals. If a pregnant woman brings along or introduces two
friends, she gets a discount on banking charges for her own UCB.
Marketing representatives of private cord blood banks admit that they
are getting good support from doctors, whereas some of my requests to
interview their patients were turned down. Gynaecologists are allowing
them to approach prospective parents directly. Marketing representatives
try to convince them through presentations and counselling as well as
common sessions for pregnant women and their spouses. The companies
are also organising continuous medical education programmes.31
All pregnant women visiting her clinic are informed about cord blood
banking, says Dr Nandita Palshetkar, consultant gynaecologist at Lilavati
Hospital, Mumbai. ‘And 70 per cent of my patients go for it.’ She says,
‘There is definitely an increase in the trend. Currently, the prohibitive
factor is the cost, but once it goes down the demand will rise’.32
4.6.1 UCB Advertising (websites and information packs/leaflets)
In the following sections I use excerpts from some of the freely distrib-
uted publicity material which I examined in order to understand what
kind of information is being provided in the promotional literature.
30 www.cordlifeindia.com/News_Events/Antenatal_Classes.php. Accessed 13 December 2012.
31 Snehlata Shrivastav, ‘Cord blood banking takes off in Nagpur’, Times News Network,
16 May 2012.
32 Deepa Suryanarayan, ‘Young Mumbai women go for cord blood banking’, Mumbai
Agency: Daily News and Analysis (DNA), 9 May 2010.
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In general the information consists of: What are cord blood cells,
and their therapeutic uses? UCB is (incorrectly) classified as biome-
dical waste that would otherwise be discarded. This is erroneous,33
just like the claim that UCB cells can provide a cure for about 75
life-threatening diseases, although scientific progress may increase
the range of diseases and conditions which can be treated by using
stem cells in the future. Some private UCB banks mention briefly
that UCB can be banked either in public or private banks, elaborate
on the advantages of banking in private banks and then go into the
details of why theirs is the best choice. Each UCB bank claims to
offer world-class state-of-the-art (cost, safety and quality norms)
facilities. The information is addressed to potential mothers/parents,
calling upon the parental responsibility for the future health of the
child and its family members with the stipulation that it is a once-in
-a-lifetime chance not to be missed. Often testimonials by public
figures and celebrities such as actors, sports personalities and high-
placed officials are used on websites and in information material to
recruit clients. Also used are testimonials by medical experts and
former clients:
Medical experts’ (paediatricians’ and gynaecologists’) testimonials
proclaim.
Preserving stem cells is the wisest decision that parents can take during the
birth of their baby. Parents who have stored their baby’s cells can be part
of a medical revolution and will have more medical options available to
them. . .
(Cordlife)
4.6.2 Using Patient/Client Testimonials
‘Mothers Speak’ testimonials are used to convince, reassuring parents for
lifelong [sic].
(Cryobanks)
These are some examples from the promotional material of LifeCell:
33 Nicholas M. Fisk and Ifat Atun, ‘Public–private partnership in cord blood banking’
(2008) 336 British Medical Journal 642–44.
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‘Storing umbilical cord blood is similar to taking out life insurance. It’s the
greatest gift you could give.’
(Priya Dutt, Member of Parliament)
‘My kids aremy precious little gifts fromGod and I want the best for them.
I’ve gifted Rashaa something extremely precious – a life filled with health
and happiness, by storing her stem cells with LifeCell.’
(Raveena Tandon, Actor)
‘From our first contact to the sample collection, the team was efficient,
prompt and professional. Post collection, the follow-ups were regular.
We are therefore pleased we selected LifeCell.’
(Ajith Agarkar, Cricketer)
‘LifeCell is a life saver.’
(R. Madhavan, Actor)34
‘Stem Cell banking is an essential modality of healthcare for newborns.
With many recent advances in the field of stem cell therapies, I believe it
has enormous advantages in the future, especially for diseases which
cannot be treated in the present day. Cordlife was the most reliable and
obvious choice to store my baby’s cord blood.’
(Hesiba Jacob, Hyderabad)35
‘In India, when a child is born, the parents open a savings bank
account to ensure the financial and educational future of the newborn.
In my opinion, banking the stem cells of the newborn is equally
important as it helps in insuring the medical future of the child. It is
a boon and the best gift we can give our children – the miracle of good
health.’36
Also, success stories of patients cured by stem cell therapy are
included.
‘Umbilical cord stem cell banking is an essential aspect for every child
since every parent holds the responsibility of securing their child’s health
for the future. I have benefitted by getting myself completely cured by this
revolutionary concept of umbilical cord blood stem cell banking and
I insist that every parent should consider in the future interest of their
child.’
(Mr Vigneshwaran, Cord blood stem cell transplant beneficiary)37
34 www.Lifecellinternational.com. Accessed 12 December 2010.
35 www.cordlifeindia.com/testimonial. Accessed 12 September 2016.
36 www.CryoSave.com. Accessed 11 October 2017.
37 www.cordlifeindia.com/testimonial. Accessed 12 September 2016.
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4.6.3 Promotion and Offers
NOW YOU RECEIVE GIFTS FOR JUST MEETING US
Sometimes good things in life are just a click away. Celebrations have no
avenues as CordLife brings to you more than one reason to stay stylish,
beautiful and always charming. All you got to do is just meet us to learn
more about protecting your family with your baby’s stem cells and get the
following gift vouchers absolutely FREE!38
Since June 2016 LifeCell has been offering a BabyMoon vacation
package worth 20,000 rupees to customers enrolling to bank with it.
With over 25 exotic destinations in India to choose from, LifeCell offers
‘a vacation to enjoy the joyous moments of pregnancy with your spouse
before you welcome your baby home’. It is meant to be an ideal vacation
to relish in nature’s serene beauty and enjoy blissful moments of
togetherness, time to relax, rejuvenate and connect with each other.39
4.6.4 Banking Your Hopes and Parental and Familial Responsibility
The message that is transmitted through the information packs is on the
benefits of UCB banking couched in the language of parental and familial
responsibility.
‘Decision to save your Baby’s cord blood cells is very crucial step in
ensuring your entire family’s health. Cord Blood banking has become
more important protection to your family compared with other ways like
home or auto insurance.’
‘Stem cells . . . offer a lifeline to your child should he or she be afflicted by
disorders later. Bank your child’s placenta; save your child.’
‘Now your family’s future lies in your hands.’
‘You have only one chance, at birth, to collect the cord blood cells. Missing
this would mean losing out on a precious potentially life-saving opportu-
nity, FOREVER.’
‘Bank your hopes with cord of life. . .’
‘As a proud parent-to-be, you are obviously planning ahead for your little
one’s future. While money, name and fame can be earned by your child,
there are some things that only you can give – like the security of parental
love and the legacy of cord blood: a potential lifeline for your child’s
future.’ (Relicord, promotional brochure)
38 www.cordlifeindia.com. Accessed 12 September 2016.
39 www.lifecell.in/services/babycord/greetings/offers/baby-moon/baby-moon.php. Accessed 12
September 2016.
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4.7 Preliminary Findings
4.7.1 Playing on Emotions and Hope
Websites and flyers, posters and information kits (including CDs and
DVDs) provide interesting material regarding recruitment practices
and strategies used by UCB banks to enrol customers. ‘The private
banks encourage parents to bank cord blood through a series of
promissory, practical and moral arguments.’40 A comparison is made
with depositing money in the bank as an investment plan on the birth
of a child. In a Zee TV news item a medical specialist said it would not
be a misnomer to call cord blood ‘Sanjivani’. This was a reference to
‘Sanjivani Booti’ – the almost magical medicinal herb which saved the
life of the severely wounded Lakshman, younger brother of Lord Rama
in the epic Ramayana, a popular story known to almost every Indian.
The flyer of LifeCell has as its opening sentence the commonly given
blessing to a child, ‘Ayushman Bhav’ (May you live long!), adding that
this ‘is no longer a prayer for your newborn. LifeCell can help make it
come true’.
Most UCB banks call upon the parental responsibility for the future
health of the child and its family members as well to take timely action by
not missing the once-in-a-lifetime chance to bank the cord blood on
delivery of the child. Often the language of the ‘gift’ is also used.
‘Your baby got a gift from heaven . . . Preserve it!! – Preserve Umbilical
Cord Blood Stem Cells & save your loved ones from life threatening
diseases.’
‘Storing your own baby’s cord blood is a first gift from your side to
your baby. No doubt is left regarding the importance and medical value of
Cord blood banking.More than 20 companies now offer this service either
for donation or private storage. It is a hard to believe fact that in spite of
global acceptance of Cord blood importance, very few expectant parents
in India know about this ‘God gift’ and this is thrown into dustbins. Is not
it an injustice to innocent newly born baby?’
(Cryobanks India promotional flyer)
In general, a lot of misinformation was present among pregnant
women and family members regarding the benefits of UCB banking.
There was much hype and speculation regarding possible future thera-
pies. Preliminary research shows that there is much in the promotional
literature which is misleading, selling hope concerning therapies derived
40 Martin et al., Capitalizing hope, p. 139.
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from cord blood stem cells in case they are needed by the child or its
family in the distant future, although these promises are built on as yet
unproven clinical efficacy: UCB banking for autologous use is associated
with even greater uncertainty than for allogeneic use.
Most pregnant women I interviewed at SRGH Hospital were
unaware of the concept of UCB banking; they would often ask me
for information about it and expressed the opinion that their gynae-
cologists should provide them more information (‘hold classes’) on
this subject. Some had heard that, like blood, UCB can be banked
for later use. Some professional women had heard of it through
newspaper articles, the Internet or from a friend/colleague who
had banked, yet they had only a vague idea of what it really entailed.
In such cases, they contacted a UCB bank themselves. Many of my
respondents (expectant mothers) were undecided whether they
would bank. Some indicated a positive response/willingness to
bank. It was seen as a good/wise investment by expectant women/
couples, mostly from higher income groups due to the cost factor.
Some women even expressed anticipated regret:
‘Having missed the chance, do I need to regret it? I think I was careless.
I will certainly bank if pregnant again.’
(AJ, MBA, telephone interview, 22 February 2011)
Others were happy to have taken the decision to bank in spite of the
cost:
‘We’re quite contented with the decision to bank. We’ll see 10 less movies,
but bank.’
(pregnant woman, engineer, telephone interview, 29 February 2012)
‘It’s more like a precaution than a cure. Our baby will have an option, also
in case of a second child, the sample will be useful for both.’
(GT, pregnant woman, 11 November 2013)
‘It’s not a proven technology. Moreover, it is not that ubiquitous. There
has to be a balance between howmuch safety you want and themoney you
spend.’
(JB, pregnant woman, post-graduate, 25 November 2013)
‘Everyone should do it for the future of the baby, if finances allow it.’
(pregnant woman, ophthalmologist, 26 November 2013)
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None were aware of any risks to mother or child associated with UCB
collection, particularly with early clamping of the umbilical cord, as
noted by some researchers.41
4.7.2 Opinions of Medical Professionals
Among the gynaecologists and obstetricians interviewed
I encountered varying opinions on UCB banking; some placed their
hope in stem cell technology, while others were critical even of
members of their own profession who support UCB banking as well
as of their patients/clients. Dr V. K. Khanna, Head Thalassaemia Unit
of the SGRH Hospital is in favour of UCB banking:
‘I tell all my thalassaemia patients to go for it. The problem is when you
store, the yield is less. The quantity is less than in bonemarrow transplant.
If after five years they can find the cells can be multiplied in vivo, we may
have a cure. Many people have done it, and left it because of less [sic]
success rates. In the conventional bone marrow transplant dose the
number of cells is more. At this time it is private banking.
The government should take the initiative. So many deliveries are taking
place in government hospitals. You will get better match.’ (interview,
27 November 2013).
‘We can help other family members. Family relations can be stronger. But,
not every family thinks like this. If we counsel, as a gynaecologist I think,
we can help promote this. I would like to tell my patients about it. For any
procedure we discuss benefits and risks. We should also think about
affordability, keep in mind that if you don’t bank, you’re not losing on
something.’
(pregnant woman, herself a gynaecologist, interview 7 November 2013)
‘There are only two public banks – Stemocyte and Reliance. Public bank-
ing is more recent. I do recommend in cases of blood disorders. It’s a good
thing if family can afford it . . . It’s a cord and placenta which will
otherwise be thrown away. At the moment they can preserve for only
twenty-one years. After twenty years the contract is transferred to the
child. When the contract expires, will he be able to get it, that question
they can’t answer.’
(Dr V., gynaecologist, interview 16 February 2011)
41 David Hutchon, ‘Commercial cord blood banking – immediate clamping is not safe’
(2006) 333 British Medical Journal 919.
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My preliminary findings are largely corroborated by Pandey et al.,42
who conducted a pioneering study to assess current awareness and
attitudes, in a sample population of potential donors from one of the
largest potential UCB repositories in India. They write:
We established only 26.5% of pregnant women in our study population
knew what exactly is meant by UCB. A large proportion (55.1%) was
undecided on whether they want to bank UCB or not. Women were more
aware of the more advertised private cord blood banking compared to
public banking. More than half of the pregnant women expected their
obstetrician to inform them regarding UCB. One-third of the women in
our population had undue expectations from banking of the UCB.
4.8 Discussion
4.8.1 Truth versus Hope
Public and private cord blood banks draw on different ‘biosocialities’,43
with very few points in common: what Santoro44 refers to as clearly two
opposite models, not only at the point of arrival – that is, where the UCB
is finally preserved – but in the whole process of collection and preserva-
tion. It is important to remember that UCB banking is based mainly on
the future development of stem cell-based therapies. ‘The banking of
UCB rests on current applications of stem cell-based therapies and the
future potential of regenerative medicine and marks the capitalization of
human tissues within a future-oriented regime of hope’.45 Prainsack46
discusses ‘the process of biomedicalization, in which market rationalities
have led to new narratives of hope and promise, both in terms of
increased health and increased profits’.
UCB banking for autologous use is associated with even greater
uncertainty than for allogeneic use. The type of disorder and the need
for autologous cells versus allogeneic cells determines the actual potential
use of these cells. The likelihood of a child requiring a transplant with its
42 Pandey et al., Banking Umbilical Cord Blood (UCB) Stem Cells.
43 Paul Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociality.’
in Essays on the Anthropology of Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
44 Pablo Santoro, ‘From (public?) waste to (private?) value. The regulation of private cord blood
banking in Spain’ (2009) 22(1) Science Studies www.sciencetechnologystudies.org/system/
files/Santoro.pdf. Accessed 10 December 2012.
45 Martin et al., Capitalizing hope, p. 127.
46 B. Prainsack, “Negotiating Life”: The regulation of human cloning and embryonic stem
cell research in Israel’ (2006) 36(2) Social Studies of Science 173–205, p. 176.
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own cord blood is small: from a 1:400 to 1:200,000 chance over the
child’s lifetime,47 and thus private UCB banking is currently not even
cost effective.48 In fact, there are certain instances in which the use of
one’s own umbilical cord blood is contraindicated, as in cases when the
defect is of a genetic origin. For example, autologous cord blood stem
cells cannot be used to treat malignant cancers such as leukaemia
because the genetic mutations for the cancer already exist in the DNA
of the cord blood. Using one’s own stem cells would be, in effect,
contaminating oneself with the same disease process.49 None of this
information is to be found in the promotional flyers and information
packs.
The American Academy of Pediatrics50 states that the use of banked
umbilical cord blood as ‘biological insurance’ is unwarranted, noting that
many of the claims of private cord blood banks are unfounded. Unlike
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,51 the AAP
recommends cord blood collection and banking for all families, but
stipulates that all cord blood should be banked in public banks for use
by the general population. It recommends private cord blood banking
only if a full sibling has a medical diagnosis for which stem cells are
currently being used for treatment.
The unproven clinical efficacy of UCB banking signifies, as several
authors have noted, the increasing dependence of emerging bioeco-
nomies on a promissory future economic value and potential rather
than present use. This has come to signify shifts from ‘regimes of truth’
(linked to established practice and proven evidence), to ‘regimes of
hope’.52 Martin et al. write about how publics are mobilised as active
consumers within neo-liberalised bioeconomies. There is a ‘construction
of expectations’, expectations which have links with markets and ‘pro-
missory capital’. These bioeconomies depend upon the participation of
multiple constituencies collaborating in the establishment of ‘commu-
nities of promise’.53 They are founded on the ‘political economy of hope’,
47 M. J. Sullivan, ‘Banking on cord blood stem cells’ (2008) 8Nature Reviews Cancer 554–63.
48 A. J. Kaimal, C. C Smith, R. K. Laros Jr et al., ‘Cost-effectiveness of private umbilical cord
blood banking’ (2010) 11(5) Obstetrics and Gynecology 1090.
49 B. Percer, ‘Umbilical cord blood banking: Helping parents make informed choices’ (2009)
13(3) Nursing for Women’s Health 216–23.
50 American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), ‘Policy statement: Cord blood banking for
potential future transplantation’ (2007) 119(1) Pediatrics 165–70.
51 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee Opinion 648,
December 2015.
52 Martin et al., ‘Capitalizing hope,’ p. 128. 53 Ibid., p. 129.
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on ‘capitalizing hope’: narratives promising hope in terms of improved
health and increased lifespan.54 Brown and Kraft55 write about active
consumers and responsible parents who are mobilised through commer-
cial UCB banks. The Internet plays a crucial role in this.
As Pablo Santoro56 observes:
The language of insurance and precautionary investment permeates the
marketing of commercial services. Even if the potential applications of
autologous transplantation remain mainly unproven, preserving UCB is
offered as the gate to a potential, though unequal, double future: that of
the child or a family member developing a disease and that of the
biomedical evolution, in which a whole new generation of stem cell
therapies will be developed.
4.8.2 Risk and Uncertainty
It is useful to discuss themarketing of UCBwithin the framework of ‘risk’
theory, which includes concepts such as ‘manufactured risk’ and ‘risk
society’,57 and ‘manufactured uncertainty’/‘fabricated uncertainty’.58
In his various writings Ulrich Beck analyses how science and technology,
mediated through market relations and various social institutions under
industrial modernity, are shaping the future – one dominated by the
matrix of risk and the requirements of risk management, creating
a ‘world risk society’. According to Rose,59 ‘Risk here denotes a family
of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable
futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order
to control that potential future.’ Beck writes about self-generated manu-
factured uncertainties in modern societies and distinguishes between
‘decision-dependent risks that can in principle be brought under control,
and dangers that have escaped or neutralized the control requirements of
industrial society’.60 Various authors have attempted to make
a distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in that the former concerns
54 Nikolas Rose and C. Novas, ‘Biological citizenship’ in A. Ong and S.J. Collier (eds.)Global
Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Malden:
Blackwell, 2005), 439–64.
55 N. Brown and A. Kraft, Blood Ties.
56 Santoro, ‘From (public?) waste to (private?) value’. p. 9.
57 Beck, Risk Society; Beck, World Risk Society; Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity;
Giddens, ‘Risk and responsibility’; Lupton, Risk; Tullock and Lupton, Risk and Everyday
Life; Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’.
58 Beck, World Risk Society; Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity.
59 Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’, p. 7. 60 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 31.
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future probabilities that can be calculated, whereas the latter represents
ones that cannot be. ‘Manufactured uncertainty’means amélange of risk,
more knowledge, more unawareness and reflexivity, and therefore a new
type of risk’.61 ‘The sociology of risk is a science of potentialities and
judgments about probabilities.’62 There is a significant level of human
agency operating in the production and mitigation of ‘manufactured
risks’.
In modern industrialised societies, new types of uncertainties arise
which Giddens63 and Beck64 call ‘manufactured uncertainties’. Scientific
experts participate in the role of producers, analysts and profiteers from
risk definitions by bringing risk into being and ‘selling risk’.65 The shift
from countable risk to uncountable uncertainty is a shift that implies
a parallel change from ‘rational’ prevention to uncertain precaution.66
It also marks a transition from the exercise of a ‘pastoral power’ by the
state to the precautionary action of the ‘somatic individual’.67
4.8.3 Governmentality and Individual Responsibility
Exponents of the ‘risk society’ thesis argue that in late modernity there is
a trend towards individualisation, in that individuals are positioned as
choosing agents who can exercise a great deal of control over the course
of their own lives. ‘Risk is primarily understood as a human responsi-
bility, both in its production and management, rather than the outcome
of fate or destiny, as was the case in pre-modern times’.68
Using the ‘governmentality’69 approach, several authors have drawn
attention to the importance placed upon the self-management of risk and
the increasing ‘privatisation’ of risk, according to Lupton.70 Prainsack71
argues: ‘The regulation of population takes place by devolving
a significant amount of agency to individuals.’ Recent trends within
healthcare to strengthen the autonomy of patients encourage a shift
61 Ibid., p. 112. 62 Ibid., p. 136. 63 Giddens, ‘Risk and responsibility’.
64 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 140. 65 Lupton, Risk.
66 H. Gottweis, ‘Governing genomics in the 21st century: Between risk and uncertainty’
(2005) 24(2) New Genetics and Society 175–94.
67 Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’. 68 Lupton, Risk, p. 4.
69 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller
(eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1991), 87–104.
70 Lupton, Risk.
71 Barbara Prainsack, ‘“Negotiating life”: The regulation of human cloning and embryonic
stem cell research in Israel’ (2006) 36 (2) Social Studies of Science 173–205, p. 195.
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from being a passive patient to being a responsible consumer and active
in assuming responsibility for health (also see the chapters by Huijer and
Detweiler, Zwart and van Beers in this volume).
Lupton72 points out that ‘the theorization of risk has tended to neglect
the insights offered by contemporary feminist theory and the sociology of
the body in understanding the links between gender, embodiment, sub-
jectivity and risk’. According to the ‘governmentality’ perspective, the
pregnant body is ‘an intensely governed body, both on the part of
medicine and on the part of the woman herself as an autonomous, self-
regulating citizen seeking her own best interests (and, even more impor-
tantly these days, those of the foetus)’.73 Parallels can be drawn here with
women’s use of prenatal diagnosis technologies to ensure the health of
the foetus, the future child. ‘Public awareness regarding the role of genes
in the incidence of disease and the possibility of making use of PNT is
increasing; it is associated with modernity and good parenthood.’74 With
the principle of informed choice and the ethical imagining of the preg-
nant woman as an autonomous individual, the woman is perceived as
responsible for this choice and thereby also for the possible future of the
child and the family unit, the prevailing theme in the advertising of
commercial services. Once again, as with other reproductive technologies
(such as contraceptives or prenatal testing technologies), the onus is laid
on women. There is an imperative to choose in favour of technology
when women find themselves in the risk trap, and anticipated regret if
they do not bank. For this reason, some women whom I interviewed
expressed feelings of guilt and a sense of regret if UCB had not been
banked in an earlier pregnancy. This is also reported by Fernandez et al.75
based on their study among Canadian pregnant women. As Helén76
warns in the context of prenatal genetic testing, it is a case of ‘risk
individualized’ and ‘responsibilization’, leaving the ethical responsibility
with ‘the mother’ and, in doing so, imposing an existential condition.
The AAP made a strong case for public cord blood banking in 2007.
In Europe and the USA, professional bodies actively discourage private
72 Lupton, Risk, pp. 7–8. 73 Lupton, Risk, p. 8.
74 Jyotsna A. Gupta ‘Exploring Indian women’s reproductive decision-making regarding
prenatal testing’ (2010) 12(2) Culture, Health and Sexuality 191–204, p. 192.
75 C. V. Fernandez, K. Gordon, M. Van den Hof, S. Taweel and F. Baylis, ‘Knowledge and
attitudes of pregnant women with regard to collection, testing and banking of cord blood
stem cells’ (2003) 168(6) Canadian Medical Association Journal 695–98.
76 I. Helén, ‘Risk management and ethics in high-tech antenatal care’, in R. Bunton and
A. Petersen (eds.), Genetic Governance: Health, Risk and Ethics in the Biotech Era
(London: Routledge, 2005), 47–63, pp. 55–6.
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UCB banking for self-use or for use by a family member at a later date,
and instead recommend publicly funded banks that collect voluntary
donations.77 When the number of units stored in public banks increases,
the chances of finding amatching unit also increase. If most parents bank
their babies’ UCB privately there will not be enough supply for public
banks for the general public to draw from. Although therapeutic claims
relating to UCB stem cells are still doubtful, questions of access to bank-
ing facility through public banks for the less well-off need to be consid-
ered as private UCB banks are proliferating. Private UCB banks threaten
the solidarity principle as equity and access to future therapies may be
limited to the few who can afford private UCB banking. Private and
public banking reflect the wider gap between private and public health-
care in India.
There is much controversy surrounding the efficacy of stem cell-based
treatments. There is a lack of knowledge and a lot of misinformation
present among pregnant women and family members in India regarding
the benefits of UCB banking. Most of the respondents thought that the
therapies were already available or would be shortly available for over 45
diseases and medical conditions, and since one or more family members
suffered from various diseases they would be able to benefit. Some of the
statements made by private cord blood banks are outright misleading.78
This has to do with misleading advertising which builds on the promis-
sory value of stem cells derived from UCB rather than proven therapies.
‘Lothian and DeVries79 reinforce the AAP’s position that expectant
families are vulnerable to the marketing strategies of private cord blood
banks. The authors go on to say that expectant parents should know that
banking UCB does not guarantee a cure. Likewise, there is no guarantee
that a private UCB bank will be able to adequately preserve the cord
blood until a time when it is needed. One potential reason for being
unable to preserve the cord blood is that the private UCB bank could go
out of business. The shelf-life of UCB is uncertain; currently it is
77 American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), ‘Policy statement: Cord blood banking for
potential future transplantation’ (2007) 119(1) Pediatrics 165–70; D. McKenna
and J. Sheth, ‘Umbilical cord blood: Current status and promise for the future’ (2011)
134(3) Indian Journal ofMedical Research 261–69; American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG). Committee Opinion 648, December 2015.
78 N. S. Fox, C. Stevens, R. Cuibotariu, P. Rubinstein, L. B. McCullough and
F. A. Chervenak, ‘Umbilical cord blood collection: Do patients really understand?’
(2007) 35 Journal of Perinatal Medicine 314–21.
79 J. Lothian and C. De Vries, The Official Lamaze Guide: Giving Birth with Confidence
(New York, NY: Meadowbrook Press, 2010, 2nd ed.).
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estimated that its efficacy ranges from 15 to 18 years, but it is unknown if
the cells would be preserved over the entire lifetime of a person. Also, this
may vary from unit to unit, or from one bank to another.
One may also ask how informed is informed consent in the case of
women who do decide to bank. As research in other settings has
revealed,80 my respondents also appeared to be underinformed about
UCB banking. They do not seem to be aware that the success rates
described for UCB relate to haematological disorders within the family
(usually sibling donations), whereas the usefulness of autologous UCB in
other disorders is still under trial.
4.9 Public Banking Favoured
There are now two international registries: NETCORD, which lists cord
blood units only, and Bone Marrow Donors Worldwide, which lists
both bone marrow and cord blood donors.81 Private (commercial) UCB
banks threaten the solidarity principle, equity and access to future
therapies. When well-intentioned parents bank cord blood privately,
it removes another unit from the public supply – potentially harming
everyone in the end, including their own baby. In the extreme case, if
the private bank goes out of business, the cord blood is lost to the
parents too. ‘Me Medicine, in this guise, isn’t even good for the indivi-
dual, let alone the collective’, says Dickenson.82 Weighing the pros and
cons of private and public UCB banking she makes a strong case for
public banking. She quotes from an editorial in the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists journal which states, ‘We argue for
public umbilical cord blood banking as a matter of good public health
and economic sense.’83
Donation to a public bank is widely regarded as an altruistic act of civic
responsibility that qualifies one as a ‘good citizen’,84 whereas paying to
store UCB may be regarded as a ‘unique opportunity’ to provide ‘insur-
ance’ for the child’s future.85 Based on their findings from a survey of
80 Fox et al., ‘Umbilical cord blood collection’.
81 M. G. Butler and J. E. Menitove, ‘Umbilical cord blood banking: An update’ (2011) 28
Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics 669–676. doi:10.1007/s10815-011–9577-
x.
82 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 92. 83 Ibid., p. 96.
84 Waldby, ‘Umbilical cord blood: From social gift to venture capital’.
85 M. Porter, I. H. Kerridge and C. F. C. Jordens, ‘“GoodMothering” or “Good Citizenship”?
Conflicting values in choosing whether to donate or store umbilical cord blood’ (2012) 9
Bioethical Inquiry 41–7, p. 41.
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Australian women, Porter et al. conclude that mothers are faced with
competing discourses that force them to choose between being a ‘good
mother’ and fulfilling their role as a ‘good citizen’. In India this dichot-
omy is not experienced by pregnant women as the clientele of public and
private banks is based on whether women give birth in a public or private
hospital, which in turn is based on financial affordability. The main
motivation for those who can afford to bank at a private UCB bank is
to serve the future medical needs of their child or a family member if
needed. Public donation of stem cells increases our national supply of
cord blood samples to help save people needing a suitable stem cell
match. Considering the huge ethnic diversity in the country many
more units would be required to give patients a reasonable chance of
finding a match. ‘The major problem faced in India is collection of UCB
due to high cost and comparatively less functional public banks.
In addition, considering a large population with deliveries in public
hospital due to low cost, UCB storage in India needs increased public-
private partnership model where UCB can be stored by affordable and
non-affordable people as well.’86
The shift from ‘We Medicine’ to ‘Me Medicine’, characterising the
trend in late modernity towards individualisation, also marks a transition
from the exercise of a ‘pastoral power’ by the state to the precautionary
action of the ‘somatic individual’.87 Private storage of cord blood is thus
marketed, in accordance with neo-liberal principles, as a form of spec-
ulative ‘biological insurance’: the cord blood ‘account’ offers the client
personal bio-security and personal risk management.88 ‘Unlike financial
types of insurance, biological insurance of the type promoted by private
banks does not protect people by sharing individual risk across
a population. Instead of pooling risk, this type of biological insurance
operates by placing greater responsibility on individuals to manage
future harm’.89 Further, it exonerates the state from investing in preven-
tive public health measures and public health services for the benefit of all
its citizens, while shifting the responsibility to private individuals for
circumventing health risk and investing in the future health of their
progeny.
86 McKenna and Sheth, ‘Umbilical cord blood: Current status and promise for the future’,
p. 264.
87 Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’.
88 Waldby, ‘Umbilical cord blood: From social gift to venture capital’, p. 64.
89 J. Haw, ‘The trouble with biological insurance,’ Impact Ethics, 4 November 2013.
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As private UCB banking is proliferating fast in India, an important
issue to consider is how to ensure that the information is balanced
(educating) and not biased (persuading) in favour of aggressive market-
ing and profit motivations of private enterprise or the ambitions of
researchers so that pregnant women can make well-informed decisions
whether to bank or not, and also to choose between public and private
UCB banks.
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5Combating the Trade in Organs
Why We Should Preserve the Communal Nature of Organ
Transplantation
kristof van assche
5.1 Introduction
Organ transplantation is often considered as one of the miracles of
modern medicine. Patients suffering from end-stage organ failure used
to face a certain, untimely and agonising death before medical break-
throughsmade it possible to replace a damaged organ with an organ from
another person.1 Since the first successful kidney transplant in 1954, solid
organ transplantation has become a global success. In 2016, 98,531 solid
organ transplants were performed worldwide, including 62,333 kidney
and 21,802 liver transplant procedures.2 From its outset the transplant
system has been governed by the key principles of voluntariness and
altruism. These principles are deemed crucial to safeguard the integrity of
the transplant system, since continued public support for organ trans-
plantation depends on confidence that organs will be ethically obtained
and equitably distributed.
At a more fundamental level, the principle of altruism is essential
because organs are too integral to personhood to allow their commodi-
fication. Treating organs as articles of commerce would undermine the
value of the persons who sell them and, in a broader perspective, would
debase humanity in general. Relatedly, altruism in organ donation is
important because it allows persons to express and foster communal
virtues. Therefore, allowing market norms to invade the interpersonal
context of organ donation would irreversibly damage the quality of
1 Peter J. Morris, ‘Transplantation – Amedical miracle of the 20th century’ (2004) 351 New
England Journal of Medicine 2678–80.
2 Data from Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation (GODT).
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relationships, community identification and notions of shared obliga-
tions essential to a flourishing society.3
Since altruism and solidarity remain the guiding principles, Donna
Dickenson rightly emphasises that the transplant system has come to
‘symbolize We Medicine at its noblest’.4 However, she warns that,
with the advent of ‘market triumphalism’ and the concomitant
exaltation of personal choice, we are currently witnessing an (alleg-
edly) unstoppable movement towards claiming property rights in
human body parts. The examples given by Dickenson, such as
DNA samples, oocytes and umbilical cord blood, and her discussion
about collecting, storing, using and patenting human tissues in the
context of biobanks expose what she calls a new ‘enclosure move-
ment’ that is targeting human body material.5
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, I will show that, just like
the other human biotechnologies considered by Dickenson, organ
transplantation has come under intense pressure from free-market
economics. The focus here will be both on the existing black market
in organs and on proposals to establish a regulated organ market in
developed countries. Second, I will examine and reject both the claims
made by proponents of a regulated organ market and the validity of the
utilitarian theory of property, which is – albeit generally uncon-
sciously – invoked by these advocates to substantiate their claims.
Third, building in part on the ethical considerations put forward by
Dickenson, I will examine the value of the personhood theory of
property and demonstrate that it is essential to preserve the altruistic
nature of organ transplantation so as to prevent dehumanisation and
the further erosion of our social fabric.
5.2 The Spectre of the Black Market
Contrary to general belief, attempts to trade in organs are not new.
In fact, the buying and selling of organs emerged as a fairly widespread
3 The arguments and the literature to substantiate these claims will be provided further on in
this chapter.
4 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 72.
5 See also Donna Dickenson, ‘Commodification of human tissue: Implications for feminist
and development ethics’ (2002) 2(1)DevelopingWorld Bioethics 55–63; Donna Dickenson,
Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007); Donna Dickenson, Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008).
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phenomenon immediately after it became technically possible to receive
an organ from an unrelated donor. Back in 1985, two years after
cyclosporine was released for general use in the prevention and treat-
ment of organ rejection, the first cases were reported of kidney patients
from wealthy countries travelling to developing countries to purchase
a kidney from destitute persons. Patients in need of an organ soon
learned that they could circumvent the prohibition of commercialisation
in their countries of origin and, if they could afford it and had no ethical
objections, could buy an organ in countries where this prohibition was
poorly enforced or where transplant legislation was marred by loop-
holes. This phenomenon of ‘transplant tourism’ was quickly and uni-
versally condemned by international organisations.6 Despite significant
successes in curbing transplant tourism – a practice which in 2000 was
subsumed under the general heading of ‘human trafficking (for organ
removal)’ – the international black market involving the payment and
outright exploitation of organ donors has proven very difficult to
eradicate.7
Due to its illegal and dynamic nature, the exact extent of the interna-
tional black market in organs is unknown. According to broad estimates
by the World Health Organization (WHO), transplantation of organs
purchased from destitute populations in the developing world accounts
for up to 10 per cent of all transplant activities performed worldwide.
Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the USA and countries in
Western Europe and the Middle East have been identified as the main
countries of origin of transplant tourists.8 By contrast, the countries of
destination are to be found in the developing world and include Bolivia,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Iraq, Moldova, Nepal,
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
Building on pioneering reports from anthropologists Nancy Scheper-
Hughes and Debra Budiani-Saberi, a clear picture of the international
6 World Medical Association Statement on Live Organ Trade, Brussels, October 1985;
World Medical Association Declaration on Human Organ Transplantation, Madrid,
October 1987; 3rd Conference of European Health Ministers, Organ Transplantation,
Paris, 16–17 November 1987, Appendix II, Para. 16; Resolution WHA42.5 on Preventing
the Purchase and Sale of Human Organs, Geneva, 15 May 1989.
7 United Nations, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Palermo, 15 November 2000.
8 Yosuke Shimazono, ‘The State of the international organ trade: A provisional picture
based on integration of available information’ (2007) 85(12) Bulletin of the World Health
Organization 955–62.
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black market in organs has only recently emerged.9 Research reveals an
enormous discrepancy between what the recipient has to pay (between
$100,000 and $200,000) and what the organ vendor eventually receives
(between $500 and $10,000).10 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that this
trade in organs is considered as one of the most lucrative of black
markets, with strong incentives on the part of brokers and collaborating
healthcare professionals to continue their illegal activities.11
One of the most disturbing findings of these reports is that, invariably,
organ vendors come from the poorest strata of society and only cooperate
because of their desperate financial situation and because they are misled
about the nature of the surgical procedure and the consequences of giving
up a kidney. Trafficking networks ruthlessly exploit the position of
extreme vulnerability, lack of alternatives and lack of education of their
victims to maximise their own profits. Due to their precarious situation,
victims generally have no real and acceptable choice but to submit to this
very serious violation of their physical integrity.12 Several studies high-
light that a huge majority of organ vendors later express serious regrets,
stating that they would certainly not have agreed to the transaction if
9 See Debra A. Budiani-Saberi and Francis L. Delmonico, ‘Organ trafficking and transplant
tourism: A commentary on the global realities’ (2008) 8(5) American Journal of
Transplantation 925–9; Debra A. Budiani-Saberi, ‘Organ trafficking and transplant tour-
ism’ in Vardit Ravitsky, Autumn Fiester and Arthur L. Caplan (eds.), The Penn Center
Guide to Bioethics (New York, NY: Springer, 2009), pp. 699–708; Debra A. Budiani-Saberi
and Kabir Karim, ‘The social determinants of organ trafficking: A reflection of social
inequity’ (2009) 4(1) Social Medicine 48–51; Debra A. Budiani-Saberi and Amr Mostafa,
‘Care for commercial living donors: The experience of an NGO’s outreach in egypt’
(2011) 24(4) Transplant International 317–23; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘The global traffic
in human organs’ (2000) 41(2) Current Anthropology 191–224; Nancy Scheper-Hughes,
‘Keeping an eye on the global traffic in human organs’ (2003) 361(9369) The Lancet
1645–8; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Black market organs: Inside the trans-atlantic trans-
plant tourism trade’ LIP Magazine 3 June 2005.
10 Marta López-Fraga, Kristof Van Assche, Beatriz Domínguez-Gil et al., ‘Human trafficking
for the purpose of organ removal’ in Ryszard Piotrowicz, Conny Rijken and Baerbel
H. Uhl (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking (London: Routledge, 2017), pp.
120–134; Assya Pascalev, Jessica de Jong, Frederike Ambagtsheer et al., ‘Trafficking in
human beings for the purpose of organ removal: A comprehensive literature review’ in
Frederike Ambagtsheer and Willem Weimar (eds.), Trafficking in Human Beings for the
Purpose of Organ Removal: Results and Recommendations (Lengerich: Pabst, 2016), pp.
15–68; Scheper-Hughes, ‘The Global Traffic’.
11 Jeremy Haken, Transnational Crime in the Developing World (Washington, DC: Center
for International Policy, 2011).
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Issue Paper: Abuse of a Position of
Vulnerability and other ‘Means’ within the Definition of Trafficking in Persons
(New York, NY: United Nations, 2013).
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their situation had not been so hopeless and if they had been properly
informed about the consequences.13
To make matters even worse, intimidation and coercion are frequently
used to force reluctant or unwilling victims to cooperate and to dissuade
them from later alerting law enforcement officials. Moreover, organ
vendors are further exploited in that the sum they eventually receive
generally is much less than what had been promised.14 Shockingly, some
cases have even been reported of blatant organ theft from persons under-
going unrelated surgery or from patients in psychiatric institutions.
There is even some anecdotal evidence of persons, including children,
having been abducted, sold and killed for their organs.15
Even apart from their exploitation at the moment of recruitment and
organ removal, victims of the black market in organs suffer from very
negative post-operative consequences. Their hope of paying off crippling
debts and securing a minimum level of subsistence through selling an
organ quickly proves illusory. Few, if any, vendors manage to improve
their financial situation in the medium term. On the contrary, they
are back in significant debt within a couple of years and experience
a significant decline in household income, attributed to a deterioration
in their physical status, which prevents them from sustaining the
demands of hard physical labour. A large majority of vendors even report
that their health worsened significantly, due to mediocre initial health,
lack of post-operative care and a continuing unhealthy lifestyle or envir-
onment. Because of the unavailability of medical assistance, or the
inability to pay for it, many of these vendors in time suffer organ failure,
13 Debra A. Budiani-Saberi and Seán Columb, ‘A human rights approach to human traffick-
ing for organ removal’ (2013) 16(4) Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 897–914;
Budiani-Saberi and Delmonico, ‘Organ trafficking and transplant tourism’.
14 See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Trafficking in Human Beings
for the Purpose of Organ Removal in the OSCE Region: Analysis and Findings, Occasional
Paper Series 6 (Vienna: Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 2013); United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, Assessment Toolkit: Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal
(New York, NY: United Nations, 2015). See also Alexis A. Aronowitz, Human
Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings (Greenwood
Publishing Group, 2009); Elaine Pearson, Coercion in the Kidney Trade? A Background
Study on Trafficking in Human Organs Worldwide (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit, 2004).
15 Vivek Chaudhary, ‘Argentina uncovers patients killed for organs’ (1992) 304(5834)
British Medical Journal 1073–4; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Commodity fetishism in organs
trafficking’ in Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Loïc Wacquant (eds.), Commodifying Bodies
(London: Sage, 2002), pp. 31–62.
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which most likely results in early death. Furthermore, vendors suffer
from stigmatisation and social isolation and many of them mention
suffering severe depression and anxiety.16
In the context of the international black market in organs, the intro-
duction of rampant market forces has resulted in a complete and inten-
tional disregard for even the most basic interests of organ vendors. Their
desperation is unscrupulously exploited to make huge profits and they
are left even worse off. Moreover, the interests of the recipients, whose
own desperation fuels the demand that drives the black market, are
frequently also negatively affected. Compared to transplantation within
the regulated domestic system, transplant tourists run significantly
higher mortality and morbidity risks. More specifically, data reveal
a heightened frequency of complications, due to a higher incidence of
unconventional, often life-threatening infections, resulting in
a significantly lower patient and graft survival rate. The reasons for this
poor outcome are multifactorial: worse initial health of recipients, who
are generally older or occasionally even excluded from their domestic
waiting list for medical reasons; the inadequacy of pre-transplantation
health screening of donors; substandard medical facilities; abbreviated
and deficient medical aftercare; and compromised follow-up at home,
due to scarce and often unintelligible medical documentation.17
16 See Nasrollah Ghahramani, S. Adibul Hasan Rizvi and Benita Padilla, ‘Paid donation:
A global view: Outcomes of paid donation in Iran, Pakistan and Philippines’ (2012) 19(4)
Advances in Chronic Kidney Disease 262–8; Madhav Goyal, Ravindra L. Mehta,
Lawrence Schneiderman and Ashwini R. Sehgal, ‘Economic and health consequences of
selling a kidney in India’ (2002) 288(13) Journal of the American Medical Association
1589–93; S. Naqvi, S. Rizvi, M. Zafar et al., ‘Health status and renal function evaluation of
kidney vendors: A report from Pakistan’ (2008) 8 American Journal of Transplantation
1444–1450; Imran Sajjad, Lyndsay S. Baines, Prem Patel et al., ‘Commercialization of
kidney transplants: A systematic review of outcomes in recipients and donors’ (2008) 28
(5) American Journal of Nephrology 744–54; Allison Tong, Jeremy R. Chapman,
Germaine Wong et al., ‘The experiences of commercial kidney donors: Thematic synth-
esis of qualitative research’ (2012) 25 (11) Transplant International 1138–49.
17 See Ashley E. Anker and Thomas H. Feeley, ‘Estimating the risks of acquiring a kidney
abroad: A meta-analysis of complications following participation in transplant tourism’
(2012) 26(3) Clinical Transplantation E232-41; N. Inston, D. Gill, A. Al-Hakim et al.,
‘Living paid organ transplantation results in unacceptably high recipient morbidity and
mortality’ (2005) 37(2) Transplant Proceedings 560–2; Meng-Kun Tsai, Ching-Yao Yang,
Chich-Yuan Lee et al., ‘De novo malignancy is associated with renal transplant tourism’
(2011) 79(8) Kidney International 908–14; Yarkin K. Yakupoglu, Ender Ozden,
Melda Dilek et al., ‘Transplantation tourism: High risk for the recipients’ (2010) 24(6)
Clinical Transplantation 835–8.
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Combined with the enormous financial sacrifice required to obtain an
organ, recipients may thus run a real risk of being exploited themselves.
‘Transplant tourism’ not only negatively affects the interests of both
vendors and recipients, but it also creates significant negative external-
ities, in that it may result in major costs and harms that have to be borne
by third parties. In this respect, it has to be noted that both the lost
productivity of vendors and the possible medical costs exceeding their
financial ability will have to be shouldered by local communities.
In addition, the emergence of underground markets may impede the
development of a regular local transplant system that would allow local
residents a reasonable chance of obtaining an organ.18 The negative
externality argument equally applies to the country of origin of the
transplant tourist. On their return home, the medical problems that
recipients may experience as a result of the suboptimal transplant con-
ditions associated with their illicit transplant will need to be addressed by
the domestic healthcare system.19 In addition, physicians will be forced to
bear responsibility for their medical treatment.20 Transplant tourism is
also likely to have detrimental effects on the efforts to develop organ
transplant programmes and attain national self-sufficiency in the country
of origin, since governments may feel less responsibility if their nationals
can obtain organs abroad relatively easily.21
5.3 The Delusion of a Regulated Organ Market
Although the principle of non-commercialisation has been upheld in
clinical practice across the USA andWestern Europe for a long time, as it
was already specified in the first domestic transplant laws (i.e. Italy,
Norway and Spain) and is enshrined in a wide range of international
guidelines and legal instruments, the idea of introducing a domestic
market in organs has proven difficult to resist for some.22 Notoriously,
18 Emily R. Kelly, ‘International Organ Trafficking Crisis: Solutions Addressing the Heart of
the Matter’ (2013) 54(3) Boston College Law Review 1317–49.
19 Katrina A. Bramstedt and Jun Xu, ‘Checklist: Passport, Plane Ticket, Organ Transplant’
(2007) 7(7) American Journal of Transplantation 1698–701.
20 Budiani-Saberi and Delmonico, ‘Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism’.
21 George M. Abouna, ‘Negative Impact of Trading in Human Organs on the Development
of Transplantation in the Middle East’ (1993) 25(3) Transplant Proceedings 2310–3;
Budiani-Saberi, ‘Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism’.
22 International guidelines and legal instruments include Council of Europe, Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997, CETSNo. 164; Council of Europe,
Additional Protocol concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human
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at the end of 1983, a Virginia physician established a company to broker
kidney sales in the USA. Triggered by the growing demand for kidney
transplants and the emergence of transplant tourism, he planned to bring
in poor donors from developing countries to sell kidneys directly on
American soil.23 Fear of exploitation, inequality in allocation and erosion
of the communitarian spirit of the transplant system quickly prompted
the US Congress to adopt the National Organ Transplant Act, crimina-
lising the transfer of an organ for valuable consideration.24
However, the general prohibition on commercialisation has not been
universally well received. As a result of the increasing gap between the
supply of and the demand for organs, especially in the USA, calls to relax
or abandon the principle of non-commercialisation are growing louder.
Proponents of an organ market point out that, as compared to the first
decennia of organ transplantation, the number of patients desperately
waiting for an organ is much higher and continues to grow at a much
faster pace than organ donation rates and transplant activities. Recently
published data on kidney transplantation indeed paint a grim picture.
For instance, at the end of 2017, in the USA, 103,226 patients were
waiting for a kidney, as compared to 88,867 at the end of 2012, while
only 19,849 transplants were performed in 2017, up from 16,487 in 2012.
In 2017, approximately 14 persons died each day while waiting for
a kidney transplant. By contrast, the European Union is one of very few
regions where organ shortage levels seem to have stabilised over the last
few years. In 2016, in the EU 69,053 patients were on the kidney waiting
Origin, Strasbourg, 24 January 2002, CETS No. 186; Council of Europe, Convention
against Trafficking in Human Organs, Santiago de Compostela, 25 March 2015, CETS
No. 216; European Union, Directive 2010/53/EU on Standards of Quality and Safety of
Human Organs Intended for Transplantation, Brussels, 7 July 2010; World Health
Organization Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue, and Organ Transplantation,
Geneva, May 2010; World Medical Association Statement on Human Organ Donation
and Transplantation, replaced by Statement on Organ and Tissue Donation, Bangkok,
October 2012; Steering Committee of the Istanbul Summit, ‘Organ Trafficking and
Transplant Tourism and Commercialism: The Declaration of Istanbul’ (2008) 372
(9632) The Lancet 5–6; The Ethics Committee of The Transplantation Society,
‘The Consensus Statement of the Amsterdam Forum on the Care of the Live Kidney
Donor’ (2004) 78(4) Transplantation 491–2; The Ethics Committee of
The Transplantation Society, ‘The Ethics Statement of the Vancouver Forum on the
Live Lung, Liver, Pancreas, and Intestine Donor’ (2006) 81(10) Transplantation 1386–7.
23 Margaret Engel, ‘Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys’
The Washington Post 19 September 1983.
24 Jed A. Gross, ‘E Pluribus UNOS: The National Organ Transplant Act and Its
Postoperative Complications’ (2008) 8(1) Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics
145–252.
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list, as compared to 69,364 in 2012. However, only 20,638 transplants
were performed in 2016, up from 18,854 in 2012, and on average 5
patients died each day on the kidney waiting list.25 On a global scale, it
is estimated that the number of transplants performed represents less
than 10 per cent of total transplant needs.26
In parallel with the worsening organ shortage in the USA, the first
detailed proposals for a regulated domestic organ market were presented
in the 1980s. Currently, a wide variety of proposals is circulating. Some
take the form of a futures market whereby individuals would sell the right
to remove and transplant their organs upon their death.27 Others propose
‘benefits’ for living organ donation, such as tax credits, comprehensive
life-long health coverage, disability and life insurance, tuition vouchers,
a contribution to a retirement plan, or the payment of funeral and burial
expenses made to families of post-mortem donors.28 However, most
proposals involve direct payment to living donors.29 In recent years,
proponents of a regulated organ market have stepped up their efforts
25 Calculations on the basis of the data found in the national data reports of the US Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network and in EDQM and Council of Europe,
‘International Figures on Donation and Transplantation – 2016’ (2017) Newsletter
Transplant 22.
26 Data from Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation (GODT).
27 Lloyd R. Cohen, ‘Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market’ (1989) 58(1) George Washington Law Review 1–51; Curtis E. Harris and Stephen
P. Alcorn, ‘To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ
Donation’ (2001) 16(3) Issues in Law & Medicine 213–33; Andrew J. Love, ‘Replacing
Our Current System of Organ Procurement with a Futures Market: Will Organ Supply
Be Maximized?’ (1997) 37(2) Jurimetrics 167–86.
28 See, for instance, Robert Arnold, Steven Bartlett, James Bernat et al., ‘Financial Incentives
for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reappraisal’ (2002) 73(8) Transplantation
1361–7; J. Randall Boyer, ‘Gifts of the Heart . . . and Other Tissues: Legalizing the Sale
of Human Organs and Tissues’ (2012) 1 Brigham Young University Law Review 313–40;
Joseph B. Clamon, ‘Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation
Through Tax Credits’ (2008) 17(1) Annals of Health Law 67–99; Curtis E. Harris and
Stephen P. Alcorn, ‘To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ
Donation’ (2001) 16(3) Issues in Law & Medicine 213–33; Jake Linford, ‘The Kidney
Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial Incentives for
Kidney DonationWhile Preserving Altruistic Meaning’ (2009) 2(2) Saint Louis University
Journal of Health Law & Policy 265–326.
29 Mark J. Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the
Market (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005); Gerald Dworkin,
‘Markets and Morals: The Case for Organ Sales’ in Gerald Dworkin (ed.), Morality,
Harm and the Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 155–61;
Benjamin Hippen, ‘In Defense of a Regulated Market in Kidneys from Living Vendors’
(2005) 30(6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 593–626; Sally Satel (ed.), When
Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney Donors (Washington, DC:
combating the trade in organs 85
considerably, imploring American political leaders to start trials to assess
whether the introduction of financial incentives would increase donation
rates.30 With the election of Donald Trump as the new American pre-
sident, there seems to be renewed hope among proponents that their
proposals might for the first time be taken seriously at governmental
level.31
Advocates of a regulated organ market argue that the growing organ
shortage and the difficulties in curtailing transplant tourism make the
introduction of financial incentives morally imperative.32 They allege
that a domestic system for ‘compensated living kidney donation’ can be
set up with substantial safeguards that would avoid the negative effects of
the black market in organs. These measures would involve safety mea-
sures for vendor protection (i.e. appropriate screening, adequate infor-
mation and good post-operative follow-up), quality control of the organs
and complete transparency of the market process. Crucially, the state
would be the only legal buyer, would set a fixed price and would deter-
mine the conditions of sale. Moreover, strict institutional oversight
AEI Press, 2008); James S. Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys:WhyMarkets in Human Body Parts
Are Morally Imperative (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).
30 See Gary S. Becker and Julio J. Elias, ‘Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs’
TheWall Street Journal 18 January 2014; Nir Eyal, Julio Frenk, Michele B. Goodwin et al.,
‘An Open Letter to President Barack Obama, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Attorney General Eric Holder and Leaders of Congress’,
11 September 2014, available at: www.ustransplantopenletter.org/openletter.html;
A. Matas, J. A. E. Ambagtsheer, R. Gaston et al., ‘A Realistic Proposal – Incentives May
Increase Donation – We Need Trials Now!’ (2012) 12(7) American Journal of
Transplantation 1957–8; Sally Satel and David C. Cronin II, ‘Time to Test Incentives to
Increase Organ Donation’ (2015) 175(8) Journal of the American Medical Association
Internal Medicine 1329–33; Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation,
‘Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposed Standards for an Internationally Acceptable
System’ (2012) 12(2) American Journal of Transplantation 306–12.
31 Sally Satel, ‘You’ve Heard of Trump Steaks, now Trump Kidneys’ Forbes
15 November 2016.
32 See Frederike Ambagtsheer and Willem Weimar, ‘A Criminological Perspective: Why
Prohibition of Organ Trade Is Not Effective and How the Declaration of Istanbul Can
Move Forward’ (2012) 12(3) American Journal of Transplantation 571–5;
Michael M. Friedlaender, ‘The Right to Sell or Buy a Kidney: Are We Failing Our
Patients?’ (2002) 359(9310) The Lancet 971–3; Michael B. Gill and Robert M. Sade,
‘Paying for Kidneys: The Case for Repealing Prohibition’ (2002) 12(1) Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 17–46; Julia D. Mahoney, ‘Should We Adopt a Market
Strategy to Increase the Supply of Transplantable Organs?’ in Wayne N. Shelton and
John Balint (eds.), The Ethics of Organ Transplantation (New York, NY: Elsevier, 2001),
pp. 65–88.
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would be provided by a competent body and the organs would be
allocated on the basis of medical need.33
Although these proposals might seem convincing to some, they are in
fact problematic on all levels. Firstly, it should be stressed that the
proposed regulated domestic organ market is bound to fail. In this
respect, profound doubts have been voiced as to the feasibility of
a regulated system, taking into account that it would be very difficult to
prevent patients from soliciting a cheaper price and circumventing the
system.34 It is indeed highly unlikely that the envisioned oversight
mechanisms would be able to regulate all market transactions effectively,
because the legalisation of the market will in itself encourage desperate
patients and potential vendors to negotiate a better deal. Since, as will be
argued below, organ supply will eventually decrease after an initial surge,
regulation will probably be gradually relaxed and ever more closely
resemble an open market. This will actually invite the exploitation that
the regulated market was intended to prevent in the first place.35 At the
same time, continuing shortages in organs and the possibility of obtain-
ing cheaper organs abroad will fuel black market activities in the devel-
oping world.
Moreover, it is readily predictable that the introduction of a domestic
organ market in developed countries will propel developing countries to
embrace a similar model, in a vain attempt to bolster donation rates and
clean up their black markets. However, in view of their regulatory
difficulties in combating current abuses, it is naïve to presume that in
33 T. Randolph Beard and Jim Leitzel, ‘Designing a Compensated-Kidney Donation System’
(2014) 77(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 253–87; Gary S. Becker and Julio J. Elias,
‘Introducing Incentives in theMarket for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations’ (2007) 21
(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 3–24; David C. Cronin II and Julio J. Elias,
‘Operational Organization of a System for Compensated Living Organ Providers’ in
Sally Satel (ed.), When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney
Donors (Washington, DC, AEI Press, 2008), pp. 34–49; Arthur J. Matas, ‘Design of
a Regulated System of Compensation for Living Kidney Donors’ (2008) 22(3) Clinical
Transplantation 378–84; Arthur J. Matas, BenjaminHippen and Sally Satel, ‘In Defense of
a Regulated System of Compensation for Living Donation’ (2008) 13(4) Current Opinion
in Organ Transplantation 379–85; Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation,
‘Incentives for Organ Donation’.
34 Francis L. Delmonico, Robert Arnold, Nancy Scheper-Hughes et al., ‘Ethical Incentives –
Not Payment – for Organ Donation’ (2002) 346(25) New England Journal of Medicine
2002–5; Francis L. Delmonico, Gabriel M. Danovitch, Alexander M. Capron et al.,
‘“Proposed Standards for Incentives for Organs Donation” Are Neither International
Nor Acceptable’ (2012) 12(7) American Journal of Transplantation 1954–5.
35 Simon Rippon, ‘Imposing Options on People in Poverty: The Harm of a Live Donor
Organ Market’ (2012) 40(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 145–50.
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those countries a market in organs could be regulated effectively.36 Most
likely, increasing financial competition between countries will emerge,
resulting in a weakly regulated, globalised organ market, with interna-
tional and local bureaucracies and law enforcement having the greatest
trouble preventing a race to the bottom. In the worst case scenario, the
exploitative practices of current transplant tourism would become legit-
imate practices, legally sanctioned at a global level.37 In short, introdu-
cing a regulated organ market might well result in the exact opposite of
what it aims to achieve.
Secondly, it is similarly very doubtful that the introduction of
a regulated organ market would result in a stable supply of organs that
would eradicate the transplant waiting list. To substantiate their claim
that it is self-evident that donation rates would increase significantly,
proponents of such a market generally point to Iran, the only country in
the world where an official system of compensation for living kidney
donors is operational.38 However, after an initial surge in living kidney
donation rates, since 2009 numbers have declined consistently and
very rapidly.39 Although there is some discussion as to whether, as the
official version goes, the waiting list for kidney transplantation had at one
point indeed disappeared, there is ample evidence that currently there is
a long waiting list.40 Consequently, contrary to what proponents of
a regulated organ market want to believe, data from Iran indicate that
an organ market is not (necessarily) able to sustain high donation rates.
36 Vivekanand Jha and Kirpal S. Chugh, ‘The Case Against a Regulated System of Living
Kidney Sales’ (2006) 2(9) Nature Clinical Practice Nephrology 466–7; Samuel J. Kerstein,
‘Autonomy,Moral Constraints, andMarkets in Kidneys’ (2009) 34(6) Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 573–85; Scheper-Hughes, ‘Keeping an Eye on the Global Traffic’.
37 Hans J. Schlitt, ‘Paid Non-Related Living Organ Donation: Horn of Plenty or Pandora’s
Box?’ (2002) 359(9310) The Lancet 906–7; Stephen J. Wigmore, Jen A. Lumsdaine and
John L. R. Forsythe, ‘Ethical Market in Organs: Defending the Indefensible’ (2003) 325
(7368) British Medical Journal 835–6.
38 Benjamin E. Hippen, ‘Organ Sales and Moral Travails: Lessons from the Living Kidney
Vendor Program in Iran’ (2008) Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 614; Rupert
W. L. Major, ‘Paying Kidney Donors: Time to Follow Iran?’ (2008) 11(1) McGill
Journal of Medicine 67–9.
39 Data from the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation indicate the follow-
ing numbers of living kidney donors: 2009: 1,740; 2010: 1,636; 2011: 1,502; 2012: 1,506;
2013: 1,501; 2014: 1,203; 2015: 1,098; 2016: 1,078. See www.transplant-observatory.org/
summary.
40 In 2011, 17,910 patients were waitlisted for a kidney transplant and 2,273 kidney
transplants were performed. See A. H. Rouchi, F. Ghaemi and M. Aghighi, ‘Outlook of
Organ Transplantation in Iran’ (2014) 8(3) Iranian Journal of Kidney Diseases 185–8. See
also, Anne Griffin, ‘Kidneys on Demand’ (2007) 334(7592) British Medical Journal 502–5.
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Moreover, the introduction of a regulated organ market may have
severe unintended effects that could result in the collapse of altruistic
organ donation. More particularly, evidence suggests that financial
incentives would crowd out altruistic motivations, which currently
prompt donors to make organs available. Findings from behavioural
sciences show that, where intrinsic incentives to perform a certain activ-
ity are replaced by extrinsic incentives, such as financial compensation,
the perception of that activity drastically changes and one’s moral com-
mitment to engage in it is weakened significantly.41 As a result, the
awareness that organs are available for sale could make potential altruis-
tic donors reluctant to volunteer. Similarly, patients themselves could be
very hesitant to expose altruistic volunteers to the risks of the interven-
tion. Furthermore, if organ donation is no longer regarded as the ulti-
mate act of generosity, the level of altruistic deceased donation will
probably also suffer heavily, with more people opting out of donation,
the next of kin less inclined to authorise organ removal and transplant
coordinators finding it more difficult to request approval.42 That these
aremore than theoretical considerations is confirmed by data from Israel.
Before the 2008 transplant law made it much more difficult for Israelis to
travel abroad to purchase an organ, transplant tourism was accompanied
by a decline in living kidney donation. Predictably, since the law changed,
living kidney donation rates have increased exponentially.43
In view of these considerations, there is a real risk that a possible
increase in purchased organs will only be temporary and will be offset
by a reduction in altruistically donated organs. In this context, it should
be noted that a large percentage of patients on transplant waiting lists
41 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, ‘A Fine Is a Price’ (2000) 29(1) Journal of Legal Studies
1–17; Uri Gneezy, The W Effect of Incentives (University of Chicago Business School,
2003). See also Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social
Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970).
42 James F. Childress, ‘The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections’ (1992) 24(5)
Transplant Proceedings 2143–8; Gabriel M. Danovitch and Alan B. Leichtman, ‘Kidney
Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of Organ Transplantation’ (2006) 1(6) Clinical Journal of
the American Society of Nephrology 1133–5; Sheila M. Rothman and David J. Rothman,
‘The Hidden Cost of Organ Sale’ (2006) 6(7) American Journal of Transplantation
1524–8.
43 Data from the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation indicate the follow-
ing numbers of living kidney donors: 2003: 71; 2004: 68; 2005: 67; 2006: 54; 2007: 57; 2008:
56; 2009: 69; 2010: 78; 2011: 111; 2012: 108; 2013: 136; 2014: 135; 2015: 174; 2016: 222. See
also J. Lavee, T. Ashkenazi, A. Stoler et al., ‘Preliminary Marked Increase in the National
Organ Donation Rate in Israel Following Implementation of a New Organ
Transplantation Law’ (2013) 13(3) American Journal of Transplantation 780–5.
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would not be helped by a system of compensated living kidney donation,
because they are medically unsuitable or otherwise inactive (35 per cent),
or because they are in need of extra-renal organs such as a heart, a liver or
lungs (20 per cent). If, as can be expected, a system of compensated living
kidney donation would indeed have a negative effect on altruistic moti-
vations, thereby jeopardising deceased donation, patients in need of
extra-renal organs would be considerably worse off than before.44
In addition, introducing a market system may remove incentives to
maximise deceased donation and to prevent organ failure. For instance,
patients suffering from hypertension, obesity or diabetes may be less
inclined to adapt their lifestyle so as to prevent organ failure, wrongly
believing that an organ market will yield an abundance of organs.45
Again, a regulated organ market might well result in the opposite of
what it aims to achieve: a net decline in kidney donation, fewer vital
organs and more patients in need of a transplant.
Thirdly, the final argument underpinning current proposals for
a regulated organ market, namely that it would result in a situation that
would maximally respect and benefit vendors, is also utterly unconvin-
cing. Proponents of such a market insist that a general ban amounts to
misplaced paternalism. They allege that it excludes would-be vendors
from an additional source of income to maximise their welfare and is an
unjustifiable interference with what they consider an individual’s sover-
eignty over his or her body.46 However, the idea that a regulated organ
market would be more respectful of an individual’s autonomy and would
represent a win–win situation is misguided.
44 Alexander M. Capron, Gabriel M. Danovitch and Francis L. Delmonico, ‘Organ Markets:
Problems Beyond Harm to Vendors’ (2014) 14(10) American Journal of Bioethics 23–5;
Danovitch and Leichtman, ‘Kidney Vending’; John H. Evans, ‘Commodifying Life?
A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial Incentives for Organ Donation’ (2003)
28(6) Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 1003–32.
45 Lainie Friedman Ross, ‘Saving Lives Is More Important Than Abstract Moral Concerns:
Financial Incentives Should Be Used to Increase Organ Donation – Con’ (2009) 88(4)
Annals of Thoracic Surgery 1056–9.
46 Mark J. Cherry, ‘Is a Market for Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative?’ (2000) 14(4)
Public Affairs Quarterly 337–60; Charles A. Erin and John Harris, ‘An Ethical Market in
Human Organs’ (2003) 29(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 137–8; Janet Radcliffe Richards,
‘Nephrarious Goings On: Kidney Sales and Moral Arguments’ (1996) 21(4) Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 375–416; Julian Savulescu, ‘Is the Sale of Body Parts Wrong?’
(2003) 29(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 138–9; Luke Semrau, ‘Misplaced Paternalism and
Other Mistakes in the Debate over Kidney Sales’ (2017) 31(3) Bioethics 190–8; Taylor,
Stakes and Kidneys; Robert M. Veatch, ‘Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives
for Organ Procurement’ (2003) 13(1) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19–36.
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Admittedly, the possibility of selling an organ would augment the
options available to individuals looking for extra income. However,
a decision to sell should always be understood within a socio-economic
context. As the black market in organs demonstrates, only individuals
who are financially desperate are likely to consider organ sale. As a rule,
they do so because they are in severe debt and have no other options to
quickly raise money. They would certainly not have considered selling an
organ if not pressured by poverty. Despite some of the so-called protec-
tive measures introduced in proposals for a regulated organmarket, there
is no reason to believe that this would be any different in a regulated
market. Although vendors may know what is best for them and although
their decision to sell an organ may be rational and informed, their
disadvantaged position and lack of alternatives will render the prospect
of financial gain irresistible, with the effect that their autonomy will be
undermined. The mere fact that a seller might be marginally better off
does not make the decision autonomous or the offer less exploitative.
Indeed, voluntariness and autonomy fall out of the picture when an agent
is only presented with objectionable alternatives and left with the choice
to act upon the least noxious of them.47 In this regard, it has been
convincingly argued that a regulated organ market will turn the despera-
tion of the poor into a medical opportunity, and may, for its proper
functioning, even need to rely on this kind of exploitation.48
Similarly, recent disturbing findings from the black market suggest
that the introduction of remuneration in fact reduces the autonomy of
potential vendors. In some ‘kidney belts’ the kidney has been elevated to
the status of the ultimate collateral, with which poor individuals are
expected to part when economic necessity arises.49 Even under so-
called controlled circumstances, it is readily conceivable that what
47 Nikola Biller-Andorno and Alexander M. Capron, ‘“Gratuities” for Donated Organs:
Ethically Indefensible’ (2011) 377(9775) The Lancet 1390–1; Arthur L. Caplan, ‘Organ
Transplantation: The Challenge of Scarcity’ in Ravitsky, Fiester and Caplan, The Penn
Center Guide, pp. 679–87; Francis L. Delmonico and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Why
We Should Not Pay for Human Organs’ (2003) 38(3) Zygon 689–98; Kate Greasley,
‘A Legal Market in Organs: The Problem of Exploitation’ (2012) 40(1) Journal of Medical
Ethics 51–6; Paul M. Hughes, ‘Constraint, Consent, and Well-Being in Human Kidney
Sales’ (2009) 34(6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 606–31; Ross, ‘Saving Lives’.
48 Tarif Bakdash and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Is It Ethical for Patients with Renal Disease to
Purchase Kidneys from the World’s Poor?’ (2006) 3(10) PloS Medicine e349; Greasley,
‘A Legal Market in Organs’.
49 Lawrence Cohen, ‘Where It Hurts: Indian Material for an Ethics of Organ
Transplantation’ (1999) 128(4) Daedalus 135–65; Javaad Zargooshi, ‘Quality of Life of
Iranian Kidney “Donors”’ (2001) 166(5) The Journal of Urology 1790–9.
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would initially be an option would transform into a demand. Subject to
normal market dynamics, it may become a regular economic asset that
can be used to pay off a loan, to finance unexpected expenses or to
become eligible for social benefits. Consequently, the bargaining position
of the poor will change: instead of selling an organ being a genuine
choice, it will be seen as the normal expectation, leaving it up to the
poor to justify why they are unwilling to sell and to bear the consequences
of refusal.50 Against this background, the notion that a regulated organ
market would be more respectful of vendors’ autonomy and moral
agency sounds very cynical.
The assertion that a regulated organ market would amount to
a win–win situation is similarly implausible. Data indicating that the
risks of living kidney donation are very low only apply to donors who are
generally healthy, properly screened for relevant risk factors and ade-
quately followed up.51 However, as black market experiences indicate,
the risks significantly increase when donors are not rigorously selected,
live in unsanitary conditions, maintain a poor diet and unhealthy life-
style, and lack access to long-term healthcare. Regrettably, those are the
exact circumstances that can be expected among the poor vendors in
regulated organmarkets. Data from Iran show a substantial deterioration
of health among a majority of vendors, and there is no reason to believe
that vendors in developed countries will be spared this outcome.
Findings from the black market and Iran point to similar concerns with
regard to the financial consequences of organ sales. Since the conditions
of indebtedness that lead to organ sale do not disappear, the great
majority of vendors quickly find themselves in a worse financial situation
50 Richard A. Demme, ‘Ethical Concerns About an Organ Market’ (2010) 102(1) Journal of
the National Medical Association 46–50; Debra Satz, ‘The Moral Limits of Markets:
The Case of Human Kidneys’ (2008) 108(3) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
269–88; Erik Malmqvist, ‘Are Bans on Kidney Sales Unjustifiably Paternalistic?’ (2014)
28(3) Bioethics 110–8; Rippon, ‘Imposing Options’; Simon Rippon, ‘Organ Markets and
Harms: A Reply to Dworkin, Radcliffe Richards and Walsh’ (2014) 40(3) Journal of
Medical Ethics 155–6.
51 For instance, the perioperative mortality rate is 3.1 per 10,000 procedures. See
Emanuele Cozzi, Luigi Biancone, Marta López-Fraga et al., ‘Long-term Outcome
of Living Kidney Donation’ (2016) 100(2) Transplantation 270–1. The risk of
developing end-stage renal disease is, although possibly slightly higher than pre-
viously thought, still extremely small. See Geir Mjøen, Stein Hallan,
Anders Hartmann et al., ‘Long-term Risks for Kidney Donors’ (2014) 86(1)
Kidney International 162–7; Abimereki D. Muzaale, Allan B. Massie, Mei C. Wang
et al., ‘Risk of End-Stage Renal Disease Following Live Kidney Donation’ (2014) 311
(6) Journal of the American Medical Association 579–86.
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than before. Absent comprehensive plans to lift vendors out of poverty
and to provide long-term assistance, the same fate will await vendors in
developed countries.52
In short, a regulated organ market would not represent a win–win
situation, but rather a zero-sum game at best.53 However, even the latter
would be an unlikely scenario if we take into account that would-be
vendors would be persuaded not to disclose adverse health information
in order not to be rejected as candidates. This would have a detrimental
effect on the quality of organs and might impose unknown risks on
recipients.54 The contention that a regulated organ market would serve
the good of all becomes even more of a cruel hoax if we also factor in the
other negative externalities that can be expected to arise. As indicated
above, these have been well documented for the black market and are
likely to also hold true for markets in developed countries. Crucially, in
addition to burdening local communities and the domestic healthcare
system when the situation of vendors predictably deteriorates,
a regulated organ market also risks corrupting the role of doctors,
potentially even causing widespread distrust and loss of prestige.
The ethics of the medical profession would be severely compromised if
physicians were to be forced to act as facilitators of an organ trade and to
infringe upon the ‘do no harm’ principle at the behest of wealthy donors.
Under these circumstances, it is readily conceivable that donor accep-
tance criteria would be relaxed unduly and that the decision to perform
organ removal could go against physicians’ best medical judgement.55
As I hope to have shown convincingly, it is to be expected that, despite
the protective measures envisaged to overcome the deficiencies of the
black market, a regulated organ market is unfeasible and its intended
52 Capron, Danovitch and Delmonico, ‘OrganMarkets’; Danovitch and Leichtman, ‘Kidney
Vending’; Thomas George, ‘The Case against Kidney Sales’ (2001) XI(1) Issues in Medical
Ethics 49–50; Julian Koplin, ‘Assessing the Likely Harms to Kidney Vendors in Regulated
Organ Markets’ (2014) 14(10) American Journal of Bioethics 7–18.
53 Rothman and Rothman, ‘The Hidden Cost’.
54 Budiani-Saberi, ‘Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism’; Rothman and Rothman,
‘TheHidden Cost’; Michael L. Volk, ‘OrganQuality as a Complicating Factor in Proposed
Systems of Inducements for Organ Donation’ (2014) 77(3) Law and Contemporary
Problems 337–45.
55 Gabriel M. Danovitch, ‘Who Cares? Impact of Commercialized Kidney Transplantation
on the Doctor–Patient Relationship’ in Willem Weimar, Michael Bos and Jan van
Busschbach (eds.), Organ Transplantation: Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects:
Towards a Common European Policy (Lengerich: Pabst, 2008), pp. 49–54; Jeffrey
P. Kahn and Francis L. Delmonico, ‘The Consequences of Public Policy to Buy and Sell
Organs for Transplantation’ (2004) 4(2) American Journal of Transplantation 178–80.
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benefits will fail to materialise. Since there is even a real risk that such an
experiment will open a Pandora’s box, resulting in a collapse of current
systems of donation and the generalisation of exploitative practices, such
a massive gamble is ill advised. In view of grave concerns of weak agency,
widespread abuse and negative externalities, the ‘paternalistic’ interven-
tion to completely ban commercialisation is and remains the only
solution.56 That this conclusion is unavoidable becomes even more
manifest when we will shift our focus to the enormous immaterial
harms that, in the name of autonomy, would be caused to society if
plans to establish a regulated organ market were carried out. First,
however, we will take a look at how legal theories of property are invoked
to justify enclosing organs in order to solve the organ shortage.
5.4 The Tragedy of the Commons and Utilitarian Theories of
Property
Organ donation and transplantation represent a typical example of
a tragedy of the commons, because all individuals meeting certain med-
ical criteria are allowed access to an organ, but contributions to the
supply are voluntary and may impose costs on the donor.57 Since indi-
viduals will not be excluded from benefiting even when they refuse to
contribute, incentives to become an organ donor are few. Foreseeably,
when the demand in organs rises, the common supply risks becoming
depleted. In some countries, this tragedy has been addressed by introdu-
cing presumed consent for post-mortem donation, premised upon a duty
of fairness (i.e. people who benefit from cooperative social schemes have
a reciprocal duty to assume some of the burdens) and a duty of easy
rescue (i.e. people who can prevent serious harm to others without
incurring important burdens have a moral obligation to do so).58
In countries with explicit consent regimes, constant appeals to solidarity
56 It can be argued that, even in the unlikely scenario where most would-be vendors act
autonomously and do not experience any harm, concern for the welfare of the remaining
vendors may be sufficient to justify a complete ban. See Malmqvist, ‘Are Bans on Kidney
Sales Unjustifiably Paternalistic?’; Erik Malmqvist, ‘A Further Lesson from Existing
Kidney Markets’ (2014) 14(10) American Journal of Bioethics 27–9.
57 Alexander Tabarrok, ‘The Organ Shortage: A Tragedy of the Commons?’ in
Alexander Tabarrok (ed.), Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal
Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 107–11.
58 Micah Hester, ‘WhyWeMust Leave Our Organs to Others’ (2006) 6(4)American Journal
of BioethicsW23-8; Jeremy Snyder, ‘Easy Rescues and Organ Transplantation’ (2009) 21
(1) HEC Forum 27–53.
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remind the public of the need to contribute and, in a few countries,
priority on the waiting list has partly been made conditional upon
a registered willingness to contribute.59
However, in some countries that are confronted with a waiting list that
is getting out of control, the idea seems to be gaining ground that the sole
reliance on solidarity and altruism will not solve the tragedy of the
commons in organ transplantation. Instead, as indicated above, it is
suggested that the tragedy can only be solved by resorting to the classical
liberal solution to this type of problem: a complete ‘enclosure of
the commons’ by converting organs into private property, which would
give owners a substantial, extrinsic incentive to make their ‘resource’
available to others in need. Donna Dickenson’s general warning against
an enclosure movement targeting human body material is both apt and
timely.
Importantly, compared to bodymaterial that has already come into the
reach of the market, organs that are still part of the body constitute
a specific category that makes them legally more resistant to commodi-
fication. This has to do with the way in which property rights can be
justified theoretically. Within legal philosophy, three largely incompati-
ble models have been developed to define private property rights: the
labour theory of property, the utilitarian theory of property and the
personhood theory of property. The labour theory of property, estab-
lished by Locke, holds that the person who encloses a previously
unclaimed resource and exerts labour upon it, becomes the exclusive
owner of the resource.60 This theory is still the fundamental basis of our
property law. It can be used – and, as Dickenson emphasises, is increas-
ingly being used – to recognise property rights in excised or extracted
body material that has been manipulated by the person who claims to
have legal title.61 Similarly, in a few jurisdictions, Lockean arguments
59 Jacob Lavee and Dan W. Brock, ‘Prioritizing Registered Donors in Organ Allocation:
An Ethical Appraisal of the Israeli Organ Transplant Law’ (2012) 18(6) Current Opinion
in Critical Care 707–11; Jacob Lavee and Avraham Stoler, ‘Reciprocal Altruism:
The Impact of Resurrecting an Old Moral Imperative on the National Organ Donation
Rate in Israel’ (2014) 17(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 323–36.
60 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Leslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, [1690] 1967).
61 For instance, inMoore v Regents of the University of California 793 P 2d 479 (Cal. 1990),
the Supreme Court of California recognised a rightful property claim by a physician who
had developed and patented a cell line using cells from a patient (without that person’s
consent), because the physician had in the process mixed his labour with his patient’s
excised body material.
combating the trade in organs 95
have been used to recognise substances produced by the body, such as
blood, sperm and milk, as property that can be sold by the individual
concerned.62 This enclosure movement raises major concerns of its own,
but it has stopped short of including the human body and those body
materials, such as organs, that have not been excised or extracted and that
are not products of the body.
Rather, attempts to justify private property rights in organs are usually
based on utilitarian theories of property. Expanding on his idea that the
greatest happiness of the greatest number should form the foundation of
morality and legislation, Bentham stated that the greatest happiness in
respect of resources will only occur when they are the private property of
persons.63 Along the same lines, proponents of a regulated organ market
allege that aggregate welfare, in terms of utility, of all those affected would
be enhanced were we to grant private property rights in organs.
Since the end of the 1960s, the utilitarian theory of property has been
considerably redefined by replacing some of its moral underpinnings
with purely economic ones. Under the influence of Chicago-style law and
economics approaches, pioneered by Richard Posner, Gary Becker and
others, the extension of property rights is presented as necessary to make
better use of resources.64 It is argued that, whenever a system of private
property rights would be better at minimising costs and maximising
economic efficiency, such a system is justified. Coupled with
a glorification of autonomy, the emphasis on economic calculations
further diminishes the importance of considerations of social justice,
which still holds some relevance in classical utilitarianism. Therefore, it
comes as no surprise that some of the most outspoken advocates of the
idea of addressing the tragedy of the commons in transplantation
through granting full property rights and establishing a regulated organ
market can be found among supporters of the Chicago-style theory of
property.65
62 Kara W. Swanson, Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk and Sperm in Modern
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
63 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, ed. Wilfried Harrison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, [1789] 1967);
Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, ed. Etienne Dumont and Richard Hildreth
(Holmes Beach, FL: Gaunt, [1802] 2011).
64 Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57(2) The American
Economic Review 347–59; Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston, MA:
Little, Brown and Company, 1972).
65 See, for instance, Becker and Elias, ‘Introducing Incentives’.
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However, the utilitarian approach to the tragedy of the commons in
transplantation raises a host of fundamental problems. Importantly,
there is no reason to presume that pursuing the greatest happiness of
the greatest number in organ transplantation necessitates a market
approach.66 On the contrary, it can be convincingly argued that benefit
would be maximised and harm minimised if the main causes of the need
for organs were better addressed and initiatives were taken to increase
donation rates without inviting crowding-out effects. For instance,
encouraging a healthy lifestyle and providing quality universal healthcare
may prevent or delay the onset of organ failure. Similarly, deceased
donation rates may be significantly boosted by implementing elements
of the ‘Spanish model’ of donor identification, passing presumed consent
legislation or allowing donation after circulatory determination of
death.67 The observation that in the EU organ shortages recently seem
to have stabilised indicates that these shortages can be effectively reduced
without having to resort to financial incentives.
In addition, as compared to ideal markets, a market in organs will be
inherently marred by severe market failures. The most important one is
that the supply will entirely depend on individuals in desperate financial
need, characterised by compromised autonomy and, hence, weak agency.
Admittedly, the market could be regulated to minimise the risk of weak
agency, but proposals to do so (e.g. establishing a monopsony, setting
a maximum price and rigorous selection) might in fact recreate organ
shortages, because many would-be vendors would be excluded and the
incentives might be insufficiently attractive. This problem could be
remedied by relaxing protective measures and increasing prices, but
that strategy would lead to a higher risk of exploitation and lower
organ quality, which can be regarded as other undesired consequences
that would negatively affect aggregate welfare.68
Moreover, proponents of an organ market do not sufficiently take into
account that the field of organ donation has some exceptional features,
which, when transformed into a market, may result in an even worse
66 Kerstein, ‘Autonomy, Moral Constraints’; Ross, ‘Saving Lives’.
67 Beatriz Domínguez-Gil, Francis L. Delmonico, Faissal A. M. Shaheen et al.,
‘The Critical Pathway for Deceased Donation: Reportable Uniformity in the
Approach to Deceased Donation’ (2011) 24(4) Transplant International 373–8;
Rafael Matesanz, Beatriz Domínguez-Gil, Elisabeth Coll et al., ‘Spanish Experience
As a Leading Country: What Kind of Measures Were Taken?’ (2011) 24(4) Transplant
International 333–43.
68 Satz, ‘The Moral Limits’.
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tragedy of the commons. As outlined above, disrupting a system that is so
firmly built on an ethos of altruism and solidarity can be expected to
crowd out the motivations that would otherwise have prompted indivi-
duals to contribute to the supply. In this way, aggregate welfare would
decrease if full property rights in organs were awarded.
It should also be noted that utilitarian appeals stressing the benefits of
an organ market neglect the importance and stringency of the back-
ground conditions that would prompt individuals to sell. As indicated
above, experiences from the black market and from Iran show that,
because of their situation of poverty and associated unhealthy living
conditions, vendors do not benefit: frequently they are considerably
worse off in the longer term, both financially and physically. Since
protective measures do not target these background conditions – and
doing so would pose an enormous burden that would also need to be
weighed in the utilitarian calculus – the assumption that providing full
property rights in organs would amount to a win–win situation proves to
be false.
Futhermore, utilitarian theories are notably difficult to apply to public
policy, because it is not clear how one person’s gain in utility should be
balanced against another person’s loss in utility. More specifically, utili-
tarianismmay endorse an organmarket that imposes harm on vendors to
the benefit of recipients as long as the aggregate net benefit would
increase. Disconcertingly, this perspective overlooks the moral impor-
tance of whether benefits and harms accrue to different persons and
whether some harms may be impermissible regardless of the net benefits
of the market.69 Although proponents of a market advocate regulation to
address this concern, utilitarian reasoning could, strictly speaking, con-
done the outright exploitation of vendors.
5.5 Organs and Personhood
Although the aforementioned reasons overwhelmingly demonstrate that
utilitarian theories of property fail to properly justify the need to assign
private property rights in organs, even more is at stake than is generally
acknowledged. More specifically, essential immaterial interests are fos-
tered by keeping in place the current, altruistic system of organ donation.
This is recognised in the personhood theory of property. This third
69 Rippon, ‘Organ Markets and Harms’.
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model of private property rights in fact denies that full property rights
can be granted with regard to the human body.
The personhood theory builds on the ideas of Hegel and Kant, who
claimed that, since private property involves an act of appropriation
indispensable for the self-realisation of the person, it is to be considered
an extension of personhood.70 According to Kant, property rights can be
extended to things but not to persons or the body. The first reason is that
persons cannot dispose over themselves because they are not a thing and
they are not their own property. Whereas things have a price, persons
have dignity – an inner value without equivalent – as a result of their
capacity for morality and rationality. Since bodies are integral to the
person, they also possess dignity and they should not be treated as things.
The second reason is that, for Kant, persons should never be treated (or
never treat themselves) merely as a means to the goals of others. After all,
respect for the dignity of persons entails a duty to treat each individual
(and oneself) as having incommensurable value. An insult to human
dignity arises when a non-instrumental valuation is totally absent, in that
persons are denied the distinct importance of their own lives, and are
instead only valued for their usefulness. According to Kant, putting
a price on persons or their bodies is just such an insult, because it reduces
them to something fungible, an object for use. Assimilating persons to
the realm of objects is the exact opposite of what we owe to them inmoral
terms.71
Kantian notions of inherent human dignity and respect for persons
also lie at the heart of general human rights, as evidenced by the pride of
place given to them in international human rights instruments.
As a consequence, they have become the bedrock of human rights
instruments in the context of biomedicine.72 Here, the right to respect
70 Georg W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [1821] 2012); Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals,
ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1797] 2012).
71 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor and
Jens Timmerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1785] 2012); Kant,
The Metaphysics of Morals.
72 Roberto Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for
a Global Bioethics’ (2009) 34(3) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 223–40; Daniela-
Ecaterina Cutas, ‘Looking for theMeaning of Dignity in the Bioethics Convention and the
Cloning Protocol’ (2005) 13(4) Health Care Analysis 303–13; Susan M. Shell, ‘Kant’s
Concept of Human Dignity as a Resource for Bioethics’ in The President’s Council on
Bioethics (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s
Council on Bioethics (Washington, DC: 2008), pp. 333–49.
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for one’s dignity translates into a negative right against unwilled inter-
ventions by others and, hence, the requirement of free and informed
consent. But respect for dignity is increasingly also formulated as
a limiting principle invoked not to promote but to restrict the exercise
of autonomy, out of concern that unlimited freedom to take advantage of
newly emerging biomedical possibilities could threaten human dignity
itself.73
Importantly, in the context of organ transplantation the commercia-
lisation of the human body and its parts is considered a type of practice
that would compromise the intrinsic worth of persons. Accordingly, the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its Additional
Protocol concerning Transplantation – binding legal instruments issued
at the level of the Council of Europe – contain a non-commercialisation
clause stipulating that ‘The human body and its parts shall not, as such,
give rise to financial gain.’74 It should be noted that the reference to ‘as
such’ leaves open the door for the legal possibility, provided by the labour
theory of property, of claiming full property rights on body material to
which one has applied one’s skill.75 However, this kind of enclosure is
entirely prohibited where it concerns organs, at least to the extent that
they have not been excised and manipulated.
It should be noted that two valid criticisms have been levelled against
Kant’s idea that, since the body is integral to the person and since the
person is beyond price, parts of the body cannot be sold without
73 David Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Biolaw,
and the Basis of Moral Community’ (2010) 21(4) Journal International de Bioéthique
21–40. See, for a more extensive discussion, Britta van Beers, Persoon en Lichaam in het
Recht. Menselijke waardigheid en zelfbeschikking in het tijdperk van de medische biotech-
nologie (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, PhD dissertation, 2009); Britta van Beers,
Luigi Corrias and Wouter G. Werner (eds.), Humanity across International Law and
Biolaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
74 Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997,
CETS No. 164, Article 21; Council of Europe, Additional Protocol concerning
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, Strasbourg, 24 January 2002,
CETS No. 186, Article 21.
75 Many examples of this enclosure can be found in the writings of Donna Dickenson. See
also, for the patenting of human body material, Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbain,
Exclusions from Patentability: How Far Has the European Patent Office Eroded
Boundaries? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Sigrid Sterckx and
Julian Cockbain, ‘The Ethics of Patenting in Genetics – A Second Enclosure of the
Commons?’ in Gabriele Werner-Felmayer, Barbara Prainsack and Silke Schicktanz
(eds.), Genetics as Social Practice – Transdisciplinary Views on Science and Culture
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 129–44.
100 kristof van assche
dehumanising the person. Firstly, Kant condemns the wilful destruction
of one’s own bodily integrity for unnecessary reasons, which – as evi-
denced by his claim that ‘to give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted’ is
tantamount to partial suicide76 – also means that his concept would have
required the rejection of living organ donation, for the same reasons as he
would have rejected the sale of an organ.77 However, this objection can be
countered by pointing out that, in line with other elements in his moral
theory, for Kant living organ donation would not constitute using oneself
as a mere means and would even be commendable, on the basis of the
duty to treat humanity as an end in itself.78 Secondly, there does not seem
to be any obvious reason why the premise that the human body as
a whole possesses dignity compels us to believe that body parts also
have dignity, and that treating body parts as objects would amount to
treating the person as an object.79 This is a fair objection, but it misses the
point that something more fundamental underlies Kant’s position and
the personhood theory of property.
For Kant, persons have a corporeal identity that is indivisible, and their
attitude towards their body and parts of their body therefore reflects their
notion of self. Persons who would agree that something so vital for
human identity as a body part could be treated as an object would signal
to others that they are open to further fragmentation of what makes them
human.80 Moreover, because persons are embedded in the moral com-
munity, each person is required to exercise his or her autonomy in a way
which does not damage the context that makes the moral community
76 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 177.
77 Dworkin, ‘Markets and Morals’; Nicole Gerrand, ‘The Misuse of Kant in the Debate
About a Market in Human Body Parts’ (1999) 16(1) Journal of Applied Philosophy 59–67;
Mario Morelli, ‘Commerce in Organs: A Kantian Critique’ (1999) 30(2) Journal of Social
Philosophy 315–24.
78 Ruth F. Chadwick, ‘The Market for Bodily Parts: Kant and Duties to Oneself’ (1989) 6(2)
Journal of Applied Philosophy 129–39; Cécile Fabre,Whose Body is it Anyway? Justice and
the Integrity of the Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Morelli, ‘Commerce
in Organs’.
79 Chadwick, ‘The Market for Bodily Parts’; Fabre, Whose Body is it Anyway?’; Stephen
R.Munzer, ‘Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts’ (1993) 6(2)Canadian Journal of Law
and Jurisprudence 319–41; Stephen R. Munzer, ‘An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights
in Body Parts’ (1994) 11 Social Philosophy and Policy 259–86; Stephen Wilkinson, Bodies
for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (New York, NY: Routledge,
2003).
80 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
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itself possible.81 The duty not to compromise one’s own dignity is
violated when persons intentionally undercut the conditions that are
essential for nurturing moral aspirations. When the underpinnings of
the moral community are threatened by the behaviour of one person,
what seems to be that person’s own interest becomes a matter in which all
other persons have an investment.82 Consequently, it is essential to
prohibit the sale of a body part not only to discourage a way of thinking
that (some) persons may lack value, but also to uphold the very idea and
functioning of the moral community.83
Precisely the link between embodiment and flourishing has inspired
many eminent scholars to expand upon the personhood theory of prop-
erty, as applied to the human body, from the perspective of virtue ethics,
feminist theories and communitarian philosophy.84 As exemplified in the
81 Jennifer Moore, ‘Kant’s Ethical Community’ (1992) 26(1) The Journal of Value Inquiry
51–71; Shell, ‘Kant’s Concept of Human Dignity’.
82 Roger Brownsword, ‘What the World Needs Now: Techno-Regulation, Human Rights
andHumanDignity’ in Roger Brownsword (ed.),Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2004), pp.
203–34; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
83 Cynthia Cohen, ‘Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: “The Gift of the
Magi” Revisited’ (1999) 24(3) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 288–306; Samuel
J. Kerstein, ‘Kantian Condemnation of Commerce in Organs’ (2009) 19(2) Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 147–69; Stephen Wilkinson, ‘Commodification Arguments
for the Legal Prohibition of Organ Sale’ (2000) 8(2) Health Care Analysis 189–201.
84 See, for instance, Barbro Björkmann, ‘Why We Are Not Allowed to Sell That Which
We Are Encouraged to Donate’ (2006) 15(1) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
60–70; Michelle B. Bray, ‘Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies’ (1990) 69(1) Texas Law Review 209–44; Cohen, ‘Selling Bits and Pieces’;
Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Oxford: Hart, 2011);
Amitai Etzioni, ‘Organ Donation: A Communitarian Approach’ (2003) 13(1)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1–18; Charles Foster, ‘Dignity and the Use of Body
Parts’ (2014) 40(1) Journal of Medicine and Ethics 44–7; Kate Greasley, ‘Property Rights
in the Human Body: Commodification and Objectification’ in Imogen Goold,
Kate Greasley, Jonathan Herring and Loane Skene (eds.), Persons, Parts and Property:
How Should We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21st Century? (Oxford: Hart, 2014), pp.
67–87; Suzanne Holland, ‘Contested Commodities at Both Ends of Life: Buying and
Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissues’ (2001) 11 Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal 263–84; Dominique Martin, Beyond the Market: A New Approach to the Ethical
Procurement of Human Biological Materials (The University of Melbourne, PhD dis-
sertation, 2011); Carolyn McLeod and Françoise Baylis, ‘Feminists on the Inalienability
of Human Embryos’ (2006) 21(1) Hypatia 1–14; Satz, ‘The Moral Limits’; Bernard Teo,
‘Is the Adoption of More Efficient Strategies of Organ Procurement the Answer to
Persistent Organ Shortage in Transplantation?’ (1992) 6(2) Bioethics 113–39; Britta van
Beers, Persoon en Lichaam; Andrew Wancata, ‘No Value for a Pound of Flesh:
Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human Body’ (2003) 18(2) Journal of Law &
Health 199–228.
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work of Margaret Radin and Donna Dickenson, the personhood theory
embraces an account of dignity in terms of human flourishing and
a perspective on personhood that stresses physical embodiment, social
interconnectedness and an ethos of care. According to Radin, private
property rights should only be recognised to the extent that they promote
human thriving. The body and its parts, since they are integral to the self
and not detachable like objects that can be owned, should be market-
inalienable (i.e. not subject to sale). If they were commodified, it would
violate our sense of personhood, corrupt our attitudes towards ourselves
and each other, encourage the perception that persons themselves may be
regarded as objects and prevent us from engaging in gift relationships
that cement communal bonds.85
Whereas commodification of the body is intrinsically harmful accord-
ing to Kant, Radin’s virtue ethics approach makes its harmfulness con-
tingent upon its effect on flourishing. The reason why commodification
of the body would be detrimental in this respect and would need to be
avoided can be found in Radin’s domino theory, which is largely inspired
by Richard Titmuss’s influential analysis of commercial blood
donation.86 The domino theory holds that, where a social interaction
exists both in a market and a non-market form, market rhetoric may
contaminate the non-market form, suppress its value, and ultimately
make it impossible to maintain. When a non-market version is morally
preferable and it is likely that the market version will change public
attitudes to the point that the social interaction will eventually be per-
ceived largely or only in market terms, the market version should be
banned.87 In the context of transplantation, altruism and solidarity are
essential for fostering personhood and a flourishing society and, con-
versely, market rhetoric would have a degrading effect on both person-
hood and society; thus organ markets should be prohibited.
Along similar lines, Dickenson argues that ‘[t]he body both is, and is
not, the person’ and that, since ‘[o]ur consciousness, dignity, ngeia
and human essence are all embodied’, the body ‘should never be only a
85 Dickenson, Property in the Body; Margaret J. Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’ (1987) 100(8)
Harvard Law Review 1849–937; Margaret J. Radin, Reinterpreting Property (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1993); Margaret J. Radin, Contested Commodities:
The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body Parts, and Other Things (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
86 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship.
87 Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’; Radin, Reinterpreting Property; Radin, Contested
Commodities.
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consumer good, an obscure object of material desire, a capital invest-
ment, a transferable resource: merely a thing’.88 Criticising the ‘new
enclosures’ that target human tissue and genetic material used in
research, procreation and medicine more generally, she acknowledges
that these types of human bodymaterial contain ‘elements of both person
and thing, subject and object’, especially ‘when tissues from the body are
no longer physically joined to the person’.89 Under these circumstances,
they may become the subject of full property rights under Locke’s labour
theory of property. Fearing that the increasing tendency to grant full
property rights on human tissue and genetic material would undermine
our humanity, Dickenson rightfully insists that we should reclaim the use
of these materials for the common good. One fruitful avenue would be to
give the persons who provide the materials limited property rights, which
would give them control but not the right to sell.
As indicated earlier, Kant’s personhood theory of property does not
leave much room for recognising any property right in the body and its
parts, leading some authors to deny that property rights can have any
bearing on organs.90 By contrast, in order to allow for altruistic donation
of body parts, a quasi-property right would need to be granted that
excludes commercial transactions but still allows individuals to control
88 Dickenson, Body Shopping, p. 168. Note that Ngeia is a Tongan concept that means both
‘awe-inspiring’ and ‘dignity’. The concept was central to the opposition of the Tongan
people to attempts by Australian biotech company Autogen Ltd to collect their tissue
samples and conduct genetic research on the population, after Autogen had been granted
exclusive access to the Tonga gene pool in an agreement with Tonga’s Ministry of Health
in November 2000. See, for more information, Lopeti Senituli and Margaret Boyes,
‘Whose DNA? Tonga and Iceland, Biotech, Ownership, and Consent’ in James
V. Lavery, Christine Grady, Elizabeth R. Wahl and Ezekiel J. Emanuel (eds.), Ethical
Issues in International Biomedical Research: A Casebook (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), pp. 53–63.
89 Dickenson, Property in the Body, pp. 5–6. Some might argue that not all bodily materials
are integral to the functioning of the self and that, consequently, market-inalienability
should be limited even in the personhood theory of property. Although some parts of the
body (e.g. hair, fingernails) are clearly not essential for personal identity, there may be
discussion about the intrinsic significance of certain other parts (e.g. blood, ova, genetic
material, kidneys) as compared to still others (e.g. heart, liver, brain) that clearly are
central. However, even if no precise distinction could be made, it is better to be inclusive
so as to avoid the slippery slope effects that may emerge when some potentially essential
body parts are surrendered to the market. See also Satz, ‘The Moral Limits’.
90 Most notable, see Leon R. Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human
Affairs (New York, NY: Free Press, 1985); Leon R. Kass, ‘Organs for Sale? Propriety,
Property, and the Price of Progress’ (1992) 107 Public Interest 65–86; Leon R. Kass, Life,
Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (San Francisco, CA:
Encounter Books, 2004).
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disposition. As a way to emphasise market-inalienability without pre-
cluding transfer by gift, scholars such as Radin and Dickenson have
proposed the recognition of a limited property right in relation to
human body material.91 More specifically, of all the ownership entitle-
ments that constitute a full-fledged property right (including the right to
income, the right to capital value and the right to transfer by sale), only
those sticks in the bundle that are restricted to the notion of personal
control would be retained, without establishing any right to income or
sale.92 Such a carefully limited property right was proposed to allow
a measure of continuing control on the part of persons whose tissues or
genetic material had been removed, stored, researched, sold and even
patented, so as to address the excesses documented by Dickenson.93
However, it is similarly useful in the context of organ donation –
where, in contrast to Dickenson’s main field of research, an enclosure
movement on the basis of the labour theory of property is largely absent –
precisely to preclude the excesses that would accompany an organ
market.
91 Dickenson, ‘Commodification’; Dickenson, Property in the Body; Dickenson, Body
Shopping; Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’; Radin, Reinterpreting Property; Radin,
Contested Commodities. See also Bray, ‘Personalizing Personality’; Jonathan Herring
and Pak-Lee Chau, ‘Interconnected, Inhabited and Insecure: Why Bodies Should Not
Be Property’ (2014) 40(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 39–43; Nuffield Council on Bioethics,
Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research (London: Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 2011); Wancata, ‘No Value for a Pound’.
92 Note that A.M. Honoré identifies 12 elements of full individual ownership. See A.M. Honoré,
Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). See also
Dickenson, Property in the Body; Radin, Contested Commodities.
93 In this regard, it should be noted that some have argued that a broad concept of privacy
may already be sufficient and would have the added benefit of avoiding the perception of
fragmentation between the body and its owner that is generated by the property para-
digm. See Roger Brownsword, ‘An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for Genomic
Torts’ (2003) 42(3) Washburn Law Journal 413–87; Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy:
A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
Graeme Laurie, Pierre Mallia, David A. Frenkel et al., ‘Interests in Genetic Research?
Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Individual Privacy and Public
Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10(4) Medical Law International 315–37;
Natalie Ram, ‘Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing Ethical and
Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research’ (2009) 23(1) Harvard Journal of Law
and Technology 119–77; Rhadika Rao, ‘Property, Privacy, and the Human Body’ (2000) 80
(2) Boston University Law Review 359–460; Rhadika Rao, ‘Genes and Spleens: Property,
Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?’ (2007) 35(3) The Journal of Law,
Medicine and Ethics 371–82; Patricia A. Roche, ‘The Property/Privacy Conundrum
Over Human Tissue’ (2010) 22(3) HEC Forum 197–209.
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Interestingly, under Radin’s personhood theory of property it may be
allowed, and even be commendable, to establish a market in an attribute
integral to the self if, by doing so, the conditions of flourishing would
improve despite the degrading effects of commodification. This situation
may arise due to what Radin calls the ‘double bind’: in the non-ideal
world where the poor live under oppressive conditions that cannot
quickly be ameliorated, it may be better to give them the opportunity
to alleviate these conditions by selling parts of their bodies. Although the
poor will be harmed by a disintegrated self-conception and by stigmati-
sation, allowing them to engage in degrading market transactions may
increase their upward mobility in a way that would still be beneficial to
their personhood. By way of example, Radin suggests that, while we
consider wealth redistribution to lift them out of poverty, destitute
women might be allowed to engage in prostitution so as to improve
their oppressed condition.
Rather surprisingly, Radin also leaves some room to consider the
establishment of a regulated organ market. Although Radin emphasises
that its acceptability would depend on a number of factors, the fact that
she does not immediately rule out the possibility is remarkable.94
The suggestion that the legitimacy of organ sales can be warranted on
the basis of cost-benefit calculations brings her close to the position of her
utilitarian counterparts. Consequently, the similar rejoinder may be
made that it is completely unrealistic to speculate that vendors would
manage to improve their financial and health situation in the long term.
The specific health impact and the fact that it is a one-off transaction
make it even less probable that, possibly unlike prostitution, organ selling
would extricate vendors from their poverty.95 Moreover, as Radin’s
theory highlights, dignitary harms will inevitably accrue to both the
vendors and society. The prospect of being left marginally better off by
the organ sale should not obfuscate the risk that severe exploitation will
take place and social inequality may worsen.96 Finally, although under
the double bind commodification would be allowed as a temporary
measure, while we wait for the state to improve the undesirable circum-
stances that led the vendors to regard selling as a viable option, states
would be disinclined to intervene after the sale of organs had been
94 Margaret J. Radin, ‘Bodies andmarkets: Ethical arguments and choices,’ lecture at Trento,
Italy, 4 June 2011.
95 Pearson, Coercion in the Kidney Trade? 96 Greasley, ‘A Legal Market in Organs’.
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authorised, precisely because the poor would then be perceived as having
an additional source of income.
5.6 The Need to Safeguard the Communal Values in Organ
Transplantation
Notwithstanding the hypothetical opening left by Radin, personhood
theories of property affirm that there is much more to account for in
the debate about (non-)commodification in organ transplantation than is
generally acknowledged by utilitarian defenders of a regulated organ
market. More specifically, severe immaterial harms would also need to
be taken into the equation, making utilitarian arguments even less
convincing.
If an organ market were established, organ donation would suffer
from the degrading effects that typically occur when the market
encroaches upon a sphere of human interaction governed by
a different mode of valuation. In line with the more general concern
that market expansion will increase domination (Walzer) and suffo-
cate dimensions of value incompatible with crude self-interest
(Anderson), personhood theories of property highlight that, when
applied to the human body, the market would erode human flour-
ishing (Radin) and disrupt communal purposes and interconnected-
ness (Dickenson).97 On the basis of the analysis performed above, we
can predict that five types of immaterial harm are likely to accrue if
a market in organs were established.
First, the mere existence of a market would undermine the possibility
of altruism. Attitudes to donation would no longer be the same, since
every future instance of altruistic organ donation would automatically
be seen in terms of its market value; the act would gradually cease to be
97 See, more generally, for a defence of ‘blocked exchanges’ to safeguard the spheres of
personal interaction: Elizabeth Anderson, ‘The Ethical Limitations of the Market’ (1990)
6(2) Economics and Philosophy 179–205; Elizabeth Anderson, Value In Ethics And
Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Allen E. Buchanan,
Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); Neil Duxbury,
‘Do Markets Degrade?’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 331–48; Michael J. Sandel, What
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Debra Satz,
Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Limits of Markets (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010); Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Incommensurability and Valuation in Law’
(1994) Michigan Law Review 779–861; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Pluralism and Equality (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983).
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experienced and recognised as a generous one.98 Some have argued that
permitting the sale of organs does not prevent individuals from acting
altruistically and that, on the contrary, it would give altruistic donors the
opportunity to act even more generously, in that they give up not only an
organ but also the payment.99
However, this is an impoverished understanding of what is really at
stake. Knowing that the organ has become an economic asset, the
purity of the motivation of altruistic donors would be tainted beyond
repair. What they had planned to be an ultimate act of civic virtue,
a selfless sacrifice of physical integrity for the common good, a symbol
of how deeply committed they are to the well-being of others, would
now inevitably appear as a market exchange, impersonal and devoid of
symbolic meaning. By changing the nature of the act from intrinsically
valuable to purely instrumental and only appealing to desperate indi-
viduals, a market would result in the collapse of altruistic donations.
Tragically, it is to be feared that, even if the purely altruistic system
were reinstated after the inevitable failure of the market experiment, it
would take a very long time to revert to the old perception. Indeed, it is
much more difficult to infuse a social activity with symbolic meaning,
especially if that meaning had earlier been intentionally destroyed,
than to drain a social activity of its symbolic meaning through market
rhetoric.
Second, the importation of market values would erode the sense of
community fostered by organ transplantation. As is duly recognised by
Dickenson and others, organ transplantation is one of only a few remain-
ing vital areas of social interactions that is still dominated by the ethos of
the gift. It is a context in which individuals know that they mutually
depend on each other’s generosity and have a shared responsibility.
In this way, it creates opportunities for expressing solidarity, sympathy
and compassion through donation. Since the experience of altruistic
behaviour itself fosters attitudes of altruism and a desire to help,
a system relying on gift-giving will also sustain and even expand indivi-
duals’ sense of community. Replacing it with a commercial system would
98 Rothman and Rothman, ‘TheHidden Cost’; Radin,Contested Commodities; Peter Singer,
‘Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss against Arrow’ (1973) 2(3) Philosophy
and Public Affairs 312–20.
99 Shaun D. Pattinson, Medical Law & Ethics (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014);
Marc Stauch and Kay Wheat, Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law and Ethics
(London: Routledge, 2015).
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deprive them of these valuable interactions and undermine their vision of
community.100 Consequently, a great deal would be lost.
Third, establishing an organ market, even if it were regulated, would
cause additional societal disruption because it would undoubtedly have
a perverse distributive impact.101 Poor persons would be disproportio-
nately persuaded into selling an organ, to the extent that an increase in
procurement rates, which in any case would not last long, would come at
their expense. Conversely, only well-off patients would be in a position to
purchase an organ. As long as aggregate welfare could be expected to
increase, utilitarianism would find few problems with a market model
that results in the (relatively) richer segments of society taking advantage
of the poorer segments, thereby further aggravating social inequalities.
However, considerations of social justice militate against initiating such
an experiment.
Fourth, and relatedly, the social and personal status of individuals who
would contribute to the supply side of the organ market would be
degraded to an extent not witnessed since the abolition of slavery.102
Reports from the black market and from Iran show that vendors suffer
from deep shame, resentment and stigmatisation because they, and their
communities, experience organ sale as a form of self-mutilation that is
inherently depersonalising. Precisely because of the physical embodi-
ment of their personality, such an irreversible surrender of their physical
integrity is regarded as crossing the imaginary line of what is deserving of
100 Anderson, ‘The Ethical Limitations’; Lori Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin, ‘Whose Body is
it Anyway? Disputes over Body Tissue in a Biotechnology Age’ (1998) 351(9095)
The Lancet 53–7; Barbro Björkmann, ‘Why We Are Not Allowed’; Cynthia Cohen,
‘Selling Bits and Pieces’; Thomas H. Murray, ‘On the Human Body as Property:
The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets, and the Meaning of Strangers’ (1987) 20(4)
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1055–88; Martin, Beyond the Market;
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Bodies; Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce’;
Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard, ‘Bodily Integrity and the Sale of Human Organs’
(1996) 22(6) Journal of Medical Ethics 334–9.
101 George J. Annas, ‘The Prostitute, the Playboy, and the Poet: Rationing Schemes for
Organ Transplantation’ (1985) 75(2) American Journal of Public Health 187–9;
Charles Foster, ‘Dignity and the Use of Body Parts’ (2014) 40(1) Journal of Medicine
and Ethics 44–7; Jeffrey P. Kahn, ‘Three Views of Organ Procurement Policy: Moving
Ahead or Giving Up?’ (2003) 13 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 45–50;
Muhammad Nasir, Tehmina Nasir, Hira Ashraf Khan et al., ‘Organ Trafficking:
Do You Want a Society Where the Destitute Become a Store for the Wealthy?’ (2013)
20 The Professional Medical Journal 177–81; Ross, ‘Saving Lives’.
102 Along this line of reasoning, it may be argued that the Kantian idea that selling a body
part would open the door for slavery does not seem so far-fetched as is generally
acknowledged.
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respect. In regulated organ markets there is a similar risk that vendors
would no longer be regarded primarily as persons with inalienable rights,
but instead as sources of body parts that could be bought and sold. Under
these circumstances, not only their social status but also their own
perception of themselves would be thoroughly corrupted.103 Moreover,
if organs became financial assets and the underprivileged segments of
society were expected to be open to selling them, the sense of autonomy
of vendors and of the poor in general would also be lost.104 Consequently,
and contrary to what proponents of a regulated organ market proclaim,
the opportunities for self-development of the poor would significantly
decrease instead of increase.
Fifth, and last, an accumulation of these immaterial harms would have
a dehumanising and destructive impact of immense proportions on
society. An organ market would promote a mindset that regards other
individuals in purely instrumental terms, in a domain where this outlook
was previously unimaginable. The rich would be invited to capitalise on
the desperation of the poor to ‘buy’ their health, resulting in the creation
of an underclass that is considered a reservoir of spare parts for the
wealthy.105
5.7 Conclusion
As compared to human tissues and genetic material used in research and
medicine, organs are currently not the subject of an ‘enclosure move-
ment’ that is legally sanctioned and reinforced. However, a huge black
103 Bray, ‘Personalizing Personality’; Bob Brecher, ‘The Kidney Trade: Or, the Customer
Is Always Wrong’ (1990) 16(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 120–3; Cohen, ‘Selling Bits and
Pieces’; Karen L. Johnson, ‘The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right’
(1987) 21(3) Valparaiso University Law Review 741–62; Martin, Beyond the Market;
Agneta M. Sutton, ‘Commodification of Body Parts’ (2002) 235 British Medical Journal
114; Wilkinson, ‘Commodification Arguments’.
104 Jennifer L. Hurley, ‘Cashing in on the Transplant List: An Argument Against Offering
Valuable Compensation for the Donation of Organs’ (2004) 4(1) Journal of High
Technology Law 117–37.
105 Bray, ‘Personalizing Personality’; Cohen, ‘Selling Bits and Pieces’; Kirpal S. Chugh and
Vivekanand Jha, ‘Commerce in Transplantation in ThirdWorld Countries’ (1996) 49(5)
Kidney International 1181–6; Delmonico and Scheper-Hughes, ‘Why We Should Not
Pay’; Ross, ‘Saving Lives’; Gilbert Hottois, ‘Dignity of the Human Body –A Philosophical
and Critical Approach’ in Peter Kemp, Jacob Rendtorff and Niels Mattsson Johansen
(eds.), Bioethics and Biolaw. Vol. II: Four Ethical Principles (Copenhagen: Rhodos, 2000),
pp. 87–102; Kass, ‘Organs for Sale?’; Scheper-Hughes, ‘Commodity Fetishism’; Wancata,
‘No Value for a Pound’; Wigmore, Lumsdaine and Forsythe, ‘Ethical Market in Organs’.
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market in organs has come into existence, emerging as soon as trans-
plantation of an organ from an unrelated donor became a feasible pro-
cedure, and growing exponentially as organ shortages have increased.
As a result of the widening gap between supply and demand, in the most
affected countries calls are growing louder to establish a regulated organ
market. Despite their admirable aim to help tens of thousands of despe-
rate patients in this way, these proposals are problematic on all levels.
Even apart from severe doubts about their feasibility, it is very likely that
a regulated organmarket would need to rely on exploitation for its proper
functioning and that it would result in a net decline in donation rates –
the exact opposite of what it would aim to achieve.
Since the labour theory of property that is driving the accelerating
commodification of tissues and genetic material is not applicable to
organs that are not excised and manipulated, proponents of a regulated
organ market are placing their hopes on utilitarian theories of property.
However, these theories cannot justify private property rights in organs.
More specifically, utilitarian theories of property would not necessarily
favour a market approach to organ transplantation. In addition, they
might condone the outright exploitation of vendors. Crucially, they also
overlook the immense immaterial harms that may arise if a regulated
organ market were established. These harms are properly recognised
only by personhood theories of property. Precisely because of the enor-
mity of these harms, these theories – relying heavily on insights from
both Kantianism and virtue ethics as synthesised by Radin, Dickenson
and others – deny that full property rights over the human body and its
parts should be granted.
At the most fundamental level, these theories demonstrate that the
principle of altruism is essential because organs are too integral to
personhood to allow their commodification. Treating organs as articles
of commerce would undermine the value of the persons who sell them
and, in a broader perspective, would debase humanity in general. Putting
a price on an organ would indicate that it has a relative value, inviting
a purely instrumental valuation of the person whose organ is considered
open to market exchange. Relatedly, altruism in organ donation is
important because it allows persons to express and foster communal
virtues. Some interpersonal contexts – especially the ones involving life-
saving sacrifices in emergency situations – are essential to a community’s
understanding of the common good and its sense of solidarity. Therefore,
allowing market norms to invade the interpersonal context of organ
donation would irreversibly damage the quality of relationships,
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community identification and notions of shared obligations essential to
a flourishing society.
Apart from being rejected on substantive grounds and on grounds of
principle, the creation of a regulated organmarket would also be reckless,
since it is very unlikely that the intrusion of market rhetoric in the
transplant context can be rolled back when the problems outlined
above do indeed materialise. We cannot risk irreversible harm being
done to vendors and to communal values in the name of proposals to
increase the organ supply, certainly if their implementation is highly
unlikely to be successful in the first place.
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6When There Is No Cure
Challenges for Collective Approaches to Alzheimer’s Disease
robin pierce
6.1 Introduction
Tremendous scientific and biomedical progress has led to a substantial
increase in life expectancy in the Western world. However, one of the
great challenges of the twenty-first century has emerged, in part, as
a consequence of successful pursuit of increased longevity. As a result
of living longer lives, the afflictions of old age have become increasingly
prevalent. Alzheimer’s disease (AD), a fatal neurodegenerative disease
associated with ageing that slowly erodes cognitive capacities as well as
underlying brain structures, has come to stand among the most dreaded
diseases of an aging population. AD, first described in 1906 by Alois
Alzheimer, is characterised by a long period of physical and cognitive
degeneration, and the toll that AD takes extends far beyond the debilita-
tion of the individual patient. Globally, the attendant quantifiable
demands of dementia – AD in particular – on family, caregivers and
society have been estimated in 2015 to come to US$818 billion per year.1
Nevertheless, the story of biomedical therapeutic approaches to AD has
not reached a happy ending or even a promising or short-term resolu-
tion. There is no cure and no effective treatment to significantly slow or
alter disease progression.
AD is a disease without a cure. Therefore, discussion of medicine
(therapeutic interventions) of any kind is necessarily limited to
the research phase of the development of therapeutic interventions.
While the seeds of collective or individualised medicine are to be found
in the research phase, both foundational and translational, characterisa-
tion at this stage is complex. Thus, basic research investigating a seemingly
1 World Alzheimer Report, The Global Impact of Dementia An Analysis of Prevalence,
Incidence, Cost & Trends (London: Alzheimer’s Disease International, 2015).
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personalised therapeutic approach may subsequently lead to wide popula-
tion-based strategies while suggested population-based interventions may
eventually prove effective only for a small subsection of AD patients,
perhaps based on genotype. Accordingly, a series of critical questions
must be asked, including when interventions should be located on the
collective–individual spectrum, with what criteria in the research phase,
and when is it appropriate and beneficial to inquire about the collective
versus personalised nature of interventions still in development.
This chapter explores the field of AD research through the lens of
‘We Medicine and Me Medicine’ (collective and personalised medicine,
respectively) introduced by Donna Dickenson.2 In this chapter, I explore
the nature and drivers of the research enterprise on AD, and identify
the relatively recent phenomenon of early detection to be at the core.
I conclude that, while the characterisation of personalised versus collec-
tive intervention may be of varying significance in the fundamental
research phase, it is essential that the translational phase include one or
more mechanisms that facilitate and prioritise impacts on collective well-
being. While there is still no cure, the personalised and the collective
operate as complementary orientations. Yet, without deliberate consid-
eration throughout the research and development and translational
process, collective approaches to a growing crisis may lose ground to
commercially more profitable individualised approaches.
The AD research community has made great strides in understanding
various aspects of the disease, from identifying highly correlative pre-
symptomatic biomarkers to developing imaging techniques for detecting
process and structural changes that distinguish AD from other neurode-
generative conditions. Next to these advances in understanding stands
a largely unsuccessful effort towards the development of effective ther-
apeutic interventions against AD. At times, the therapeutic prospects
have seemed promising (as judged by news headlines or pharmaceutical
stock prices) and, at other times, they have seemed to be an ever-growing
terrain of disappointing clinical trials and devastated hopes. Over time,
research strategies have shifted and new therapeutic targets have been
identified. One of the most dramatic shifts in AD research is the prior-
itisation of early detection. As a result, most therapeutic interventions are
now expected to rely on early detection as a key component. A critical
question that must be asked is how the emphasis on early detection will
2 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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affect the larger effort to reduce the incidence and prevalence of AD and
to effectively treat the growing millions of people who develop the
disease. Consequently, a critical question for the research community
and its funders is how the prevalence and burden of AD are to be factored
into the research strategy. That is, how do we make sense of
‘We Medicine versus Me Medicine’ when there is as yet no effective
medicine and the research effort is very much inconclusive? This chapter
explores this question through the lens of AD and, in part, through its
focus on early detection, a defining feature of the current AD research
strategy, addressing questions regarding 1) the value and cost of early
detection as a key feature of AD treatment, 2) the effectiveness of this
strategy as a response to the nature of the burden of AD, and 3) more
fundamentally, whether it is premature to consider collective versus
individual therapeutic approaches in the research phase while the search
for an effective intervention is still ongoing. When is the optimal time to
incorporate a consideration of the collective versus the individual in our
quest for optimal healthcare and what should this consideration look
like?
6.2 Early Detection
6.2.1 The Holy Grail
A phenomenon that has emerged that cuts across most research strate-
gies is the centrality of ‘early detection’.While numerous theories abound
regarding the most promising therapeutic approaches, there is general
consensus in the AD research community that any success that might
come forth in the treatment of AD will involve early detection. The basis
for this approach is the belief that the neuropathology associated with AD
begins more than a decade before any symptoms appear. The string of
disappointing clinical trials prompted researchers to draw the now
widely accepted conclusion that the problem was not necessarily one of
the wrong target or the wrong pharmaceutical compound, but rather that
these experimental therapeutic interventions were being introduced too
late in the disease progression. They were missing the ‘therapeutic
window’.3 This resulted in robust research efforts to identify AD earlier
in the disease progression. The ground-breaking introduction of
3 Robin Pierce, ‘Complex calculations: ethical issues in involving at-risk healthy individuals
in dementia research’ (2010) 36(9) Journal of Medical Ethics 553–7.
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Pittsburgh Compound B (PIB)4 that, with the use of PET scans, allows for
in vivo detection of amyloid plaques, altered the research landscape in
significant ways. With this technology, the presence of amyloid could be
detected, quantified and monitored in living patients instead of having to
wait for post-mortem confirmation of its presence. Given that amyloid
plaques are one of the two primary neuropathologies associated with AD
and constitute a necessary, but not sufficient, pathology for a diagnosis
of AD, in vivo detection was understandably heralded as a major step
forward. Furthermore, many believe that amyloid build-up is an impor-
tant trigger to the onset of AD5 and, therefore, has served as a primary
target of pharmaceutical research aiming to treat AD. In vivo amyloid
detection in living patients also provided an important metric for experi-
mental interventions that sought to measure effectiveness based on
a change in the presence and amount of amyloid.
Early detection of AD came to be viewed as a peculiar form of the Holy
Grail. Even if researchers were unable to treat the disease, they experi-
enced some success in their efforts to identify elevated risk of it. Careers
began to be built not on discovering treatments for AD, but on enhancing
the ability to detect it earlier in the disease progression. This led to an
avalanche of technological non-fixes that heralded the ability to detect
biomarkers for AD before the first symptoms.
The theory behind early detection in AD is not novel. One of the
foundational approaches in health policy and public health is that ‘early
intervention leads to better outcomes’. This rule finds a lot of traction in
many disease treatment strategies. Screening programmes for a host of
diseases that aim to ‘catch’ a disease before obvious symptoms manifest
have become an accepted and valued component of clinical care, parti-
cularly for those diseases that only display symptoms in the middle to late
stages, e.g. colon cancer.
Early detection efforts in AD research have led to the identification of
several biomarkers. In 2010 discussions of the presence of biochemical
changes in cerebral spinal fluid (CSF)6 led to proposals of possible
4 William Klunk, H. Engler, A. Nordberg, Y. Wang, G. Blomqvist, D. P. Holt et al., ‘Imaging
brain amyloid in Alzheimer’s disease with Pittsburgh Compound-B’ (2004) 55(3) Annals
of Neurology 306–19.
5 John Hardy and D. J. Selkoe, ‘The amyloid hypothesis of Alzheimer’s disease: progress and
problems on the road to therapeutics’ (2002) 297(5580) Science 353–6.
6 Kai Blennow and H. Zetterberg, ‘Cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers for Alzheimer’s disease’
(2009) 18(2) Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease 413–17.
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introduction of spinal taps for AD biomarkers as routine clinical care.7
This was quite controversial for reasons including cost-effectiveness,
challenges in identifying optimal screening populations, possible side
effects and the absence of an effective therapy should CSF suggest
a diagnosis. Reports of early detection strategies employing novel mod-
alities have emerged with some regularity, including eye tests,8
nanosensors9 and blood tests10. Nevertheless, even the most compelling
methods of asymptomatic detection make no claim to even the slightest
therapeutic effect.
Although it is clear that early detection alone, even if achieved, will not
deliver effective interventions, it has come to occupy centre stage in
the AD research effort. Ironically, it is precisely this development in the
research landscape that may lead to greater challenges for collective
approaches to effectively combatting AD as the epidemic that it has
become. An examination of how early detection is achieved in practice
yields insight into some of these challenges.
6.2.2 Early Detection Technology and Its Beneficiaries
The first major breakthrough in the field of early detection was the
discovery of Pittsburgh Compound B (PIB), a chemical compound
that, with the use of a PET scan, enabled detection of amyloid
plaques.11 Introduced in 2004, PIB was a game-changer in its ability to
confirm the presence of amyloid plaques in vivo whereas previously this
could only be done post mortem. As both a research and clinical tool,
PIB/PET scan served as amajor catalyst in the move toward the centrality
of early detection.
7 Manuel Menendez-Gonzalez, ‘Routine lumbar puncture for the early diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease. Is it safe?’ (2014) 6(65) Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience 1–2.
8 Swati More, J. Beach and R. Vince, ‘Early detection of amyloidopathy in alzheimer’s mice
by hyperspectral endoscopy’ (2016) 57 Investigative Ophthalmology & Visual Science
3231–8.
9 Ajeet Kaushik, R. D. Jayant, S. Tiwari, A. Vashist and M. Nair, ‘80 Nano-biosensors to
detect beta-amyloid for Alzheimer’s disease management’ (2016) Biosens Bioelectron
273–87; ‘Nanosensors for the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease’, cordis.europa.eu/result/
rcn/188315_en.html.
10 Henrik Zetterberg, D. Wilson, U. Andreasson, L. Minthon, K. Blennow, J. Randall and
O. Hansson, ‘Plasma tau levels in Alzheimer’s disease’ (2013) 5 Alzheimers Research &
Therapy 9.
11 Klunk, ‘Imaging brain amyloid’, 306–19.
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A secondmajor early detection technology was promoted in early 2010
in the form of cerebral spinal fluid (CSF).12 This fluid flows through the
spine and is obtained through the administration of a ‘spinal tap’. This
fluid can be analysed for the presence of markers that were highly
associated with the onset of AD, and could be detected some time before
behavioural and cognitive changes could be detected. However, despite
the high concordance of these biochemical changes with the onset of AD,
CSF proved to be a very controversial technology. Questions arose about
screening and who should get a spinal tap for AD detection and how
these people would be identified out of the general population.
Discussions of spinal taps as a component of routine clinical care met
with substantial resistance.13 With no effective treatment for
incipient AD that might be detected, the value of pre-symptomatic AD
pathology screening as routine care was less than compelling.
Furthermore, none of these biomarkers for early detection have been
validated.14 So, at best, the most reliable indicators of the presence of
incipient AD pathology are risk indicators rather than diagnostic tools.
Despite the ever-increasingly sophisticated technologies to detect AD
earlier in the disease progression, this is not accompanied by the ability
to prevent, treat, delay or cure the onset of AD. Rationally speaking, the
fanfare for early detection can only be a muted one.
6.2.3 The Cost and Value of Early Detection
Advantages offered by PIB were that it allowed for differential diagnosis
as well as greater diagnostic certainty. From a research perspective, it
facilitated quantification of the impact of therapeutic interventions seek-
ing to manipulate the production or presence of amyloid in the living
brain as a way of altering disease progression. Not only could the target
phenomenon be detected, it could be measured pre- and post- interven-
tion. For early detection research, it also facilitated the identification of
patients and potential clinical trial participants who carried an amyloid
burden, thus allowing the enrichment of trial participant populations.
As a research tool, some value could be shown. The clinical value outside
of differential diagnosis is considerably less compelling.
12 Blennow, ‘Cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers’, p. 413.
13 Shima Mehrabian, P. Alexopoulos, M. Ortner, L. Traykov, T. Grimmer, A. Kurz et al.,
‘Cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers for Alzheimer’s disease: The role of apolipoprotein
E genotype, age, and sex’ (2015) 11 Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 3105–10.
14 Alzheimers Association, www.alz.org/research/science/earlier_alzheimers_diagnosis.asp
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In Western countries, the use of sophisticated technologies for early
detection of AD has already met with resistance. This contrast became
perhaps most visible in the anxiously awaited decision in the USA by the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMMS), the federal agency that
determines which medical interventions will be covered by Medicare
and Medicaid. This was a particularly critical decision regarding the
question of whether social insurance would pay for the use of MRI
scans for the clinical care of AD.15 Given that Medicare is the publicly
available medical insurance for persons over 65, this decision was of
paramount importance to the AD research community, not least for
the financial implications. The centrality that these expensive scans
could take on in clinical care for AD and mild cognitive impairment
(MCI)16 from a financial perspective, would not be insubstantial. With
nothing else in the AD treatment arsenal, these scans could become
standard of care and be seen as a core part of clinical care. Moreover,
these scans could become a centrepiece around which all other future
interventions must interact, thus entrenching the technology further into
the AD ‘treatment’ paradigm. Of course, many treatment paradigms
involve the use of a specific technology, e.g. dialysis. However, the
imaging of amyloid is currently of ambiguous value. It is neither
a treatment modality nor an assistive technology. So when the CMMS
applied their criteria for coverage – the proposed intervention improves
health outcomes, proponents of the uptake of the scans by Medicare had
an uphill battle.
In 2013, following a proposal for the inclusion of PET scans to detect
the presence of amyloid plaques as part of AD diagnosis for Medicare
coverage under specified circumstances, the federal agency making such
decisions rejected this inclusion. Even though the technology was
acknowledged to perform the necessary task competently and reliably,
a positive impact on health outcomes could not be shown, as a general
matter.17 The CMMS concluded that there was insufficient evidence of
therapeutic benefit or effect on patient outcomes for it to be covered by
Medicare. Two exceptions were made: 1) differential diagnosis of fronto-
15 Centers for Medicaid and Medicare, ‘Decision Memo for Beta Amyloid Positron
Emission Tomography in Dementia and Neurodegenerative Disease’ (CAG-00431 N).
(2013) www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?
NCAId=265.
16 Karl Herholz and K. Ebmeier, ‘Clinical Amyloid Imaging in Alzheimer’s Disease’ (2011)
10 The Lancet Neurology 667–70.
17 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, ‘Decision Memo for Beta Amyloid’.
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temporal dementia (FTD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) under specific
requirements; or, 2) use in a CMS approved practical clinical trial focused
on the utility of FDG-PET in the diagnosis or treatment of dementing
neurodegenerative diseases.18 This decision is significant for multiple
reasons. First, by a focus on the benefit rather than on efficacy alone,
the CMMS rejected an almost sacrosanct technological imperative in
favour of a more value-based method of evaluation. This was widely
regarded as an enormous blow to the AD research community; it prob-
ably marked a ‘win’ for medicine in the public interest. Although
Medicare coverage would also have meant wider availability, this would
not necessarily have resulted in benefit to patients.
The ambiguity of benefit of early detection of amyloid is further
underscored by the fact that while plaques are invariably a feature
of AD, the presence of these plaques is not invariably associated
with AD. In other words, amyloid plaques are not necessarily indicative
of AD in that a not insubstantial percentage of the cognitively healthy
population carries amyloid plaques at the time of death.19 Thus, the value
of being able to identify amyloid asymptomatically is somewhat dimin-
ished. Moreover, several trials have put this hypothesis to the test with
perhaps the biggest blow occurring in the aducanumab trial that suc-
ceeded in reducing amyloid burden but resulted in no impact on cogni-
tive capacities.20
Early detection of AD is a very technology-intensive enterprise. It is
expensive and generally inaccessible relative to the size and resources of
the patient population. That is, there is no way to accomplish early
detection without the use of sophisticated technology. A brief look at
the economic costs of early detection shows that many of the technolo-
gies required for early detection are quite high. For example, a spinal tap
through which cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) is obtained costs roughly
between €3,000 and €5,000.21 The average cost of a Florbetapir F18
PET scan (for in vivo detection of amyloid burden) is approximately
$3000.22 This does not address the initial costs to develop the appropriate
18 Ibid. 19 Herholz, ‘Clinical Amyloid Imaging’, p. 668.
20 Jeff Sevigny, P. Chiao, T. Bussière et al., ‘The antibody aducanumab reduces Aβ plaques in
Alzheimer’s disease’ (2016) 537 Nature 50–56.
21 Cristina Valcarcel-Nazco, L. Perestelo-Perez, J. L. Molinuevo, J. Mar, I. Castilla,
P. Serrano-Aguilar, ‘Cost-effectiveness of the use of biomarkers in cerebrospinal fluid
for Alzheimer’s disease’ (2014) 42(3) Journal of Alzheimers Disease 777–88.
22 Alzheimer’s Association, ‘For Healthcare Professionals: Frequently asked questions about
Amyloid Beta Imaging’ (2013), www.alz.org/documents_custom/hps_auc_faq.pdf
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expertise and infrastructure necessary to provide access to this technol-
ogy. This could present substantial barriers to access in low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC) or in rural areas. Moreover, in countries with-
out universal health insurance, individual patients would be required to
pay the cost of early detection, potentially limiting access further.
Healthcare of the elderly may be covered by programmes like Medicare
in the USA or national healthcare systems, like the NHS in the UK; these
technologies will be limited by eligibility criteria, which inevitably incor-
porates some degree of cost-effectiveness analysis.
6.2.4 Early Detection and the Right (Not) to Know
The centrality of early detection must make sense not only scientifically,
but also from a social perspective. The Human Genome Project’s Ethical
Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) project generated a field of literature
highlighting the fact that early (risk) detection is not an unqualified
benefit.23 Even if early detection ultimately proves capable of contribut-
ing to the development of effective intervention, it is naive to think that
this aspect would not come at a cost. The debates occasioned by the
Human Genome Project called attention to the complexity of the use of
genetic risk information. Even in cases where effective therapies existed,
the concept of the ‘right not to know’ held a certain ground.24 Moreover,
debates unveiled a distinct unspoken belief that knowledge of disease risk
may not necessarily be the prevailing value in society. Other things
matter.
In the case of AD, the right not to know takes on particular valence
given the nature of the disease. Frequently regarded as among the most
dreaded diseases, AD erodes multiple aspects of ourselves, including
a sense of self, the ability to recall cherished memories and recognise
loved ones. Moreover, it robs us of one of our greatest forms of currency
in the Western world – our cognitive capabilities. Consequently, early
detection of a disease that erodes this currency can ultimately serve to
intrude on many aspects of our functional life, depending on how early
this early detection takes place. In AD, the estimates of the time before
symptoms of the neuropathology associated with AD range from 10 to 20
23 Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics (New York: Routledge, 2003).
24 Roberto Andorno, ‘The right not to know: an autonomy-based approach’ (2004) 30(5)
Journal of Medical Ethics 435–9.
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years.25 Thus, as early technology improves and becomes more accurate,
integration of early detection also will mean intrusion of a highly com-
promising disease into our vibrant personal and professional lives. With
the incursions on the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act
(GINA) opening up more loopholes that allow for the lawful collection
and use of genetic information – for example, the Wellness Program
exception26 – confidence in protections against undesirable use of early
detection information not limited to genetic information stands on very
little. As such, the question arises regarding the relationship between
early detection and collective approaches to AD and healthcare.
6.3 Finding a Place for Early Detection: Collective versus
Individual Approaches
6.3.1 Early Detection for Some Things But Not Others
In the absence of a cure, early detection presents challenges to prioritisa-
tion of collective or public health approaches. First, early detection
generally requires the use of expensive and sometimes invasive technol-
ogies inaccessible to the majority of patients. Secondly, there is still no
evidence supporting the hypothesis that early detection leads to better
outcomes for AD, and so it yields little benefit in exchange for the use of
limited resources. However, given the evidence showing incipient AD
pathology more than 10 years before symptoms, early detection may
serve as a component of some research strategies. It may not be possible
to make useful assessments of the value of early detection when it is not
altogether clear what role, if any, it will ultimately play. But whatever the
relationship between early detection and collective approaches turns out
to be, its ability to yield a therapeutic benefit to more than a select few
individuals will be required. That this inquiry needs to begin at the
research phase seems highly appropriate as a critical question of steward-
ship and resource allocation.
25 Reisa Sperling, P. S. Aisen, L. A. Beckett, D. A. Bennett, S. Craft, A. M. Fagan et al.,
‘Toward defining the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease: Recommendations from
the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s Association workgroups on diagnostic
guidelines for Alzheimer’s disease’ (2011) 7(3) Alzheimers and Dementia, 280–92.
26 American Society of Human Genetics, ‘ASHG Opposes H.R.1313, the Preserving
Employee Wellness Programs Act: Bill Would Undermine Genetic Privacy Protections’
(8 March 2017), www.ashg.org/press/201703-HR1313.html
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6.3.2 Genetic versus Non-Genetic Basis of AD
Early detection informed by genetic information presents perhaps
a clearer case. The distinction between strategies aiming to address the
genetic versus non-genetic basis of AD is one widely recognised as
essential and important by patients, researchers and policymakers.27
However, within this distinction sits the basis for several alternative
strategies. From an ethical and social justice perspective as well as
scientific perspective the specific targeting of the small population
of AD sufferers who have or are at risk for the familial form of AD can
be justified. This population represents approximately 2 per cent of AD
patients who typically develop the disease earlier in life, resulting in the
disease designation of Early Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (EOAD).28
The burden of this disease for affected persons justifies a dedicated
approach, in part because of the generally greater loss experienced by
this AD sub-population in comparison to sporadic AD patients who tend
to develop the disease much later in life. Seeking to allocate more
resources to a population that suffers a greater loss would be defensible
on many grounds, including solidarity.
On the other hand, a different type of focus on genetic involvement
in AD would appear to fall in line with the Precision Medicine agenda,
propagated by the US and other western governments. This genetic
contribution to non-EAOD form of AD suggests for some that the only
way to address the heterogeneity of AD aetiology is to personalise treat-
ment strategies.29 This has two consequences that are likely to prove
problematic for collective approaches to AD. First, various degrees of
patient stratification can lead to the creation of ever-growing AD patient
subsets, each of which generated drug development and pursuit of
approval under ‘rare disease’ status,30 thereby establishing small patient
population, a perverse form of tribalism in direct conflict with collective
approaches. The second consequence is more general in that, in order to
know the genetic risk of a particular AD patient, some form of
27 Kai Blennow, M. J. de Leon and H. Zetterberg, ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ (2006) 368
The Lancet 387–403.
28 Xing Peng, P. Xing, X. Li et al., ‘Towards personalized intervention for Alzheimer’s
disease” (2016) 14(5) Genomics, Proteomics & Bioinformatics 289–97.
29 Ibid., p. 289.
30 Aaron Kesselheim, C. L. Treasure and S. Joffe, ‘Biomarker-defined subsets of common
diseases: policy and economic implications of Orphan Drug Act coverage’ (2016) 14(1)
PLoS Medicine e1002190.
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genotyping must occur. This avenue of research carries little promise
where the availability of one’s genetic information might be limited.
Consequently, an inquiry into the impact on the collective burden of
disease of this research arm suggests that research into EOAD, the rarer
form of AD, can be justified on social justice grounds. Therefore, mea-
sures like the Orphan Drug Act31 and other types of initiatives aiming to
support the health and well-being of ‘disease minorities’ who would
otherwise present as commercially unattractive to ‘for-profit’ medical
innovation – collective approaches rooted in solidarity, in principle –
seek to move the entire patient population toward health and well-being.
Nevertheless, early detection is a technologically dependent intervention
that comes with infrastructural barriers ranging from the availability and
logistics of genotyping to reimbursement schemes. This does not mean
that it should not be pursued, but rather that it should not be seen as ‘the’
solution if it operates to exclude a substantial proportion of AD patients
from access to effective treatment. Research oriented toward broader
access must be promoted and supported.
6.4 Alternatives: Orienting towards the Right Goal
6.4.1 Cure/Treatment versus Care: Debates on Futility
Despite the investment of billions of dollars and years of research, there is
no cure or effective treatment. This conundrum demands reflection.
Perhaps the most recent indication of such reflection can be found in
the announcement in January 2018 by pharmaceutical giant Pfizer that it
would discontinue research on pharmaceuticals for Alzheimer’s disease.
Pfizer explained that ‘Alzheimer’s has always been a highly challenging
area with notmuch progress beingmade despite the investment of a lot of
funds and resources’.32 The sense of futility and frustration are not the
only bases giving rise to re-evaluation. There are many who think that,
given that AD is a disease closely associated with ageing attempts to
identify a cure may be futile and that the more realistic and attainable
goal is to find ways to slow progression of the disease, particularly in ways
31 Orphan Drug Act of 1983. Pub L. No. 97–414, 96 Stat. 2049.
32 ‘Pfizer halts research into alzheimer’s and parkinson’s treatments’ (2018) NPR, www.npr
.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/08/576443442/pfizer-halts-research-efforts-into-alz
heimers-and-parkinsons-treatments; ‘Alzheimer’s takes another hit as Pfizer ends
research in this area’ Nasdaq (8 January 2018), www.nasdaq.com/article/alzheimers-
takes-another-hit-as-pfizer-ends-research-in-this-area-cm901602.
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that extend the functional phase and shorten the most severe stages.33
Thus, one way of distinguishing research strategies is by the goal that is
sought, whether cure or treatment (stopping/reversing progression or
slowing progression/lessening symptoms).
Despite even this relatively modest goal, some have asserted that the
investment in pharmacological interventions to effect a cure is a poor
allocation of limited resources. This camp stresses that, because the
disease is inextricably tied to ageing, a cure is unlikely.34 Proponents of
this view argue that the money is much better spent on care and social
arrangements for persons affected by dementia.
It is difficult to say whether a treatment/cure versus care approach is
preferable in terms of propelling a collective approach given that such
a characterisation is highly dependent on precisely what kind of treatment/
cure emerges, if any. On the other hand, heavy monetary and time invest-
ments in futile or unpromising treatment strategies are unlikely to serve
anyone, except perhaps in the form of a fleeting sense of hope. The belief
that the disease can be effectively treated if the right target(s) are reached,
with the right intervention at the right time, clashes dramatically with
ardent care proponents who argue that the billions of dollars invested in
cure research is money that would be better spent on learning how to best
care for this growing patient population. Among the most vocal in this
camp, Peter Whitehouse, author of The Myth of Alzheimer’s,35 sees AD as
not so much a disease, but a form of the incurable phenomenon of ageing.
Whitehouse makes the argument that the spending of vast financial
resources searching for a cure to what is essentially part of the ageing
process should be redirected to various forms of care and care research.
The reasoning goes that we all age differently, partly or largely by virtue of
how we have lived – have we exercised regularly, eaten healthy foods,
attended to our social needs, and so on? Consequently, this view suggests
that acknowledging that this age-related disease is a natural consequence of
ageing, sometimes referred to as ‘severe ageing’, and is not curable, would
be a more responsible approach. An emphasis on pharmaceutical inter-
vention for many care proponents raises concerns about a misallocation of
limited resources that ultimately serves not the collective but rather phar-
maceutical interests.
33 Margaret Lock, The Alzheimer Conundrum: Entanglements of Dementia and Aging
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
34 Ibid., p. 27.
35 Peter Whitehouse and D. George, The Myth of Alzheimer’s: What You Aren’t Being Told
About Today’s Most Dreaded Diagnosis (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2008).
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Any number of reasons could explain the lack of success with early
intervention experimental therapies. Some speculate that it could stem
from the nature of the disease itself. As a multifactorial disease, AD is
known to have different aetiologies, which may, in turn, affect the effec-
tiveness of experimental interventions. Other reasons could include the
obvious –wrong target, wrong pharmaceutical compound or influence of
undetected comorbidities.
While an emphasis on care over treatment may present as a more
promising means of actually delivering something of concrete benefit to
the collective, it precludes any possibility of ameliorating the chances to
reduce or eliminate affliction. However, should costly pharmaceutical
research result in an effective treatment, it could ultimately attend to the
collective nature of the burden of AD, depending on the nature of the
intervention. Consequently, both approaches could present opportunities
for collective orientation, one perhaps more immediate and less spec-
ulative than the other. But foregoing the long-term vision for the short-
term reward also carries certain risks that are, in this instance, probably
better avoided in favour of a more diversified research portfolio that
concurrently attends to both dimensions of healthcare.
6.4.2 Prevention: What do we know so far?
An alternative strategy to cure or care is prevention. Effective prevention
strategies have assumed a place in the AD research agenda, with studies
on readily available ingestibles such as Vitamin D.36 As a potential
approach to prevention, it could contribute to collective approaches if
proven to be effective in that these are in ready and inexpensive supply
and would be more widely accessible.
A number of risk factors have been identified that are highly correlated
with the onset of AD. Most of these risk factors are modifiable and can
serve as targets for health promotion and public health strategies.37 These
modifiable risk factors are shared with a number of other serious diseases
and many are themselves considered morbidities, including hyperten-
sion, diabetes, obesity, cardiovascular diseases as well as some lifestyle-
36 Thomas Littlejohns, W. E. Henley, I. A. Lang, C. Annweiler, O. Beauchet, P. H. Chaves
et al., ‘Vitamin D and the risk of dementia and Alzheimer disease’ (2014) 83(10)
Neurology 920–8.
37 Ewilena Maliszewska-Cyna, M. Lynch, J. J. Oore, P. M. Nagy and I. Aubert, ‘The benefits
of exercise and metabolic interventions for the prevention and early treatment of alzhei-
mer’s disease’ (2017) 14(1) Current Alzheimer Research 47–60.
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related risk factors such as excessive alcohol consumption, smoking,
cognitive inactivity, physical inactivity, low education and social
inactivity.38 Essentially, what is known about the onset of AD in terms
of modifiable risk factors points to lifestyle changes that are generally
accessible to everyone regardless of location, income and health infra-
structure. Moreover, aerobic exercise has been tentatively shown to have
a positive effect on MCI and cognitive decline.39
These correlations speak volumes, often echoing public health wisdom
long embraced. For example, among the most robust associations are
those pertaining to cardiovascular health. Additionally, high blood pres-
sure, stroke and excess weight in midlife have been strongly associated
with risk of AD.40 Consequently, one prevention strategy would be to
piggy back on the existing public health strategies. Thus, AD prevention
strategies could include such things as reduction of salt intake, regular
aerobic exercise and reduced fat and sugar intake.
As well, positive behaviours such as cognitive activity and social
engagement have been identified as having a positive effect on the like-
lihood of cognitive decline.41 Both these interventions are ripe for col-
lective uptake via health promotion initiatives.
Prevention as a public health strategy is appealing in part because of the
collective impact that it could generate in comparison to pharmaceutical and
technology-intensive interventions which have hitherto proven unsuccess-
ful. A turn to prevention as a healthcare strategy would seem to make good
sense. Prevention holds out few, if any, barriers to a collective approach,
including for LMIC. If it is possible to minimise the risk of AD before it
starts, and the ways that this can be done are generally accessible, then
prevention may serve as the most practical and effective collective approach.
Whether one stands on either end of the ‘curable/treatable disease’–‘in-
curable/untreatable severe ageing’ spectrum, it is undeniable that the body
ages, sometimes badly. Prevention as an alternative to or robust comple-
ment to early detection as a strategy to combat AD would seem to stand as
a critical and necessary component of any agenda seeking to minimise the
38 Kimberly Ashby-Mitchell, R. Burns, J. Shaw and K. Anstey, ‘Proportion of dementia in
Australia explained by common modifiable risk factors’ (2017) 9(1) Alzheimers Research
& Therapy 11.
39 Maliszewska-Cyna, ‘The benefits of exercise’, p. 48.
40 Simone Lista, B. Dubois and H. Hampel, ‘Paths to Alzheimer’s disease prevention: from
modifiable risk factors to biomarker enrichment strategies’ (2015) 19(2) Journal of
Nutrition Health & Aging 154–63.
41 Maliszewska-Cyna, ‘The benefits of exercise’, p. 48.
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burden of this disease. The overall impact from even minor modifications
of disease incidence and progression could bode well for society.
6.5 Timing the Inquiry about Collective Approaches
Although it is probably premature to conclude that the most that really
can be done (or should be done) is to promote and administer public
health measures aimed at modifiable risk factors, the importance of
a collective approach must be kept within view. Any number of reasons
could explain the lack of success with early intervention experimental
therapies. As a multifactorial disease, AD is known to have different
aetiologies, which may, in turn, affect the effectiveness of experimental
interventions. Other reasons could include the obvious – wrong target,
wrong pharmaceutical compound, influence of undetected comorbid-
ities, and so on.
In some ways, it is reasonable to argue that all AD research has the
potential to have a significant impact on the collective burden, regard-
less of whether its therapeutic target is extremely narrow or aims for
broad impact. On this basis, we may be tempted to give a pass to
research on prohibitively costly interventions with narrow patient
population targets because of the fundamental knowledge that it
could yield. This would be a mistake. The pursuit of effective therapeu-
tic interventions for an ultimately fatal disease with increasing inci-
dence which has been characterised as an epidemic, requires that the
development of an intervention that may ultimately be introduced into
clinical care must consider how it will be administered, when and to
whom.
This does not need to tie the hands of researchers conducting research
on therapeutic interventions; rather, consideration at this stage requires
an honest assessment and articulation of the grounded expectations of
how integration into healthcare may ultimately look. The narrative that
accompanies the research should reflect this assessment of grounded
possibilities for healthcare.
The example of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) serves as a good exam-
ple of therapeutic research on a relatively inaccessible intervention, if it
ultimately proves effective. DBS is currently under investigation as
a possible intervention for early AD.42 As a clinical care intervention,
42 Adrian Laxton and A. Lozano, ‘Deep brain stimulation for the treatment of Alzheimer
disease and dementias’ (2013) 80(S28) World Neurosurgery e21–S28.
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should DBS show therapeutic benefit, the cost and technological sophis-
tication of the contemplated intervention could place DBS outside of the
reach of the majority of AD patients. Of course, DBS has taken
a prominent role in the treatment of Parkinson’s Disease, a disease of
considerably lower prevalence and incidence. Thus, a rather individua-
listic approach to treatment serves a larger percentage of the patient
population than would be the case in AD, depending on the indications
of successful use. That is, the AD population for whom DBS might be
effective is so narrowly circumscribed in the investigational phase that
any narrowly defined patient population would be further narrowed by
highly selective eligibility criteria.43
Characterised as a ‘growing epidemic’, AD is a great ‘leveller’. That is,
characterised by having age as its highest predictive association, the non-
genetic form of AD appears to strike fairly indiscriminately. It could
happen to any one of us and, according to some researchers, would
happen to everyone if they lived long enough. Consequently, this is
a disease that ‘belongs’ to everyone, either by affliction or the sharing of
a familial or community burden. Consequently, the emergence of an
effective treatment for AD will have implications for everyone – either as
a therapeutic basis for optimism or as a distant treatment that exists but is
only for a select few, literally adding insult to injury. Aside from the not
insubstantial exclusionary impact of elitist availability is the minimal
impact on the general burden of AD that can be had by such
a narrowly targeted intervention. This is especially disturbing when one
considers that funding devoted to investigation of narrowly targeted
interventions may be funds that could have been allocated to research
on interventions that, if successful, would be more widely available to AD
patients. In terms of collective approaches, DBS presents as
a substantially less responsive intervention to the burden presented by
this disease.
Low cost–benefit ratio and justice are only two of the reasons why
research into narrowly tailored therapeutic interventions is problematic
when the burden of disease is so substantial. Yet even these highly
compelling reasons do not justify abandoning such research in all
instances. These reasons do suggest that if collective impact is to be
prioritised in any meaningful way, some scrutiny should attend the
43 Tejas Sankar, M. Chakravarty, A. Bescos, M. Lara, T. Obuchi, A. Laxton et al., ‘Deep brain
stimulation influences brain structure in Alzheimer’s disease’ (2015) 6(3) Brain
Stimulation 645–54.
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funding and agenda of such research. The type of scrutiny needed at this
phase could pertain to the claimsmade and the orientation of the research.
If we consider the case of DBS as a possible treatment of AD, it is highly
unlikely that DBS will ever have a substantial impact on the burden of
disease. As a coherent research strategy, relatively little hope can be placed
on the use of DBS in the treatment of AD as a way of addressing the
burden of this disease. Instead, research on the effect of DBS on AD does
have an arguably compelling justification in its potential to yield highly
valuable fundamental knowledge, possibly pertaining to the mapping of
brain functions, interconnectivity and thresholds for impact and adverse
effects. This is knowledge that could serve the entire neurological research
community and support the study of multiple neurological diseases.
Moreover, the mapping function of DBS research on AD conceivably
could, in fact, ultimately contribute to the discovery or development of
effective treatment by offering a greater understanding of possible targets,
their effects and interactivity. Consequently, despite the highly persona-
lised nature of DBS, it may contribute to fundamental research.
The problem arises when research goals and therapeutic goals are
conflated in the presentation of both avenues. DBS, as a technologically
intensive treatment modality, flies in the face of collective approaches.
As fundamental research, it could yield valuable knowledge.
As a neurodegenerative disease in which critical parts of the brain
degenerate, the effectiveness of DBS as a treatment for AD can probably
be expected to have a limited effect. Even the neurophysiological effect
that it has been reported to have has been minimal and variable and its
impact on cognitive function even smaller and short-lived.44
Buried here is the dilemma arising when research that produces
knowledge that can be used in further research on the development of
therapies with no clear distinction between a goal of generalisable knowl-
edge versus a therapeutic effect. Each requires a different type of scrutiny.
But, of course, this is easier said than done, and is even more so in the
context of a disease for which people are desperate for any type of
disease-altering effect.
6.6 AD and ‘We Medicine’
This chapter points to a few possible strategies for how consideration of
collective versus individual approaches could inform the research stage
44 Sankar et al., ‘Deep brain stimulation’, p. 646.
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when there is no cure. In essence, it would require, first, an examination
of the burden of disease and an assessment of the effect the contemplated
intervention would have if it were to prove effective. This is not merely or
even principally a question of how many people suffer from a particular
disease, but rather a call to deliberate regard of the overarching policy
implications of certain research strategies. Policymakers and regulators
have long recognised the importance of protecting research for diseases
that afflict a relatively small population. This inquiry is driven by prin-
ciples of justice and solidarity that translate into shared goals of health
and well-being. And, as articulated by Donna Dickenson, this includes
a sense of shared burden and address – ‘We Medicine’.
A ‘We Medicine’ approach would scrutinise therapeutic research and
would put forth questions regarding availability, accessibility, adequacy
of infrastructure and availability of expertise. As the DBS example shows,
a conflation of therapeutic with foundational research in some ways is
a disservice to funders, society and patients in that a coupling with
therapeutic potential holds out a promise that it cannot fulfil for the
overwhelming majority of AD patients even if it were to prove effective.
A ‘We Medicine’ approach would find the DBS highly inadequate as
a strategy to address the burden of AD, but perhaps permissible as
a fundamental research effort conducted on a limited scale.
More difficult to analyse through the lens of collective versus indivi-
dual approaches is the phenomenon of early detection. With the public
health mantra that ‘early intervention leads to better outcomes’, it is
difficult to know how to best understand the role of early detection in
potentially addressing AD. In the context of AD, a relatively simple
intervention becomes a technologically intensive treatment, again placed
out of the reach for many AD patients. A screening programme of some
sort would need to become routine for healthy vibrant individuals at the
prime of their functional lives. This, of course, raises other concerns.
In fact, the concordance of even the most reliable methods using sophis-
ticated technologies, such as fMRI and cerebral spinal fluid, are not
100 per cent accurate in their ability to diagnose or predict the onset
of AD and no biomarkers have been validated. Diagnosis is, at best,
a complicated endeavour, and prediction even more so.
But if, in the future, the effectiveness of a new drug is proven, but only
if taken at a stage in the disease progression detectable by one of the
technology-intensive early detection methods currently available, it is
difficult to make a case that such an intervention should not be pursued,
even if the centrality of early detection makes the treatment unavailable
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to amajority of patients. This would seem to leave us with little choice but
to settle for a largely individualised approach to a widely dispersed
burden. If early detection is essential, research should prioritise low
cost, low-tech methods of detection that can be widely accessed.
6.7 Conclusion
Alzheimer’s disease stands as one of the greatest global challenges in the
twenty-first century. A neurodegenerative disease that requires consider-
able care and that is ultimately fatal exerts a great toll on individual
patients and on family and caregivers. Yet, despite billions of dollars
invested in research, no treatment or cure has been found. Consequently,
the search for anything that might prove effective in arresting this disease
garners interest and support. However, research resources are finite and
must be handled responsibly. The commitment to widely available inter-
ventions that would be accessible to the patient community as broadly as
possible must be vigorously pursued. Given the growing incidence of AD
in LMIC, ensuring broad accessibility of any therapeutic intervention
that may be developed would seem to merit utmost priority. For the
research enterprise to emerge with a narrowly tailored and inaccessible
intervention would be a modest success, at best, in the face of themillions
suffering from this dreaded affliction.
Undoubtedly, what a commitment to ‘We Medicine’ looks like when
there is no cure is complex. Such phenomena as technologically intensive
early detection or with highly individualised treatments, such as DBS,
may be valuable in the research phase, yielding valuable knowledge that
can later be used to develop more accessible therapies. In a landscape
barren of effective treatment options, a certain degree of patience and
flexibility seems to be required. Nevertheless, regard for the collective
burden would advise some priority for interventions that can be ‘up-
scaled’ to meet the challenge that faces communities worldwide.
Admittedly, there is little profit in the promotion of modifiable lifestyle
risk behaviours. Our permissible acceptance, even celebration, of small
victories for a handful of AD patients even at great cost, should not blind
us to our long-term goals and foundational regard for health and well-
being for everyone, including when there is no cure.
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7Lost and Found
Relocating the Individual in the Age of Intensified Data Sourcing in
European Healthcare
klaus hoeyer
7.1 Introduction
Places with intense human traffic, such as train stations and airports,
often have an office for the lost and found. Ideally, a lost and found office
reconnects people with the objects they might lose in the course of their
journey. To achieve the purpose somebody has to find the lost object – it
must be handed in at the office, catalogued, and thus be made available
for retrieval. Lost and found offices can be fascinating places. Like
Simmel’s famous figure of ‘the stranger’,1 they are products of moder-
nity’s complex forms of social organisation and mobility. Simmel notes
that a ‘stranger’ unites what is far away in a social sense with that which is
near in a physical sense, and that the ‘stranger’ is both an outsider to
a social group, while concomitantly being granted a social position – that
of stranger – thanks to the group. In lost and found offices, things act as
strangers, and strange things happen. Sometimes what is ‘lost’ was never
meant to be retrieved; it was lost on purpose, and sometimes it is
retrieved by others than the original owner. The passage from being
lost to being found can redefine an object and make it into something
else for somebody else.2 Even when returned to the original owner, an
object can acquire a newmeaning and significance after having been lost.
This chapter is about being lost and found in new places of intense
traffic: the digital infrastructure for health data. It is about the passage
from individual data to population data, where the interests of indivi-
duals are lost, as it were, and how these data can be used to create
1 G. Simmel, ‘The Stranger’ in K. Wolff (ed.) The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York, NY:
Free Press, 1950), pp. 402–8.
2 K. Hetherington, ‘Secondhandedness: consumption, disposal, and absent presence’ (2004)
22 Environment and Planning D: Society and Spaces 157–73.
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personalised advice which is applied to individuals. A new ‘owner’ is
found. Health data can operate as ‘strangers’ in the sense that users of
data can experience physical nearness to data subjects despite
social distance. Sometimes a researcher will know things about an indi-
vidual that not even close relatives would know, but still not know the
individual as an actual person. As data change hands, they potentially
change meaning and function, much like the stuff in the lost and found
office. Health data always relate in some way to individuals and, in the
end, the various uses of this data are supposed to benefit individuals, one
way or another. Benefits are never guaranteed, however, and the routes to
potential benefit are many and not always easily understood. As data uses
multiply, data come to live more promiscuous lives.
As laid out in the introduction to this book, Dickenson suggests
a distinction between We Medicine and Me Medicine to interrogate
contemporary developments in healthcare.3 With We Medicine,
Dickenson refers to the publicly organised delivery of healthcare that
takes solidarity as its primary starting point, while MeMedicine begins in
the individual and transforms collective challenges to individual oppor-
tunities and risks. Using this distinction, this chapter explores how the
ongoing data intensification relates to this spectrum of Me Medicine and
We Medicine. How do public and commercial forms of data sourcing
operate? What counts as collective and individual risk and benefit? How
do the public and the private forms of data sourcing compare? What are
the stakes for individuals in those processes? What are the interests of
society? How do the two relate? Who are lost and what is found? What is
lost, and who are found?
7.2 Data Sourcing and Use in Denmark
Health data are collected, stored and exchanged all over the world, but
the ways in which this happens differ according to place and the political,
economic and social norms and material infrastructures of different
healthcare systems. The Nordic healthcare systems deliver universal
access and they are primarily financed through taxes. In the following
discussion of infrastructures for data, I will take most of my examples
from one Nordic country, Denmark, where public collection and use of
3 D. Dickenson, ‘A reality check for personalizedmedicine’ in D. Dickenson,MeMedicine vs
We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2013), pp. 1–6.
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health data is pervasive.4 Thanks to the use of personal identity numbers
in all encounters with public services, Danish health data can be com-
bined with data on socio-economic and educational status from employ-
ers and tax authorities.5 The other Nordic countries have similar
elaborate register infrastructures6, but Denmark has taken what can be
seen as a more radical approach to research facilitation than the other
Nordic countries by allowing data to be used without consent.7
The remarkable opportunities for population-based research in
Denmark have regularly been discussed in, for example, the journal
Science, describing the whole country as a ‘cohort study’.8 To retain this
4 M. K. Saunders, ‘In Denmark, Big Data Goes To Work’ (2014) 33(7) Health Affairs 1245.
5 L. C. Thygesen and A. K. Ersbøll, ‘Danish population-based registers for public health and
health-related welfare research: Introduction to the supplement’ (2011) 39 (Suppl 7)
Scandinavian Journal of Public Health 8–10; L. C. Thygesen and A. K. Ersbøll, ‘When the
entire population is the sample: strengths and limitations in register-based epidemiology’
(2014) 29(8) European Journal of Epidemiology 551–8. The registers are regularly validated
(M. Schmidt, S. A. Schmidt, J. L. Sandegaard et al., ‘The Danish National Patient Registry:
a review of content, data quality, and research potential’ (2015) 7 Clinical Epidemology
449–89 and they are primarily used for epidemiological research designs where the ability to
control how the diseased compare to a background population implies that many of the
criticisms raised against new Big Data methodologies (e.g. D. Boyd and K. Crawford,
‘Critical questions for big data: Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly
phenomenon’ (2012) 15(5) Information, Communication& Society 662–79 and poor admin-
istrative and clinical data systems in other countries are not particularly relevant (e.g.
M. S. Lauer, E. H. Blackstone, J. B. Young and E. J. Topol, ‘Cause of Death in Clinical
Research’ (1999) 34(3) Journal of the American College of Cardiology 618–20; L. Li and
P. M. Rothwell, ‘Biases in detection of apparent “weekend effect” on outcome with admin-
istrative coding data: population based study of stroke’ (2016) 353 British Medical Journal
1–9; D. M. Maslove, J. A. Dubin, A. Shrivats and J. Lee, ‘Errors, omissions, and outliers in
hourly vital signs measurements in intensive care’ (2016) 44 Critical Care Medicine e1021–
e1030). The special status of the Nordic health data can be illustrated for example with the
fact that when the (public) American Food and Drug Administration approved the (private)
company Merck’s vaccine for human papillomavirus, it was on the condition that they
would use the (publicly sanctioned but privately run) Nordic registers to follow up on long-
term vaccine outcomes (Food and Drug Administration). 8 June 2006 Approval Letter –
Human Papillomavirus Quadrivalent (Types 6, 11, 16, 18) Vaccine, Recombinant (Rockville,
MD: Department of Health and Human Services, 2006).
6 A. Cool, ‘Detaching data from the state: Biobanking and building Big Data in Sweden’
(2015) 11(3) BioSocieties 277–95.
7 K. Hoeyer, ‘Denmark at a crossroad? Intensified data sourcing in a research radical
country’ (2016) 29 The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data 73–93. Cohort studies and other
research initiated data collections typically use informed consent, and some databases do
too, not least if they are sponsored by or work closely with industry – but for public
registers and clinical databases consent is not legally required.
8 J. Couzin-Frankel, ‘Science gold mine, ethical minefield’ (2009) 324 Science 166–8;
L. Frank, ‘When an entire country is a cohort’ (2000) 287(5462) Science 2398–9;
L. Frank, ‘The epidemiologist’s dream: Denmark’ (2003) 301(5630) Science 163.
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position, the Danish parliament in 2014 deleted an opt-out register in
which 16 per cent of the population featured.9 People could not opt out of
register-based research,10 but with the registration they could avoid being
contacted by researchers wanting further information from them. It will
come as a surprise to many outside observers that nothing about the
abolition of the opt-out register was communicated to the people who
were now again eligible for invitation to active participation in research,
but in Denmark the abolition gave rise to little public comment. Lately,
the government has proposed the use of the publicly gathered health data
to attract international investment in the Danish pharmaceutical indus-
try. In the ‘national lost and found office’ of health data, data can not only
change custodianship, but also purpose and beneficiary.
Taking the metaphor of the lost and found office and Donna
Dickenson’s notion of We versus Me Medicine11 as the points of depar-
ture for my analysis, this chapter presents some reflections on changing
meanings and uses of health data in an ever more data-intensive health-
care system. I first clarify my conceptual approach to data intensification
and then outline some trends in, and outcomes of, data sourcing prac-
tices in the public sector followed by some examples from private-sector
initiatives. Though using ‘public’ and ‘private’ casually as descriptive
concepts, it will be clear that the public–private distinction is itself in
need of critical scrutiny,12 but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to
discuss this. Subsequently, I discuss how We and Me Medicine as
a conceptual pair work in relation to an assessment of what is lost and
what is gained through intensified data sourcing in its various
manifestations.
7.3 The Data Circle and Intensified Data Sourcing
During the past decade, health services have undergone significant
changes as they have sought to take advantage of new information and
9 F. Nordfalk and K. Hoeyer, ‘The rise and fall of an opt out system’ (2018) Scandinavian
Journal of Public Health, Published online.
10 It is still the case that register data can be used for research without consent. Denmark and
a few other countries lobbied hard to ensure exemption for the general consent rules of
the EU Data Protection Regulation and succeeded in ensuring opportunities for con-
tinuation of the old system. This is also discussed by Sterckx, Dheensa and Cockbain in
this volume.
11 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine.
12 S. Gal, ‘A semiotics of the public/private distinction’ (2002) 13(1) A Journal of Feminist
Cultural Studies 77–95.
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communication technologies in an intense process of digitalisation and
integration of information platforms.13 Everyday healthcare activities
also generate numerous tissue samples taken for diagnostic purposes.
Such samples, when stored, can be retrieved for quality assurance and
research purposes.14 A blood sample can be used for whole genome or
exome sequencing or be used to identify new biomarkers. As a result,
patients today give rise to increasing amounts of traceable healthcare data
every time they use health services.
Accelerated data intensiveness has paved the way for a much hyped
‘revolution’ in science towards what is often framed as Big Data mining.15
However, healthcare data are typically produced in conjunction with
routine care, hence data intensification is not just a matter of facilitating
research. Therefore, I have suggested supplementing the focus on Big Data
with an interest in what I call intensified data sourcing,16 by which I mean
attempts to get more data, of better quality, on more people in a dynamic
process of creating, collecting, curating and storing data while simulta-
neously making it available for multiple purposes. Big Data debates are
strongly focused on research,17 but scientific research is only one of many
purposes for which health data are used. Also, I think ‘sourcing’ is a better
concept than ‘data mining’ because ‘mining’ suggests that data are found,
extracted and consumed. Yet data are not ‘found’, but made to exist, and
unlike raw metals and other mining products, there is no such thing as
‘raw data’.18 Furthermore, metals are finite resources, while data can be
13 L. Olsen, D. Aisner and J. M. McGinnis, The Learning Healthcare System: Workshop
Summary (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007).
14 M. Richards, R. Anderson, S. Hinde et al., The Collection, Linking and Use of Data in
Biomedical Research and Health Care: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 2015).
15 V. Mayer-Schönberger and K. Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How
We Live, Work and Think (London: John Murray, 2013).
16 K. Hoeyer, ‘Denmark at a crossroad? Intensified data sourcing in a research radical
country’ (2016) 29 The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data, p. 74.
17 D. Boyd and K. Crawford, ‘Critical questions for big data: Provocations for a cultural,
technological, and scholarly phenomenon’ (2012) 15(5) Information, Communication &
Society 662–79; M. Hildebrandt, ‘Who needs stories if you can get the data? ISPs in the
era of big number crunching’ (2011) 24(4) Philosophy & Technology 371–90;
J. P. Ioannidis, ‘Informed consent, big data, and the oxymoron of research that is not
research’ (2013) 13(4) The American Journal of Bioethics 40–2; B. D. Mittelstadt and
L. Floridi, ‘The ethics of Big Data: Current and foreseeable issues in biomedical contexts’
(2015) Science and Engineering Ethics 1–39.
18 L. Gitelman and V. Jackson, ‘Introduction’ in L. Gitelman (ed.), ‘Raw Data’ Is an
Oxymoron (Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 2013), pp. 1–14.
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sold again and again, re-used and retained while forwarded.19 Finally,
metal retains essential material properties irrespective of its users, while
data as semiotic products modulate when entering new networks with
new users: data are epistemologically and ontologically unstable.20
Partly, the new data opportunities reflect rapidly lowering cost of
genetic sequencing technologies and electronic data storage,21 partly
new real-time processing opportunities facilitating ever more uses.22
Scientific research is only one of many drivers of data production. Data
are produced to increase accountability, to ensure proper remuneration,
to feed into performance measurement, quality development and
because of changed clinical needs.23 In consequence, the health services
are likely to increase their data intensity irrespective of research uses.
Interestingly, this emphasis on reuse of data often leads policymakers and
data users to ignore well-established social science insights into how
secondary uses impede data validity.24 Data are conceptualised as if
immune to the social processes bringing them about.25
One of the medical research areas thriving on (and stimulating) the
data surge is personalised medicine.26 Though it is termed ‘personalised
medicine’, it is of course still a matter of creating sub-populations with
particular characteristics and directing health guidance based on
19 M. T. Mayrhofer, ‘About the new significance and the contingent meaning of biological
material and data in biobanks’ (2013) 35(3) History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
449–67.
20 J. van Dijck, ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific para-
digm and ideology’ (2014) 12(2) Surveillance and Society 197–208.
21 M. Richards, R. Anderson, S. Hinde et al., The Collection, Linking and Use of Data in
Biomedical Research and Health Care: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 2015); The Expert Group on Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges
of International Biobank Research, Biobanks for Europe: A Challenge for Governance
(Brussels: European Comission, 2012).
22 J. Roski, G. W. Bo-Linn and T. A. Andrews, ‘Creating value in health care through big
data: Opportunities and policy implications’ (2014) 33(7) Health Affairs 1115–22.
23 T. Hey, S. Tansley and K. Tolle, The Fourth Paradigm (Redmond, WA: Microsoft
Research, 2009); P. C. Smith, ‘Reflecting on “Analytical perspectives on performance-
based management: an outline of theoretical assumptions in the existing literature”’
(2015) Health Economics, Policy and Law 1–5.
24 M. L. Markus, ‘Toward a theory of knowledge reuse: Types of knowledge reuse situations
and factors in reuse success’ (2001) 18(1) Journal of Management Information Systems
57–93.
25 O. Halpern, Beautiful Data: A History of Vision and Reason since 1945 (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 2014).
26 L. Hood and M. Flores, ‘A personal view on systems medicine and the emergence of
proactive P4 medicine: predictive, preventive, personalized and participatory’ (2012) 29
(6) New Biotechnology 613–24.
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population characteristics to individual members of that population.27
Therefore, personalised medicine necessitates a flow of data that can be
described as following a classic public health data circle (see figure 1).
With the data circle I mean the way in which individuals, named and
known, serve as sources of data in the construction of population data.
As data become accumulated at a group level in a smaller or larger
‘population’, the individual is lost, so to speak (in the sense of information
being disentangled and anonymised). But when knowledge from popula-
tion data is put to use, it is again applied to named and known persons,
who are found and targeted with preventive advice or treatment options
expected to suit their case.
The image of a data circle might simplify the data journeys involved
a little too much when we consider some of the intricate features of
intensified data sourcing. Data travel in many directions, and some of the
data uses influence the data values and thereby affect the goals of the
idealised public health data circle. For example, some of the adminis-
trative uses of data, such as remuneration, are known to influence data
quality.28 When diagnostic codes are used to differentiate between prices
for services, it is well known that more ‘expensive’ diagnoses become
more prevalent, irrespective of the distribution of the disease burden in
society.29 The diagnostic coding system is used differently depending on
Person as
source
Population
Person as
target
Individual
Figure 1 The Data Circle
27 C. Holmberg, C. Bischof and S. Bauer, ‘Making predictions: Computing populations’
(2013) 38(3) Science, Technology & Human Values 398–420.
28 See also M. L. Markus, ‘Toward a theory of knowledge reuse: Types of knowledge reuse
situations and factors in reuse success’ (2001) 18(1) Journal of Management Information
Systems 57–93.
29 E. Silverman and J. Skinner, ‘Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership’ (2004) 23
Journal of Health Economics 369–89.
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the uses to which the codes are put, and in this way administrative uses of
medical data can influence the clinical utility of the same data. In fact,
there is a long list of such data problems associated with performance-
based management.30 As a consequence of increasing uses of data, they
come to feed into many different circles whereby their valences poten-
tially change.
With the current multiplication of purposes the classic public health
data circle seems to be exploding into open-ended networks. Competing
uses of data influence data values and in the process the information
might lose its worth for some of the original purposes. If uses of diag-
nostic codes for remuneration purposes erode their clinical accuracy, the
information loses both clinical and scientific value. As a lost-and-found
office, data infrastructures can make simple pieces of information such as
diagnostic codes change meaning and value as they are put to use by new
‘owners’ for new purposes. Even when publicly financed, collected and
used, data might work through mechanisms that contain elements of
both solidarity (We Medicine) and individualised gain (Me Medicine).
To understand the value tensions in data sourcing better, I now discuss in
a bit more detail how data is created, collected, curated, stored and used
for multiple purposes, first in public and then private settings. Today,
digital data dependency is engrained in most clinical work practices,
including record keeping, communication between units and the con-
struction of treatment plans: it is not an option to return to an analogue
mode of narrative record keeping in a closed closet. But does it bring
more Me or more We Medicine to the table (or the bedside)? Both,
I think, as I shall seek to illustrate in the following section.
7.4 Public Data Intensification
To assess the collective and individual values of public data sourcing and
use, I present some trends and examples – but for obvious reasons I cannot
claim that these provide a comprehensive picture. Nevertheless, in
Denmark, data intensification in public healthcare institutions can be
said to revolve around, and contribute to: 1) governance; 2) clinical care;
and 3) research.
30 S. Wadmann, S. Johansen, A. Lind, H. O. Birk and K. Hoeyer, ‘Analytical perspectives on
performance-based management: an outline of theoretical assumptions in the existing
literature’ (2013) Health Economics, Policy and Law 1–17.
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I have already described the multiple purposes of public governance.
Data are seen as essential in the creation of transparency, accountability
and predictability.31 Without data there are fewer options for financial
control, quality control and planning – at least, that is a common percep-
tion among policymakers.32 This can be seen as a matter ofWeMedicine,
because it is about the efficiency of a shared public system. Ironically,
however, data are used to model tax-financed services on market ideals,
for example, by enhancing competition between the different units in the
healthcare sector (reflecting methods of governance emphasising self-
interest more in line with Me Medicine). Also, data intensification gives
rise to new initiatives to facilitate cross-sector data sharing with poten-
tially detrimental effects for distributive justice and access to care,33 as for
example when health data are increasingly becoming part of decisions
concerning the allocation of benefits in the social sector. The Director of
the Danish National Board of Health, Søren Brostrøm, has suggested that
the social sector puts such pressure on the health sector for diagnostic
codes that the meaning of the diagnostic codes is gradually changing.34
When health data are used to allocate social benefits it alsomeans that the
notion of ‘sharing information’ changes, because of the differences
between the interests of the individuals and the systems involved in the
sharing.
When it comes to data intensification in the clinical setting, it is
important to notice that it is co-produced with technologies of care
that necessitate large datasets to find the right treatment for
individuals.35 Clinical guidelines and other support tools are now part
of everyday care, and interaction with them depends on support software
that guides both diagnosis and follow-up care. This type of software
depends on translation of narratives about symptoms into data and
diagnostic codes. A new data trend is to also facilitate patient-generated
31 L. Olsen, D. Aisner and J. M. McGinnis, The Learning Healthcare System: Workshop
Summary (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007).
32 P. C. Smith, ‘Reflecting on “Analytical perspectives on performance-based management:
an outline of theoretical assumptions in the existing literature”’ (2015) Health Economics
Policy and Law 1–5.
33 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, pp. 72–7.
34 Rasmussen, L. I. (2016), ‘Danmark er et diagnosesamfund’, Politiken, March 27, (pp. 4–6).
35 A. Hedgecoe, The Politics of Personalised Medicine: Pharmacogenetics in the Clinic
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); R. Tutton, ‘Personalizing medicine:
Futures present and past’ (2012) 75(10) Social Science & Medicine 1721–8; R. Tutton,
Genomics and the Reimagining of Personalized Medicine (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing,
2014).
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data.36 It adds to the number of expectations, stakeholders and data
types, as well as the potential uses: physicians might need to contemplate
data in new formats produced by new data suppliers, and patients might
acquire new responsibilities they had not foreseen.37
It is often the research uses of public health data that are most hotly
debated at the expense of the governance and clinical implications of data
intensification.38 This emphasis easily creates the impression that data
intensification calls for well-known measures from medical ethics, such
as informed consent, irrespective of whether it speaks to the collective
(We) or individual (Me) challenges that come along with data
intensification.39 In the international perspective, Denmark has taken
a radical route to promote research uses of health data by insisting on
consent exemption rules and by deleting the opt-out register.
In Denmark, everyone is included and this is defended with reference
to public interest.40 While this is not what Dickenson means by
We Medicine, it is indeed a route providing little emphasis on the rights
of the individual in order to protect what the state defines as the interests
of the collective. In the Danish context, researchers, policy workers and
politicians use arguments of solidarity and the common good when
justifying the system, though in the international literature it has been
argued that solidarity presupposes awareness (e.g. through informed
consent) of the purposes to which you as a citizen contribute.41 This is
36 P. J. van der Wees, M. W. G. Nijhuis-Van der Sanden, J. Z. Ayanian et al., ‘Integrating
the use of patient–reported outcomes for both clinical practice and performance
measurement: Views of experts from 3 countries’ (2014) 92(4) The Milbank Quarterly
754–75.
37 C. Dedding, R. van Doorn, L. Winkler and R. Reis, ‘How will e-health affect patient
participation in the clinic? A review of e-health studies and the current evidence for
changes in the relationship between medical professionals and patients’ (2011) 72(1)
Social Science & Medicine 49–53. See also Huijer and Detweiler in this volume.
38 L. F. Hogle, ‘The ethics and politics of infrastructures: Creating the conditions of
possibility for big data in medicine’ in L. Floridi and B. Mittelstadt (eds.), The Ethics of
Biomedical Big Data (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), pp. 1–32.
39 B. D. Mittelstadt and L. Floridi, ‘The ethics of Big Data: Current and foreseeable issues in
biomedical contexts’ (2015) Science and Engineering Ethics 1–39.
40 Danske Regioner, Handleplan for bedre brug af sundhedsdata i regionerne (Copenhagen:
Danske Regioner, 2015), pp. 1–19; Danske Regioner, Sundhedsdata i spil (Copenhagen:
Danske Regioner, 2015); Ministeriet for Sundhed og Forebyggelse, National Strategi for
Adgang til Sundhedsdata (Copenhagen: Ministeriet for Sundhed og Forebyggelse, 2014),
pp. 1–2.
41 B. Prainsack and A. Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
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not the case with respect to register-based research for the wider Danish
population.
What type of research has been used to justify the consent exemption?
What are the public registers used for? The best way of addressing these
questions is to look at the examples that the official committee coordi-
nating register-based research itself brings forward – that is, how it
justifies register-based research. These justifications have been gathered
in a document summarising key research results achieved using Danish
health data,42 and I use that document as a reference for the examples
below.
The document presents 29 examples of research with international
impact. Thousands of studies use the registers, but these examples were
selected to show how data representative of a whole population can give
rise to many different types of knowledge that probably could not be
gained in any other way.43 Through comprehensive registers, the health-
care system becomes an in vivo experiment with long-term follow up.
I convey the results as the researchers present them though some readers
might doubt their validity. Indeed, what counts as true today can always
be questioned tomorrow, but the examples have been chosen by the
committee because of their high current standing in the scientific estab-
lishment. Civic groups, social scientists and ethicists typically continue to
oppose medical findings, e.g. when it is stated that a treatment is ‘safe’,44
but here I merely present the findings used by the medical establishment
to justify national register-based research.
It is striking that the examples chosen demonstrate how registers have
been used to document side effects of drugs that could not be identified in
short-term trials (e.g. risks associated with new types of contraceptive
pills), but also erased doubts about potential side effects and dangers
associated with particular treatments. They thereby serve to create
a better understanding of safety, at least from a medical perspective.
For example, for years it was assumed that heavy use of pain relief
medication increased the risk of recurrence among breast cancer
42 Strategisk Alliance for Register- og Sundhedsdata, Eksempelsamling. Brug af sundheds-
data i forskning til gavn for patient og borger (Copenhagen: Strategisk Alliance for
Register- og Sundhedsdata, 2016), pp. 1–55.
43 The document itself groups the examples somewhat arbitrarily, seemingly according to
the research groups producing them: ‘quality of treatment’, ‘biological data’, ‘children’,
‘pregnancy’, ‘cancer’, ‘medicine’, ‘vaccine’ and ‘prevention’.
44 See also C. L. Decoteau and K. Underman, ‘Adjudicating non-knowledge in the Omnibus
Autism Proceedings’ (2015) 45(4) Social Studies of Science 471–500.
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patients. The comprehensive Danish registers allowed researchers to
compare the medication schemes and cancer prevalence in the whole
population and thereby debunk the hypothesis and facilitate more effec-
tive pain relief without fears of negative impact on cancer risk. In another
example, American researchers claimed that abortion was associated
with a higher risk of developing breast cancer, while the Danish registers
were used to debunk this claim, because all abortions in Denmark can be
linked to all registered cancers in the whole population and show there
was absolutely no correlation. Another example of suggested dangers
that comprehensive registers suggest are non-existent, is the idea that it
would be dangerous to live close to high-voltage lines. For many years it
was assumed it could be dangerous, but Danish registers made it possible
to combine data of residence and workplace (and their proximity to high-
voltage lines) with rates of mortality, morbidity and use of medication,
and found no such correlation. One day the medical consensus might
change again, of course, but for now this is regarded as the best available
evidence. Similarly, expecting parents have for years feared the effects on
babies of particular diseases during pregnancy, and the registers suggest
that many of these fears were unfounded. The Danish registers were also
used to investigate the effects of some vaccines accused of having serious
side effects, showing that there was no reason to assume they could cause,
for example, autism, as some researchers had hypothesised. Registers
have also been used to debunk claims with potentially stigmatising
effects, such as the one that cancer patients commit suicide more often.
Furthermore, the registers have been used to document inequality in
health (here, examples are numerous because inequality in health has
been a key interest of Nordic epidemiologists – see, for example, the
lifetime contributions of Finn Diderichsen, which informWHO work in
this area). Note that many of these research results constitute knowledge
that can underpin new guidelines or policies. They do not need to be
translated into commercially sold products to have an impact on public
health. In this sense, they form part of We Medicine.
The research value of Danish registers depends on the full inclusion of
an unbiased population (through universal access to healthcare) and the
absence of opt-out opportunities. While Dickenson emphasises a right to
informed consent even inWeMedicine, I suggest that this Danish model
could be seen as We Medicine in a double sense; the benefits of research
are shared with the public and depend on shared access to services and
shared obligations to deliver data. There are, however, trends that under-
mine this ‘mandatory-solidarity’ approach. The World Medical
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Association, the European Union and the National Council of Ethics
have all discussed the introduction of informed consent in register-
based research. Probably many women who have had an abortion
would opt out of research on abortion, not because they do not like
the results described above, but because they would consider the past
event sensitive and, given the option, that it is more appealing to ask
for less attention, rather than more. Few of the Danish women who
have had an abortion, however, will know that they have contributed
to the research results mentioned above, or even think about it when
reading about the results in the newspaper. They have been connected
with a stranger, the data analyst, in the lost-and-found office, but never
experienced any consequences. Their intimate knowledge of an abor-
tion has been able to travel as data without returning to them as
individuals. Informed consent, however, operates in a different way.
It creates an emotional and personalised relation to data: it becomes
‘My Data’, even when researchers only work on population statistics,
‘Our Data’. Informed consent makes the individual feel ‘found’, and
thereby some of the opportunities for the population are lost.
Furthermore, opt-out registers literally are registers and thereby
a new source of knowledge about people and the research types from
which they wish to opt out. As long as people feature as part of
a population only, their identities can be better protected than when
singled out as autonomous decision-makers. The data are gathered
irrespective of research uses, so opting out of data-intensive medicine
is never an option.
Another trend toward Me Medicine that affects the uses of population
data for research is the recent rise in private healthcare delivery. Private
hospitals are supposed by law to deliver data to the national registers, but
here well-known problems from the USA pop up: there is a lack of
incentives for proper reporting and no effective sanctions when data
are not sent as agreed. It causes problems not only for the utility of
population data, but also in some cases for the patients opting for private
healthcare because they still depend on public healthcare in other
instances, but now their medical records have gaps and omissions.
Hence, Me Medicine also involves risks for the individual who cannot
be found in the data jungle when having left the collective grid.
Finally, the We Medicine approach in data use is under pressure as
a result of public authorities seeking to attract private investments into
the Danish pharmaceutical industry by making the publicly collected
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data available for commercial partners.45 There are similarities here to
the care.data case in the UK46 and the collaboration between Google’s
DeepMind project and the National Health Service in the UK.47 As noted
by Cool48 in a discussion of big data practices in Sweden, the state-
centred notion of ‘sharing’ in relation to health issues is under pressure
in an increasingly globalised world economy.49
7.5 Private Data Intensification
Data are created, collected, curated, stored and made available for multiple
purposes also – and perhaps chiefly – outside the public sector. Commercial
data intensification is less transparent, however, and because data here equals
competitive edge and monetary potential, it is difficult to gain any clear
understanding of who accumulates which types of data, and how they do it.
Huge amounts of data are gathered passively as people accept terms of use for
their phone or cookies onhomepages, and thereby allow companies to gather
and sell data about theirmobility patterns or interests.50 Data is also gathered
from people who opt for so-called ‘free services’ (apps or Internet searches
such as Google, Gmail or other presumably ‘free’ platforms). As Andrew
Lewis has put it: ‘If you’re not paying for something, you’re not the customer;
you’re the product being sold.’51Data can also be acquired as people purchase
direct-to-consumer health services, such as various tests.52 Here they might
45 See e.g. Danske Regioner, Handleplan for bedre brug af sundhedsdata i regionerne
(Copenhagen: Danske Regioner, 2015), pp. 1–19; Danske Regioner, Handlingsplan for
personlig medicin (Copenhagen: Danske Regioner, 2015); Danske Regioner,
Sundhedsdata i spil (Copenhagen: Danske Regioner, 2015); Ministeriet for Sundhed og
Forebyggelse,National Strategi for Adgang til Sundhedsdata (Copenhagen:Ministeriet for
Sundhed og Forebyggelse, 2014), pp. 1–2.
46 S. Sterckx, V. Rakic, J. Cockbain and P. Borry, ‘“You hoped we would sleep walk into
accepting the collection of our data”: controversies surrounding the UK care.data scheme
and their wider relevance for biomedical research’ (2015) Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 1–14; P. Vezyridis and S. Timmons, ‘Understanding the care.data conondrum:
New information flows for economic growth’ (2017) Big Data & Society 1–12.
47 J. Wakefield, ‘Google Deepmind: Should patients trust the company with their data?’
BBC, September 2016.
48 A. Cool, ‘Detaching data from the state: Biobanking and building Big Data in Sweden’
(2015) 11(3) BioSocieties 277–95.
49 See also the chapter by Sterckx, Dheensa and Cockbain in this volume.
50 See, for example, Huijer and Detweiler in this volume.
51 E. Pariser, The Filter Bubble (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 21.
52 See, for example, S. Sterckx, J. Cockbain, H. Howard et al., ‘“Trust is not something you
can reclaim easily” – Patenting in the field of direct to consumer genetic testing’ (2013) 15
(5) Genetics in Medicine 382–7.
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opt for a discount by way of giving the company access to their data (this is
typically presented as a matter of allowing ‘research’ on it). In principle,
private data sourcing is mediated by some form of contractual acceptance as
people have to accept cookies and agree to data policies to use the services
through which their data are being sourced. It might look verymuch likeMe
Medicine with its praise of individual choice, but companies like 23andMe
actively promote themselves as working for the common good. In this realm
‘informed consent’ serves to establish commercial rights for those who
accumulate the data, and some participants were horrified when 23andMe
took out a patent on a gene for Parkinson’s Disease though the consent form
mentioned that ‘intellectual property’ would belong to the company.53 Still,
the notion of autonomous choice often lacks substance; in fact, the practices
of accepting ‘cookies’, ‘termsof conditions’, etc., seemno less constricted than
the public data sourcing initiatives described above because the terms of
agreement often change, the agreements are obscure, or people are forced by
other factors to use the services and thereby accept (even unreasonable)
agreements.
If public data sourcing contributes to the development of public
governance, clinical care and research, what are privately created and
collected health data used for? Basically, commercially gathered data are
sold to those who can afford it. Uses of data therefore develop continu-
ously and cannot be predicted. There is limited knowledge about the
concrete data market flows because this type of information (data about
data) constitutes a commodity in its own right, beyond the reach of
academic research. Ethical analysis in this way becomes restricted
through the new modes of organising health data markets. Commercial
competition thus redirects the ethical analysis away from commercial
data sourcing and back to national tax-financed initiatives, at least those
that are (hopefully accurately) disclosed to the public, simply because this
is what ethicists can analyse. Still, it seems safe to say that privately
organised data collections contribute to, or are at least expected to
contribute to three areas: 1) development of new health products; 2)
‘personalised’ pricing structures; and 3) personalised marketing.
Big Pharma has always used commercially gathered data to develop
new health products, but some of the Big Data methodologies involved
today are new. New types of products include also the devices and soft-
ware used for data collection and handling. Furthermore, software with
algorithms that allow development of personalised risk profiles, lifestyle
53 E. C. Hayden, ‘A broken contract’ (2012) 486 Nature 312–4.
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guidance and clinical decision-support tools also constitute important
product innovations with a potentially big impact on healthcare.54 Most
of these products are sold direct to the consumer as tools for self-
improvement.55 Some of these new self-monitoring apps are installed
on people’s mobile phones and thereby deliver the data circle – full
circle – right in people’s pockets: it is possible to generate data and to
measure yourself against others and get your feedback right away.56 You
are never lost, so to speak; but a new question emerges: how many
companies and other actors may find you?57 The Veteran’s
54 L. F. Hogle, ‘The ethics and politics of infrastructures: Creating the conditions of
possibility for big data in medicine’ in L. Floridi & B. Mittelstadt (eds.), The Ethics of
Biomedical Big Data (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), pp. 1–32.
55 M. Bode and D. B. Kristensen, ‘The digital doppelgänger within: A study on self-tracking
and the quantified self-movement’ in D. Bajde and R. Canniford (eds.), Assembling
Consumption (Oxford/New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), pp. 119–34.
56 T. Sharon and D. Zandbergen, ‘From data fetishism to quantifying selves: Self-tracking
practices and the other values of data’ (2016) 19(11) New Media & Society 1695–1709.
doi:10.1177/1461444816636090. See also Huijer and Detweiler in this volume.
57 According to some observers, it is a general feature of the self-monitoring device industry
that the start-ups begin selling devices and then acquire their real value based on the data
they gather: the data becomes a selling point for the companies (H. K. Holst,
‘Forsikringsselskaber vil tjekke dig døgnet rundt med smartwatch og skridttæller’,
Berlingske Business September 2016). Another, more publicised example, is Facebook’s
takeover of the message service appWhatsApp. Facebook wanted to data source although
WhatsApp had promised not to do so. Nevertheless,WhatsApp had gained value through
accumulation of the enormous amounts of data on people who had opted out of more
easily accessible data (e.g. from Gmail accounts), and Facebook did not consider itself
bound by the previous owners’ assurances. Facebook’s intentions were questioned by
authorities in the USA (Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Notifies Facebook, WhatsApp
of Privacy Obligations in Light of Proposed Acquisition’, Federal Trade Commission,
April 2014), and in the UK the Information Officer is also looking into the legality
(E. Denham. Statement on Changes to WhatsApp and Facebook’s Handling of Personal
Data. United Kingdom Information Comissioner’s Office, 2016), though revelations of
terrorists using WhatsApp have stimulated the British Government also to pursue access
to the data for investigative purposes. Most recently, the Hamburg commissioner for data
protection has started proceedings to stop the data sourcing (Hamburg Commissioner for
Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Administrative Order Against the Mass
Synchronization of Data Between Facebook and WhatsApp. Hamburg, Germany:
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, 2016), which
comes as a continuation of the attempts by the German Bundeskartellamt to prevent
Facebook from using its privileged market position to impose ‘unreasonable’ terms of
agreement on its costumers (Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding
against Facebook on Suspicion of Having Abused its Market Power by Infringing Data
Protection Rules. Bonn, Germany: Bundeskartellamt, 2016). Furthermore, data live pro-
miscuous lives also due to problems with data security. Basically everything can be
hacked, and many of the new self-monitoring technologies (especially those dependent
on Bluetooth technology) have serious security flaws according to some studies (R. Goyal,
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Administration (VA) in the USA, that Dickenson58 mentions as an
example of classic We Medicine, has tested tools for the identification
of people at risk of suicide based on changes in their typing speed and the
vocabulary they use on social media.59 Keeping track of the data gathered
on the many new devices can be extremely difficult. Some of the new data
products can become engrained in classic We Medicine healthcare sys-
tems, while others circumvent ideas about shared responsibility and
allocate benefits and risks to individuals.
Another avenue opened by private data collection and use of health
data is personalisation of prices. In countries with private insurance
coverage, data profiles of potentially expensive health service users (e.g.
those at risk of low compliance) can be a valuable commodity for
insurance companies.60 According to Hogle,61 the data market in the
USA is now taking over the insurance market. In Denmark, it was
recently proposed to make it illegal to use genetic information to differ-
entiate insurance prices (the insurance industry does not agree with this
proposal),62 yet at the same time insurance companies experiment with
pricing models where those who are willing to provide access to apps and
mobile devices that demonstrate high levels of physical activity can get
discounts on their insurance.63 It might look like a matter of free choice
(Me Medicine), but it does remove other choices; e.g. not to share your
data without paying extra, or to enjoy a run in the forest without bringing
your devices along to prove your good health. Moreover, those who,
for various reasons, cannot comply with the standards of healthy beha-
viour will have to pay a higher price if those who can comply get cheaper
insurance.
According to some observers, this whole personalisation of the pricing
structure is still only in its infancy, at least when compared to the
N. Dragoni and A. Spognardi, ‘Mind the tracker you wear: A security analysis of
wearable health trackers’ (2016) 31st ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC’16)
131–6).
58 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. vii.
59 L. F. Hogle, ‘The ethics and politics of infrastructures: Creating the conditions of
possibility for big data in medicine’ in L. Floridi and B. Mittelstadt (eds.), The Ethics of
Biomedical Big Data (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), pp. 1–32.
60 See also examples mentioned by Sterckx, Dheensa and Cockbain in this volume.
61 L. F. Hogle, ‘Data-intensive resourcing in healthcare’ (2016) 11(3) BioSocieties 372–93.
62 Lov (L 157) Om ændring af lov om forsikringsaftaler og lov om tilsyn med firmapen-
sioner, www.retsinfo.dk.
63 H. K. Holst, Forsikringsselskaber vil tjekke dig døgnet rundt med smartwatch og
skridttæller, Berlingske Business, September 2016.
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personalisation taking place through the use of data-intensive methodol-
ogies in other sectors.64 In the area of Internet-based commodity trade,
differentiated pricing furthermore goes hand-in-hand with personalised
marketing. Algorithms andmodels are constructed in order to adequately
describe and predict patterns of behaviour and interest. Based on pre-
dictions, individuals are targeted with offers using customised price-
setting and other features aimed at optimising the chances of a deal
with maximum profit. Amazon pioneered this mode of personalisation,
but today this type of data market is converging with health, as insurance
companies and healthcare suppliers learn about the value of ‘knowing
their customer’, as noted also by investigative journalist Eli Pariser.65
This constitutes an arena of Me Medicine, and some customers are
bound to love the effects of an online sphere that knows them so well
that they ‘coincidentally’ come across the very health products they are
most likely to buy.
There is, however, a darker side to the personalised modes of market-
ing. According to researcher and data analyst Henrik Legind Larsen,66
the market in health data is intertwined with illegal trade in sensitive
information, which gains its value because the people with the most
desperate health needs can be targeted with offers of treatment with little
or no evidence of efficacy at very high costs.67 Marketing here typically
interacts with medical tourism, although tourism is a flawed metaphor
when we consider the nature of the travel undertaken by people despe-
rately seeking a cure when there are no medically sanctioned opportu-
nities left.68 Others can be targeted for their potential interest in
treatments that are either illegal or extremely expensive in their home
countries. Still others can be targeted with treatments that involve mate-
rials in short supply within medical systems dependent on free donations
64 H. M. Krumholz, ‘Big data and new knowledge in medicine: the thinking, training, and
tools needed for a learning health system’ (2014) 33(7) Health Affairs 1163–70; J. Roski,
G. W. Bo-Linn and T. A. Andrews, ‘Creating value in health care through big data:
Opportunities and policy implications’ (2014) 33(7) Health Affairs 1115–22.
65 E. Pariser, The Filter Bubble (London: Penguin, 2011).
66 Larsen, personal communication, 5 September 2016.
67 A recent episode revealed that IT criminals do target emails from Danish health autho-
rities to harvest health data (O. N. M. Toft, ‘Blixt kræver samråds-svar i data-sag’,
Altinget, September 2016).
68 A. Wahlberg and T. Streitfellner, ‘Stem cell tourism, desperation and the governing of
new therapies’ in A. Leibing and V. Tournay (eds.), Technologies de l’espoir. Les débats
publics autour de l’innovation médicale (Montreal: Université de Montréal, 2009).
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of organs, gametes and tissues.69 Here again, Me Medicine takes over
from We Medicine, but it is not simply a matter of granting new
opportunities to wealthy individuals who can purchase treatment – it
can easily put the wealthy at risk too, as they chase treatment options with
no guarantees and little legal (and scientific) backing.
Just as we saw with public data sourcing, data sourcing is ubiquitous in
the private sector. It cuts across sectors, and even if the research uses of
data were to be more legally restricted, the data practices are not likely to
become less intense or more aimed at the common good. Though
primarily operating in the realm of Me Medicine, many of the privately
mediated data practices are in practice no less inescapable than the ones
in the Danish public sector.
7.6 Concluding Reflections
In the current age of intensified data sourcing, data creation, collection,
storage and use have become ubiquitous. Collective and individual inter-
est in the new data practices can be difficult to pinpoint. Data can serve
individuals and collectives, but can also expose them to potential harm.
Public data intensification is intertwined with attempts to ensure key
values of public administration – transparency, efficiency, evidence – but
it also feeds into new forms of obscuration, increased expenditure and
initiatives based on unfounded promises of prediction. In practice, data
gathered in the public and the private sector may cross over and be used
for new purposes irrespective of their mode of production. Unless care-
fully regulated, data infrastructures easily acquire traits of the lost-and-
found office. Like Simmel’s ‘stranger’, they can give people who are far
away from data sources in a social sense a physical presence to informa-
tion that is highly intimate. Moreover, data infrastructures can – by way
of the outside position of the data analyst (the stranger) – create new
social groupings, ideas about disease and notions of the self.
Because ethicists typically have access to more information about data
flows in the public sector, and because medical ethics has a long tradition
of discussing the terms of research participation, there is a tendency to
focus criticism of data intensive methods on public data used for research
69 D. A. Budiani-Saberi and F. L. Delmonico, ‘Organ trafficking and transplant tourism:
A commentary on the global realities’ (2008) 8(5) American Journal of Transplantation
925–9; J. P. Pirnay, E. Baudoux, C. Olivier et al., ‘Access to human tissues for research and
product development: From EU regulation to alarming legal developments in Belgium’
(2015) 16(5) EMBO Reports 557–62.
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purposes. In particular, critique tends to focus on study methods that
violate norms from clinical ethics associated with the right to give an
informed consent.70 It is problematic, however, to nail the analysis to the
notion of informed consent as a ‘solution’ developed to address
a different set of problems.71 The private sector thrives on forms of
data sourcing that are no less inescapable than those of register-based
public research, though in principle relying on ‘consent’, and commercial
data practices are furthermore combined with less transparency.
‘Acceptance of cookies’ and similar clicks do little to care for consumer
rights and interests. Do we expect that quick ‘click’ options would do
much good in the public health sector? Also, informed consent for data
usage for research purposes leaves all the other uses of data unexamined,
andmight in fact expose the individual more (not less) because it involves
creating a tighter connection between the individual and the data which
will be gathered anyway. If individuals are to access and administer
research access to their personal data then the digital networks will
need to have more entry points and become easier to hack. It will not
necessarily protect individuals better.
So are Danish health data practices part of We Medicine or Me
Medicine? I think there are elements of both. When publicly sourced
data are used to attract commercial investments and generate profit, it
looks more like Me Medicine thriving on the illusion of We Medicine.
When data are used for identifying individuals based on algorithmic
profiling and this identification individualises risks and benefits it simi-
larly comes across more like Me Medicine using We Medicine as a veil.
Nevertheless, if we believe at all in the value of medical consensus, the
common goods derived from research uses can also be significant.
Without the Nordic registers and consent exemption rules, there would
70 K. Hoeyer and N. Lynöe, ‘Is informed consent a solution to contractual problems?
A comment on the article “‘Icelandic Inc.’? On the ethics of commercial population
genomics” by Jon F. Merz, Glen E. McGee and Pamala Sankar’ (2004) 58(6) Social Science
and Medicine 1211–13; J. F. Merz, G. E. McGee and P. Sankar, ‘“Iceland Inc.”?: On the
ethics of commercial population genomics’ (2004) 58(6) Social Science & Medicine
1201–9.
71 D. Grande, N. Mitra, A. Shah, F. Wan and D.A. Asch, ‘The importance of purpose:
Moving beyond consent in the societal use of personal health information’ (2014) 161(12)
Annals of Internal Medicine 855–62; L. F. Hogle, ‘The ethics and politics of infrastruc-
tures: Creating the conditions of possibility for big data in medicine’ in L. Floridi &
B. Mittelstadt (eds.), The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), pp.
1–32; B. D. Mittelstadt and L. Floridi, ‘The ethics of Big Data: Current and foreseeable
issues in biomedical contexts’ (2015) Science and Engineering Ethics 1–39.
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be fewer options for checking and challenging the claims made by the
pharmaceutical companies based on short-term randomised controlled
trials (RCTs). The registers have been used to identify unknown side
effects, to stimulate a better understanding of poly-pharmacy effects, and
have also shown that certain fears were probably unfounded. Many of
these research results arising from public Danish health registers are now
freely available and implementable in a non-rivalrous manner and to the
benefit of the people delivering the data in the first place. In this sense, the
data circle works and it works as We Medicine. If research uses were to
be restricted through the use of informed consent, the risks would be
differently distributed and the benefits of unbiased information
disappear.
Rather than insisting on informed consent, would it not be more
adequate to focus on the responsibilities that authorities and companies
incur through mandatory data sourcing? Responsibilities for insuring
safety, communal purposes and fair use? For compensating those harmed
by data leaks or hacking? For ensuring that secondary purposes with data
sourcing do not overrule primary purposes so that clinical utility is
hampered in the pursuit of administrative or research utility?
Responsibilities to think through carefully how data usage can avoid
undermining the entitlement to healthcare for vulnerable individuals?
Furthermore, there is a need to complement the current focus on the
privacy and autonomy interests of those from whom data derive and to
take into account also the group privacy interests of those at the receiving
end of the new data tools developed with the big datasets to ensure they
are put to use for the common good and not just as profiling tools that
individualise risks and benefits.72 Will it be possible to be lost and stay
lost? Is there a right to be forgotten as well as a right not to be tagged as
a particular profile? There is a need to find ways of countering the risks
associated in particular with private data sourcing, and to help indivi-
duals manoeuvre the landscapes of personalised pricing, marketing and
services that might make the user into the product. Data intensification
involves many challenges, but they are hardly solved with rules about
informed consent. They demand communal approaches setting rules for
collectives rather than distributing responsibilities to individuals. Those
scholars who continue to insist on informed consent as an obligatory
72 L. Taylor, ‘Safety in numbers? Group privacy and big data analytics in the developing
world’ in L. Taylor et al. (eds.), Group Privacy. New Challenges of Data Technologies
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2017).
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passage point for data sourcing will have to address these challenges too,
lest they simply aim at individualising responsibilities in a complex data-
intensive age.
Intensified data sourcing changes medicine as we know it. It reflects
and affects epistemological issues (what we can know), issues of citizen-
ship (the rights and duties of individuals), economic issues (costs of
healthcare and accumulation of capital), as well as issues of societal
morality (public values and the distribution of goods and risks).
In many ways, it looks as if data intensification tends to take healthcare
in the direction of Me Medicine. Still, if we think of the common good
not as ‘accumulated goods’ (akin to accumulated data), but as goods that
derive from the collective,73 intensified data sourcing could also be
a prime example of We Medicine when only directed towards common
good goals. It is, however, a key task to ensure that the collective goods do
not become redirected into private pockets – and that collectives help
each other to counter individual risks. I believe it is possible to bring
some of the old values of We Medicine to the table of a data-intensive
healthcare system and work for communal use, shared risk and collective
benefits. It is well worth a try, considering that there is little reason to
assume that healthcare will become any less data-intensive in the future.
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8Presuming the Promotion of the Common Good
by Large-Scale Health Research
The Cases of care.data 2.0 and the 100,000 Genomes Project in
the UK
sigrid sterckx, sandi dheensa and julian
cockbain
8.1 Introduction1
8.1.1 Background
Before World War One (WWI), levels of financial inequality world-
wide had reached previously unknown magnitudes,2 despite forms of
democracy having been introduced into many Western countries.
WWI was, however, to yield a world ‘fit for heroes’,3 one in which
the common person had a fair share. Between WWI and World War
Two (WWII), little was done to reduce inequality. With WWII’s
outbreak, the problem of inequality was set to one side. However,
after Germany had capitulated, the UK general elections brought in
a socialist government whose stated promise was to establish a
‘Welfare State’, to provide education, health, unemployment benefits
and pensions for all, and to nationalise utilities and key
infrastructures.
UK citizens and residents are not required to have identity cards or
record their domicile with the local authorities. However, the UK gov-
ernment and its agents keep extensive data records, e.g. of births, mar-
riages, deaths, passports, driver’s licences, entries into and departures
1 All information in this chapter is up to date as of 6 November 2017.
2 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014).
3 Politician David Lloyd George promised the British public to undertake major reforms to
address education, health, housing and transport inadequacies and to create a land ‘fit for
heroes to live in’.
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from the UK, (un)employment, tax, crime and, not least, healthcare.4 To
some, it may be obvious that it is in the interest of the state to collate these
records to give a clearer picture of the population and to improve the
allocation of state resources. The records are of particular value in
optimising healthcare, crime prevention and education, three of the
primary tasks of the UK government. To others, the spectre of Big
Brother comes to the fore with fears of a totalitarian state such as those
well-known from the last century.
8.1.2 Health Data Collection in the UK
In this chapter, we are concerned with the collection of health-related
data in the UK, in particular those deriving from institutional care (e.g.
care in hospitals – the majority of which are still public institutions),
personal care (e.g. data held by family physicians, known in the UK as
General Practitioners, or GPs, who are not state employees but contrac-
tors) and from specific government initiatives such as UK Biobank (which
holds material and data from about half a million citizens) and the
100,000 Genomes Project (which is to hold information from about
70,000 people with cancers and rare diseases and their relatives, as
discussed further in this chapter).
The collation of such health data clearly could improve the efficiency of
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS),5 for example, by identifying
treatments that are more effective and improving regional allocation of
resources. Research using the collated data may help the development of
new diagnostic and treatment methods and drugs. This may well fall
under the label of ‘We Medicine’,6 understood as accessible and publicly
funded healthcare aiming to benefit all. However, where commercial
players become involved as potential vendors of new products, rather
than simply as contractors for the NHS, the benefits may flow to more
limited sets of individuals.
4 Digital Economy Act 2017, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/30/contents/enacted,
accessed 6 November 2017.
5 As Vezyridis and Timmons explain, health data has also become a valuable source of
income for the NHS. Paraskevas Vezyridis and Stephen Timmons, ‘Understanding the
care.data conundrum: New information flows for economic growth’ (2017) Big Data and
Society. Published online.
6 Donna L. Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine – Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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In April 2005, the UK government set up a (publicly owned) company,
the ‘Health and Social Care Information Centre’, which acquired institu-
tional personal health data with at least the aim of making it available for
research where the researcher was neither within nor a contracted agent
of the NHS. This company (HSCIC-1) went under the names of ‘The
Information Centre’ and the ‘NHS Information Centre’. Following the
enactment of the Health and Social Care Act 2012,7 HSCIC-1 was
dissolved in March 2013 and its functions were transferred to a new
publicly owned company, also called the Health and Social Care
Information Centre, which was created on the following day. This new
company, which we will refer to asHSCIC-2, was empowered to integrate
into its health database the personal health records held by GPs. The
scheme for harvesting GP data was referred to as ‘care.data’, and,
although due to begin in 2014, was suspended that same year. In April
2016, the government announced that, from July 2016, HSCIC-2 would
change its name to NHS Digital, and in July 2016 the care.data scheme
was officially scrapped.8 However, although the name has been dropped
and the ‘consent’ model underlying it has been changed, the scheme
continues, as we will explain.
In the same year as the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the UK
government announced the launch of ‘The 100,000 Genomes Project’
(hereinafter 100kGP) to ‘bring the benefits of personalised medicine to
the NHS’.9 The project involves sequencing the whole genomes of NHS
patients with either a rare disease or cancer. Genomics England, a
company owned by the Department of Health (DoH), is delivering the
project through thirteen Genomic Medicine Centres (GMC) in NHS
trusts.
This project has been developing the infrastructure for a national
genomic medicine service in which whole-genome sequencing will
become a routine and frontline test in cross-cutting areas of medicine.
There are plans to ‘concentrate all NHS genomic testing into the same
7 Health and Social Care Act 2012, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents,
accessed 6 November 2017. This Act epitomised the privatisation of the NHS by facilitat-
ing the contracting of NHS services to private providers. Allyson M. Pollock, Alison
Macfarlane and Sylvia Godden, ‘Dismantling the signposts to public health? NHS data
under the Health and Social Care Act’ (2012) 344 British Medical Journal e2364.
8 George Freeman, ‘Written statement to Parliament: Review of health and care data
security and consent’ (2016), www.gov.uk/government/speeches/review-of-health-and-
care-data-security-and-consent, accessed 6 November 2017.
9 NHS England, ‘Genomics’ (2012), www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/qual-clin-lead/persona
lisedmedicine/genomics, accessed 6 November 2017.
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data centre’with ‘access to . . . industry for the purpose of developing new
knowledge, methods of analysis, medicines, diagnostics and devices’.10
8.1.3 Concerns
The collection of residents’ health-related data undoubtedly has the
potential for public benefit, but is surrounded by concerns regarding
privacy, autonomy and justice. While the UK government’s schemes do,
at least superficially, take these concerns into account, we address in this
chapter what we see as a gap – indeed a gaping chasm – between the
government’s rhetoric and the governance structures they put in place.
By taking a closer look at both in the cases of care.data and the 100kGP,
we demonstrate that what is presented as ‘We Medicine’ in fact falls far
short. We begin our review with care.data before turning to the 100kGP
and the ethical issues we consider to be most pressing.
8.2 Care.data
8.2.1 Current Sharing of Health Data
As David Springate, a biostatistician who works on electronic data base
research at the University of Manchester, has noted:
For a sizeable proportion of the UK population, the sharing of their
electronic medical records . . . is already a reality and has been for decades.
About a third of UK patients already have their electronic medical records
held on the main current UK primary care databases . . . and many have
their pseudoanonymised data accessible (for a fee) to both medical
researchers . . . [and] private companies, including drug companies . . .
In themajority of cases now, patients will not even be aware that their data
are being collected, let alone be offered the opportunity to consent.11
Physician and science writer Ben Goldacre commented:
[A] government body handed over parts of my medical records to people
I’ve never met, outside the NHS andmedical research community, but it is
10 Sally Davies, ‘Generation Genome. Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer’ (2016)
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/631043/
CMO_annual_report_generation_genome.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017 (chapters 14
and 2).
11 David Springate, ‘Health database could help avoid another pharma scandal’ (2014) The
Conversation, www.theconversation.com/health-database-could-help-avoid-another-
pharma-scandal-23730, accessed 6 November 2017.
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refusing to tell me what it handed over, or who it gave it to, and the
minister is now incorrectly claiming that it never happened anyway.
There are people in my profession who think they can ignore this pro-
blem. Some are murmuring that this mess is . . . a public misunderstand-
ing to be corrected with better PR. They are wrong: it’s like nuclear power.
Medical data, rarefied and condensed, presents huge power to do good,
but it also presents huge risks. When leaked, it cannot be unleaked; when
lost, public trust will take decades to regain.12
Survey results show that only 54 per cent of the public support commer-
cial access to their health data for health research. However, there is a
clear desire for the NHS to seek permission before allowing access to
companies. Some participants think data access is unacceptable if it is
solely for private benefit and do ‘not want anyone . . . to be able to co-opt
health data for political ends’.13
8.2.2 Concerns Regarding the (Im)Possibility of Opting Out from Care.
data
In April 2013, nine months before care.data launched, Jeremy Hunt, the
UK Secretary of State for Health, gave the public a reassurance that any
patient who did not want personal data in their GP records to be shared
with HSCIC-2 ‘would have their objection respected’.14 On 12 September
2013, he added that ‘All they have to do in that case is speak to their GP
and their information won’t leave the GP surgery’.15 Objections to
information leaving the GP surgery became known as a ‘Type 1’ objection.
At the same time, for objections to information leaving the HSCIC-2, a
‘Type 2’ objection, was proposed.16
The option to opt out of care.data is not overseen by the Information
Commissioner’s Office (the ICO), and is not guaranteed by law.
Moreover, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA), the law that
12 Ben Goldacre, ‘Care.data is in chaos. It breaks my heart’ (2014) The Guardian, 28
February.
13 Wellcome Trust/IPSOSMori, ‘The one-waymirror: Public attitudes to commercial access
to health data’ (2016), www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/5200–03/sri-well
come-trust-commercial-access-to-health-data.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
14 Fiona Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’ (2016), www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535024/data-security-
review.PDF, accessed 6 November 2017.
15 Department of Health (DoH), ‘Jeremy Hunt confirms commitment to balance patient
safety and privacy’ (2013), www.gov.uk/government/news/jeremy-hunt-confirms-com
mitment-to-balance-patient-safety-and-privacy–2, accessed 6 November 2017.
16 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’.
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provided the basis for the care.data scheme, ‘trumps’ key provisions of
the Data Protection Act 1998.17 Specifically, the HSCA allows all patient
data to be used for purposes that extend beyond patient care without
consultation, i.e. without the patients’ knowledge. Indeed, the HSCA
makes it impossible for patients to prevent their data from being used for
research.
In autumn 2013, NHS England set up a care.data website where
citizens could record their views and in January 2014 an information
leaflet on care.data was sent to all English households.18 However,
public concern rose, as did concern among General Practitioners.
Many patients began to take advantage of the opportunity to opt
out that Hunt had offered. Hunt had effectively promised that the
data for those who opted out would not be harvested from the GPs’
records. In reality, the intent was to harvest that data anyway and
then ‘de-identify’ their records.19
Amendments to the HSCA in the Care Act 201420 went some way
towards addressing public concerns regarding confidentiality and inap-
propriate use of patient health data, not least by allowing data releases
only ‘for the purposes of the provision of healthcare or adult social care,
or the promotion of health’. However, this amendment clearly does not
prevent data being made available to drug researchers, pharmaceutical
firms and tech giants like Google.
Care.data was not just problematic for patients. As Vezyridis and
Timmons21 observe, the new obligation on GPs to share data with
HSCIC-2 created pressure on GPs who are responsible for telling patients
about a scheme that they know little about themselves. As data control-
lers with legal liability for their patients’ information, they face conflict-
ing statutory obligations to process patient data fairly and yet disclose
17 Jamie Grace and Mark J. Taylor, ‘Disclosure of confidential patient information and the
duty to consult: The role of the health and social care information centre’ (2013) 21(3)
Medical Law Review 415–47; Data Protection Act 1998, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1998/29/contents, accessed 6 November 2017.
18 Vezyridis and Timmons point out that the leaflet was sent out without checks, was biased
towards the programme’s benefits and had little information about the so-called opt-outs.
It was later deemed ‘unfit for purpose’. (Vezyridis and Timmons, ‘Understanding the
care.data conundrum’).
19 NHS England, ‘Privacy impact assessment: care.data’ (2014), www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/cd-pia.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
20 Care Act 2014, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents, accessed 6 November
2017.
21 Paraskevas Vezyridis and Stephen Timmons, ‘Dissenting from care.data: an analysis of
opt-out forms’ (2016) 42(12) Journal of Medical Ethics 792–6.
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data. Many GP practices provided patients with opt-out forms, but they
provided extremely variable information and could have been confusing
and unintentionally misleading.
With many GPs showing concern, in February 2014 the government
decided to delay GP data harvesting to allow NHS England the opportu-
nity to persuade GPs, healthcare professionals and patients that care.data
was necessary and that sufficient safeguards had been put in place. Key
elements of the discussions included: appropriate consent mechanisms
for data collection and use; the right to object to processing of personal
data; the extent of the data collected; and the uses of the data by the NHS
or third parties. Citizens also raised several of these concerns.22
In September 2015, Hunt bought more time for care.data by commis-
sioning the National Data Guardian, Fiona Caldicott, to review the
protection of personal health data and the provision of appropriate
opt-outs. The Caldicott Review could then be held out as legitimately
dealing with the public’s concerns. Shortly thereafter, in November 2015,
one concerned GP, Dr Neil Bhatia, made a request under the Freedom of
Information Act asking whether the extraction of GP data would still be
the same care.data scheme, albeit with an ‘updated’ dataset, or whether it
would be an additional, parallel, extraction for a different project. The
following month, NHS England confirmed that ‘There will be a single
national GP dataset which would therefore replace the dataset as cur-
rently defined for the care.data pathfinder stage.’23
8.2.3 The Caldicott Review
In July 2016, the UK government issued the long-awaited report on the
initiation of the Iraq War, the Chilcot Report. Astonishingly, on the same
day, the Caldicott Review24 was issued, and the UK government announced
that the care.data scheme had been scrapped. However, it stated that it
remained ‘absolutely committed to realising the benefits of sharing information
22 Sigrid Sterckx, Vojin Rakic, Julian Cockbain et al., ‘“You hoped we would sleep walk into
accepting the collection of our data”: Controversies surrounding the UK care.data scheme
and their wider relevance for biomedical research’ (2016) 19(2) Medicine, Health Care
and Philosophy 177–90; Rebecca Hays and Gavin Daker-White, ‘The care.data consensus?
A qualitative analysis of opinions expressed on Twitter’ (2015) 15 BMC Public Health 838.
23 NHS England, Letter dated 10 December 2015, responding to a Freedom of Information
Request by Dr Neil Bhatia, www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/single_national_gp_data
set_2, accessed 6 November 2017.
24 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’.
presuming the promotion of the common good 161
. . .Therefore, this workwill nowbe taken forward . . . in order to retain public
confidence and to drive better care for patients’ (emphasis added).25
The Caldicott Review was clear that it had been an exercise in gen-
erating public trust in the use of their health data:
This has been a report about trust. . . . Because of the importance of
earning public trust, the Review concluded that people should be able to
opt out of their personal confidential data being used for purposes beyond
their direct care unless there is a mandatory legal requirement or an
overriding public interest.26 (emphasis added)
However, Caldicott recommended that: confidential patient information
should nonetheless be collected by HSCIC-2, irrespective of any opt-out
by individual patients; and that ‘data that has been de-identified [by
HSCIC-2] according to the [Information Commissioner’s Office’s] anon-
ymisation code should not be subject to the opt-out’ (emphasis added).27
Interestingly, Caldicott noted the government’s decision to re-brand
HSCIC-2 as NHS Digital saying that ‘[t]his will provide [HSCIC-2]
with a good opportunity to use the NHS brand to make it clear to
everyone that it is part of the NHS “family”’.28
Since the effects of the opt-outs proposed by Caldicott would conflict
with the Type 1 opt-out promised by Hunt in relation to care.data,
Caldicott recommended that ‘the Government should consider the
future of the care.data programme’.29 More particularly, Caldicott
noted that applying the Type 1 opt-out ‘to all HSCIC[-2] data collections,
including existing data collections from hospitals, would degrade the
quality of data currently available to . . . researchers’.30 It is thus abun-
dantly clear that the function of the Caldicott Review was to advise the
government how to restart the care.data scheme for the same purposes, but
without the risk of public outcry and without Hunt’s misleading promise
that opting-out would prevent data being harvested from the GP records.
We refer to the ‘new’ scheme as care.data 2.0.
Rhetoric aside, Caldicott proposed that NHS England consider two
approaches to opt-outs, and present these to patients on forms with tick-
boxes. One approach offers two alternatives (which we will label, for
clarity, ‘broad’ – the default option – and ‘narrow’), while the other also
adds a third (which we will label ‘limited’):
25 Freeman, ‘Written statement to Parliament: Review of health and care data security and
consent’.
26 Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’. 27 Ibid., p. 8.
28 Ibid., p. 7. 29 Ibid., p. 8. 30 Ibid., p. 34.
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Broad: ‘Information about me can be used to run the NHS and social care
system and to support research to improve treatment and care for everyone.’
Limited: ‘Information about me can be used to run the NHS and social care
system, but not for research.’
Narrow: ‘Information about me can only be used by the people directly
providing my care.’
This way of representing the opt-outs is problematic for at least three
reasons. First, in the wording of each of the options, the patient is told
that this relates to ‘information about me’, while the opt-out applies to
‘confidential patient information’. The patient is given no indication that
the latter is a term with a specific and narrow legal definition (see below)
and that the HSCIC-2 is free to share de-identified, pseudonymised or
anonymised data (which patients think is also ‘information about me’31)
with anyone as long as it is ‘for the purposes of the provision of healthcare
or adult social care, or the promotion of health’. The information pro-
vided also fails to make clear the technical limitations of pseudonymisa-
tion as a de-identification technique.32 Second, in the Limited option, the
patient is not offered the choice between research by or for the NHS and
research by and for commercial organisations,33 and hence is ‘nudged’
away from this option. Third, in the Narrow option, the patient is not
advised that persons directly providing their care are not just the physi-
cians and other healthcare professionals with whom they interact.
This misleading nature of the Caldicott opt-outs is also shown in the
language used in introducing the proposed opt-outs:
You are protected by the law. Your personal confidential information will
only ever be used where allowed by law . . . [Y]ou can ask your health care
professional not to pass on particular information to others involved in
providing your care. You have the right to opt out.You have the right to opt
out of your personal confidential information being used for these other
purposes beyond your direct care . . . This opt-out will be respected by all
31 Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The one-way mirror’.
32 Kieron O’Hara, Transparent Government, Not Transparent Citizens: A Report on Privacy
and Transparency for the Cabinet Office (Southampton: University of Southampton,
2011).
33 Caldicott noted that ‘people hold contrasting views about information being used for
purposes beyond direct care and some people became concerned when data is shared
outside the NHS “family”’. Nevertheless, she took the view that the opt-out model ‘should
be set around the purpose to which data is put . . . and that dividing up NHS and “non-
NHS organisations” without reference to purpose can be artificial and misleading’. This
decision is highly problematic, as we will explain in the section on ethical questions.
Caldicott, ‘Review of data security, consent and opt-outs’, p. 23.
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organisations that use health and social care information . . . You can
change your mind . . .34 (emphasis added)
In sum, the Caldicott Review makes it clear that the opt-out only
applies to data from which the patient may be directly identified, and
even then only to data supplied to those not involved directly with the
patient’s care, with ‘direct care’ being defined more broadly than the
normal person would understand this term. This is problematic, as a
Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori35 report shows that people are already
unclear about who can access their data. The obfuscatory language in
the Caldicott Review will only exacerbate the confusion.
8.2.4 Has the GDPR Any Effect?
In 2016, the EU enacted the General Data Protection Regulation
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679, GDPR), a law that came into force in EU
member states in May 2018. Under Article 18(1)(d) GDPR, people are
given ‘the right to obtain . . . restriction of processing . . . [of data relating
to them] pending the verification whether the legitimate grounds of the
[data] controller override those of the data subject’ (emphasis added).
Article 21(1) GDPR, moreover, states that ‘The data subject shall have the
right to object . . . to processing of personal data . . . unless the [data]
controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the proces-
sing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data sub-
ject. . . ’ (emphasis added).
However, Article 6(1) GDPR reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that [it is necessary]: for
compliance with a legal obligation to which the [data] controller is subject . . .
[or] for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the [data] controller. (emphasis added)
Perhaps not surprisingly, the GDPR thus allows EU member states to
override the data subject’s rights in certain (if not most) circumstances
concerning state use. Until at least March 2019 the UK is covered by EU
regulations. Thus it will come as no surprise that the UK government has
introduced in the House of Lords the Data Protection Bill,36 which, when
accepted, will be UK law.
34 Ibid., p. 39. 35 Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The one-way mirror’.
36 Data Protection Bill [HL], www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017–2019/
0066/18066.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
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In Section 15 of the Data Protection Bill, the relevant government
minister is to be given the right to override the GDPRwithout Parliament
approval, by issuance of a Rule:
– to adapt the application of rules of the GDPR . . . for compliance with a
legal obligation, for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority;
– [under Article 23(1) GDPR to restrict] the scope of the obligations [to]
and rights [of the data subject] . . . to safeguard certain objectives of general
public interest; [and]
– [under Article 89 GDPR] to provide for derogations from the rights
mentioned in paragraphs (2) and (3) of that Article . . . for scientific . . .
research [or] statistical purposes (emphasis added)37
In other words, the Data Protection Bill, when passed, will allow free use
of de-identified personal health data.
8.2.5 Post-Caldicott: The ‘National Data Lake’
Following the issue of the Caldicott Review, but before releasing its
response, in July 2017 the government undertook a consultation exer-
cise38 and in August 2017 a document setting out the proposals for a
‘Target Architecture’ for care.data 2.0 was leaked to the press.39
37 Article 23(1) GDPR, in relevant part, reads: ‘Member State law . . . may restrict . . . the
obligations and rights provided for in Articles [18 and 21 GDPR] when such a restriction
. . . is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard . . .
important objectives of general public interest of . . . a Member State, in particular . . . an
important economic or financial interest of the . . . Member State, including . . . public
health’ (emphasis added). Likewise, Article 89 GDPR, in relevant part, reads: ‘Processing
. . .. in the public interest [or for] scientific . . . research purposes or statistical purposes,
shall be subject to appropriate safeguards . . . Where those purposes can be fulfilled by
further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data
subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.’ (emphasis added). Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), Official Journal L 119/1, 4 May 2016.
38 Department of Health, ‘Your data – Better security, better choice, better care. Government
response to the National Data Guardian for Health Care’s Review of data security. Consent
and opt-outs and the Care Quality Commission’s Review “Safe data, safe care”’ (2017), www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/627493/
Your_data_better_security_better_choice_better_care_government_response.pdf, accessed 6
November 2017.
39 NHS England, ‘Enabling evidence-based continuous improvement. The Target
Architecture. Connecting care settings and improving patient experience’ (2017),
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The consultation exercise showed the importance of public trust but
had also indicated that, while a need for a national data collection existed,
the public is ‘less willing to share their data when the direct benefit for
them and their local population is unclear’.40 The proposal is thus to
harvest data into local pools, each representing the maximum size for
which a high degree of public trust can be predicted: about 2–5 million
people. With a common architecture in the format of each pool, and with
a national spine making the pools interconnectable, a ‘National Data
Lake’ will be created which merely appears to be a set of local pools for
local people.
NHS England effectively admits this in the target architecture plan:
Sensitive personal and confidential data (which is fully identifiable) will
almost certainly be required to achieve interoperability and to facilitate
precision medicine and case finding. The [Caldicott] Review opt-out will
not apply.41
Such data, however, obviously remains sensitive. It is ‘confidential
patient information’, a term which is precisely defined by law and does
not mean personal health records in general, as most people would think.
It refers to information42 which, without a court order, generally cannot
be released to parties outside the NHS and its contracted agents without
the patient’s consent, distinguishing it from information that the NHS is
permitted to release without the patient’s consent, even if the patient has
opted out.
Care.data 2.0 thus involves NHS Digital collecting confidential
patient information, and, by de-identifying it, creating a database of
https://medconfidential.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017–07-13-Target-
Architecture.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017.
40 NHS England, ‘Enabling evidence-based continuous improvement’, p. 35.
41 Ibid., p. 31.
42 National Health Service Act 2006, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/41/contents,
accessed 6 November 2017. Section 251(10) defines ‘patient information’ as follows: ‘(a)
information (however recorded) which relates to the physical or mental health or con-
dition of an individual, to the diagnosis of his condition or to his care or treatment, and
(b) information (however recorded) which is to any extent derived, directly or indirectly,
from such information, whether or not the identity of the individual in question is
ascertainable from the information.’ However, Section 251(11) goes on to make clear
that patient information is ‘confidential patient information’where: ‘(a) the identity of the
individual in question is ascertainable—(i) from that information, or (ii) from that
information and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come
into the possession of, the person processing that information, and (b) that information
was obtained or generated by a person who, in the circumstances, owed an obligation of
confidence to that individual.’
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‘non-confidential’ information. The new Caldicott opt-outs have no effect
whatsoever on the release to any party of personal health data which has
been ‘de-identified’, to whatever extent the government sees fit.
The government warmly welcomed and supported Caldicott’s recom-
mendations, and HSCIC was duly rebranded as NHS Digital. A national
data opt-out is being prepared, i.e. a single opt-out to replace the Type 1
and Type 2 opt-outs (to prevent uploading of GP data to HSCIC-2’s
database, and to prevent release of identifiable data by HSCIC-2, respec-
tively). This national opt-out is to be available fromMarch 2018. In effect,
the only thing the national opt-out will provide is the right to prevent
fully identifiable data from being used for research and ‘planning’.
The timeline set out in the government’s response to the Caldicott
Review sets a date of September 2019 for NHSDigital to implement a new
mechanism to de-identify data on collection fromGP practices, so we can
presume that this is likely to be the new start date for care.data 2.0.
8.3 The UK 100,000 Genomes Project
8.3.1 Background, Focus and Patient Recruitment
The 100kGP is a hybrid of a biobank for research (including by industry
and commercial actors) and clinical practice (in that participating in the
project might lead to a diagnosis or to the identification of a treatment for
that patient’s presenting condition).
The 100kGP is being delivered and implemented using existing NHS
resources. NHS clinicians treating potentially eligible patients identify
and refer them to the project. Those who want to take part have
a preliminary discussion with a healthcare worker and are sent informa-
tion documents to read. Genomics England has designed these
documents via piloting with public/patient involvement groups and
discussion with different advisory committees. Notably, research showed
that some patients found the documents too lengthy and complex and
they have been revised.43
At least 24 hours after receiving the information, patients and family
members are seen in a face-to-face consent appointment with NHS staff
at a Genomic Medicine Centre. There, they give samples of blood, tissue
and saliva which are sent to the sequencing hub. The sequence data
are sent for storage to Genomics England’s data centre. Genome data
43 Caroline Benjamin, ‘Findings from the National Consent Evaluation’ (2016) www.geno
micsengland.co.uk/consent-evaluation-findings, accessed 6 November 2017.
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are then combined with data about the patient from their hospital or
clinic, their GP records, national disease registries, social care records
and Public Health England. The data is to be extracted over the patient’s
whole life into a database built in partnership with NHS Digital. In a bid
to protect privacy, the linked dataset is ‘de-identified’. The samples are
also stored for future research. These sample and data banks are con-
trolled by Genomics England (although what will happen to them once
the project is over will be left to the Secretary of State for Health to
decide).
The project shares some similarities with the 500,000-participant
strong UK Biobank,44 which also collected biomaterial and detailed
health-related information linked to GP and hospital data. The key
differences are that UK Biobank had broad recruitment criteria and
offered test results such as blood pressure readings and body mass
index, while 100kGP recruitment is more tightly linked to the NHS
patient ‘family’ and provides results from tests otherwise unavailable
through the NHS (whole-genome sequencing and, eventually, other
‘omics’). Many patients and families in the rare diseases arm will be
those who have had earlier tests which failed to achieve a diagnosis.
Whole genome sequencing is a last hope after a long ‘diagnostic odyssey’.
Although patients and family members are told that diagnoses are not
guaranteed, they are told they are possible. In fact, newspaper coverage of
the project’s pilot phase has shown that several patients in the rare disease
arm have been diagnosed.
Tested people can also opt to have their genomes searched against a
constantly updated predefined list of ‘additional findings’ for potentially
serious but actionable risks, e.g. familial hypercholesterolemia and famil-
ial cancer syndromes. This offer – as Genomics England’s Chief Scientific
Officer Mark Caulfield suggests – is made on the basis of increasing
fairness and trustworthiness: ‘[patients] have entrusted us with their
genomic information, it seems only fair that we can offer . . . options
. . . [that] may benefit their future health’.45 Genomics England sends
reports to physicians about their patients, and so any feedback about
results is offered as part of clinical consultations.
44 UK Biobank, ‘Participants’ (2016) www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/participants, accessed 6
November 2017.
45 Genomics England, ‘100,000 Genomes Project gains ethical approval to offer NHS
patients further information about their genomic results’ (2015) www.genomicseng
land.co.uk/100k-genomes-projectp-gains-ethical-approval-to-offer-nhs-patients-
further-information-about-their-genomic-results, accessed 6 November 2017.
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The focus is on rare diseases since, in 80 per cent of cases, these
diseases have a genomic basis. Although individually uncommon, the
diseases affect 6–7 per cent of the UK population. Finding the genetic
cause can shed light on the nature of the disease, its prognosis and
potential treatments, and areas for further research. Half of new cases
of such disease are found in children. The list of eligible rare diseases
consists of: diseases for which there is a clinical diagnosis but no mole-
cular diagnosis and no readily detectable genetic mutation in known
disease-related genes; diseases for which there is a suspected clinical
diagnosis; and diseases that are ‘ultra-rare’. Since comparing sequences
can aid interpretation, multiple family members are invited to participate
in the project.
In the cancer arm, patients’ germline genomes and the genomes of
their cancers will be sequenced, because mutations in tumours are a
central factor in determining the progression of the cancer and its likely
response to therapy. The project’s focus on cancer is unsurprising: in the
UK, cancer killed 160,000 people in 2014 and over 350,000 new cases
were reported that same year. Given that cancer is extremely heteroge-
neous, even among people with the ‘same’ diagnosis, the stated aim of the
project here is to make diagnoses that are more precise, as well as to find
better, more ‘personalised’, treatment choices – i.e. those that have a
better balance of response rate to toxic side effects. Genomics research
has already led to success in this respect, showing that HER2 positive
breast cancers respond to the drug Herceptin (trastuzumab).
8.3.2 Research and Development
One of the project’s aims – enabling new scientific discovery and insight –
is said to be possible only through research on the genomic and clinical
information. Thus for patients, having their clinical tests and any chance of
a diagnosis is presented as being contingent upon giving broad consent to
future, unspecified research on their data. Some of this research is to be
done by industry and commercial companies. This is said to be because: ‘if
any new diagnostic tests and treatments are to come from this project, they
will need to be developed, as they always have been, by the private sector
and not within government or the NHS’.46
46 Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, ‘West London Genomic Medicine Centre’, www
.chelwest.nhs.uk/about-us/research-development/west-london-genomic-medicine-cen
tre, accessed 6 November 2017. This is of course misleading. Many diagnostic tests and
pharmaceuticals have been discovered and developed, if not commercially marketed, by
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There are strict restrictions about who can access the data for research.
Insurers, marketers and other government agencies, such as the police,
are disallowed automatic access, although the police and Home Office
can seek a court order for access. Researchers can access only de-identi-
fied subsets of the data for research purposes approved by the ‘access
review committee’, in a monitored, secure data environment. Priority
and royalty-free access to data is given to members of the Genomics
England Clinical Interpretation Partnerships (GeCIPs) which are
domains of over 2000 researchers, clinicians, trainees and funders from
academia, charitable organisations, government or healthcare. GeCIPs
will carry out research into particular disease-types or cross-cutting
issues (e.g. health economics) and get free access because their research
will aid the interpretation of data. Researchers who do not meet the
eligibility criteria to join a GeCIP (e.g. private healthcare institutions or
commercial companies) will be able to access the dataset for a fee.
Regarding intellectual property and patenting, Genomics England has
adopted a relatively standard approach to inventions made by public
bodies carrying out research on its data: patents may be sought and may
be licensed to commercial entities and academic institutions on favour-
able terms. Genomics England also states that there may be cases where it
decides not to patent an invention for public policy reasons, e.g. if it
would serve the public interest to make the invention freely available for
use. The key question, of course, is the extent to which patent rights may
vest in commercial entities carrying out research on its data.
8.3.3 Funders and Commercial Actors Involved
Genomics England is largely government funded: the UK government
committed £250million as part of its 2016 spending review after an initial
investment of £300 million. The Medical Research Council contributed
£24 million towards computing power for the analysis and interpretation
of data. NHS England agreed to underwrite an NHS contribution of up to
£20 million over the duration of the project. The Wellcome Trust con-
tributed £27 million towards a sequencing facility near Cambridge, UK.
Illumina, the US biotechnology company carrying out the genome
sequencing, is investing £162 million in return for its £78 million sequen-
cing contract.
the public sector. One has only to think of the antibiotic penicillin and the anti-cancer
drug paclitaxel.
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In 2015, Genomics England granted access to a subset of aggregated
data to twelve pharmaceutical, biotechnology and diagnostic companies
from the UK and abroad, including GSK, Roche and AstraZeneca, as part
of an industry trial. They asked each company to identify areas of improve-
ment in data collection and to invest money (a fee of £250,000) and staff
(scientists and bioinformaticians) to aid the storage, security and analysis
of data. These companies have been obliged to publish all research from
the industry trial ‘at the point at which intellectual property for any
product is protected, in common with best practice in the pharmaceutical
industry’.47 Notably, intellectual property is only ‘protected’ once all the
relevant patents are granted: something that will normally occur only 5–15
years after the initial invention. Thus this is by no means a promise of
rapid publication. As Samuel and Farsides48 comment, ‘little is known
about the outcome of this trial . . . [and] how the ethical issues associated
with partnering with commercial entities might unfold’. Several other
commercial companies, including Illumina, have access to the data centre
or data pipelines because they are providing technical services, such as
computing infrastructure, data storage or genome analysis.
At its core, 100kGP is a vehicle through which the government can
build a database and capabilities to analyse the data that can lead to health
benefits and stimulate economic growth. Indeed, when launching the
project in 2012, then-Prime Minister David Cameron stated his govern-
ment’s desire ‘to see the emergence of genomic platforms in the UK that
. . . support the emergence of new companies and innovations’ leading to
the developments of ‘valuable new products that are sold around the
world’.49
8.4 Ethical Questions
The developments regarding care.data 2.0 and 100kGP validate Donna
Dickenson’s concern that: ‘Me Medicine is eclipsing what I call We
47 Genomics England, ‘FAQs about how we are working with industry’ (2014), www
.genomicsengland.co.uk/working-with-industry/working-with-industry-faqs, accessed 6
November 2017.
48 Gabrielle Natalie Samuel and Bobbie Farsides, ‘The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project:
manifesting policymakers’ expectations’ (2017) 36(4) New Genetics and Society
336–53.
49 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS), ‘Industrial strategy: government
and industry in partnership. Strategy for UK life sciences. One year on’ (2013), www.gov
.uk/government/collections/industrial-strategy-government-and-industry-in-partner
ship, accessed 6 November 2017.
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Medicine, so that we’re losing sight of the notion that biotechnology can
and should serve the common good’.50 Without pretending to be exhaus-
tive, in this section we will discuss three ethical issues that these schemes
highlight.
8.4.1 Obfuscatory Language and Promissory Discourse
NHS England and Genomics England use the contentious terms ‘perso-
nalised care’ and ‘personalised medicine’. The terms are often used
interchangeably with ‘precision medicine’ and ‘stratified medicine’51.
Donna Dickenson has observed that:
[O]ne meaning of personalized medicine that does seem genuinely ben-
eficial [is] drug treatment tailored to the patient on an evidence-based
model for better clinical care. Whether that’s really personalized in the
sense of individualized, however, is arguable . . . individuals are classified
into groups according to which allele (variant) of the relevant gene they
have . . . Even the biotechnology industry-linked Personalized Medicine
Coalition concedes that pharmacogenetics is about population subgroup
response to particular drugs.52
However, she also rightly remarks that ‘Patients’ enthusiasm for phar-
macogenetics would take quite a hit if they saw it as a rationale for
denying them therapy, but in an era of cost cutting, that’s exactly what
could happen.’53
Indeed, highly targeted ‘personalised’ drugs (i.e. ‘MeMedicine’ – help-
ing me and people like me), available at huge mark-ups over the produc-
tion costs, could reduce the strength of the population-wide ‘safety net’
(‘We Medicine’) that is the NHS. What’s more, personalised care could
lead to an even more fragmented NHS. In an ethnographic study explor-
ing the translation of stratified medicine into a London cancer centre,
Day and colleagues found that:
[S]tratified medicine placed additional strains on the service through its
requirement for a highly-skilled workforce and a meticulously integrated
patient pathway that, in the context of budget constraints, were difficult to
deliver. Highly-skilled staff have moved increasingly to back-office func-
tions such as laboratory analysis [and] replaced in frontline functions by
50 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 2.
51 Sara Day, R. Charles Coombes and Louise McGrath-Lone, ‘Stratified, precision or
personalised medicine? Cancer services in the “real world” of a London hospital’ (2017)
39 Sociology of Health and Illness 143–58.
52 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 8. 53 Ibid., p. 75.
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less qualified staff following the protocols of the new medicine . . . [T]his
recalibration of staff roles has enabled hospitals to trim budgets and carry
on, but staff and patients alike reported increasing fragmentation
and particular difficulties in coordinating the steps along a pathway . . .
[M]easures to improve coordination and navigation . . . do not always
work, with the result that some patients describe care that is far from
personalised.54
Echoing Day’s findings, Samuel and Farsides highlight ‘the pitfalls of
unfulfilled promissory genohype’ around the 100kGP. They found that
staff at, or working with, Genomics England, felt that policymakers
driving the project had ‘grandiose expectations’: implementation
brought several organisational tensions, for example, about whether the
‘cash-strapped busy’ NHS and ‘stressed and busy’ staff not trained in
genomics would be capable of delivering the project. Other participants
felt that the political rhetoric surrounding the project, and the fact that an
‘entrepreneurial company’ was responsible for the project, was a positive
force – mobilising the project and overcoming so-called clinical inertia.
As one participant said, ‘The objective was . . . to drive this fast . . . and
not to give people time to downgrade it’.55 Along similar, but less
positive, lines, a Lancet editorial from 2017 about the UK Chief
Medical Officer’s report cites research that whole-genome sequencing is
unlikely to benefit day-to-day care and argues that the NHS might not be
the right place to mainstream genomic medicine because it is struggling
to deliver even basic services.56
The promissory discourse that is so prevalent in relation to both care.
data and 100kGP is particularly problematic in view of the multiple
unanswered questions and epistemological challenges that surround
Big Data projects in biomedicine. These challenges imply fundamental
questions regarding the scientific utility and validity of these types of
projects, and each of the epistemological problems also has ethical
implications.57 All these problems simply remain unmentioned, so as
not to threaten the hype, it would seem.
54 Day, Coombes and McGrath-Lone, ‘Stratified, precision or personalised medicine?’,
p. 154.
55 Samuel and Farsides, ‘The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project’.
56 Editorial, ‘Public genomes: the future of the NHS?’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 203.
57 We do not have the space here to elaborate on this, but for particularly interesting
discussions of the problems involved, see, for example, John Ioannidis, ‘Informed con-
sent, big data, and the oxymoron of research that is not research’ (2013) 13(4) American
Journal of Bioethics 40–2; Wendy Lipworth, Paul Mason, Ian Kerridge et al., ‘Ethics and
epistemology in big data research’ (2017) 14(4) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 489–500;
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8.4.2 The Ethical (In)Defensibility of the Consent Models
As we have hinted at above, the ‘consent’model for care.data 2.0 is hugely
problematic. The consent model in 100kGP has some shortcomings, but
the project is much more limited in scope.
8.4.2.1 The Opt-Out Model Recommended by the Caldicott
Review
The Privacy Impact Assessment of care.data undertaken by NHS
England (NHS England 2014) made it clear that the GP data of
those registering an opt-out would be passed to the HSCIC and
would most likely be used in research to which those patients have
not consented:
Where patients have objected to the flow of their personal confidential
data from the general practice record, the HSCIC will receive clinical data
without any identifiers attached . . . If a patient is (a) content for personal
confidential data from their GP record to be extracted into the secure
environment of the HSCIC but (b) objects to flows of personal confiden-
tial data from the HSCIC . . . then the HSCIC will extract the fact of
the objection, the date of the objection and the individual’s NHS number.
The NHS number will be used internally within the HSCIC tomatch these
data to other data held for that patient so that the data can be anonymised
before release.58 (emphasis added)
In this context, ‘anonymisation’ actually meant ‘pseudonymisation’, a
‘technique that replaces identifiers with a pseudonym that uniquely
identifies a person’, i.e. what is frequently called ‘coding’ of health data.
Astoundingly, what is being said here is that a patient’s wish that their
confidential information is not extracted or used, is respected by extract-
ing and using the data anyway, but in pseudonymised form. This is not
what the average person understands by ‘opting out’ – arguably, people
understand this as meaning that their data will not be used in any way.
Little has changed in the wake of the Caldicott Report since the recom-
mended opt-outs relate only to ‘confidential patient information’, and,
as mentioned in Section 8.2.4 (‘Has the GDPR Any Effect?’), data
collected by NHS Digital and de-identified is not considered to be
confidential patient information. In other words, the opt-out is not
actually an opt-out. This scheme is simply care.data 2.0.
Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘The ethics of big data: Current and foreseeable
issues in biomedical contexts’ (2016) 22 Science and Engineering Ethics 303–41.
58 NHS England, ‘Privacy impact assessment: care.data’, pp. 9–10.
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This is ethically problematic. As argued by bioethicist Julian Savulescu:
Each [mature] person has values, plans, aspirations, and feelings about
how that life should go. People have values which may collide with
research goals . . . To ask a person’s permission to do something to that
person is to involve her actively and to give her the opportunity to make
the project a part of her plans. When we involve people in our projects
without their consent we use them as a means to our own ends.59
This illustrates why the care.data consent model amounts to a
violation of people’s autonomy. The principle of respect for auton-
omy is based on the principle of respect for persons.60 Respecting
people implies that they should be offered ethically appropriate and
clearly understandable ways to consent (or not) to have their health
records included in central databases. Except for purely privacy-
related concerns, de-identification of health data cannot overcome
any of the important ethical concerns that many people have about
the creation and use of databases and/or tissue banks for research
purposes.61 For example, various studies indicate that people may
consider commercial uses to be at odds with their original motiva-
tion to participate in research even when they explicitly agreed to
take part in research.62
59 Julian Savulescu, ‘For and Against: No consent should be needed for using leftover body
material for scientific purposes. Against’ (2000) 325 British Medical Journal 648–9, p. 649.
60 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report – Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979) www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/belmont-report/index.html, accessed 6 November 2017.
61 NBAC, ‘Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy
Guidance (Executive Summary)’ (1999) https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/
nbac/hbm_exec.pdf, accessed 6 November 2017; Kristof Van Assche, Serge
Gutwirth and Sigrid Sterckx, ‘Protecting dignitary interests of biobank research
participants: lessons from Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents’ (2013) 5
(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 54–84. At most, anonymisation might offer
protection with regard to privacy, although various studies suggest that even this
cannot be guaranteed. Genome data pose a high risk of re-identification. This is
doubly problematic since genome data have implications for the patient and her
family members. Melissa Gymrek, Amy L. McGuire, David Golan et al., ‘Identifying
personal genomes by surname inference’ (2013) 6117 Science 321–4.
62 Tore Nilstun and Göran Herméren, ‘Human tissue samples and ethics–attitudes of the
general public in Sweden to biobank research’ (2006) 9(1) Medicine Health Care and
Philosophy 81–6; John Arne Skolbekken, Lars Ø. Ursin, Berge Solberg et al., ‘Not worth
the paper it’s written on? Informed consent and biobank research in a Norwegian context’
(2005) 15 Critical Public Health 335–47.
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8.4.2.2 The Consent Model Underlying 100kGP
Policymakers are using the 100kGPmodel as a starting point to design an
appropriate approach to consent for NHS genomic medicine services. At
the time of writing, this approach was still in development.63 It remains
to be seen whether broad consent, i.e. consent for unspecified and
unknown research, and the entwinement of consent for the clinical
aspect (e.g. a primary diagnosis) and research will be carried forward.
Broad consent could be argued to be morally justified in the name of ‘We
Medicine’: seeking consent for individual studies could slow down
research of potential social value. However, the question arises as to
how the potential for benefit to the common good of any research project
can be assessed. Without an answer to this question, it is difficult to
justify the use of broad consent on the grounds of the common good.
Further questions arise, such as how public and individual interests can
be balanced and who should carry out these balancing exercises. In
100kGP, Genomics England’s Access Review Committee64 takes on this
role. It is up to NHS England to decide whether such a committee should
continue to exist post-100kGP.
As we will discuss next, notions of altruism and solidarity are some-
times invoked in arguments supporting broad consent. Caulfield and
Kaye have pointed out that there is a danger of conflating the idea that
people want to participate in a project ‘altruistically’ – in the name of the
common good – with the idea that the ethical and legal norm (i.e.
consent) should be altered in its service.65 Interestingly, some research
suggests that the public and patients do not see broad consent as accep-
table. A systematic review of studies from the USA showed that partici-
pants preferred tiered or specific forms of consent, and were less
supportive when data could be shared with pharmaceutical companies.66
Moreover, one survey of over 1000 participants found that initial support
for broad consent diminished once specific types of controversial
research (e.g. including research into safer abortion methods,
63 Becki Bennett, ‘What does consent mean for Generation Genome?’ (2017) BioNews, 18
September, www.bionews.org.uk/page_886840.asp, accessed 6 November 2017.
64 Chaired by Professor Jonathan Knowles, who is also chairman of the board of
Adappimunne Ltd and Immunocore Ltd, two UK-based biotechnology companies.
65 Tim Caulfield and Jane Kaye, ‘Broad consent in biobanking: reflections on seemingly
insurmountable dilemmas’ (2009) 10 Medical Law International 85–100.
66 Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, Nila A. Sathe, Armand H. Matheny Antommaria et al., ‘A
systematic literature review of individuals’ perspectives on broad consent and data
sharing in the United States’ (2016) 18(7) Genetics in Medicine 663–71.
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xenotransplantation and, notably, research that would lead to patents)
were raised as a possibility.67
Other research has shown that the general public is generally positive
towards medical research and is usually willing to participate without
expecting any personal benefit.68 However, the willingness to participate
decreases if the benefits to society are unclear or if private profits might
be derived.69
8.4.3 Appealing to Altruism: Furthering a Neoliberal Political Agenda?
Donna Dickenson identifies corporate interests and political neoliberal-
ism as one of the key drivers of ‘Me Medicine’. Neoliberalism includes
making significant cuts in public spending while at the same time
increasing the involvement of private corporations in areas such as
healthcare, education and scientific research (and outsourcing from the
public to the private sector of an increasing number of services).70 With
regard to biomedicine and healthcare, the neoliberal nature of the poli-
tical agenda is very clear.
For health services, the agenda translates into the following
stratification:
(a) to keep the voters happy, a basic, low-level service should be paid for
by the state;
(b) a higher-level service should be available to those who pay, directly
or via insurance;
67 Raymond G. De Vries, Tom Tomlinson, H. Myra Kim et al., ‘The moral concerns of
biobank donors: the effect of non-welfare interests on willingness to donate’ (2016) 12 Life
Sciences, Society and Policy 3.
68 Dianne Nicol and Christine R. Critchley, ‘Benefit sharing and biobanking in Australia’
(2012) 21(5) Public Understanding of Science 534–55.
69 Christine R. Critchley, Dianne Nichol, Margaret F. A. Otlowski et al., ‘Predicting inten-
tion to biobank: a national survey’ (2012) 22 European Journal of Public Health 139–44;
Åsa Kettis-Lindblad, Lena Ring, Eva Viberth et al., ‘Genetic research and donation of
tissue samples to biobanks. What do potential sample donors in the Swedish general
public think?’ (2006) 16(4) European Journal of Public Health 433–40; Saskia C.
Sanderson, Michael A. Diefenbach, Randi Zinberg et al., ‘Willingness to participate in
genomics research and desire for personal results among underrepresented minority
patients: a structured interview study’ (2013) 4(4) Journal of community genetics 469–
82; Wellcome Trust/IPSOS Mori, ‘The One-Way Mirror’.
70 Damien Cahill and Martijn Konings, Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017);
Owen Jones, The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It (London: Allan
Lane, 2014).
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(c) extremely expensive services should be paid for by the state, but on a
rationed basis;
(d) expensive infrastructure, for whatever purpose, should be paid for by
the state; and
(e) value from the services provided by and infrastructure generated by
the state should, as far as is possible, be channelled into the private
arena.
Indeed, as Donna Dickenson observes, ‘at the highest governmental
levels, public backing has been solicited to underpin private-sector profit
making from biotechnology’.71 Moreover, ‘[the] public sector, as the
entrepreneurial state, is being asked to sponsor the growth and shoulder
the risks for the private sector’.72
Interestingly, two simultaneous trends can be observed in the UK:
while healthcare and social care data are centralised for research pur-
poses, the provision of healthcare itself is being decentralised. Indeed,
accompanied by a narrative about building healthcare services ‘around
the needs of local populations’, the UK government has announced the
‘restructuring’ of the NHS through so-called ‘Sustainability and
Transformation Plans’ (STPs). A total of 44 geographical areas (‘foot-
prints’) are created that need to develop strategic plans to rationalise
services. This is arguably a further step in the process of dismantling the
NHS as a national health service. The STPs, like care.data, suggest that
‘sustainability’ and economic growth have become the de facto social
values. Moreover, ‘Individuals, rather than organisations or public insti-
tutions, are forced to deal with the healthcare, social and financial con-
sequences of ever-increasing and ambiguous data dissemination
practices among entities they are not always aware of’.73
Yet, as we have hinted at in our discussion about broad consent, the
neoliberal political agenda is veiled with references to benefits for all and
altruism. For example, care.data was promoted by the UK government as
a scheme that would ‘improve the quality of care for all’.74 In the case of
the 100kGP, the message is that the project enhances altruism and that
people who take part are altruistic. As Woods75 has pointed out,
71 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 21. 72 Ibid., p. 180.
73 Vezyridis and Timmons, ‘Dissenting from care.data’.
74 NHS England webpage previously available at: www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-
data/better-care.
75 SimonWoods, ‘Big Data governance: solidarity and the patient voice’ in Brent Mittelstadt
and Luciano Floridi (eds.), The Ethics of Biomedical Big Data (Springer International,
2016), pp. 221–38.
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Genomics England has used this rhetoric to rally the public to a common
cause and to implicitly call upon their civic duty to endorse the project. In
this way, 100kGP appeals to the best of ‘WeMedicine’ (i.e. the production
of wide social goods through the coming together of rare disease and
cancer communities), and ‘Me Medicine’ (i.e. the chance of a precise
diagnosis and treatments). It draws on the language of ‘We Medicine’,
with the ultimate promise of (and hopes for immediate) ‘Me Medicine’.
The frequent invoking of the principle of altruism echoes the dis-
courses that have surrounded older healthcare and research ventures,
such as National Blood Donation and UK Biobank. The form of altruism
applied in such discourses was Richard Titmuss’s (1970) ‘gift relation-
ship’. An altruistic act within a gift relationship is one that is voluntary
and that has no expectation of return. 100kGP is purported to promote
altruism and the people taking part are doing so because, at least in part,
they are altruistic. Speaking to the Financial Times, Professor
Mark Caulfield (Chief Scientific Officer) has assumed that the partici-
pants are well aware that few will see pharmaceutical benefits themselves:
‘[T]hey’ve enrolled on the principle that this is altruistic, and they don’t
expect any personal benefit. They’re doing it because they want someone
else to have a better chance than they did.’76
However, as we have said, the 100kGP does offer (although does not
promise) clinical benefit. So is it accurate to say that people are partici-
pating to benefit others? It is likely that at least some are participating to
get a diagnosis. Caulfield’s assumption, and the references to altruism,
thus seem inappropriate.
What function is this rhetoric about common good, civic duty and
altruism serving? As others have argued with regard to the biobanks that
came before 100kGP, it detracts from the role of industry and from
concerns that participants might have about injustice in the research
enterprise.77 It also deflects from the glimmer of hope that there will be a
diagnosis or a treatment (the ‘Me Medicine’ aspect). It masks the ques-
tion as to whether, if new drugs come out of the project, the NHS will
even be able to afford them if it is privatised further. This would be a clear
76 Richard Hodson and Clive Cookson, ‘NHS launches genetic sequencing centres to
develop treatments’ (2014) Financial Times, 22 December.
77 Richard Tutton and Barbara Prainsack, ‘Enterprising or altruistic selves? Making up
research subjects in genetics research’ (2011) 33(7) Sociology of Health and Illness
1081–95; Lars Ø. Ursin, ‘Biobank research and the welfare state project: the HUNT
story’ (2010) 20(4) Critical Public Health 453–63.
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loss for ‘We Medicine’ as a whole, and a win for ‘Me Medicine’ but only
for those who can afford expensive treatments.
While the two schemes we discuss in this chapter purport to promote
the common good, we would submit that fairness requires real benefit-
sharing and not just rhetoric. The HSCIC reassures people that it will not
make a profit from providing data to other organisations, but will only
charge an access fee to cover its costs. While this may look unproble-
matic, what it means is that commercial companies are provided access to
assets they have not themselves bought or created and are thus being
given a quasi-free commercial boost by the UK government. However, to
put NHS databases at the disposal of industry, without requiring a ‘kick-
back’ to enhance the service that the NHS is set up to provide, is
inappropriate. The mere fact that a new drug might reach the market is
not sufficient to count as benefit-sharing with UK citizens, since this
benefit (the new drugs) is then also available for citizens in other coun-
tries, whose health data has not been mined by the companies in ques-
tion. Instead, the companies seeking access should be required to provide
the NHSwith reduced access costs for the resulting drugs or other health-
related products. With data being collected from the UK population at
the expense of the UK state, we are talking about a concealed Public
Private Initiative: something which should not be entered into unless the
benefits to the private party are at least balanced by the benefits to the
public as a whole.
8.5 Concluding Remarks: Trust versus Trustworthiness
The huge controversy surrounding the care.data scheme clearly showed
that the various misleading elements of the scheme undermined citizens’
trust. The Caldicott Review78 and the UKChiefMedical Officer’s report79
rightly mention repeatedly that trust is essential for making any such
scheme work. However, we should emphasise that there is a difference
between being trusted andmeriting trust (i.e. being trustworthy). In order
to merit any trust, those who acquire health data ought to make sure that
they respect the autonomy of individuals whom they expect to entrust
them with their health data.
Does the ‘architecture’ proposed by the Caldicott Review and the Chief
Medical Officer’s report represent a scheme that is trustworthy?
78 Caldicott, ‘Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-outs’.
79 Davies, ‘Generation Genome’.
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Transparency is a crucial prerequisite, both for trust and trustworthi-
ness. Regarding care.data 2.0, unfortunately, the misleading and obfus-
cation continue. In spite of all the Caldicott Review’s talk about opt-
outs, it is clear that the scheme is not in fact based on an opt-out regime,
since, as explained above, a patient’s wish that their confidential infor-
mation is not extracted or used, is met by extracting and using the data
in de-identified form. This makes a mockery of the claim that people
can opt out. If somebody opts out, that should mean that their data are
simply not extracted and used, i.e. HSCIC should receive no data, not
even in ‘de-identified’ form.
It is clear from NHS England’s response to Caldicott and from NHS
Digital’s draft target architecture from July 2017 that NHS England is
intent on pressing ahead with care.data 2.0 with a fig-leaf of a national
opt-out and the illusory regional fragmentation of the National Data
Lake it so desperately wants to create. Health data is to be conscripted
regardless.
The consent model underlying the 100kGP arguably might be
ethically defensible, on the grounds that the research might promote
the common good. However, it is not clear how ‘common good’ will
be defined by policymakers and how the involvement of industry
will affect the nature and the extent of any benefits to society. As we
have discussed, appeals to altruism can be a thin veil for the neo-
liberal drive behind ‘Me Medicine’ schemes and the drastic impact
they could have for the NHS and its users. As Dickenson points out,
there is a danger that, eventually, people will ‘perceive that their
altruism is being exploited by commercialisation’.80 Those who feel
exploited will have little recourse, as a commenter on The Times
newspaper’s coverage of the NHS ‘National Data Lake’ has
pointed out:
[O]nly the very wealthy have a choice as to whether they want a relation-
ship with the NHS . . . however much someone may dislike or distrust the
NHS, they cannot seek medical treatment elsewhere. The NHS may want
to appear to encourage people to be altruistic . . . but they come very close
to compelling rather than promoting the altruism. We are being asked to
sign up to the rules of a club that most of us cannot leave.81
80 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 199.
81 R. Moss, Comment on article by Kat Lay, ‘NHS to share opt-out patients’ data’ (2017) The
Times, 19 September.
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Clearly, care.data 2.0 and the 100kGP are using the NHS ‘brand’ to
generate trust in a health service that looks very different to the one set
up after WWII. However, trust should be merited and not manufactured
for the sake of generating support for whatever projects the government
wishes to implement.
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9My Genome, My Right
stuart hogarth, julian cockbain and sigrid
sterckx
‘Everyone has the right to access and understand their personal genetic
information . . . It’s amazing to me it’s so controversial that you should be
able to get your genetic information.’1
‘The imaginary of rights is gradually replacing social justice. The decolo-
nization struggles, the civil rights and counter-cultural movements fought for
an ideal society based on justice and equality. In the human rights age, the
pursuit of collective material welfare has given way to individual gratification
and the avoidance of evil.’2
9.1 Introduction
The growing number of firms offering direct-to-consumer genetic testing
(DTCGT) has prompted commentary from scientists, clinicians, bioethi-
cists and ELSI scholars. Those critical of this nascent consumer industry
have expressed concerns about, inter alia, the absence of evidence sup-
porting the utility of DTCGT, the vulnerability of the public to mislead-
ing advertising claims and the appropriateness of marketing tests direct
to the consumer.
But even amongst those sceptics who believe that the business models
of consumer genetics firms are as shaky as their scientific claims, there
can be little doubt that one notable success they have enjoyed has been to
shift the terms of public debate about genetic testing. In the face of a
variety of efforts to regulate the consumer genetics industry, some firms
(and some of their customers and supporters) have asserted the principle
that individuals have a right to ‘their genome’. This assertion has proved
1 Anne Wojcicki quoted in Jason Madara, ‘The extraction process: meet 23andMe’s Anne
Wojcicki’, Wired (6 March 2017), www.wired.co.uk/article/the-extraction-process,
accessed 28 January 2018.
2 Costas Douzinas, ‘The paradoxes of human rights’ (2013) 20(1) Constellations 51–67.
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extremely powerful, and its broad appeal requires us to pay it careful
attention. What assumptions underpin the assertion of this genomic
right? What might be its consequences? Should this putative right be
seen as a legal right or a fundamental human right? What would be the
implication of such a right for regulatory initiatives? What implications
would it have for other forms of diagnostic testing?What other rights are
invoked (implicitly or explicitly) in the policy debate about consumer
genetics and what bearing do they have on any putative right to one’s
genome?
To understand what it is stake, it is necessary to provide some brief
background on the DTCGT industry: the range of services it offers and its
business models, the variety of regulatory responses the nascent sector
has generated and the commentary such initiatives have provoked.
Given this book’s focus on medicine and public health, we shall focus
on firms that offer health-related testing, but the industry is broader,
encompassing paternity testing, ancestry testing and lifestyle testing,
such as genes related to athletic ability. Before 2005, the first wave of
health-related DTCGT firms largely focused on nutrigenetics, testing for
genes linked to nutrient metabolism and providing tailored dietary
recommendations or selling nutritional supplements; a second wave of
firms launched around 2007 focused on offering polygenic risk tests for a
range of common diseases such as asthma, diabetes and stroke. A recent
survey3 found 246 firms, but the industry comprises mostly small start-
up firms with a high failure rate. Even 23andMe, the largest firm offering
health-related testing, is still not profitable a decade after launch.
23andMe is notable for experimenting with multiple business models:
in particular, it has tried to supplement income from test sales by lever-
aging its growing DNA database as a research platform for the pharma-
ceutical industry.
There have been two types of regulatory initiatives that have impacted
on the DTCGT market. Legislation in a number of European countries
has either banned or limited the availability of genetic tests that can be
purchased without the involvement of a medical professional – such
legislation is generally not focused solely on the issue of the DTCGT
market but has aimed to provide a more general governance framework
for genetic testing. Meanwhile in the USA, the Food and Drug
3 Andelka M. Phillips, ‘Only a click away – DTC Genetics for ancestry, health, love . . . and
more: A view of the business and regulatory landscape’ (2016) 8 Applied & Translational
Genomics 16–22.
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Administration (FDA) has policed the sector through a series of warning
letters that culminated in November 2013 in action against 23andMe, the
most high-profile firm, when the FDA shut down the health-related
portion of its testing service.
The FDA’s intervention in the DTCGT market was characterised by
some commentators as premature,4 an overreaction5 or even an infrin-
gement of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.6 The most
impassioned responses to the FDA’s 2013 action against 23andMe
invoked the language of genomic rights and framed the issue as a
Manichean conflict between the state and market, with the latter as
the guarantor of individual freedom. This position was articulated in
Forbes magazine by Harry Binswanger, a director of the Ayn Rand
Institute: ‘The real issue is not the reliability of these tests. The real
issue is the right of an individual to act on his own judgment, free of
government coercion.’7
9.2 The Right to One’s Genome
Just what might the widely claimed right to one’s genome actually mean?
A human right or a legal right? A right in relation to the information
carried by the genome or a right to the chemical material itself? A right to
own, to access, to exclude, or to use and provide to others?
The claim that people have a right to their genomes is only clear if one
establishes which right is being claimed, and particularly whether the
subject matter of the claim is material or information. Several commen-
tators making the general claim of a right to one’s genome simply
conflate the material and the information.8
The material is a rivalrous good, one that cannot be shared, and thus
potentially the basis for and covered by a claim to ‘self-ownership’.
4 Barbara Prainsack, Jenny Reardon, Richard Hindmarsh et al., ‘Personal genomes: misdir-
ected precaution’ (2008) 456 Nature 34–5.
5 Caroline F. Wright, Alison Hall and Ron L. Zimmern, ‘Regulating direct-to-consumer
genetic testing: what is the fuss about?’ (2011) 13(4) Genetic Medicine 295–300.
6 Robert C. Green and Nita A. Farahany, ‘Regulation: the FDA is overcautious on consumer
genomics’ (2014) 505 Nature 286–7.
7 Harry Binswanger, ‘FDA says, “No gene test for you: You can’t handle the truth”’, Forbes (26
November 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/harrybinswanger/2013/11/26/fda-says-no-gene-
test-for-you-you-cant-handle-the-truth/#221c75d74156, accessed 28 January 2018.
8 Michele Loi, ‘Nobody’s DNA but mine’ (2017) Journal of Medical Ethics. doi:10.1136/
medethics-2017-104188.
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The information is a non-rivalrous good, i.e. one that can be and is
shared, and one therefore that requires very special reasons for permit-
ting ownership and control rights. Thus, for example, society does
occasionally permit short-term ownership and control rights of some
non-rivalrous goods (e.g. inventions and unpublished data). Since the
information may be shared by more than one person, there can be no
question of an ownership right. Equally, since sharing that information
with others, e.g. by publishing it, may harm the interests of those having
the same genetic sequences, we consider that the ‘right to your genome’
cannot be an unrestricted right to use the information. For the purposes
of this chapter we will therefore consider the ‘right’ at maximum to be a
human right to access your genetic information.
The idea of an inviolable right to access information regarding your
genome plays on the concept that your DNA is the key to your personal
identity, the genetic blueprint that defines your essential individuality.
However, in the post-genomic age, attention has moved beyond the
genome to the epigenome, the metabolome, the proteome and the micro-
biome. Are these new ‘omic’ sciences creating new rights? In this chapter
we suggest that genomes constitute collectives as well as individuals; that
genomics is a field replete with tensions between individual rights and
collective rights; and that an individual’s exercise of her rights needs to be
constrained by regulators (rather than self-regulation) to protect those
rights of others which trump the individual’s rights.
What can an individual be allowed to do with their genetic information
once they have received it? Can access to parts of it be denied when there is
concern that the individual might suffer from or abuse that information?
These questions stem particularly from the right of others to privacy, since
genomic information, unlike genetic material (i.e. the physical thing), is
not unique to the person. Admittedly, the entirety of your genomic
information is unique to you, but relevant and concerning parts of it are
shared with others, in particular your relatives and your community.
We thus need to distinguish between:9
– A: an individual who wishes to order a DTC test
– ‘not A’: everybody else (including regulators and the state)
– ‘B’: individuals who are not A, but who are sufficiently closely related to
A that they share a greater degree of (presumable) informational
9 See Wendy Elizabeth Bonython and Bruce Baer Arnold, ‘Direct to consumer genetic testing
and the libertarian right to test’ (2017) Journal of Medical Ethics. doi: 10.1136/medethics-
2017-104188.
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commonality between their genome and the genome of A due to
genetic or geographic relatedness than the degree of commonality in
the general population.
The interests of ‘B’ are crucial yet seem to be overlooked by many
commentators.
9.3 Human Rights
How might the idea of a right to access or own one’s genomic data fit
within our existing systems of rights?Wemight begin by considering this
putative right in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),10 and here we consider two rights: the right to healthcare and
the right to access scientific knowledge.
9.3.1 The Right to Healthcare
If we address first the health-related aspects of DTCGT, then the relevant
provision would seem to be Article 25 UDHR:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services.11
To what extent would this right be relevant to DTCGT?Many firms have
sought to distance themselves from the world of medical care, arguing
that what they offer is ‘recreational genomics’ or ‘lifestyle genomics’. This
rhetorical strategy is primarily a form of regulatory arbitrage, intended to
provide cover from regulatory agencies like the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), but if taken at face value, it would appear to
exclude the DTCGT firms that adopt such terminology from any con-
sideration that their services might fall under Article 25 UDHR. Further,
since many firms offer polygenic risk assessment for common diseases,
and this type of testing has not been shown to be clinically useful, let
alone medically necessary, it is not clear that even if such tests are
marketed as medical care, that they meet the test of something necessary
to ensuring health and well-being. Failing such a test would make it
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights, accessed 29 January 2018.
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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difficult to envisage this portion of DTCGT as part of a right to
healthcare.
Article 25 UHDR seems to be more relevant for genetic tests that are
deemed clinically useful, such as the carrier testing that 23andMe offers
for a range of singe-gene diseases. However, even medically necessary
products may not be available direct-to-consumer. For instance, in many
jurisdictions essential medicines such as antibiotics and powerful pain-
killers are only available via prescription. There is no public outcry about
this situation, and this tacit acceptance of the intermediary role played by
healthcare professionals in the provision of essential medicines suggests
that people understand the distinction between the principle that access
to a public good, such as clean drinking water, should be considered a
universal human right, and the question of how that right is delivered.
Further, many would defend the principle that equitable access to such
public goods is best guaranteed by giving the state a monopoly on
provision, rather than by relying on the private sector. The UK Human
Genetics Commission’s (HGC) report Genes Direct supported the prin-
ciple of state provision:
We feel strongly that there should be a well-funded NHS genetics service
supported by a genetically literate primary care work force, which can
properly manage and allow access to new predictive genetic tests that are
being developed. This could involve the NHS providing ready access to
testing services provided by commercial testing laboratories. It would
enable predictive genetic testing to be retained within a well-respected
model of continuing healthcare.12
State provision, it should be made clear, is not only a model for ensuring
access but also for evaluating what is medically necessary. In the context
of the UK, for instance, new genetic tests are evaluated by the UKGenetic
Testing Network in order to decide whether they should be available on
the NHS and to which patients. This evaluative process is a first level of
gatekeeping, but even if the test becomes available, then a clinician must
be persuaded that you meet the relevant clinical criteria before she will
order the test. In the clinical context of a public healthcare system, access
to technological resources must be rationed, and diagnostic tests, of any
sort, cannot be ordered simply to satisfy scientific curiosity.
Nevertheless, the HGC’s view that medically necessary genetic testing
should be available on the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), delivered
through a publicly funded health service open to all citizens, offers a
12 Human Genetics Commission, Genes Direct (London: Department of Health, 2003).
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model of how to ensure the human right enshrined in Article 25 UDHR
within an equitable framework founded on the principle of social soli-
darity rather than relying on market-based satisfaction of human rights
through costly consumer services.
As noted earlier, much of the rhetoric of FDA critics suggests a
Manichean conflict between the market and the state. It is no surprise
then, to discover that Anne Wojcicki, 23andMe’s CEO and the most
high-profile advocate of genomic rights, is a sceptic about public health-
care systems and believes that consumers should pay directly for medical
services. A 2012 article in the UK newspaper The Times reported that
Wojcicki does not believe in free public healthcare systems like the UK
National Health Service: ‘I support a monetised system, but one that
emphasises prevention and more freedom to choose’.13 Thus we can see
how the assertion of an individual’s right to access her genome is
predicated on a neoliberal philosophy that disconnects negative rights
(to be free from state interference) from positive rights (such as access to
publicly funded healthcare). As Jane Mummery characterises the neolib-
eral refashioning of democracy:
Having disconnected freedom from social justice, neoliberalismmust also
reject all ideas and practices of social or distributive justice . . . in framing
democracy merely as a mechanism for the attainment of individual free-
dom, neoliberalism can have no understanding of the political and social
ends that democracy might serve.14
It is in this context that we have to understand how the term ‘democracy’
is being operationalised when 23andMe claims that it is ‘democratizing
genomics’ (and the hostility of many DTCGT advocates to FDA regula-
tion). However, in response to Wojcicki’s neoliberal vision of how to
guarantee genomic rights, we might suggest that a right becomes a
privilege when it is dependent on a certain level of disposable income –
clean drinking water is a political right; bottled mineral water is a con-
sumer luxury. Viewed in this way, it becomes clear that DTCGT could
lead to the denial, rather than the protection, of human rights and that
state-funded healthcare provision can act as a guarantor of the human
right to necessary medical care.
13 Anne Wojcicki in Tim Teeman, ‘Married to Mr Google’, The Times (4 February 2012),
www.thetimes.co.uk/article/married-to-mr-google-nc6qc5znkwt, accessed 20 February
2018.
14 Jane Mummery, Radicalising Democracy for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge,
2017), p. 153.
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9.3.2 The Right to Scientific Knowledge
Shifting from the realm ofmedical necessity and returning to the realm of
‘informational’ or ‘recreational’ genomics, a claim frequently made by
firms like 23andMe is that they are providing consumers with an oppor-
tunity to become familiar with genomic science. In this regard, we might
consider the relevance of Article 27 UDHR, which states:
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the . . . cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and
its benefits.15
For many, the rhetorical allure of the assertion of an individual’s right to
access her genome lies in the emotional appeal of its underlying assump-
tions: the Baconian belief that knowledge is power, and the idea that
the free circulation of knowledge is fundamental to democratic societies.
One immediate line of argument in response to this reasoning would be
the one outlined above – that a premium-priced consumer service is not
the optimal means to ensure equitable access to something that is a
universal human right. A second approach is to critically evaluate the
pedagogic role played by DTCGT firms. Notwithstanding Balzer’s argu-
ment16 that the contemporary overuse of the term ‘curation’ has ren-
dered it meaningless, we might suggest that the principal role of DTCGT
firms is curatorial – they select from amongst the plethora of novel
genotype/phenotype associations those that they deem worthy of report-
ing to their consumers. This was certainly the model of firms like
23andMe and Navigenics, which launched around 2007: these firms
mined the data emerging from the new wave of genome wide association
studies (GWAS) to identify genetic risk markers that could be combined
together to create polygenic risk scores for a range of diseases like asthma,
diabetes and stroke.
However, polygenic risk scores have been subject to considerable
scientific critique that brings into question the legitimacy of the pedago-
gic claims advanced by DTCGT firms. The DTCGT sector has been the
target of considerable criticism and has become a lightning rod for
broader concerns about the regulation of genetic testing. There are
three broad areas of concern about the DTCGT market:
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
16 David Balzer, Curationism: How Curating Took Over the World and Everything Else
(London: Pluto Press, 2015).
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1) information provision: information asymmetries are a classic justi-
fication for regulation and the challenges of consumer understanding
in a fast-moving and complex area of science are exacerbated by
failures in information provision by firms. For instance, in 2008 the
European Technology Assessment Group undertook a review of 38
companies offering genetic tests DTC. Using an evaluative framework
comprising a checklist of 12 criteria devised by Datta et al.,17 it
assessed the quality of information provision and found that 55 per
cent of companies (21 out of 38) complied with four or fewer of the 12
criteria, and concluded that such ‘fundamental information deficits
[had] . . . possibly far-reaching consequences for consumers’.18
2) test quality and marketing claims: a series of academic papers argued
that: i) there was insufficient evidence to support the claims made by
many of the companies;19 and ii) even amongst those firms which only
reported well-validated gene-disease associations there were major dis-
crepancies, with the same individual receiving different risk information
depending on which genetic markers are being tested for.20
Furthermore, the field was moving so quickly that a person’s risk profile
could change repeatedly as new gene-disease associations were discov-
ered.21 A 2010 report by the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO) presented at a Congressional hearing summarised these con-
cerns and quoted experts who argued that the genetics of common,
complex diseases was still a science in the making and that therefore
polygenic risk assessment lacked clinical utility.22 The report concluded
17 Adrija K. Datta, Tara J. Selman, Tony Kwok et al., ‘Quality of information accompanying on-
line marketing of home diagnostic tests’ (2008) 101(1) Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine 34–8.
18 Leonhard Hennen, Arnold Sauter and Els van den Cruyce, Direct to Consumer Genetic
Testing: Final Report (Bonn: European Technology Assessment Group, 2009), p. 38.
19 A. Cecile J. W. Janssens, Marta Gwinn, Linda A. Bradley et al., ‘A critical appraisal of the
scientific basis of commercial genomic profiles used to assess health risks and personalize
health interventions’ (2008) 82(3) American Journal of Human Genetics 593–9.
20 Raluca Mihaescu, Mandy van Hoek, Eric J. G. Sijbrands et al., ‘Evaluation of risk
prediction updates from commercial genome-wide scans’ (2009) 11(6) Genetic
Medicine. 588–94; Pauline C. Ng, Sarah S. Murray, Samuel Levy et al., ‘An agenda for
personalised medicine’ (2009) 461 Nature 724–6.
21 Mihaescu, van Hoek, Sijbrands et al., ‘Evaluation of risk prediction updates from com-
mercial genome-wide scans’.
22 Government Accountability Office, Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Tests: Misleading Test
Results Are Further Complicated by Deceptive Marketing and Other Questionable Practices
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), pp. 8–9.
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that DTCGT firms were misleading a public that lacked the scientific
expertise to assess the veracity of companies’ claims.
3) service quality: although tests for susceptibility to common diseases
have been the mainstay of the DTCGTmarket, some companies offer
more traditional clinical genetic tests to consumers, reporting on a
range of monogenic disorders. Here the concern is not the lack of
clinical validation, but the lack of medical supervision and pre- and
post-test counselling.
Translated into the language of rights, the first two concerns are
couched in terms that appeal to statutory consumer rights long estab-
lished in most, if not all, jurisdictions with mature mass-consumer
markets: the right to adequate disclosure of information before the
purchase of a service, and the right to expect that goods and services
will meet certain pre-established standards. The third of the regulatory
concerns outlined above speaks to issues of professional monopoly and
the demarcation of certain services as the preserve of appropriately
qualified professionals. We will address these issues in turn, dealing
with the first two together, before moving on to the third.
9.4 Regulation of Information
The widespread misgivings about whether DTCGT firms could be relied
upon as curators of genomic science impelled the FDA to take regulatory
action, even as the agency expressed support for the principle that
consumers have a right to access their genomic data:
We don’t have an issue with people getting their own DNA data . . . We
just have concerns with how it’s being interpreted . . . People have every
right to get their data . . .Wewant to make sure they can trust what they’re
being told about it, too.23
After the FDA shut down 23andMe’s health-related testing service in
2013, Robert Green and Nita Farahany questioned whether the type of
information that the firm offered consumers could really be classed as
medical and whether the FDA might be in breach of the First
Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects both ‘the rights of
23 Alberto Gutierrez quoted in Diane Brady, ‘Do genetic tests need doctors? FDA defends its
challenge to 23andMe’, Bloomberg Businessweek (27 November 2013), www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2013–11-27/do-genetic-tests-need-doctors-fda-defends-its-chal
lenge-to-23andme, accessed 29 January 2018.
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individuals to receive information, and of “commercial speech”’.24
Academic commentators like the lawyer Barbara Evans and the social
scientist Jennie Reardon have invoked historical parallels to illustrate the
importance of the principles at stake in the free flow of genetic informa-
tion. Equating the completion of the Human Genome Project to the
invention of the printing press, Evans compares contemporary disputes
about access to the genomic ‘Book of Life’ to the debate about whether to
translate the Bible into English so that it could be read by ordinary
people.25 Reardon connects the FDA’s reaction to 23andMe’s attempt
to create a mass consumer market for genomic data to historic fears of
mob rule undermining democracy.26 Rather more pragmatically, Anne
Wojcicki utilises the idea of information flows to question the very
feasibility of regulation:
If you get your genome done, you can ship it off to Canada or China or
other places in the world and get an interpretation. So how do you
regulate information? That’s one of the issues. I’m not sure you can
hold it back.27
The need to protect the free circulation of information is not a new
argument against the FDA’s role in regulating biomedical innovation.
It is, moreover, an idea that is closely related to a fundamental tenet of
neoliberal philosophy – the superiority of the market as a processor of
information – and that links in turn to historic efforts by US neoliberals
to undermine the legitimacy of FDA’s authority. As Edward Nik-Khah
has recently revealed,28 the Chicago School of Economics has, since 1972,
worked with the pharmaceutical industry to challenge the regulatory
regime established by the 1962 Kefauver Amendment29 to the US
24 Robert C. Green and Nita A. Farahany, ‘Regulation: the FDA is overcautious on con-
sumer genomics’ (2014) 505 Nature 286–7.
25 Barbara J. Evans, ‘The First Amendment right to speak about the human genome’ (2014)
16(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 549–63.
26 Jenny Reardon, ‘The “persons” and “genomics” of personal genomics’ (2011) 8(1)
Personalized Medicine 95–107.
27 Robert Hof, ‘“We are going for change”: A conversation with 23andMe CEO Anne
Wojcicki’, Forbes (15 August 2014), www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/08/15/we-
are-going-for-change-a-conversat ion-with-23andme-ceo-anne-wojcicki/
#5af96b275477, accessed 29 January 2018.
28 Edward Nik-Khah, ‘Neoliberal pharmaceutical science and the Chicago School of
Economics’ (2014) 44(4) Social Studies of Science 489–517.
29 Drug Efficacy Amendment (‘Kefauver Harris Amendment’) PL 87–781 (10 October
1962).
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C),30 as what can be seen as
part of a mobilisation by US industry against the broader rise of con-
sumer protection regulations. In his contribution to the 1972 conference
that inaugurated this assault on the FDA, Sam Peltzman, a leading
member of the Chicago School of Economics, followed the classic neo-
liberal line in arguing that it was themarketplace that was most capable of
generating new data on pharmaceuticals:
His primary complaint about the 1962 Amendments was that they had in
fact decreased the value of information available to consumers: FDA
restrictions on pharmaceutical companies’ claims would decrease the
amount of information on non-sanctioned uses of drugs, while any
reduction in marketing for a drug of a particular brand would reduce
information about the drug type in general.31
Thus, in the absence of measured discussion of what regulation of
the DTCGT market might look like in practice, the FDA’s critics
frequently simply conflated regulation with proscription and pre-
sented a stark choice between rights and regulation. However, to
return to our analogy with the state’s role in ensuring clean water
supply as a human right, even those who advocate privatisation of
water services might concede the need for state regulation to create a
framework within which firms can operate (indeed the privatisation
of public utilities has generally been accompanied by the establish-
ment of state agencies to regulate the newly created markets).
Regulators play a variety of functions in such markets, but two
fundamental regulatory functions that are relevant here are the set-
ting and enforcement of standards; it is precisely these functions that
FDA has now performed in the DTCGT market in the course of
approving two submissions from 23andMe. The first approval in
2015 covered carrier testing for a number of genetic diseases and
the second was for a number of genetic risk tests (although not any
polygenic risk scores). Each approval was accompanied by a special
controls document, a regulatory guidance that established a new
standard for validating this specific class of tests. These standards
encompassed not only the scientific approach to validation of diag-
nostic accuracy, but also the evidentiary requirements for firms to
30 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C).
31 Sam Pelzman cited in Edward Nik-Khah, ‘Neoliberal pharmaceutical science and the
Chicago School of Economics’ (2014) 44(4) Social Studies of Science 489–517.
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demonstrate that consumers can understand the information they
receive.32
9.5 Regulation through Professional Monopoly
Nonetheless, these recent approvals notwithstanding, FDA continues to
restrict what 23andMe can offer. In relation to genetic risk assessment,
the agency has not approved BRCA1/2 testing for breast cancer risk and
has publicly stated that the potential consequences of positive BRCA
results, in particular prophylactic mastectomy, are so serious that the test
requires the involvement of healthcare professionals.33 Again, to return
to the analogy with the sale of medicines, what has been created is a
mixed market in which some tests are available DTC and others can only
be accessed via a clinician. This approach might seem like an appropriate
balance of freedoms and protections to some, and has been implicit in
the approach of most DTCGT firms, which have been highly selective in
the types of genetic data they report to customers.
The prescription-only approach speaks to the issue of the quality of
service provided, which was the third of the regulatory concerns outlined
above, and in particular to issues of professional monopoly and the
demarcation of certain services as the preserve of appropriately qualified
professionals. Professional standard-setting is another a way to guarantee
standards for consumers, but the recourse to professional monopoly as a
means to ensure those standards has been attacked by DTCGT advocates
as the protection of producer rights at the expense of consumer choice. In
the neoliberal era, producer rights have increasingly been eclipsed by
consumer rights; however, even Adam Smith, who was first to crown the
consumer sovereign, stated that: ‘Consumption is the sole end and
purpose of all production and the welfare of the producer ought to be
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the
consumer.’34 Smith’s assertion leaves open the possibility that producer
32 Margaret Curnutte, ‘Regulatory controls for direct-to-consumer genetic tests: A case
study on how the FDA exercised its authority’ (2017) 36(3) New Genetics and Society
209–26.
33 Alberto Gutierrez in Diane Brady, ‘Do genetic tests need doctors? FDA defends its
challenge to 23andMe’, Bloomberg Businessweek (27 November 2013), www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2013–11-27/do-genetic-tests-need-doctors-fda-defends-its-chal
lenge-to-23andme, accessed 29 January 2018.
34 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 376.
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rights may in some instances be a necessary guarantor of consumer
rights.
Aside from the FDA’s regulatory intervention in the US market,
there are other legal restrictions that address the consumer diagnos-
tics market and/or genetic testing in particular. Some states have
limits on the legal right to purchase diagnostic tests without the
involvement of a healthcare professional or have specific restrictions
relating to genetic testing. A succession of policy reports in the last
two decades has established a broad consensus on the standard of
care for clinical genetic testing, including the need for informed
decision-making, supported by appropriately qualified healthcare
professionals (often encompassing genetic counselling), and
the need to ensure rigorous, independent evaluation of tests before
they enter routine clinical use. These ideas have been enshrined in
transnational standards such as the Council of Europe’s 2008
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, and
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
2007 Best Practice Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Molecular
Genetic Testing.35 However, both these documents state that not all
genetic tests require the same standard of care. The need for the
involvement of a healthcare professional in genetic testing is also
enshrined in legislation in some EU member states, including
France, Germany and Portugal, although there is no evidence of
active enforcement36 (it is also unclear how many states have imple-
mented the standards set out in the OECD guidelines).
In the USA, state law also dictates whether healthcare provider
authorisation is required to obtain a laboratory test, including a genetic
test. Some states explicitly permit labs to deal directly with patients
without authorisation from a healthcare provider for specific tests (such
35 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (2008) (CETS No. 203);
OECD, Best Practice Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Molecular Genetic Testing
(2007); Dolores Ibarreta and Stuart Hogarth, ‘Quality issues in clinical genetic services:
regulatory issues and international conventions’ in Ulf Kristoffersson, Jörg Schmidtke
and Jean-Jacques Cassiman (eds.), Quality Issues in Clinical Genetic Services (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2010).
36 Pascal Borry, Rachel E. van Hellemondt, Dominique Sprumont et al., ‘Legislation in
direct-to-consumer genetic testing in seven European countries’ (2012) 20(7) European
Journal of Human Genetics 715–21.
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as cholesterol or pregnancy tests).37 Other states, such as New York,
explicitly proscribe all DTC testing, and still other states have no
relevant legislation. Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia
permit DTC laboratory testing without restriction, whereas 13 categori-
cally prohibit it. DTC testing for certain specified categories of tests is
allowed in 12 states but it is not clear whether these laws would extend
to genetic tests. In 2014, the Clinical Laboratories Amendments Act was
amended to let patients request that test reports be sent to them, instead
of or as well as to their physician. This amendment only applies to
laboratories covered by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Privacy Rule and is designed to give patients ‘con-
trol of their personal health information’.
Upon request by a patient (or the patient’s personal representative), the
laboratory may provide patients, their personal representatives, and those
persons specified under 45 CFR 164.524(c)(3)(ii), as applicable, with
access to completed test reports that, using the laboratory’s authentication
process, can be identified as belonging to that patient.38
9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed two fundamental aspects of the debate about
genomic rights: the assumption that a right to one’s genome trumps
other rights and the framing of regulatory intervention as a Manichean
conflict between state and market. Much of the preceding discussion
might be considered as an exploration of conflicting genomic rights – the
right to unfettered access to information regarding one’s genome con-
flicts with legislation and regulations designed to safeguard other rights.
The FDA’s regulation of DTCGT firms has sought to ensure that con-
sumers rights have access to clear and comprehensive information in the
testing process. Documents such as the OECD Guidelines and the
Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol that emphasise the need for
the involvement of a healthcare professional with genetic expertise in the
pre- and post-test processes of deciding to order a test and then
37 Genetics and Public Policy Center, Survey of Direct-to-Consumer Testing Statutes and
Regulations (Washington, DC: Genetics and Policy Center, 2007), https://repository
.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/511162/DTCStateLawChart.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 29 January 2018.
38 42 CFR 493.1291(l).
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interpreting, and acting upon the test results, can be seen as establishing
the individual’s right to a certain standard of care.
Thus, there is the question of whether the right to access information
regarding one’s genome is absolute and inalienable or whether it must
take its place somewhere within a field of overlapping and sometimes
conflicting rights, taking precedence over some but outranked by others.
Furthermore, in practical terms, the ability to exercise this right is limited
by the availability of genetic testing. As noted above, in public healthcare
systems, access to genetic testing must be balanced against other clinical
priorities. The individual’s right to access to information regarding their
genome might be outranked by the collective right to prioritise health-
care spending.
But what if the individual is willing to spend their own money on
buying a genetic test from a private provider? Here we return to the issue
of the conflict between the right to exercise autonomy as a consumer in a
market and the right of consumers/patients to enjoy a collectively defined
standard of care (and of course such standards are always collectively
defined). Absent the collective enforcement of this standard of care, then
consumers are vulnerable to those wishing to offer cheaper testing
services which may not be of the same quality. Would it be an unaccep-
table breach of autonomy to regulate the commercial genetics market to
ensure certain standards, keeping out companies which do not meet
those standards? We would submit that the assertion of the autonomous
individual’s right to access their genomic information does not preclude
the possibility of legitimate forms of state intervention in the consumer
genetics market.
In sum, we would suggest that, given its relevance to healthcare, an
individual has a human right to access to their genomic information, but
that this is a negative rather than a positive right and is subject to
reasonable state regulation. The right extends to a right to control access
to and use of genomic information derived from the individual, and to
limit publication of genomic information from close relatives. However,
the right does not equate to ownership of data. In view of the correspond-
ing rights of others, the individual’s right cannot extend to an unlimited
right to publish their genomic information.
The complex interplay of individual and collective rights and the
question of the state’s role in establishing and enforcing such rights
illustrates the inadequacy of the state/market dichotomy that underpins
much criticism of regulatory initiatives in this field. Such rhetoric is not
uncommon amongst DTCGT firms like 23andMe, which are part of a
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Silicon Valley culture of disruptive innovation and operate with a busi-
ness model predicated on regulatory arbitrage and a hostility to govern-
ment fuelled by the libertarian anti-statism of Ayn Rand, a key
intellectual inspiration for many leading figures in the West Coast tech-
nology sector.39 Such anti-statism, redolent of an older tradition of
Jeffersonian democracy, not only fails to translate well to Europe, but it
perpetuates a misconception of American success as predicated on a
weak federal government, a myth that is nowhere more apparent than
in Silicon Valley, where industrial success has been heavily reliant on
state funding for R&D.
In fact, public and private sector institutions are densely intertwined in
the field of genomics. Much attention is focused at the moment on
standards for genomic data and the respective roles of public and private
actors in establishing standards and platforms for the sharing of scientific
data. In the USA, the Obama administration’s Precision Medicine initia-
tive linked academic science, industrial R&D and the FDA together to
pursue new standard-setting initiatives. The language of pipelines and
flows draws us back to our analogy with the water supply. In contem-
porary society, we accept that some fundamental forms of physical
infrastructure are best provided by the state, but in the nineteenth
century there was considerable resistance to the right of the state to
compel individual households to connect to a communal system for the
supply of water and the disposal of human waste.
Consumer genomics companies already benefit from the free flow of
scientific data from publicly funded research. The second wave of
DTCGT firms including Navigenics and 23andMe that launched in
2007 did so on the back of the new wave of scientific data emerging
from large, transnational genome wide association studies (GWAS) such
as the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium.
The interpenetration and mutual dependence of state and market
indicate the limitations of rights-based rhetoric that pits one against the
other. As this chapter has demonstrated, the invocation of genomic rights
is not a short cut to closure on deliberation about the complex trade-offs
between different needs and interests. Instead it opens up a complex
terrain on which can be mapped out a variety of positions and interests.
39 Stuart Hogarth, ‘Valley of the unicorns: Consumer genomics, venture capital and digital
disruption’ (2017) 36(3) New Genetics and Society 250–72.
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10
‘The Best Me I Can Possibly Be’
Legal Subjectivity, Self-Authorship and Wrongful Life
Actions in an Age of ‘Genomic Torts’
britta van beers
10.1 Introduction: ‘Persons’ in Personalised Medicine
and ‘Persons’ in Law
Who is the person in personalised medicine? Terms such as ‘personal
genomics’, ‘personalised medicine’ and ‘Me Medicine’1 each raise the
question as to which concept of the person and of the self is at the root
of these emerging medical-technological practices. Somewhat predicta-
bly, enthusiasts and sceptics of personalised medicine answer the ques-
tion differently.
According to the ‘believers’, personalised medicine is able to do
justice to the patient’s biogenetic uniqueness and individuality. They
point out that the abandonment of the traditional ‘one size fits all’
model of healthcare may result in new forms of patient empowerment
and self-authorship. Their hope is not only that personalised medicine
will enable targeted and more ‘customised’ types of medical treatment
(e.g. pharmacogenetics), but also allow patients to make better
informed health and lifestyle decisions, manage their own health data
(e.g. personalised genetic testing) and even allow them to select or alter
the genetic profile of their offspring (e.g. reproductive genetics). From
this point of view, the fact that personalised medicine has in the
meantime become intertwined with commercial interests, and even
part of a burgeoning industry, is not necessarily a problem.
Commercial genetic testing, for instance, could ‘democratise DNA’,
in the words of Linda Avey (one of the founders of 23andMe), and
1 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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‘take genetics out of the protective realm of the scientific community
by making it accessible to the lay public’.2
However, according to those who are more sceptical of these promises,
the emphasis within personalised medicine on the uniqueness, indivi-
duality and autonomy of the patient is mostly illusory, in many cases
misplaced and in some cases even harmful. First, it could be said that
personalised medicine is not truly about the individual, as the term
suggests, but instead about genetic types, and thus about membership
of genetic groups.3 Second, critics fear that the concept of the person
underlying personalised medicine is too biological. For instance, some
point out that pharmacogenetic developments in oncology are better
described with the phrase ‘biology-driven medicine’ than ‘personalised
medicine’.4 Moreover, proper medical treatment not only involves
knowledge of the patient’s genetic profile, but also knowledge of one’s
personal circumstances, relations and narratives.5 A third criticism is that
the individualistic ideology underlying personalised medicine neglects
the importance of more communal approaches in healthcare, as Donna
Dickenson argues in her book Me Medicine vs We Medicine (2013).
In this chapter I offer a legal-philosophical contribution to the debate
on theMe ofMeMedicine. If we take personalised medicine’s aspirations
towards personal autonomy and empowerment seriously, the relevance
of a legal perspective becomes visible immediately. As Jenny Reardon
describes the ideal typical subject of personalised medicine:
The preferred subject of human genomic variation research is no longer
the ‘vulnerable’ isolated indigenous population but the ‘empowered’ per-
son. This person is a rational individual, capable of self-governance and
imbued with rights – centrally, the right to consume.6 (emphasis added)
From this perspective, the person in personalised medicine is intercon-
nected with law’s understanding of the person as a bearer of legal rights
and responsibilities. Indeed, it could be said that one of the reasons why
2 Quoted in Jenny Reardon, ‘The “persons” and “genomics” of personal genomics’ (2011) 8
(1) Personalized Medicine 95–107.
3 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 8; Heather Widdows, The Connected Self:
The Ethics and Governance of the Genetic Individual (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), p. 44.
4 F. Doz, P. Marvanne and A. Fagot-Largeault, ‘The person in personalised medicine’ (2013)
49 European Journal of Cancer 1159–1160.
5 Barbara Prainsack, ‘Personhood and solidarity: What kind of personalised medicine do we
want?’ (2014) 11(7) Personalized Medicine 651–7.
6 Reardon, ‘The “persons” and “genomics” of personal genomics’.
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the rhetoric of personalised medicine has proven to be so powerful, even
if many of its promises have failed to come true so far,7 is that it accords
with ‘the sacredness of personal choice and individualism’8 in a society
which has adopted the language of individual rights as a dominant way of
thinking.
Correspondingly, it can be expected that personalised medicine will
give rise to new types of legal claims and responsibilities, such as the oft-
invoked right to access genomic information,9 even if the existence of
that right is still legally and ethically controversial.10 This chapter is
premised on the idea that the emergence of these ‘genomic rights’ also
reflects back on the subjects of these rights, and in some cases even calls
into existence new types of legal subjects. The reason is that in order to
invoke these new types of rights, legal subjects have to take on a certain
shape in law.
To explore how certain legal claims in the context of personalised
medicine affect law’s understanding of the person, I focus on the emer-
gence of new legal rights and new modes of legal subjectivity in a field of
law that is already being referred to as ‘genomic torts’. One of the most
striking illustrations of genomic torts liability is the wrongful life action.
Under a wrongful life action, a child who is born with certain genetic
disabilities charges that she has been harmed by being brought into
existence, as a result of which she now has to live a life full of suffering.
This suffering could have been prevented, according to the claimant, if
a physician, genetic counsellor or other medical professional had not
negligently failed to warn her parents of the genetic impairments with
which she would be born.
As I will discuss, the wrongful life action, according to its internal legal
logic, enables the child with the genetic disabilities to exercise a radical
form of retroactive self-authorship and autonomy. Yet, upon closer inspec-
tion, the claim to self-authorship, as implied by wrongful life claims, comes
out as deceptive and problematic in several respects. In other words, within
the context of wrongful life claims, the discussion on the person in
personalised medicine recurs on a legal-philosophical level.
7 Michael J. Joyner and Nigel Paneth, ‘Seven questions for personalized medicine’ (2015)
314(10) JAMA 999–1000.
8 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 24.
9 E.g. Misha Angrist, ‘Personal genomics: Access denied? Consumers have a right to their
genomes’ (2008) September/October MIT Technology Review, www.technologyreview
.com/s/410662/personal-genomics-access-denied.
10 See the chapter by Hogarth, Cockbain and Sterckx in this volume.
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This chapter’s line of reasoning is as follows. In Section 10.2 I first
explore in general terms the interconnections between the Me of Me
Medicine on the one hand, and the legal subject on the other hand,
through Michel Foucault’s and Nikolas Rose’s reflections on legal sub-
jectivity in an age of biopower. I use their thoughts to develop the idea
that, as the language of personalised medicine and genetic risk becomes
a dominant way of thinking in society, it also leaves its marks on the legal
system and law’s central category: the legal subject. Indeed, personal
genomics and the accompanying rhetoric are likely to result in the
creation of new ‘genomic rights and duties’, which are already starting
to take shape, especially in the field of tort law (Section 10.3). Through an
exploration of the concept of ‘genomic negligence’ in the context of
wrongful life claims (Section 10.4), I demonstrate how the insertion of
law into genomic discourse leaves its marks on law’s understanding of the
person as a bearer of rights and duties (Sections 10.5 and 10.6).
I conclude that wrongful life claims are emblematic of a Me Medicine
approach to regulating reproductive genetics and genomics in several
respects, including its most problematic.
10.2 Legal Subjectivity, Biopower and Personalised Medicine
What are the interconnections between the rhetoric of personalised
medicine and the legal language of rights? And how are genetic and
genomic understandings of the self affecting the legal concept of the
person? To come to an answer to these questions, Michel Foucault’s
reflections on the relation between biopower and legal subjectivity offer
important insights.
As also explained by Huijer and Detweiler in this volume, by
‘biopower’ Foucault refers to the technologies of power that are
centred on life itself, that is, life in its most corporeal and biological
aspects. This power over life itself, through the ‘administration of
bodies and calculated management of life’,11 can be recognised on
various levels in society, ranging from education to health, as part of
an intricate network of professionals, experts, services and bureau-
cratic apparatuses.
Originally, biopower emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury in the form of ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’ and ‘a
11 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume I (London:
Penguin Books, 1998), p. 140.
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biopolitics of the population’.12 However, over the centuries, biopower
has manifested itself in various forms and gradations. Indeed, decades
after the publication of the first volume of hisHistory of Sexuality (1976),
Foucault’s reflections on biopower seem more relevant than ever, given
the multiple biopolitical networks of governance and self-governance
which have emerged in response to medical technologies, especially in
the field of biomedicine. From genetic counselling to consumer genetics,
from medical-ethical committees to medical-professional associations,
and from preconception screening programmes to euthanasia laws and
protocols, all of these phenomena illustrate to what extent the biological
lives of individuals have been inserted into various configurations of
control. Indeed, as a consequence of the rise of genetics and other life
sciences, contemporary biopolitics even functions at the level of genes
and neurochemistry, thereby taking on the form of ‘molecular politics’.13
The normalising effects of genetic and genomic truth regimes on our
self-understanding, and the new modes of subjectivity that they have
produced, have in the meantime become the topic of an extensive
literature.14 What has received less attention are the implications of
Foucault’s thoughts for legal subjectivity in an era of biopower.
Interestingly, according to Foucault, the rise of biopower in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century coincides with the start of a phase of
regression of the law and legal models of power.15 As he argues, in
order to come to an understanding of the novelty of the concept of
biopower, we have ‘to rid ourselves of a juridical and negative represen-
tation of power, and cease to conceive of it in terms of law, prohibition,
liberty, and sovereignty’.16 Whereas the traditional, juridico-discursive
model of power goes back to the sovereign’s ‘right to take life or let live’,
biopower refers to a more productive, normalising account of power, ‘a
power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’.17 Consequently,
within biopolitical constellations of power, the legal subject can no longer
be at the forefront. As Foucault explains in the following striking
sentences:
12 Ibid., p. 139.
13 Nikolas Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’ (2001) 18(6) Theory, Culture & Society 1–30, p. 12.
Also see the chapter by Huijer and Detweiler in this volume.
14 E.g. Hub Zwart, ‘Genomics and identity: the bioinformatisation of human life’ (2009) 12
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 125–36; Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself:
Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007). Also see Zwart’s chapter in this volume.
15 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 144. 16 Ibid., p. 90. 17 Ibid., p. 138.
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For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible sub-
strate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death
and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and
power’s sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply
with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with
living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over themwould
have to be applied at the level of life itself. It was the taking charge of life,
more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the
body.18 (emphasis added)
What do Foucault’s words imply for the functioning of law and legal
subjectivity in an age of genetic and genomic regimes of truth? At first
sight, his remark that biopower is exercised over living beings rather than
legal subjects seems to suggest that in the context of biopolitics, the notion
of legal subjectivity is under pressure. If biopower is exercised over the
biological and genetic aspects of life, and if individuals are moulded by
the normalising effects of biopolitical institutions, how then can we hold
on to the law’s implicit ideal of the person as an individual who is capable
of making choices and who can be held responsible for his or her
actions?19
Related concerns can be recognised in current debates on the possibly
erosive effects of the life sciences on the foundations of law. If, for
example, genetic understandings of the self become more prevalent,
and a growing number of individuals’ actions and decisions are attrib-
uted to genetic and genomic predispositions, what will be left of central
legal notions such as ‘guilt’ and ‘intent’, or law’s foundational belief in
liberté, égalité, fraternité?20 From that perspective, it is likely that geno-
mic technologies will lead to a further erosion of responsibility and legal
subjectivity, and to new types of determinism and objectification of
individuals that are at odds with fundamental rights and principles.
However, upon closer inspection, this account of the relation between
genetics and legal subjectivity is not entirely convincing, also from
18 Ibid., p. 143.
19 In Lon Fuller’s famous words: ‘To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct
to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or
can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and
answerable for his defaults’ (Fuller 1964, 162). Also see Giorgio Agamben, ‘Identity
without the person’ in Giorgio Agamben, Nudities (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2010), p. 46.
20 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker,
2016).
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a Foucauldian perspective. As already explained briefly, within Foucault’s
analysis, power is not understood in primarily negative terms, such as
repression, prohibition or objectification; instead, biopower functions in
more complex and productive ways, at the level of identity formation,
disciplining the individual to behave in certain ways, and producing new
forms of self-understanding and subjectivity.
Similarly, it seems that legal subjectivity within the context of personal
genomics is not so much eroding, but rather transforming. Indeed, even
if risks of genetic determinism have to be taken seriously, what we are
witnessing as a result of genomic technologies is in many cases better
described as an ‘explosion, not an erosion, of responsibility’,21 also on
a legal level.
For example, within the context of reproductive genetic testing, doctors
are generally said to have an expanded duty of care. According to profes-
sional guidelines, they are responsible not only for the well-being of their
patients with fertility problems, but also for the well-being of the children
whomay be born as a result of the fertility treatment.22 As will be discussed
in a later section, wrongful birth and life claims offer a striking illustration
of the possible legal consequences of this expanded responsibility: medical
professionals can be held liable, both by the parents and by the child itself,
if they negligently failed to detect certain genetic risks or genetic abnorm-
alities during pregnancy or fertility treatment. It is clear that under these
circumstances, genetic technologies are producing new responsibilities
and rights, and therefore new modes of legal subjectivity, rather than
merely new types of genetic determinism or objectification of individuals.
Foucault scholar Nikolas Rose arrives at similar conclusions, albeit
from a primarily sociological perspective. In his book The Politics of Life
Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century
(2007), he discusses how, within contemporary practices of genetic test-
ing and genomic knowledge, patients are no longer believed to be passive
parties, who are merely subjected to medical treatment and knowledge.
Instead, individuals who are ‘genetically at risk’ are supposed ‘to become
skilled, prudent and active, an ally of the doctor, a protoprofessional and
to take a share of the responsibility for getting themselves better’.23 In this
21 Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 87.
22 ESHRE, ‘The welfare of the child in medically assisted reproduction’ (2007) 22(10)
Human Reproduction 2585–8.
23 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the
Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 110.
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process of ‘genomic subjectification’, individuals are required to take an
active role in their own medical trajectory. According to the rhetoric of
personalised medicine, patients who find out that they are at genetic risk
can take responsibility for their health and use this genomic information
to make better-informed choices in life. As they adapt their life plans
upon confrontation with their genetic profiles, they are transforming, in
Rose’s words, into ‘somatic individuals’, endowed with ‘genetic respon-
sibility’ towards not only themselves, but also an expanding group of
third parties, such as relatives, reproductive partners and future
offspring.
Typically, in these novel processes of identity formation, concerns
about genetic risk are expressed in terms of rights and duties. In an age
of personalised medicine, with its emphasis on patient empowerment
and autonomy, somatic individuals, ‘even when genetically at risk [. . .]
consider themselves to be creatures of rights, legal subjects whose
somatic personhood grants them entitlements as well as obligations’.24
As a result, new ‘genomic’ rights and duties are emerging. In Rose’s
words:
In this context, where autonomy and choice are paramount, and where
genetic information is thought of as containing the potential to transform
one’s life, the disclosure of genetic risk information gets framed in terms
of the language of rights: the right to know of one’s kin and children, so
that they may have the right to choose versus the right not to know, the
right not to be known, the fear of the consequences that that knowledge
may bring for one’s conduct of one’s own life and for one’s treatment by
others – friends, employers, teachers or insurers.25
Given these developments, the legal subject does not seem to be fading
into the background at all, as Foucault’s words on legal subjectivity and
biopower may seem to imply at first. Instead, as also convincingly argued
by Rose, legal subjectivity takes on a new form: it becomes part of and
interacts with genomic discourse.
This account of the relation between legal subjectivity and biopower
also corresponds better with Foucault’s own words elsewhere on the
functioning of law in an age of biopower. In a crucial paragraph, he
writes that by ‘juridical regression’ he does not mean to imply that the law
becomes completely redundant. Instead, his argument is that, ever since
the rise of biopower, ‘the law operates more andmore as a norm, and that
the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of
24 Ibid., pp. 124–5. 25 Ibid., p. 128.
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apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for
the most part regulatory’.26
In this chapter, I argue that these thoughts also apply to the interaction
between the rhetoric of personal genomics and legal discourse. As the
language of genetic risk and personalised medicine becomes a more
dominant way of thinking in society, the legal system and its basic
categories are also incorporated into these new truth regimes. In that
process, law’s understanding of the person as a bearer of rights and duties
is equally changing, as I will illustrate through the concept of genomic
negligence and, more specifically, the wrongful life action.
Because Rose’s analysis is predominantly sociological, he leaves these
legal-philosophical questions undiscussed. To come to a further under-
standing of these developments, the next section explores the new rights
and duties surfacing in the context of what has been called ‘genomic torts’
or, more precisely, ‘genomic negligence’.
10.3 From ‘Genetic Responsibility’ to ‘Genomic Negligence’
It is common knowledge that legal systems are struggling to keep up with
technological developments. Genetics and genomics are no exception to
that rule. In the absence of direct government regulation of these tech-
nological developments, and given the inevitable rise of conflicts in this
new field, tort law is starting to fill the regulatory gap. More precisely, tort
law can function as a form of indirect regulation of these technologies by
confronting health professionals who are assisting individuals in their
genetic projects with liability when these professionals engage in negli-
gent behaviour that causes harm to their patients or relevant third parties,
such as the patient’s family members or offspring.27
As early as 1997, Deftos coined the phrase ‘genomic torts’ to designate
the emerging area of tort law that derives, either directly or indirectly,
from outcomes and applications of genomics research.28 The rise of legal
claims in this field offers a striking illustration of the ways in which the
26 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 144.
27 Victoria Chico, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel
Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic Technology (London/New York, NY:
Routledge, 2011), p. 16; Radhika Rao, ‘How (not) to regulate assisted reproductive
technology: Lessons from “Octomom”’ (2015) 49(1) Family Law Quarterly, p. 141.
28 L. J. Deftos, ‘Genomic torts: The law of the future – the duty of physicians to disclose the
presence of genetic disease to the relatives of their patients with the disease’ (1997) 32
University of San Franciso Law Review 105–138.
208 britta van beers
language of genetic risk and the language of legal rights have indeed
started to blend. However, even if roughly 20 years have passed since
Deftos’ publication, and genomics-based technologies have started to
take off in the meantime, many questions remain as to what the exact
legal status is of these new legal claims. To what extent and under which
circumstances can genomic information give rise to negligence and
damage?
In her elaborate study on genomic negligence under English law, legal
scholar Victoria Chico offers a legal analysis of four situations that are
leading to genomic claims. Each of these four types of genomic claims
arises ‘due to the culpable carelessness of an individual who has under-
taken to assist the aggrieved party in her genetic project’.29
The first two situations that Chico identifies relate to genetic risk in the
context of reproductive medicine, and were already briefly mentioned in
the previous section. If a medical professional fails to detect severe
genetic deficiencies in the foetus, or fails to disclose this information to
prospective parents, based on which the parents would have decided to
abort the child, the parents can claim damages for the birth of their child
through a wrongful birth action. Second, the child itself can also claim
that it has been aggrieved by the medical professional’s failure to detect
his or her genetic deficiencies (a wrongful life action).
The third and fourth situation relate to more general practices of
genetic information disclosure. With genetic testing becoming increas-
ingly commonplace, the question arises as to how far the medical profes-
sional’s duty of care extends under these circumstances. Can or should
a physician share information on genetic deficiencies with the patient’s
genetic relatives, as this information may also indicate certain genetic
risks for these parties? Or should medical confidentiality prevail in these
circumstances? Additionally, legal claims can be expected from indivi-
duals who are confronted with genetic risks or deficiencies about which
they would rather have remained ignorant. In these cases, they may
invoke what is often called a right not to know.
As Chico admits, the legal status of most of these genomic claims is still
shrouded in controversy and leaves much room for speculation. Because
the case law in this field is still in an embryonic stage of development,
much disagreement persists among legal scholars, both in England and
worldwide, on the question of whether and to what extent these claims
can be recognised under existing systems of negligence law. For example,
29 Chico, Genomic Negligence, p. 1.
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although much has been written about the right not to know in legal and
ethical literature, it is still unclear whether such a right not to know can
lead to negligence.30 According to Chico, the main problem is that
genomic negligence causes frictions with the existing legal concept of
damage. Her book can, therefore, be understood as an attempt to develop
an alternative concept of damage which, unlike traditional concepts of
damage, is able to recognise novel grievances in the context of genetic
services. Her central argument is that the concept of autonomy is able to
fill the current gap in negligence law. According to her line of reasoning,
the main harm involved in future genomic negligence claims is inter-
ference with the aggrieved party’s autonomy. As such, Chico’s approach
to these novel legal dilemmas is in line with personalised medicine’s
references to patient empowerment and autonomy.
In this chapter I take a different approach by exploring how genomic
negligence claims not only cause frictions with the legal concept of harm,
but also with the legal concept of the person. Moreover, by focusing on
legal subjectivity, several shortcomings of autonomy-based approaches
to these dilemmas can come to light.
As such, this chapter’s approach is in line with a more general trend in
bioethics and biolaw to rethink the paramount position of the individual
in ethics. In this vein, Knoppers and Chadwick argue that developments
in human genetic research have caused a shift in ethics: away from the
traditional emphasis on values such as autonomy, privacy and informed
consent towards more communal values such as reciprocity, mutuality,
solidarity, citizenship and universality.31 Similarly, Widdows proposes to
come to a renewed, interconnected account of the self to serve as
a conceptual aid in the governance of genetic technologies.32 For exam-
ple, the aforementioned dilemma, whether medical professionals can be
said to be under a duty to disclose a patient’s genetic information to the
patient’s relatives, would not have arisen if patients and their relatives
were truly autonomous and independent instead of interconnected and
interdependent of each other in the context of genetic testing.
Hereafter, I focus on the first and second type of genomic claims that
Chico analyses in her study: wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.
30 Lee Black, Jacques Simard and Bartha Maria Knoppers, ‘Genetic testing, physicians and
the law: Will the tortoise ever catch up with the hare?’ (2010) 19(1) Annals of Health Law
115–120; Chico, Genomic Negligence.
31 Bartha M. Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick, ‘Human genetic research: emerging trends in
ethics’ (2005) 6 Nature Reviews Genetics 75–9.
32 Widdows, The Connected Self.
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Whereas the concept of genomic negligence is still quite speculative in
the third and fourth situation (the failure to disclose genetic information
and the disclosure of unwanted genetic information), genomic claims
within the context of reproductive genetics have been recognised in
several legal systems for quite some time, even if they remain
controversial.
10.4 Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions: Regulating
Reproductive Genetics as Me Medicine
Once human reproduction becomes part of a complex of medical-
technological interventions, in which multiple parties are involved –
ranging from genetic counsellors to gynaecologists and from genetic
test developers to embryologists – and several difficult choices have to
be made that may have profound consequences for both prospective
parents and future children, Sandel’s ‘explosion of responsibility’33 does
indeed not seem far away. If something goes wrong somewhere along the
reproductive chain – for example, because reproductive choices have
been negligently frustrated or certain genetic services are performed
without due care and attention – both parents and resulting child can
turn to tort law for recognition and compensation of their resulting
grievances. Probably the most striking examples of tort liability in this
area are wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits.
Tort law can be regarded as a private law alternative to the more
common ‘top-down’ regulation of reproductive genetics through public
law.34 A typical public law measure within the governance of reproduc-
tive genetics is banning the use of these technologies for eugenic or
enhancement purposes through criminal law prohibitions. For example,
in many European countries PGD for non-therapeutic reasons, such as
non-medical sex selection or the creation of ‘designer babies’, is prohib-
ited by law, and as such constitutes a punishable act.
To some, private law regulation of assisted reproductive technolo-
gies (hereafter: ARTs) seems a more appealing option. For example,
legal scholar Michele Goodwin proposes to explore the viability of tort
law to address the harms resulting from negligent application of
33 Sandel, The Case against Perfection.
34 As is basic knowledge among lawyers, public law concerns those fields of law that, broadly
speaking, govern the relationship between the state and its citizens. Examples are criminal
law and constitutional law. Private law, on the other hand, regulates the relationships
between private parties, through contract law, tort law and property law.
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ARTs.35 According to her, one of the dangers of public law regulation
of these questions is a communitarian approach to reproduction that
‘seemingly legitimizes holding reproduction and intimacy hostage to
community values’.36 Conversely, by delegating the regulation of ARTs
to the judiciary, the government does not have to enter into this legal-
ethical minefield and can remain neutral on several controversial
issues, such as the limits of liberal eugenics. Additionally, Goodwin
argues that private law regulation makes for a fairer distribution of the
financial costs related to accidents that take place in the field of ARTs.
As she argues:
The issue most important to address is one of fairness with contemporary
biotechnologies. Who should pay for the mistakes increasingly incurred
by the use of technology? The disabilities resulting from reckless use of
ART range from life-threatening conditions to an impaired quality of life.
The costs incurred in treating and living with severe disabilities is calcul-
able and, absent recovery from a parent, may be borne entirely by the child
(into adulthood) or the state [. . .] Much in the same way that the law
recognizes personal injury arising from the use of technology, such as
cars, trains, and planes, so too should the law recognize personal injury
actions in biotechnology and in ART in particular.37
Nevertheless, even if private regulation has certain advantages over
government regulation, it is not without reason that ‘tort law [. . .] is
generally underexplored in the domain of reproductive technologies’.38
First, liability for personal injuries arising from transportation technol-
ogy, to use Goodwin’s example, does not raise as many moral questions
as liability for birth injuries arising from reproductive technologies. For
example, under Goodwin’s proposal, children would be able to sue their
own parents for irresponsible use of ARTs, which breaks with the legal
tradition of intra-familial immunity, as Goodwin also admits.39 And in
the case of wrongful birth and life actions, the harm involved is the birth
of a child, which raises concerns on the legal principle of human dignity
(more on this in Sections 5 and 6).
Additionally, also in the case of private law regulation, the state is not
truly and entirely neutral. As legal scholar Radhika Rao points out,
governments are still indirectly involved by allowing tort liability for
35 Michele Goodwin, ‘A view from the cradle: Tort law and the private regulation of assisted
reproduction’ (2010) 59 Emory Law Journal 1039–100, p. 1043.
36 Michele Goodwin, ‘Prosecuting the womb’ (2008) 76 George Washington Law Review
1657–746, p. 1672.
37 Goodwin, ‘A view from the cradle’, p. 1089. 38 Ibid., p. 1080. 39 Ibid., p. 1074.
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these cases in the first place.40 Indeed, governments can easily bring an
end to wrongful life actions through legislation that rules out the
possibility of wrongful life actions. A striking example is the so-called
Loi Anti-Perruche that was enacted in France after the Cour de
Cassation had recognised Nicolas Perruche’s wrongful life claim.41
Also, the democratic deficit of private law regulation in comparison to
enacted laws needs to be taken into account. Finally, Rao points out that
regulation through tort liability delegates decision-making on repro-
ductive matters to judges and juries, thereby increasing the risk of bias
and discrimination.42
Although I agree with Rao, I choose a different line of argumenta-
tion to problematise the use of tort law in this field. Through the lens
of negligence, the legal issues involved in reproductive medicine tend
to be viewed as disputes between individuals about personal rights
and entitlements.43 Consequently, reproductive genetics is then
regarded as a type of Me Medicine: Me Medicine for the parents in
case of wrongful birth cases, and Me Medicine for the child in
wrongful life cases. Moreover, as also will become clear in the next
section, central values within Me Medicine, such as personal choice,
self-authorship and autonomy, figure prominently within a tort law
approach to regulating reproductive genetics. In other words, the
choice for private law regulation instead of public law regulation of
reproductive genetic testing reflects the choice of a Me Medicine
approach. However, like Dickenson, I am concerned that within
such a Me Medicine approach we lose sight of the more communal
interests that are also at stake.44 Or, as Reuter writes in an article on
the politics of wrongful life:
in spite of their liberal individualist preoccupation, these cases should not
be viewed narrowly as isolated disputes between individuals – that is, not
as personal troubles but rather as public issues. In other words, these
malpractice suits extend beyond the legal matter of negligence to encom-
pass larger problematics deriving from the normative risk politics that
have emerged with contemporary geneticization.45
40 Rao, ‘How (not) to regulate assisted reproductive technology’, p. 141.
41 La loi no. 2002–303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du
système de santé (commonly called ‘Loi anti-Perruche’).
42 Rao, ‘How (not) to regulate assisted reproductive technology’, p. 142.
43 Shelley Z. Reuter, ‘The politics of “wrongful life” itself: Discursive (mal)practices and Tay-
Sachs disease’ (2007) 36(2) Economy and Society 236–62, p. 245.
44 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 2.
45 Reuter, ‘The politics of “wrongful life” itself’, p. 245.
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Even if tort lawmay fill an existing regulatory gap, and even if it can serve
as an important incentive against the negligent application of ARTs by
fertility doctors, tort liability’s internal logic shows several important
shortcomings and inconsistencies for the regulation of reproductive
genetics when the claimant is the resulting child, as I discuss in the
next two sections through an analysis of wrongful life claims.
10.5 Wrongful Life Actions and the Ideal of Self-Authorship
Negligence in the area of reproductive genetics can have far-reaching
consequences, not only for the prospective parents, but also for their
future child. For example, a doctor mistakenly selects and implants an
embryo with a serious genetic disorder as part of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (hereafter: ‘PGD’),46 or she wrongly assumes that there is no
reason for prenatal testing, even if there is a family history of a certain
genetic diseases. As a consequence of her culpable carelessness, a child is
born with severe genetic disorders. Under these circumstances, wrongful
birth actions allow the parents to act as aggrieved party, whereas wrong-
ful life actions allow the child to take on this legal role.
Wrongful life claims have been recognised in several legal systems
worldwide.47 However, the number of lawsuits against the medical pro-
fession is likely to increase as the number of genetic tests continues to
expand. In this chapter, I focus on Dutch and French landmark rulings
on wrongful life as representing two distinct directions in the case law on
wrongful life.
One of themost puzzling aspects of wrongful life claims is that a child’s
congenital disabilities, which have not been caused as such by third
parties, can legally qualify as a source of damages. The idea is that the
child’s suffering could have been prevented because, if the prospective
parents had been informed about their child’s genetic impairments, they
would, in all probability, have decided to terminate the pregnancy.
The concept of wrongful life claims thus presupposes that under
46 For more on wrongful life claims in these situations, see Kate Wevers, ‘Prenatal torts and
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis’ (2010) 24(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
257–80; Rosamund Scott, ‘Reconsidering wrongful life in England after 30 years:
Legislative mistakes and unjustifiable anomalies’ (2013) 72(1) Cambridge Law Journal
115–54.
47 For an overview and comparison, see Ivo Giesen, ‘The use and influence of comparative
law in “wrongful life” cases’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 35–54; Ronen Perry, ‘It’s
a wonderful life’ (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 329–400.
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circumstances of foreseeable genetic risk, the fact of being given life
instead of being aborted can be considered a legal wrong. Under this
line of reasoning it becomes possible to perceive reproductive genetic
testing as a type of Me Medicine for the child, even if at the moment of
genetic testing, the child is not yet born, and therefore not yet even
recognised as a legal subject.
Much has been written about wrongful life claims over the years.
However, a question that is generally neglected is what kind of legal
concept of the person is presupposed by this legal action. How is it possible
that these children are allowed to use their legal subjectivity to complain
about the way in which they were created and became legal subjects in the
first place? As will be discussed below, there is something profoundly
troubling about wrongful life’s depiction of reproductive genetics as
a form of Me Medicine for the child. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
that, in line with Me Medicine’s allusions to personal choice and indivi-
dualism, awarding damages for wrongful life can also be defended as
promoting the child’s autonomy and self-authorship on several levels.
I will discuss three levels: economic empowerment; access to the legal
system; and retroactive self-authorship.
Firstly and most obviously, the compensation that these children
receive for their suffering can help them live their lives in relative
economic independence. Awarding damages to the children themselves,
and not only to their parents under a wrongful birth action, can be
regarded as a welcome supplement, because these children’s financial
support can then continue when they reach the age of majority or in the
unfortunate event of their parents’ death. From that perspective, the legal
qualification of a child’s life as wrongful can be regarded as ‘enabling her
to live her life in a manner that is as dignified as possible, to the extent
that it is possible to realise that through a sum of money’, to paraphrase
the Dutch Supreme Court’s Baby Kelly decision.48 It is clear that within
the Dutch court’s interpretation, the principle of human dignity is under-
stood as synonymous with the MeMedicine values of empowerment and
respect for autonomy.49
48 Hoge Raad, 18 March 2005 (Baby Kelly), NJ 2006, 606, par. 4.15.
49 See Beyleveld and Brownsword’s well-known distinction between two prevailing inter-
pretations of human dignity: human dignity as empowerment and human dignity as
constraint (Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and
Biolaw [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001]). On the Dutch Supreme Court’s analysis
of human dignity in the Baby Kelly case, see Britta van Beers, Persoon en Lichaam in het
Recht: Menselijke Waardigheid en Zelfbeschikking in het Tijdperk van de Medische
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Secondly, also on amore legal level, self-authorship is realised for these
children. Because the plaintiffs in these lawsuits are in most cases also
mentally disabled, in real life, they would not have been able to voice their
complaints. In legal reality, however, they are able to function as auton-
omous subjects. Because they are legally represented by their parents, the
judge can, by legal fiction,50 act as if these children brought suit them-
selves. For example, both in the Baby Kelly and Perruche case, the parents
initiated the procedure. It could be said that through this legal construc-
tion, a voice is given to these disabled children, thereby granting them
access to the legal system. From this perspective, wrongful life claims
assist in their ascendance as legal subjects despite their mental disabil-
ities, and as such are a legal recognition of these children’s dignity.51
Finally, but also most controversially, recognition of wrongful life
legally assists in what could be called retroactive self-authorship. That
is, through these lawsuits children can have a say about the process of
reproductive decision-making preceding their birth. To a certain extent,
this fits with the more general trend in reproductive ethics to take the
welfare of future children into account, as already briefly mentioned.52
During the reproductive treatment, others will necessarily have to speak
on behalf of the future children and represent their interests for them.
One could say that a wrongful life action allows these children to finally
also speak for themselves, albeit retroactively. Do the children in ques-
tion, now that they are born, actually agree that their interests and welfare
were served well by the reproductive decisions that others made on their
behalf? Would they have wanted to be born under these circumstances,
with such a genome? Under a wrongful life cause of action, the child’s
answer to these questions is negative.
Interestingly, the argument of self-authorship is also an important
argument for those who are critical about the possibilities offered by
reproductive genetics. For example, one of German philosopher Jürgen
Habermas’ main concerns in his book The Future of Human Nature is
that children who are born as a result of selective or eugenic reproduction
Biotechnologie (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2009), pp. 324–30; and see
Giesen, ‘The use and influence of comparative law in “wrongful life” cases’.
50 Elsewhere, I have written more extensively on the legal fictions that are employed in
wrongful life actions (Britta van Beers, ‘The changing nature of law’s natural person:
The impact of emerging technologies on the legal concept of the person’ (2017) 18(3)
German Law Journal 559–94).
51 Muriel Fabre-Magnan, ‘Avortement et responsabilité médicale’ (2001) RTD Civil
285–318, p. 300.
52 See Section 10.2; and see ESHRE, ‘The welfare of the child’.
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‘may no longer see themselves as the undivided authors of their own
lives – nor will be called upon as such’ (emphasis added).53 He explains
the interference with the child’s capacity of self-authorship as a result of
reproductive genetics as follows:
If we see ourselves as moral persons, we intuitively assume that since we
are inexchangeable, we act and judge in propria persona – that is our own
voice speaking and no other. It is for this ‘capacity of being oneself’ that
the ‘intention of another person’ intruding upon our life history through
the genetic program might primarily turn out to be disruptive.
The capacity of oneself requires that the person be at home, so to speak,
in her own body.54
In the light of these words, it seems that, from Habermas’ perspective,
recognition of children’s wrongful life claims should be welcomed as
a form of compensation for their parents’ intrusion upon their life his-
tories. Wrongful life actions enable these children to take their life and
personhood (‘propria persona’) into their own hands (self-ownership) and
to write their own life history (self-authorship), at least on a legal level.
At long last, by being given a legal voice, they are involved in ‘the com-
munication process’,55 out of which they were initially excluded through
their parents’ efforts to create the best possible child.56
10.6 ‘The BestMe I Can Possibly Be’: From Self-Authorship
to Autopoietic Legal Subjects
Upon closer inspection, the notion of self-authorship comes out as
deceptive and self-contradictory in the context of wrongful life claims.
As already mentioned, in practice, it is often the parents who speak on
behalf of the child in a wrongful life claim, thereby reinforcing the
intrusion on the child’s life history instead of undoing it. Nonetheless,
on a more fundamental level, there is something disconcerting about
wrongful life’s depiction of reproductive genetics as a form of Me
Medicine for the child. To explain that, two different interpretations of
53 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 67.
54 ibid., p. 57. 55 Ibid., p. 62.
56 It should be noted at this point that Habermas is critical about parents’ wrongful birth
claims, which, in his words, seem to suggest that ‘the medically unexpected handicap was
tantamount to damage to one’s property’ (ibid., pp. 13–4). Indeed, from the perspective of
self-authorship, wrongful birth claims are damaging as they reconfirm on a legal level the
parents’ intrusion on the child’s life history. However, the question remains as to how
children’s wrongful life claims should be valued from the perspective of self-authorship.
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the wrongful life claim should be distinguished, each with its own
problematic reading of self-authorship.
10.6.1 Self-Authorship as the Right Not to Be Born
A first possibility is that the court awards damages for the child’s entire
life. The child not only receives damages for the expenses related to its
disabilities, but also for all its living expenses. In the Baby Kelly case
(2005), the Dutch Supreme Court (‘Hoge Raad’) chose this direction.
A benefit of this approach is that it seems to follow the rules of causality:
without the medical failure to detect the genetic impairments, the parents
would have known about them and would have had the chance to abort
the child. In other words, as a result of the failure, the child is condemned
to be born and thus to live its severely disabled life.
Nevertheless, what makes this interpretation controversial is that it
presupposes that one can ever have a legal interest in one’s own abortion.
In other words, under this interpretation of wrongful life, the notion of
self-authorship takes on the form of a right not to be born.57 The question
is, of course, whether one can one ever have such a right or legal interest.
Protection of the child’s right would, paradoxically, cause the child not to
come into existence in the first place. The philosophical riddles under-
lying the supposed right not to be born are well rehearsed in academia as
part of what Derek Parfit famously calls the nonidentity problem.58 One
of the more practical aspects of the nonidentity problem, with which
judges in wrongful life cases are confronted, is how to assess the damages
owed to the child. The traditional logic underlying the law of damages
would require judges to compare the child’s current situation with the
situation in which the harm would not have taken place. However, in this
case that would amount to comparing existence with nonexistence,
which seems logically impossible.
At the root of this practical problem is the more fundamental question
whether one can ever legally argue that nonexistence is preferable to
57 The Dutch Supreme Court explicitly denied that it had recognised a right not to be born
(see Baby Kelly, paragraph 4.13). In the legal reasoning underlying the ruling, Kelly’s
claim is interpreted as derived from her parents’ right to self-determination. Therefore,
within this specific interpretation of wrongful life, children would not be able to sue their
parents for wrongful life. However, given the fact that Kelly was awarded damages for her
entire life, the conclusion seems inevitable that, if Kelly did not have a right not to be born,
she at least had a legal interest in her own abortion, as I have argued elsewhere (Van Beers,
Persoon en Lichaam, pp. 316–23).
58 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
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existence in a liberal democracy committed to protecting each life as
having an equal intrinsic worth. Indeed, in many legal systems, recogni-
tion of wrongful life claims is deemed to be at odds with the legal
principle of human dignity, because it implicitly depicts the child’s
disabled life as not worth living.59
A possible objection against arguments based on human dignity or
fears of eugenics, is that wrongful life actions do not rely on other
people’s value judgement about the child’s life or some objective standard
of worthwhile life (objective interpretation). Instead, the child’s own
judgement and experiences can be said to be the starting point of these
actions (subjective interpretation). However, even leaving aside the fact
that it is often the parents who sue for wrongful life on behalf of their
child, this argument does not convince. In order to apply tort law to this
situation, the child’s suffering has to be legally qualified under the exist-
ing system of the law of damages. In Hensel’s words, ‘a line will have to be
drawn somewhere between actionable and non-actionable disabilities’.60
This makes the question inevitable what kind and which degree of
suffering is enough to be able to conclude that the child’s life is not
worth living and can be legally regarded as a source of damages. In other
words, some objective standard is inevitably needed to measure the
child’s life and to argue that it falls below the threshold of worthwhile
life. Additionally, most defenders of wrongful life claims agree that the
child’s congenital disabilities need to be severe enough in order to justify
this legal claim,61 though it is beyond doubt that discussions on the
question what we exactly owe to future children will continue.62
These discussions will undoubtedly become even more complex with
the prospect of further developments in the field of ‘fetal personalised
medicine’.63 For example, fetal whole genome sequencing makes it pos-
sible to uncover enormous volumes of genomic data already before birth.
59 E.g. under English law (McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166); and
German law (BVerfGE 88, 203 (296)).
60 Wendy F. Hensel, ‘The disabling impact of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions’
(2005) 40 Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 141–95, p. 182.
61 Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and DanielWikler, From Chance to Choice:
Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 240–1; Scott,
‘Reconsidering wrongful life in England after 30 years’.
62 E.g. Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, Design (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2006); David DeGrazia, Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
63 Diana W. Bianchi, ‘From prenatal genomic diagnosis to fetal personalized medicine:
progress and challenges’ (2012) 18 Nature Medicine 1041–51.
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If this technology were to become more routinely applied, which degree
of risk and what kind of genetic ‘abnormality’ will then be deemed severe
enough to recognise wrongful life claims?
Even from a tort law perspective, it is clear that theMeMedicine values
of self-authorship and autonomy will not be able to provide answers to
these vexing questions. More generally, it could be said with Hensel that
‘once the nondisabled are given authority to judge from a “reasonable
person” perspective whether or not the disabled life is worse than no life,
the power of individuals with disabilities over their own identity and self-
worth is seriously diminished’.64
10.6.2 Self-Authorship as the Right to Be Born in a Different Body
According to the second approach to wrongful life, the medical profes-
sional in question is liable only for the costs related to the child’s
disabilities. This interpretation is also at the root of the Cour de
Cassation’s Perruche decision (2000).65 It presupposes that children
such as Nicolas Perruche are wronged, not by the fact of being born,
but by their genetic deficiencies. A major advantage of this approach is
that no value judgements have to be made about the child’s life, only
about his genetic disabilities. The child’s legal situation no longer needs
to be explained in terms of a supposed right not be born or to be aborted.
Consequently, objections based on human dignity can be evaded.
Yet this reading of wrongful life claims poses other serious problems.
After all, the child’s disabilities are inherent to its existence. They were, as
such, not caused by third parties, but have a genetic cause. In other
words, under the current possibilities of reproductive technologies, it
would not have been possible for the child to be born without the genetic
deficiencies. Therefore, holding medical professionals liable solely for the
genetic impairments implies going against the laws of causality, and even
the laws of nature.
As French legal historian Yan Thomas demonstrates in his fascinating
analysis of the Perruche case, these counterfactual elements go back to
a novel legal fiction that is introduced by this interpretation of wrongful
life. This legal fiction entails that the child could have been born in
a different body and with a different genetic make-up and still be the
same person. Of course, the law mobilises legal fictions more generally,
64 Hensel, ‘The disabling impact of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions’, p. 194.
65 Cour de Cassation (ass. plén.), 17 November 2000, JCP 2000, II, 10438, p. 2293.
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also with regard to unborn life.66 However, what makes the wrongful life
claim’s legal fiction historically unprecedented is that it calls into exis-
tence a completely fictional legal subject.67
By treating the child’s genetic disabilities as a source of damages, even
if he could not have been born without them, the child is implicitly
allowed to exercise a form of self-authorship that presupposes a right to
be born in a different body.68 In order to be able to exercise this novel
right, the legal subject becomes dissociated from and even juxtaposed to
his flesh-and-blood-counterpart. The result is a Cartesian separation
between person and body, and between legal subject and flesh-and-
blood human being. As such, the wrongful life claim in its second inter-
pretation offers a striking illustration of the idea that I have a right to be
‘the best Me I can possibly be’, to use Dickenson’s expression,69 even if
this means that ‘that better individual [would] actually be someone else –
not “Me” any longer’.70
Within this reading of wrongful life ‘the problem of line drawing’71
becomes more acute. The limit is no longer set at the minimum of
worthwhile living, but becomes even more diffuse. Operating under the
legal fiction that the child could have come into existence without genetic
deficiencies, wrongful life no longer revolves around the question of
worthwhile living, but the question of undesired genetic disabilities.
Moreover, as assisted reproductive technologies continue to be develop,
the standard will become increasingly difficult to determine.
For example, if, in a near future, human reproduction through ‘easy
PGD’ (a combination of whole genome sequencing and gametogenesis)
became the norm for reproduction in society, as Henry Greely predicts in
his 2016 book The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction, and
natural reproduction came to be regarded as too risky for the child,72 will
children start to use wrongful life actions to claim that they have been
wronged by being brought into existence the natural way?
66 For example, the nasciturus-fiction, which dates back to Roman law, can still be recog-
nised in many contemporary legal systems: An unborn child, if subsequently born alive, is
considered as already in existence whenever it is to its own advantage (‘nasciturus pro iam
nato habetur quotiens de commodo eius agitur’ (Digest 1.5.7)).
67 Yan Thomas, Du Droit de Ne Pas Naître (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 166.
68 Thomas, Du Droit de Ne Pas Naître, p. 147.
69 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 113. 70 Ibid., p. 126.
71 Hensel, ‘The disabling impact of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions’, p. 181.
72 Henry Greely, The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016).
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More importantly, with the currently much discussed technology of
human gene editing (CRISPR/Cas9) on the horizon, one of the most
important barriers for the recognition of wrongful life claims, namely the
impossibility of separating the child from its genetic disabilities, may be
lifted in a near future. After all, the right to be born in a different body can
no longer be rejected as an outrageous legal fiction as soon as it is
technologically possible to genetically engineer children. Indeed, one of
the effects of the introduction of human gene editing for reproductive
purposes would be that the nonidentity problem can no longer be used as
an argument against the recognition of wrongful life claims. In all like-
lihood, the number of wrongful life claims will then also rise
dramatically.
10.6.3 Self-Authorship as Legal Autopoiesis
In both interpretations, the wrongful life claim has far-reaching conse-
quences for the legal concept of the person. In the first interpretation, to
make the legal claim for wrongful life, one has to, so to say, distance
oneself from one’s disabled life in order to be able to make a value
judgement about it, as if one were able to occupy an Archimedean
point of view. In the second interpretation of wrongful life, the claimant
becomes a highly unnatural and disembodied legal being.
Moreover, because both the right not to be born and the right to be
born in a different body are given retroactive effect (‘retroactive self-
authorship’), relating to negligent acts that took place in a period pre-
ceding the child’s own legal existence, it could be said that wrongful life
claims, in both interpretations, ultimately also introduce self-authorship
at the level of legal subjectivity itself. That is, the child becomes the author
of its own legal subjectivity by rejecting the circumstances under which it
was given legal subjectivity. The child ‘acts in propria persona’, to use
Habermas’ words, by being allowed the means to rewrite its own legal
subjectivity. In other words, the child uses its legal subjectivity to legally
contest the outlines of its own legal subjectivity. Through this act of legal
self-constitution,73 the child’s legal persona becomes causa sui.74
The circularity of this act suggests that the idea of self-created legal
subjectivity is deeply problematic. Indeed, wrongful life claims, in their
73 Thomas, Du Droit de Ne Pas Naître, p. 165.
74 Elsewhere, I offer a more elaborate analysis of the legal concept of the person and
currently emerging legal claims to rewrite one’s own legal persona in various contexts
(Van Beers, ‘The changing nature of law’s natural person’).
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self-referential conceptualisation of the legal self, can be said to negate the
ways in which the legal concept of the person is, at heart, an intersubjec-
tive or transsubjective category. The Roman etymology of the word
‘person’ can be used to illustrate this.
‘Persona’ originally stood for the masks worn by actors in Roman
theatre. In this vein, the legal concept of the person is generally under-
stood as the role that the law writes for its subjects to play on the stage of
law. By accepting this legal role, individuals subject themselves to the
legal order. In return, they are protected as free and equal beings.75
However, in today’s legal order, a growing number of individuals
demand to be recognised as the authors of their own legal roles. In the
words of legal philosopher Dorien Pessers, these individuals
[. . .] remove the mask of the intersubjective legal subject, and demand
recognition as human beings of flesh and blood who require complete
self-determination, as an expression of their individual dignity. They
refuse their symbolic transformation into legal subjects, perceiving this
transformation as a restriction of their freedom and happiness. In other
words, they withdraw from the inter-subjectivity of the law and of what is
considered as the supra-individual, general interest. But, does this depri-
vation not also deprive them – in the same act – from the legal, normative
infrastructure upon which their existence depends?76
These ambiguities can be equally recognised in the dynamics of
wrongful life claims. On an individual level, many of these children will
be empowered by the legal recognition of their suffering and the financial
compensation. However, on a societal level, wrongful life claims may
cause these children more harm than good. By depicting their disabled
lives as a source of damages, and by attributing to them a right not to be
born or a right to have a different body, the law threatens to stigmatise
these children’s lives as less worthy of living than ‘normal’ people’s lives.
10.7 Conclusion
How will genomic technologies affect our identities? Will they become
a tool to write one’s own story, as is suggested by the rhetoric of
75 Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law (New York,
NY: Verso Books, 2007), pp. 20–1; Dorien Pessers, ‘The symbolic meaning of legal
subjectivity’ in Bart van Klink, Britta van Beers and Lonneke Poort (eds.), Symbolic
Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Switzerland: Springer 2016), 201–12;
Van Beers, ‘The changing nature of law’s natural person’.
76 Pessers, ‘The symbolic meaning of legal subjectivity’, p. 209.
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personalised medicine? Or will they be used as an instrument by other
people to decide ‘who I am’? As Hub Zwart describes these core
questions:
Who can be regarded as the author of these novel genomics-based iden-
tities that are envisioned? Will these technologies invite individuals to
constitute themselves as subjects, or will new identities rather be produced
by emerging discursive practices and strategies of classification and
demarcation?77
In this chapter I have explored these questions on a legal-philosophical
level, focusing on the effects of genomic technologies for legal subjectiv-
ity. Emerging legal claims in the recent field of genomic torts suggest that
the law is already adopting, to a certain extent, a Me Medicine approach
to regulating genomic technologies. As Chico argues, the grievances
underlying genomic negligence claims are best explained in terms of an
interference with the aggrieved party’s autonomy and self-authorship.
Nevertheless, this autonomy-based framework for regulating the
dilemmas raised by genomic technologies has important shortcomings.
To illustrate and identify several of these problematic aspects, I have
discussed the role and meaning of self-authorship within a specific type
of genomic negligence claims: wrongful life claims.
In line with Me Medicine’s allusions to personal choice and individu-
alism, awarding damages for wrongful life can be defended as promoting
the child’s autonomy and self-authorship. However, upon closer inspec-
tion, the child’s claim to self-authorship comes out as deceptive, self-
contradictory and even harmful.
The ideal of self-authorship is deceptive, because recognition of chil-
dren’s wrongful life claims is practically impossible without a third
party’s judgement of the value of these children’s lives, be it from the
judge, the parents or the ‘reasonable person’. The notion of self-
authorship is also self-contradictory because awarding damages for the
child’s genetic deficiencies is based on the remarkable fiction that the
child could have been born in a different body with a different genetic
constitution, and still be the same person. Finally, wrongful life’s empha-
sis on self-authorship is harmful, because it leads to a disregard of various
societal interests and communal values that are also at stake in the
regulation of reproductive genetics. Evidently, these interests and values
include the parent–child relationship, the place of disabled people in
77 Zwart, ‘Genomics and identity’, p. 136.
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society and the value of human dignity in a legal order that is devoted to
the protection of each human life as having an equal intrinsic worth.
What has, however, generally received less attention, is that wrongful
life’s radicalisation of self-authorship also has a major impact on one of
law’s most important institutions: the legal subject. Whichever reading of
the wrongful life claim is chosen, the result is an internally fragmented,
surrealistically disembodied and ultimately autopoietic legal subject.
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11
I Run, You Run, We Run
A Philosophical Approach to Health and Fitness Apps
marli huijer and christian detweiler
11.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the Apple iPhone in 2007 and the App Store
that accompanies it, millions of people have downloaded and used health
and fitness apps on iPhones, Android phones and other smartphones.
In 2016, 102.4 million smartwatches and fitness trackers shipped. Fitbit
alone shipped 22.5 million devices in that year.1 Health and fitness apps,
often used in combination with wearable sensing technologies, primarily
track physical fitness, sleep, diet, smoking and stress.2 The predominantly
healthy users of these apps aim to acquire knowledge about their beha-
viour and states in order to maintain or improve their daily functioning
and well-being.
How to understand this phenomenon of self-tracking? Are these
technologies tools to increase self-knowledge and to empower indivi-
duals to better take care of themselves? This position is taken by the
global Quantified Self (QS) movement, which understands self-tracking
or ‘life-logging’ practices as a way to acquire ‘self-knowledge through
numbers’.3 The Socratic phrase ‘Know Thyself’ is used to argue that
quantified knowledge of the self is the starting point to reach and main-
tain a healthy and good life.4 Self-tracking is thus a personalised type of
1 Dan Graziano, ‘Fitbit sold more wearables in 2016 than Apple and Samsung combined’,
CNET, 2 March 2017, available at www.cnet.com/news/fitbit-sold-more-wearables-in
-2016-than-apple-and-samsung-combined (accessed 2 February 2018).
2 Eun Kyong Choe, Nicole B. Lee, Bongshin Lee, et al., ‘Understanding quantified selfers’
practices in collecting and exploring personal data’ (2014) Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems – Proceedings 1143–52.
3 Deborah Lupton, ‘M-health and health promotion: the digital cyborg and surveillance
society’ (2012) 10(3) Social Theory & Health 229–44. See also: quantifiedself.com.
4 Gary Wolf’s talk on the Quantified Self at TED@Cannes, www.ted.com/talks/
gary_wolf_the_quantified_self.
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‘primary prevention’, that is, prevention of disease, injury or early death
before it ever occurs.
However, self-tracking technologies can also be understood as disci-
plinary instruments that subject (groups of) individuals to disciplinary
regimes in order to reach the highest level of health and well-being for
both the individual and the population at large. This critical stance is
taken by sociologists, science and technology and human–computer
interaction scholars who analyse the health and illness norms inscribed
in self-sensing and self-monitoring technologies.5 Self-tracking is here
understood as both a personal and a collective type of primary preventive
health. Commercial rather than public goods seem, however, to rule
these disciplinary regimes.
In this chapter, we put these two ways of understanding self-tracking
technologies into a broader philosophical context. We will first show that
understanding the use of these technologies as a form of self-knowledge
and self-empowerment is part of a more general discourse of what Donna
Dickenson calls Me Medicine, a style of medicine centred on the indivi-
dual’s personal health and well-being. Second, we will show that under-
standing self-tracking technologies as disciplinary instruments is part of
a broader discourse that criticises the so-called ‘biopolitical’ societal
development in which populations and individuals are submitted to
health norms that support economic and political goals.6 Although
these disciplinary regimes operate at both the individual (Me) and
collective level (We), corporate interests rather than common goods
dominate the market of health and fitness apps.
Though it is tempting to be either enthusiastic or to remain critical of
self-tracking technologies for health and fitness, we will examine
approaches in philosophy that allow us to offer a third alternative.
Starting from the assumption that the view of mankind from which
5 Deborah Lupton, ‘Self-tracking cultures: towards a sociology of personal informatics’
(2014) Proceedings of the 26th Australian Computer-Human Interaction Conference on
Designing Futures: the Future of Design 77–86; Vera Khovanskaya, Eric P. S. Baumer,
Dan Cosley et al., ‘Everybody knows what you’re doing: a critical design approach to
personal informatics’ (2013) Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems 3403–12; Stephen Purpura, Victoria Schwanda, Kaiton Williams,
‘Fit4life: the design of a persuasive technology promoting healthy behaviour and ideal
weight’ (2011) Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems 423–32.
6 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (London:
Penguin, 1976); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(London: Penguin, 1977); Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself.
i run, you run, we run 227
one designs has a bearing on the design itself and on the constella-
tions of humans and technologies that one brings about, we argue for
a design of self-tracking technologies that is predominantly informed
by notions of We Medicine. In this perspective, the users’ responsi-
bility for primary prevention is not limited to their own selves, but
encompasses broader common interests and goods related to health
and fitness.
11.2 Me Medicine and Health Apps
In her thought-provoking book Me Medicine vs We Medicine, Donna
Dickenson analyses how publicly targeted healthcare has increasingly
been replaced by personalised forms of medicine. Direct-to-consumer
genetic testing, personal tailored drug regimes, personalised pharmaco-
genetics, private umbilical cord blood banking and enhancement tech-
nologies are examples of an ever more individualised healthcare. What
these technologies have in common is an underlying assumption that
‘individual’ is better than ‘social’ and that a ‘true revolution’ is going on in
medicine to make it more individualised.7 What makes Me Medicine
attractive to patients, physicians, multinational firms, researchers and
even ‘presidents of the United States’,8 is that it goes beyond the ‘one size
fits all’model for patients. What could bemore appealing than physicians
being able to make the most effective medical decisions for individual
patients?
In her philosophical exploration of why people are tempted to buy into
personalisedmedicine,Dickenson discerns four possible reasons: threat and
promise; narcissism; corporate interests and political neoliberalism; and the
sacredness of personal choice. Dickenson draws on a range of technologies,
such as private umbilical cord banking, direct-to-consumer genetic testing
and enhancement technologies, to illustrate these approaches to under-
standing Me Medicine. These technologies are not the only ones that
exemplify the shift towards Me Medicine. We argue that activity trackers
and accompanying health and fitness apps also embody the reasons that
people might be tempted to subscribe to personalised medicine.
Threat and promise. The rise of individualised healthcare is inspired
not only by fear of threats such as pollution, toxins, the zika virus and
other contagious diseases, but also by financial or political crises that
make it difficult to find insurance for healthcare. The anxiety that there
7 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 4. 8 Ibid.
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will be no one to help you when you fall ill encourages people to find out
all they can about their personal health risks and to minimise the chance
of illness. In this perspective, do-it-yourself diagnostic and therapeutic
technologies appear to be the best means to prevent diseases and to
promote health and fitness.
Health and fitness apps play on the promise to tackle these threats.
Optimism and promises about a better personal life seem better strate-
gies to seduce potential users than the pessimistic message of threats.9
The apps aim to help their users mitigate the risk of a sedentary life by
prompting them to be active frequently. For example, one of the latest
versions of the Fitbit Charge, the Charge 2, sends users reminders to
move, encouraging users to take 250 steps every hour. Fitbit calculates
users’ ‘active minutes’ and refers to Centers for Disease Control’s
recommendations on how much physical activity adults need.10
Among the recommendations is a minimum amount of activity that
adults need. While this does not explicitly indicate a threat, it can leave
users feeling uncomfortable if they do not move enough to meet these
recommendations.
Narcissism. In a celebrity culture, every person seems to be as news-
worthy as celebrities. Each detail of one’s life and one’s body can be the
stuff of drama. Social media provides individuals with the means to
express themselves by showing their performances, daily activities, work-
outs or outputs. Self-expression, self-admiration and self-centred beha-
viour is stimulated by the likes of digital ‘friends’. This sharing on social
media platforms could be seen as a type of social bonding, but it is often
reached through group closure. People who are ‘not like us’ are excluded.
More in general, the practice of increasing social capital through group
closure, which has become ever more common in the USA, might be one
of the explanations why there is more ‘Me’ness in today’s medicine and
social policy.11
Popular commercial self-tracking technologies invite users to indulge
in narcissistic activities. Users are encouraged to track every step, every
meal (or snack) they eat and even every hour of sleep. Statistics are often
9 Similarly, the brand for companies selling direct-to-consumer personalised genetic test-
ing is promise rather than threat. See Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 55.
10 Fitbit,What are Active Minutes, available at: help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/
1379 (accessed 2 February 2018; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Physical
Activity, available at: www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/basics/adults/index.htm (accessed
2 February 2018).
11 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 17.
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presented back to the user in dashboards, where graph bars and histo-
grams display the past week of steps, active minutes, meals and sleep, for
the user to peruse in an attempt to gain ‘self-knowledge’. On those
activities where a user has exceeded some personal goal, the visualisation
of that activity might contain a green element (to indicate goodness) or
a star (to indicate achievement). In some cases, a user will earn a badge
(e.g. the Trail Shoe badge in Fitbit, which indicates 30,000 steps) to
display on her personal profile. Users are encouraged to share these
achievements on social media.
Corporate interests and political neoliberalism. Personalised medicine
has coincided with the growing dominance of a neoliberal political
ideology that aims to limit the state’s involvement in healthcare and
public wealth and increases the involvement of private corporations.
The state is believed to be harmful to free markets, whereas the free
market is seen as the ‘true creator of wealth’.12 This dominance of free
market economics has affected science and medicine as well: private
capital has entered a wide range of medical and scientific activities.
Profits can be gained in personalised diagnostic tests, personalised treat-
ments, personalised drug regimens and personalised information.
The immense growth of the personalised health and fitness apps
market is a further sign of neoliberalism’s influence in Me Medicine.
These apps emphasise that, through self-tracking, one can adjust one’s
behaviour to optimise one’s well-being and productivity, echoing the
neoliberal focus on self-responsibility.13 Furthermore, the apps portray
health and fitness as things that can be shaped in the first place and
should be, supported by consumer products.14
Commercial health apps also explicitly play to corporate interests, by
offering products for corporations. FitBit, for example, introduced the
programme ‘Group Health’, which allows clients to ‘keep employees
happy, healthy and engaged by creating an effective wellness program
with Fitbit’.15 This Group Health programme aims to ‘improve employee
health status’ and ‘create a culture of well-being’.16 These are typically
among the aims of public health, but here we see these functions shift
towards private organisations (facilitated by Fitbit). Essentially, this
aligns with policies of ‘rolling back the state’ and involvement of private
12 Ibid., p. 20. 13 E.g. Lupton, ‘Self-tracking cultures’.
14 Brad Millington, ‘Smartphone apps and the mobile privatization of health and fitness’
(2014) 31 Critical Studies in Media Communication 479–93.
15 Fitbit, Health Solutions, www.fitbit.com/nl/group-health (accessed 2 February 2018).
16 Ibid.
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organisations in key governmental functions (i.e. public health) – policies
Dickenson describes as neoliberalism: ‘We the people’ has become
‘We the market’.17
Moreover, the benefits of Fitbit’s GroupHealth programme are framed
in terms of the corporate benefits of employee well-being, e.g. ‘[r]esearch
shows that wellness programs can have big benefits for your business’;
‘[c]ompanies with worksite wellness programs experience an 8% increase
in employee productivity’;18 and ‘Decrease healthcare costs – CDW
Healthcare reports wearable technology could reduce hospital costs by
as much as 16% over the course of 5 years.’19 Inserting these types of
interests into the function of health promotion can be seen as
a downplaying the notion of the public good.
The sacredness of individual choice. Autonomy, personal choice and
self-ownership have become the paramount values both inmedical ethics
and in society as a whole. Me Medicine relies heavily on the rhetoric of
unlimited personal choice. In light of the commodification of medicine,
this focus on autonomy and individual choice has transformed into
a sacredness of the consumers’ personal choice, self-engagement and self-
care. Communitarian forms of medicine are challenged, because they
limit individual choice.
The emphasis on individual choice is clearly prevalent in discourses on
digital technology-driven healthcare. As the sociologist Deborah Lupton
has observed, patients and lay-persons have become ‘participants’ who
are deliberately and actively involved in self-care. In her view, these
discourses also represent the latest version of patient consumerism:
In contemporary discussions of patient consumerism, the discourse of
patient engagement is brought together with that of digital medicine to
construct the figure of what I term ‘the digitally engaged patient’ when lay
people are advised that they should use digital technologies as part of
patient engagement practices.20
Health and fitness apps fit into this focus on individual choice. Wearable
activity trackers and accompanying apps, such as FitBit, Jawbone UP and
Moov NOW, embrace individual choice and self-engagement even
17 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 185. She draws this phrase from
Thomas Frank’s book Pity the Billionaire (2012).
18 Fitbit, Health Solutions, www.fitbit.com/nl/group-health (accessed 2 February 2018).
19 Fitbit, Fitbit for Corporate Welness, www.fitbit.com/content/assets/group-health
/FitbitWellness_InfoSheet.pdf (accessed 2 February 2018).
20 Deborah Lupton, ‘The digitally engaged patient: Self-monitoring and self-care in the
digital health era’ (2013) 11(3) Social Theory & Health 256–70, p. 258.
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before users purchase an activity tracker: Fitbit sells a whole range of
activity trackers (Blaze, Surge, Charge 2, Charge, Alta, Flex 2, One, Zip),
some with features beyond counting steps, such as guided breathing
sessions, GPS location tracking and heart rate sensing, to suit different
users’ preferences. Eachmodel is available in its own range of colours and
some models include ‘special editions’ and ‘designer collections’.
Taglines on the website include ‘Only Fitbit gives you the freedom to
get fit your way’21 and ‘Fitbit motivates you to reach your health and
fitness goals by tracking your activity, exercise, sleep, weight and more’,22
emphasising personal expression alongside fitness and motivation.
Individual choice and self-engagement also characterise Google’s ‘Play
Store’ and Apple’s ‘App Store’, where users can choose from thousands of
apps to help them exercise, maintain a healthful diet or lose weight. Once
users install and begin to use such apps, individual choice and engage-
ment remain important. In Fitbit, for example, users are first asked to
enter personal information, such as weight and age. The next step is to set
personal goals, such as amount of weight to lose, daily amount of
exercise. Though the app provides defaults based on recommendations
from organisations such as the AmericanMedical Association, the user is
still free to set personal goals. This is the user taking ‘personal responsi-
bility for detecting and directing [her] own future health’.23
Health and fitness apps exemplify Me Medicine in all of the
approaches Dickenson identifies: they promise to counter individual
health risks, they encourage self-expression, they generate profits for
private companies and they focus on individual choice.
11.3 Disciplinary Regimes and Health Apps
Yet, how personalised are health and fitness apps? Certainly, each user
views statistics specific to their tracked activity. Users might even get
feedback or ‘coaching’ on their activity in light of their personal goals.
However, the overall approach is the same for all users: be active and eat
and sleep well to meet goals. It is a ‘personal choice’ to do as everyone
should do. In other words, a ‘personal choice’ but within a framework (of
goal-setting) constructed by the apps’ designers.
21 Fitbit, Why Fitbit, www.fitbit.com/nl/whyfitbit (accessed 2 February 2018).
22 Fibit, Official Site for Activity Trackers & More, www.fitbit.com/home (accessed
2 February 2018).
23 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 39.
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Could it be that these Me Technologies are based on a collective
societal and/or economic interest that everyone should act as
a responsible citizen? This brings us to the second interpretation of self-
tracking technologies: as disciplinary instruments that seduce or force
individuals to take responsibility for their own health and fitness.
InDiscipline and Punish, French philosopherMichel Foucault explains
how, from the end of the eighteenth century, individuals became sub-
mitted to disciplinary tactics that governed and controlled their move-
ments and behaviours. These disciplinary methods originated in the
army, where discipline and dressage had been introduced in the seven-
teenth century. The success which discipline brought armies engendered
a military dream of society: what worked in the army would also work in
society.24 Means of correct training, such as hierarchical observation of
individuals, normalising judgements (small penalties, humiliations, cor-
rections, gratifications and ranking) and examinations (combining
observation and normalising judgements), were used to transform pupils
at school, patients in hospitals, prisoners in prison and labourers in
factories into docile bodies.
Activity trackers and health apps match the disciplinary means of
correct training, i.e. hierarchical observation, normalising judge-
ment and examination, as described in Foucault’s Discipline and
Punish.
Observation – this is described by Foucault as an ‘absolutely indiscreet’
surveillance that is ‘everywhere and always alert’ while simultaneously
being absolutely ‘discreet’, since it functions largely in silence.25 Tracking
activity necessarily involves observation of some kind. Activity trackers
can count the wearer’s steps (by detecting motion) and, in some cases,
measure the wearer’s heart rate. The same motion detection can be used
to track sleep. Though it is uncertain whether activity trackers actually
improve health outcomes,26 the idea behind the activity they encourage is
to get people to be healthier by being more active, which the apps
stimulate by giving people ‘insights on [their] performance’27 and
reminding them to be active, as discussed above. When reminding
users to be active, these apps implicitly inform users that the user’s
activity is being observed (by the app). When insights on performance
24 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 169. 25 Ibid., p. 177.
26 E.g. J. M. Jakicic, K. K. Davis, R. J. Rogers, W. C. King, M. D. Marcus, D. Helsel et al.,
‘Effect of wearable technology combined with a lifestyle intervention on long-term weight
loss: the IDEA randomized clinical trial’ (2016) 316 JAMA 1161.
27 Fitbit, Fitbit App, www.fitbit.com/nl/app (accessed 2 February 2018).
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are presented to users, however, it is the user observing themselves. This
gives rise to a situation in which data are recorded by an individual about
that individual – what Katie Shilton calls ‘participatory personal data’.28
In activity tracking, then, data collection is used both as a means of
discipline and self-discipline.
Normative judgement (or normalisation) is described by Foucault as ‘a
small penal mechanism’ that defines and represses behaviours outside the
scope of the law, enforces artificial orders, functions as a corrective,
prefers rewards above punishment and ranks individuals according to
their good or bad behaviour.29 It refers to the means of achieving
discipline through imposing norms. Normalisation is pervasive in activ-
ity trackers and their accompanying apps, but is subtle.
A frequently encountered feature of activity tracking apps is
a visualisation of activity levels for a certain period (e.g. the last seven
days). Such a visualisation often includes a representation of the desired
or recommended level of activity. For example, the Fitbit app includes
a screen with a histogram of the last seven days of activity, expressed in
steps walked. The histogram includes a line at the daily step goal (set by
the user or by default). Such a visualisation directly expresses a norm or
standard to which the user’s activity is compared. Though the user is free
to set the daily step goal, there is no option to disable the line that
represents it.
Also, the app describes the default goal (10,000 steps) as being based on
CDC recommendations, reinforcing the idea that this is a norm or
standard to meet. If the user zooms in on a specific day, another histo-
gram is displayed (in two-hour intervals). In this visualisation, bars are
coloured according to the level of intensity of the user’s activity – red for
‘light activity’, yellow for ‘moderate activity’ and green for ‘intense
activity’. Categorising activity in such a way is also a form of normalising.
In this case, the user is not free to set the thresholds of each category.
Users are also rewarded for certain achievements, for example, by being
awarded a ‘badge’ for walking 30,000 steps in one day. Such rewards
implicitly label certain behaviour as desirable or praiseworthy – in other
words, certain behaviour is normalised in these apps.
Health apps also embed normalisation through defaults for various
goals. For example, Jawbone’s UP app allows users to set goals for hours
28 Katie Shilton, ‘Participatory personal data: An emerging research challenge for the
information sciences’ (2012) 63 Journal of the American Society for Information Science
and Technology 1905–15.
29 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 177–84.
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of sleep, daily steps and weight. The slider with which the user can set
hours of sleep also indicates ‘average’ sleep and ‘recommended’ sleep,
which is the default. Below the slider it says ‘[t]he National Institutes of
Health recommends between 7–8 hours of sleep per night’. The slider to
set a daily step goal similarly has indicators for the average and recom-
mended amounts and a text stating ‘[a]verages based on UP users.
Experts recommend 10000 steps a day for an active, healthy lifestyle.’
Finally, the weight slider indicates a ‘Healthy Range’ and the user’s
current weight. If the user sets a goal below his or her current weight,
the text below the slider states
Lose. Eat 500 calories fewer than you burn in order reach your weight
goal. There are also other factors that affect weight loss, like sleep, which
you can log inUP. If you stick to that plan, you are likely to reach your [xx]
kgs goal in about [x] weeks. Men your height should weigh between [xx]
kgs and [xx] kgs according to WHO’s BMI formula (Jawbone’s UP app).
These defaults, averages and recommendations impose norms on users’
goal setting. Even if users choose not to follow apps’ recommendations in
setting their goals, they still act relative to a norm. As such, their choice of
goal is either ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. Moreover, once they have set a goal,
their activity is judged in relation to that goal and is thus normalised.
Even the act of goal-setting is a norm in such apps; activity tracking apps
are normalising from the outset.
The final technique of disciplinary control that activity trackers and
their apps implement is the examination, in which the techniques of
hierarchical observation and of normalising judgement are combined.
Foucault describes this examination as both a ritual and a ‘scientific’ way
of fixing individual differences, in which each individual is pinned down
in his own particularity. The examination is at the centre of the disci-
plinary power:
It is the examination which, by combining hierarchical surveillance and
normalizing judgment, assures the great disciplinary functions of distri-
bution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and time, con-
tinues genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes and,
thereby, the fabrication of seller, organic, genetic and combinatorial
individuality.30
In health and fitness apps, the examination is embedded through the
ways in which the apps process users’ self-tracked data (observation) in
30 Ibid., p. 192.
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light of the norms the apps include (normalising judgement) to classify
the user and their activity. In Fitbit, users’ activity is classified as ‘intense’,
‘moderate’ or ‘light’. Jawbone UP users’ sleep is categorised as ‘awake’,
‘light’ or ‘sound’. Those users’ meals get a score and are classified as
‘healthy’, ‘OK’ or ‘avoid’ (if they log food intake). In some cases, apps
even actively advise users to change their behaviour. For example,
Jawbone UP’s ‘Smart Coach’ feature will tell a user who has slept
3 hours and 58 minutes:
Last night you only slept for 3 h 58 m. Try for more tonight. Skip that new
episode of Dancing with the Stars or The Big Bang Theory. Your body will
thank you tomorrow (Jawbone’s UP app).
Users are also compared to other users. In the case of Fitbit, the user’s
activity level is compared to other ‘befriended’ users and ranked accord-
ingly. Cyclists who use the Strava app can see how they rank in compar-
ison to other users (or ‘athletes’) on the time it took them to complete
a segment of road. Some apps, such as Fitbit, also give users badges for
certain achievements, such as new badges for each additional 10,000 steps
taken in a day. This comparison to other users, ranking and rewarding
achievements exemplifies the examination aspect in health and fitness
apps.
What this disciplinary perspective on health and fitness apps discloses
is that Me and We Medicine are intertwined: collective norms are taken
as default criteria to set personal goals. Disciplinary regimes, especially in
the field of health and illness, are always aimed at both the individual and
the population at large. In The Will to Knowledge (1976), Foucault shows
that while health became an ever more important economic value in
Western societies, knowledge regimes and disciplinary powers became
increasingly oriented toward the optimisation of the health of both the
individual and the population. He uses the word ‘biopower’ to explain the
disciplinary forces and policies that incite individuals and society at large
to behave as healthily as possible: ‘Western man was gradually learning
what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body,
conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective
welfare, forces that could be modified and a space in which they could be
distributed in an optimal manner’.31
Biopower, as a ‘political technology of life’, evolved over two axes: the
one focused on an ‘anatomo-politics’ of the human body and the other on
31 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 142.
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a ‘biopolitics’ of the population.32 In these regimes, the human body
became surveyed and disciplined unto the smallest, microphysical level.
Today, these disciplinary forces work at an even smaller scale, as the
sociologist Nikolas Rose argues in The Politics of Life Itself: at the mole-
cular (genetic and neurochemical) level of the human body. The species
body, on the other hand, became regulated and controlled in order ‘to
protect the security of the whole from internal dangers’.33
Yet, these disciplinary regimes cannot be understood as either a Me or
We type of Medicine. The distinction between strategies governing the
individual body and those regulating the species body already became
blurred in the nineteenth century, as state authorities and later ‘sub-State
institutions such as medical institutions, welfare funds, insurance and so
on’ sought to act upon the population through action upon the human
body.34 The best example to explain this is the political issue of sex, which
was at the pivot of the two axes:
On the one hand it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing,
intensification and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of
energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of popula-
tions, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. It fitted in both
categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent
controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical
or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with
the body. But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical
assessments and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups
taken as a whole.35
Continuing this line of thought, Rose analyses how contemporary citi-
zens have become vehicles of biopolitics themselves. Rather than feeling
subjected to this politics of life, individuals consider themselves to be free
and autonomous beings who deliberately take responsibility for their
individual health and well-being. Rose links Foucault’s later work on
‘care of the self’ to the existing disciplinary health regimes. While
Foucault considered ‘care of the self’ to be a technique to criticise existing
knowledge and power regimes and to open up new ways to work on and
shape one’s self, Rose shows that this strategy also further submits
individuals to disciplinary power regimes. Contemporary ‘biological
citizens’ not only enthusiastically engage with their own health, they
32 Ibid., p. 139. 33 Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’, p. 249.
34 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 141. Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’, p. 250.
Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p. 53.
35 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, pp. 145–6.
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even claim to have a right to health and well-being and thus to genetic
testing, anti-depressive drugs or enhancing technologies.36 They are
convinced that they have freely chosen to behave as healthily as
possible.37
Deborah Lupton’s sociological critique of self-tracking and ‘the quanti-
fied self’ subscribes to this type of analysis. Lupton argues that ‘Foucault’s
writings on the practices and technologies of the self in neoliberalism are
pertinent to understanding the quantified self as a particular mode of
governing the self’.38 On this view, citizens voluntarily engage in practices
that serve their own interests and conform to those of the state – the
responsible citizen self-manages her health through ‘self-knowledge’
gained through self-tracking (‘voluntary self-surveillance’).
11.4 We Medicine and Health Apps
Is it possible to develop health and fitness apps that do not conform to
Me Medicine? Could health and fitness apps prioritise We Medicine over
Me Medicine? What would such apps look like? Dickenson’s main goal
in Me Medicine vs We Medicine is to reclaim medical and bio-
technologies for the common good.39 Rather than focusing on the nar-
cissism, corporate interests and autonomous choice of Me Medicine, she
stresses the importance of public health, notions of common interests
and common ownership and concepts of mutuality and interrelation-
ships – in short, We Medicine – while dealing with diseases and other
conditions that affect our health and fitness.
Historically, it was not Me Medicine but We Medicine—programs like
public vaccination, clean water and screening for tuberculosis—that
brought us reduced infant mortality, comparative freedom from conta-
gious disease, and an enhanced lifespan. Yet today, many of these public
programs seem to be increasingly distrusted, even detested.40
36 Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas use the term ‘biological citizenship’ descriptively, ‘to
encompass all those citizenship projects that have linked their conceptions of citizens to
beliefs about the biological existence of human beings, as individuals, as families and
lineages, as communities, as population and races and as a species’. See Nikolas Rose and
Carlos Novas, ‘Biological citizenship’ (2002), at p. 3, available at: http://thesp.leeds.ac.uk
/files/2014/04/RoseandNovasBiologicalCitizenship2002.pdf (accessed 2 February 2018).
37 Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, pp. 146–7 and 154. See also Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our
Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
38 Lupton, ‘The digitally engaged patient’, p. 28.
39 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. viii. 40 Ibid., p. 5.
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The question, then, is how we, in primary prevention, can make use of
health and fitness apps (or similar technologies) to embodyWeMedicine
rather than Me Medicine. Before we can offer proposals for design
directions such apps could take, we need to be more specific about
what We Medicine means.
Public health programmes such as those mentioned above exemplify
what Dickenson calls We Medicine. It encompasses solidarity and altru-
ism (‘We factors’41) and involves communal action directed towards
communal purposes, common possessions or the common good (‘work-
ing together for what we have in common’). So, in promoting the idea of
We Medicine, Dickenson is calling for a return to, or a reclaiming of, the
commons – and creating a ‘new spirit of togetherness’.42
However, Dickenson identifies two threats to the commons that we
see in Me Medicine today and that need to be overcome in order to
realise We Medicine. First, there is the threat of free riding: that is,
individuals endangering the commons (or communal resource) by
‘taking more than their fair share’.43 One example of this is parents
who decide to withdraw their children from vaccination programmes.
Sufficient individual participation in such programmes creates
a communal health resource or commons – population immunity.
Individuals who withdraw their children distrust public health and
their view is that they alone are responsible for protecting the individual
health of their children – a view fed by market populism, according to
Dickenson. By not participating in vaccination programmes, these
individuals reap the benefits of population immunity (they are pro-
tected by it), but they do not contribute to it themselves. Of course, as
Dickenson notes, if too many parents were to withdraw their children
from vaccination programmes, population immunity would decline
and there would be no commons.
The other threat to the commons is the threat of the commons being
enclosed to create a wholly or partially private good.44 Under this threat,
commoners who contributed to the commons are now kept from acces-
sing the benefits of that communal resource. Dickenson illustrates
this second threat with the example of corporations such as 23andMe
owning and deriving (commercial) value from the commons of the
human genome. In this case, individuals’ access to the benefits of, for
example, diagnostic testing based on these commons can be limited by
the private owner of those commons.45
41 Ibid., p. 207. 42 Ibid., p. 227. 43 Ibid., p. 218. 44 Ibid., p. 218. 45 Ibid., p. 222.
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So, the commons that We Medicine should reclaim, according to
Dickenson, can include common goods, such as population immunity,
to which individuals contribute through individual actions, such as
undergoing vaccination. It can also be information that individuals
contribute, such as genome sequencing information, from which all
can benefit through, for example, diagnostic testing based on the com-
munal resource.
Above, we discussed how health and fitness apps and activity track-
ers exemplify many of the reasons for Me Medicine. Do these apps and
activity trackers similarly exemplify threats to a commons? If so, what
commons do they threaten? The threat of free-riders, exemplified by
the vaccine case, does not seem to have an obvious parallel in health
and fitness apps – there does not seem to be an equivalent of popula-
tion immunity (or of free-riding individuals) in health and fitness
apps.
A more plausible parallel seems to exist between individual users
tracking their activity through a centralised service such as Fitbit and
individuals contributing to 23andMe’s genotype-phenotype database.
The latter was ‘created by the labour, cash and bodily materials of
thousands of individuals’,46 but belongs to a private firm. Similarly,
users of activity trackers spendmoney on the means to track their activity
and labour (exercise) to produce the data on a private firm’s servers.
Where the genotype–phenotype database captures a communal
resource – the genome is something all humans have in common –
from which individuals could benefit, the databases in which the daily
activity data of millions of individuals are stored captures a communal
resource of knowledge about human behaviour. People have activity (or
absence thereof), food intake and sleep in common, and while private
firms such as Fitbit do not own the activities themselves, they do own the
data derived from these activities. So, as in the 23andMe example, private
firms are in a position to limit or deny access to a form of communal
resource, to sell the data generated by patients to pharmaceutical com-
panies, private firms in health and fitness apps are in a position to decide
in what ways they use or exploit these data. In the case of 23andMe,
beside marketing their database, they can use their databases to patent
gene sequences and to stake patent claims. In 2012, 23andMewas granted
a US genetic patent related to Parkinson’s disease withoutmaking clear to
consumers that it was seeking such patents, ultimately undermining
46 Ibid., p. 222.
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consumers’ trust in 23andMe.47 Though it is not immediately clear how
Fitbit’s databases could be used to seek patents, similar issues could arise
if Fitbit attempts to create intellectual property from aggregated data and
profit from it.
Dickenson discusses a number of possible responses to these threats, in
the form of various collective movements. One of these responses is the
charitable trust model. In this model, contributors to a biobank do not
gain ownership rights of (samples and related data in) the biobank, but
there is a requirement that the trustees act in the interest of the bene-
ficiaries – so it would not be possible to profit from the biobank. Another
response is for an (indigenous) group to claim the right to determine
what is done with its genetic data, often by appealing to traditional
communal belief systems.48
Promoting the idea of We Medicine in relation to health and fitness
apps would mean to start with the question of what health and fitness
norms we share and what primary preventionmeans best fit these norms.
In the case of air pollution, for example, rather than digitally alerting
citizens and helping them to adapt their behaviour to the amount of
pollution (thus intermingling Me and We medicine), designers could
start by asking what the best primary prevention measures are to prevent
health-endangering forms of air pollution. Citizens could bemotivated to
work together to improve the quality of the common air. Something
similar can be seen in Strava’sMetro product.49 Strava is a service that lets
people track their cycling and running activity. Strava Metro anonymises
and aggregates this data and licenses it to departments of transportation
and related organisations to improve infrastructure for cyclists and
pedestrians. Though Strava is using data its users have contributed to
create intellectual property, the data is ultimately used to improve peo-
ple’s safety.
PrioritisingWeMedicine in the design of health and fitness apps could
start from new sorts of communal identification or new kinds of com-
munal concerns for prevention of diseases. Initiatives such as Science
Commons and FOSTER Open Science, which aim to make research data
reusable, better accessible and better integrated, are examples of how
47 Sigrid Sterckx, Julian Cockbain, Heidi Howard et al., ‘“Trust is not something you can
reclaim easily”: patenting in the field of direct-to-consumer genetic testing’ (2013) 15
Genetics in Medicine 382–7.
48 See also Donna Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 8.
49 Strava, Strava Metro, https://metro.strava.com (accessed 2 February 2018).
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communal concerns can be taken as the starting point for digital com-
munitarian associations focused on common goods. Dickenson refers to
Richard Titmuss’s notion of ‘the gift relationship’, funding the UK blood
donation system, to stress the importance of the sense of identification
with a wider collective.50
We Medicine in the health and fitness apps area also implies investi-
gating the options for common possessions. On the one hand, non-profit
public databases could be built that store and analyse the data of tracking
activities. Comparable to the charitable trust model, the interests of the
contributors would be represented by the trustees. As far as profits are
made, they could be used to further research or other common
interests.51 On the other hand, small group databases could be built, in
which members share their activity data and have the right to determine
what is done with these.
11.5 Conclusion
Taking Donna Dickenson’s contrast between Me and We Medicine as
a starting point, the development of health and fitness apps can be seen as
both a type of MeMedicine and a disciplinary regime imposing collective
norms on the individual.
The most robust explanation for the rise of MeMedicine in this case is,
similarly to other fields of medicine, the dominance of corporate interests
and a neoliberal public policy. The responsibility for living a healthy and
long life is put on the individual and no longer seen as a communal
interest.
Yet, it is impossible to draw a strict boundary between Me and
We Medicine. Health and fitness apps are also disciplinary technologies
in which public, state and sub-state norms or corporate interests are
translated into actions on the individual body. However, Me Medicine
claims to be superior to We Medicine when primary prevention is at
stake. ‘Me often markets itself as clinically superior to We’, as Dickenson
argues – even though the evidence base for this superiority is weak.52
Dickenson’s plea to resurrect the commons, in this case in digital
technologies that support primary prevention goals, invites us to take
50 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, pp. 214–5.
51 Dickenson presents the non-profit UK Biobank and PXE International Foundation as
examples of a middle way between pure altruism and pure capitalism (Me Medicine vs
We Medicine, p. 211).
52 Ibid., p. 57.
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a completely different angle. Developing health and fitness apps from
a We Medicine perspective, governed by common rather than corporate
interests, would imply that users (contributors) would have an insight
into and a say in the norms inscribed in the apps; that they are stimulated
to identify with communal values and communal concerns; that they
know what data are stored and what algorithms are used to analyse these
data; and that they have a right to determine what is done with the
collected data.
Designers who are willing to bring in more ‘We’-ness in the design
of health and fitness apps should be aware that Me Medicine in
primary prevention often eclipses We Medicine. So, rather than
focusing on promises for a better individual life, on narcissism,
corporate interests and self-engagement, designers would have to
take communal values and common goods as their starting point
for design. Design for We Medicine would involve designing for
communities rather than individual users. Active involvement and
deliberation of citizens and other users in the design of digital pri-
mary preventive medicine technologies could be a way to broaden the
normative scope of the good life as aimed for in health and fitness
apps. Moreover, designers should be aware that group closures (only
sharing data with ‘people like us’) can further encourage the rise of
Me Medicine.
In order to bring more We Medicine into health and fitness apps,
designers should also recognise that observation, normalising judgement
and examination are part and parcel of data tracking technologies. Each
design embodies, often invisibly, norms, values and ideologies.53 Rather
than keeping these invisible or implicit, it would be better to submit the
embedded norms, values and ideologies to public scrutiny and
discussion.
Finally, designers could respect the ‘commons’ by building databases
in which contributors can share their data and stories without giving up
the right to decide about these data, in a form similar to the examples of
charitable trust fund models that Dickenson discusses.
53 Bruno Latour, ‘Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane
artifacts’ (1992) www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/50-MISSING-MASSES-GB
.pdf; Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Embodying values in
technology: Theory and practice’ in Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (eds.),
Information Technology and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), pp. 322–53; Peter-Paul Verbeek, Moralizing Technology (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2011).
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Although there is still a long way to go to resurrect the commons in
medicine and to reclaim the various kinds of medical and bio-
technologies for the common good, Dickenson’s invitation to look for
new ways to create a spirit of togetherness in biomedicine undeniably
opens up new perspectives to design, develop and use health and fitness
apps with more solidarity and in more altruistic We-oriented ways. Just
as user-friendliness became a central aim in the design of digital technol-
ogy, We-ness could become the focus of health and fitness apps.
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The Molecularised Me
Psychoanalysing Personalised Medicine and Self-Tracking
hub zwart
12.1 Introduction
During the 1990s, new forms of technoscience pervaded postmodern
society, exemplified by the Human Genome Project (HGP) in the life
sciences and by the Internet in the realm of Information and
Communications Technology (ICT). These developments initially
focused on the construction of a novel ‘We’, represented by the transper-
sonal Human Reference Genome (HRG) in the life sciences and by the
World Wide Web (as a decidedly transpersonal enterprise) in ICT.
Currently, however, against the backdrop of Next Generation
Sequencing (NGS) and the emergence of wearable electronic devices, we
witness the advent of yet another revolution, again combining genomics
with ICT, which claims to entail a shift of focus from We to Me. Francis
Collins1 and others herald the advent of a new era of personalised medi-
cine, referred to by Donna Dickenson2 as Me Medicine: a development
which allegedly transforms human individuals into bio-citizens, empow-
ering them to become proactive managers of their own wellness and
health. These bio-citizens become increasingly involved in new practices
of the Self, often referred to as self-monitoring, self-tracking, do-it-yourself
(DIY) diagnostics, personal informatics or lifelogging.3 Such practices
assist users in maintaining wellness by closely monitoring personal activ-
ities such as exercise, sexuality and diet. Indeed, even the molecular effects
1 F. Collins, The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalised Medicine
(New York: Harper, 2010).
2 D. Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common
Good (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
3 D. Lupton, The Quantified Self: A Sociology of Self-Tracking (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016).
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of allegedly healthy activities such as laughter on wellness are being
studied.4 Bio-citizens are regarded as valuable repositories of information,
and the focus is no longer on various stages of illness or recovery, but
rather on wellness as such, and more specifically on the latent subliminal
molecular onsets of health challenges during the wellness stage. Or, to
phrase it in the terminology of French philosopher of science Gaston
Bachelard,5 the focus of attention has shifted from the phenomenal (i.e.
physical) aspects of health and disease to the noumenal (i.e. the biochem-
ical, biomolecular or microphysical) dimensions.
Although self-monitoring, self-measuring and self-recording have
been practiced since ancient times, in the era of wearable devices and
sensor-saturated environments a self-tracking culture has gained
momentum that is increasingly bent on quantification.6 Indeed, the
combination of digital devices and personalised health information has
given rise to the emergence of a numbered or ‘quantified’ Self,7 and self-
knowledge is increasingly articulated in terms of measurements and
numbers, so that bio-citizens are expected to measure and monitor
their bodies and their everyday lifeworld in real time, continuously and
automatically.
But personal data are never purely personal. Not only because, at least
potentially, they may become available to others (developers of devices,
data-mining companies, government agencies, cybercriminals and the
like8), but also because, for these measurements to make sense, they must
be compared to transpersonal standards and performance levels, to
sociocultural expectations, indeed: to a digital version of the superego,
exposing the self-tracking bio-citizen to continuous surveillance and
criticism.9
In this contribution, the advent of Me Medicine (or personalised
medicine) will be assessed from a psychoanalytical perspective.
Basically I will argue that Me Medicine entails a molecularisation or
4 T. Hayashi et al., ‘Laughter regulates gene expression in patients with type 2 diabetes’
(2006) 75 Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 62–5.
5 G. Bachelard, ‘Noumène et microphysique’ (1932/1970) Recherches Philosophiques 55–65:
11–24; G. Bachelard, L’activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1951).
6 Lupton, The Quantified Self: A Sociology of Self-Tracking. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 4.
9 H. Zwart, ‘The obliteration of life: depersonalisation and disembodiment in the terabyte
age’ (2016) 35(1) New Genetics and Society, 69–89. doi:10.1080/14636778.2016.1143770;
H. Zwart, ‘“Extimate” technologies and techno-cultural discontent: A Lacanian analysis of
pervasive gadgets’ (2017) 22(1) Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 24–54.
doi:10.5840/techne20174560.
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digitalisation of our conscience as well as of the unconscious:
a technification of both the superego and the id. The design of this
chapter is as follows. First, I will assess currently emerging self-tracking
practices against the backdrop of an extended history of self-
directedness, and as the most recent ‘epidemic’ of the human tendency
towards self-obsession. Donna Dickenson already problematises this in
psychoanalytic terms, namely as a ‘wave of patient narcissism and self-
absorption’,10 in combination with capitalism’s protean capacity for
creating new products. This is not only reflected by personalised genetics
as such, moreover, but notably in combination with the latest wave of
ICT gadgets (cf. the lower-case i in iPods, iPhones, iPads and so on11).
Subsequently, I will outline how traditional genomics (focused on
sequencing the molecularised We) during the first decade of the new
millennium gave way to personalised genomics (focused on exploring the
molecularised Me). I will explain how new technologies, notably the
combination of Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) and wearable
devices, give rise to self-tracking practices as part of a global ‘citizen
health science’ movement, exemplified by a paradigmatic laboratory
experiment known as the Snyderome. I will indicate how such practices
concur with the famous psychoanalytic rule which claims that, in order to
achieve self-knowledge, everything, however trivial, personal or embar-
rassing, should be reported. My basic argument will be that, rather than
facilitating practices of the self, these self-tracking endeavours expose the
individuals involved to a molecularised superego or voice of conscience,
continuously imploring them to better their daily habits, so as to exploit
and enjoy life to the full.
12.2 Know Thyself 3.0: A Brief Genealogy of Self-Directedness
In Phaedo, Socrates tells how his interest in philosophy was aroused
by a book entitled On Nature, written by Anaxagoras.12 The reading
disappointed him, however. For how was it possible to determine
whether the ideas put forward by this author were credible and true?
How to determine whether this author was a reliable source of
knowledge? Socrates concluded that, in order to understand the
10 Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 14.
11 J. M. Twenge and Keith W. Campbell, The Narcissism Epidemic. Living in the Age of
Entitlement (New York, NY: Free Press, 2009).
12 Plato, Plato I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus [Loeb edition] (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1914/1995), pp. 97–9.
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external world, we must first of all secure our understanding of
ourselves, by critically questioning the reliability of our sense organs
and of the human mind. As his maxim he adopted the phrase ‘Know
Thyself’ (γνῶθι σεαυτόν), which was inscribed on the forecourt of
the Temple of Apollo at Delphi by the seven sages during the sixth
century BC, as recorded by the Greek travelogue writer Pausanias.13
So, paradoxically, in order to understand nature (external reality, the
world, the object), we first of all must understand ourselves: we must
shift our focus from world to Self, from object to subject. And
dialectics, as a practice of the self, was basically a programme of self-
edification via intellectual exercises, meant to transform oneself into
a reliable instrument of knowledge.
However, here a second paradox emerged. Within our innermost Self,
we discover something else, namely λόγος, the voice of conscience and
reason: our inner ‘demon’, as Socrates called it, or as the Christian
author Augustine would later reframe it: God, speaking to us fromwithin
ourselves (as interior intimomeo, i.e. as somethingmore internal thanmy
innermost Self). So, in our quest for self-knowledge, another shift inevi-
tably takes place: not only from object (nature) to subject (Self), but also
from subject toOther: to the inner voice of conscience, or reason, or God,
leading the subject upward, as it were. This gave rise to a normative set of
questions: how to constitute oneself, not only as a reliable source of
knowledge but also as a responsible moral subject? Similar to the dialec-
tical exercises (required for becoming a reliable instrument of knowl-
edge), moral self-edification required a practice of the self as well,
consisting of ascetic exercises resulting in self-mastery (ἄσκησις in
Greek). Building on Nietzsche and others, this focus on exercise, on
practices of the self or auto-plasticity, was taken up by Michel Foucault
in the 1980s14 and more recently by Peter Sloterdijk.15 The moral and
intellectual exercise perspective allows us to see Descartes’s Discourse on
Method, for instance, as a meticulous recording of a self-directed prac-
tice, a series of spiritual exercises, grafted on Jesuit models.16 And indeed,
according to Sloterdijk,17 human history is basically the result of
13 Pausanias, Guide to Greece Volume I (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 466.
14 M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2: L’usage des plaisirs (Paris: Gallimard,
1984); M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 3: Le souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).
15 P. Sloterdijk, Du musst dein Leben ändern: Über Anthropotechnik (Suhrkamp, 2009).
16 H. Zwart, Technocratie en Onbehagen: De Plaats van de Ethiek in het Werk van Michel
Foucault (Nijmegen: Sun, 1995).
17 Sloterdijk, Du musst dein Leben ändern.
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millennia of relentless self-experimentation by practicing individuals or
networks of individuals.
In the course of the nineteenth century, self-reflection (i.e. the critical
turn towards the Self) became objectified by a new discipline, namely
psychology (in its various branches and guises), focused on the mental
and behavioural aptitudes of individuals. The Self became the formal
object for scientific psychological assessment and research. Although the
birth of the psychological research subject was already thematised (and
problematised) in Georg Büchner’s dramatic classic Woyzeck,18 this
development gained momentum around 1900, when the scientific
reframing of the Self resulted in the emergence of a new type of human
subject: the quantified and objectified Self of test psychology.
This development is convincingly captured by the movie A Dangerous
Method (2011), directed by David Cronenberg and casting Michael
Fassbender in the role of Carl Gustav Jung. In his thirties, just before
meeting Freud, Jung conducted association experiments to explore
unconscious psychic ‘complexes’, employing new experimental devices
such as a galvanometer, but also a Fünftel-sekundenuhr (a one-fifth
second time watch) to measure reaction times of patients and/or research
subjects as accurately as possible.19 Slight, almost imperceptible hesita-
tions in a subject’s responses to certain stimuli could provide a window
into these psychic complexes (i.e. particular constellations of ideas, con-
cerns and emotions) which hampered the individuals involved. After the
break with Freud, Jung took up this line of research again, culminating in
his theory of psychological types,20 which notably differentiates between
‘introvert’ and ‘extrovert’ personality types: terms which are still in use,
for instance in the context of the Myers–Briggs personality test. In other
words, test psychology provided new options and new vocabularies for
self-knowledge: a new set of techniques was introduced for opening up
the black box of our inner Self.
Yet here again, a paradox occurs. Terms such as ‘introvert’ and ‘extro-
vert’ only make sense in comparison with certain standards of normalcy.
In other words, in our quest for self-knowledge, we are inevitably
18 H. Zwart, ‘Woyzeck and the birth of the human research subject: genetic disposition and
the nature–nurture debate through the looking-glass of fiction’ (2013) 6(3) Bioethica
Forum, 97–105.
19 C. G. Jung, ‘Über das Verhalten der Reaktionszeit beim Assoziationsexperimente’ in
Gesammelte Werke II. Experimentelle Untersuchungen (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau:
Walter, 1905/1979), pp. 239–289.
20 C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typen (Leipzig and Stuttgart: Rascher, 1921/1925).
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confronted with a standardised, normalised Other, with a societal stan-
dard or optimum which we may aspire to reach: defined by those who
designed the test.
In the early twentieth century, such psychological and psychoanalyti-
cal techniques were still regarded as dangerous methods, as the title of the
movie indicates, but nowadays psychological vocabularies and techni-
ques have become more firmly embedded in everyday language and
social practices. They have become domesticated, so to speak, becoming
household terms. Perhaps the same will happen to the molecular-digital
repertoire of genome-speak during the coming years.
In this chapter I argue that personalised medicine, or Me Medicine,
may indeed be regarded as yet another turn towards self-knowledge,
albeit employing bio-molecular and digital terms and techniques. Self-
tracking devices purport to provide access to our molecularised uncon-
scious. The research platform MyFinder, for instance, established by
Takashido Kido in Tokyo, explicitly aims to make intelligent agents
more aware of their ‘subconscious’ processes, signals and behaviours,
via daily self-monitoring.21 In other words: self-tracking purports to
offer a more direct window into unconscious mechanisms, bypassing
more traditional language-based techniques such as psychotherapy,
dream analysis or free associations on a Freudian couch.22 Again,
words are increasingly replaced by quantification, by measurements,
by numbers.
But once again we are faced with a paradox, I argue. At the heart of
this quest for a personalised (i.e. molecularised, quantified and
sequenced) Self of the terabyte age, we encounter a (big) Other:
a molecularised voice of conscience, confronting us with demands
and expectations, in accordance with the pervasive neoliberal ration-
ality and its entrepreneurial logic, which entails a neoliberal imperative
of wellness and sexuality as well. For, as Žižek23 convincingly argues,
building on Lacan, neo-liberal bio-citizens are faced with a rather
demanding imperative: they are expected to enjoy life relentlessly and
to the full.
21 http://takashikido.info
22 H. Zwart, ‘The genome as the biological unconscious – and the unconscious as the
psychic “genome”: A psychoanalytical rereading of molecular genetics’ (2013) 9(2)
Cosmos and History: the Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 198–222.
23 S. Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (London/New York, NY:
Routledge, 2004/2012), p. 299.
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12.3 The Personal (= $1,000 dollar) Genome and Its Pioneers
(Venter, Collins, Crichton)
One of the first individuals who had his personal genome sequenced was
genomics pioneer Craig Venter. Some years after launching a privately
funded human genome sequencing endeavour of his own (in competi-
tion with the publicly funded programme led by Francis Collins), he
published an autobiographical account of the genomics revolution
entitled A Life Decoded: My Genome: My Life.24 For anyone interested
in contemporary life sciences research and personalised medicine, this
ego-document is simply inescapable: a must-read. In the author’s own
language, it is ‘a tale of seemingly impossible quests and grand objectives’,
but also of ‘great rivalries and bitter disputes’, of ‘battles of ideologies,
morals and ethics’, of ‘clashes of egos’.25 The story relates (in an engaging
manner) how the human genome epic swept the author ‘from peaks of
incredible exhilaration as I marshalled a relatively small but dedicated
army of scientists, computers and robots to achieve what seemed almost
impossible, and then plunged me into black pits of depression as I faced
opposition from Nobel laureates and senior government officials, my
colleagues, and even my wife’.26 Interestingly, moreover, the book con-
tains a systematic reflection on the relationship between personal genes
and biographical vicissitudes. In separate boxes, dedicated to specific
genes which Venter discovered on his own genome, the author notably
singles out genes that are allegedly associated with behavioural charac-
teristics, such as thrill-seeking behaviour, attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and stress-coping. Thus, Venter is a genomics pioneer
in more than one sense. He is one of the first individuals who explicitly
began to think about himself in terms of genes and genomics techniques.
In Venter’s case, autobiography and the genome are connected in more
than one way.
At the same time, there is an obvious incongruence between Venter’s
genetic boxes and the story of his life. For if a lesson can be derived from
the latter at all, it would be that the vicissitudes of scientists and their
projects are the outcome of a horrendously complex constellation of
interacting factors so that, narratively speaking, the explanatory (let
alone predictive) power of certain (behavioural or personality) genes
can be regarded as negligible. What seems absent in Venter’s
24 J. C. Venter, A Life Decoded: My Genome: My Life (New York, NY: Viking/Penguin,
2007).
25 Ibid., p. 2. 26 Ibid., p. 2.
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reconstruction, for instance, while figuring prominently in the psychol-
ogy of types developed by Carl Gustav Jung27 mentioned above, is that,
even if certain predispositions of individuals (say, an inclination towards
risk-seeking, or rather the lack thereof) can be associated with the pre-
sence or absence of certain genes, there will at the same time be
a tendency in the human beings involved to ‘compensate’ for their
deviances, so that extrovert persons, for instance, will invest time and
effort in becoming more focused, while introverts will learn to develop
interest in others, and so on. Indeed, even if some level of explanatory
power can be granted to specific genes, the ‘nurture’ dimension (educa-
tion, societal interaction, relationships and the like) is likely to compen-
sate for geneticised ‘nature’.
But the issue of rethinking health and biographies from a personalised
genomics perspective was also taken up by Venter’s competitor Francis
Collins, former director of the publicly funded Human Genome Project
(HGP) and now Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), in
his book The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalised
Medicine.28 Although Collins still sees the HGP as ‘one of the boldest
scientific efforts that humankind has ever mounted’,29 at the same time
he observes that genomics enthusiasm has more or less evaporated.
The revolution is still raging, he maintains, but will not be realised by
the discovery of the human sequence as such. Rather, the impact of
genomics will become visible via the subsequent stage of Next
Generation Sequencing (NGS) and personalised medicine:
Healthy individuals are increasingly able to discover some of their body’s
inner secrets and take appropriate action. The potential for individual
prediction is beginning to spill out to the general public, offering the
opportunity to take more control of your fate . . . None of this is happen-
ing overnight, [but] without question, man’s knowledge of man is under-
going the greatest revolution since Leonardo.30
But as soon as Collins comes up with concrete examples, the revolution-
ary fervour rapidly evaporates.31 One of the examples given by Collins is
the impact of the personalised genomics revolution on assessing person-
ality traits. Through the focus on personality and behaviour, the geno-
mics revolution moves beyond clinical settings and enters into the daily
27 C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typen. 28 F. Collins, The Language of Life.
29 Ibid., p. 299. 30 Ibid., p. 5.
31 H. Zwart, ‘Francis Collins: The Language of Life’ (Book Review) (2011) 6(3) Genomics,
Society & Policy, 67–76.
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lifeworld of healthy individuals, he argues. Will information derived
from NGS and personalised genome sequencing in the near future
replace (or at least complement) existing techniques such as the
Myers–Briggs personality test? Will pre-employment genetic screening
(PEGS), for example, become accepted practice, testing candidates (for
their own benefit) for genes associated with stress tolerance, for instance?
In recent years, a number of genes associated with personality traits have
indeed entered the stage, Collins remarks, notably genes allegedly asso-
ciated with novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence and
persistence. As Collins points out, however, although some of these genes
may have some effects, the contribution of each of them will be so
infinitesimally small that predictability claims of personality traits
based on DNA testing ‘should be taken with considerable scepticism’.32
The same holds for the genetic basis for male ‘infidelity’ as a personality
trait: ‘Do not be misled . . . the actual influence on the behaviour on an
individual male [of such a gene] is quite modest, and should certainly not
be used in mate selection or as an excuse for cheating [on] one’s
partner’.33 Thus, compared to the soaring claims made in the introduc-
tion to his book, the actual evidence provided for the ‘next’ genomics
revolution is remarkably slight.
In the novel Next (a reference perhaps to NGS), science novel author
Michael Crichton34 takes the argument one step further by using his
novel as an ethical laboratory for exploring the emerging future. Series of
lifeworld experiments are conducted in the form of multiple storylines:
what will happen if personalised genomics information proliferates into
society and increasingly affects the ways in which individuals think and
speak about themselves? Next explores in an imaginative manner the
impact of personalised bio-information on self-understanding and
identity-formation by showing a number of individuals actively
engaged in redefining themselves on the basis of their genetic profile.
Their narratives revolve around a number of ‘genes for’ – i.e. recently
identified genes that supposedly co-determine behavioural characteristics
such as the ‘maturity’ gene, the ‘novelty-seeking’ (or thrill-seeking) gene,
the ‘sociability’ gene and the ‘infidelity’ gene. The absence of the maturity
gene, for instance, serves to explain an individual’s propensity for drug
addiction. Various practices of the Self, ranging from paternity testing and
partner selection up to taking a stand in court, are articulated in terms of
32 Ibid., p. 200. 33 Ibid., p. 204.
34 M. Crichton, Next (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2006).
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genomics-speak. Thus, themoral of the story is that, in the near future, bio-
citizens may indeed use the absence or presence of certain genes in their
genomes to identify themselves, as easily perhaps as we currently speak
about ourselves as introverts or extroverts. In the end, however, although
there are various traceable connections between storylines and ongoing
research programmes,35 Crichton’s novel seems to ridicule rather than to
endorse the genomics revolution by taking the logic of behavioural and
personality genomics to the point of absurdity.
Things continue to evolve rapidly, though, and in the current situation,
because of the combination of personalised genome information with self-
tracking practices, involving wearable devices, the revolution finally
appears to gain momentum (in high-income parts of the world, that is).
12.4 The Snyderome
In 2012, Michael Snyder and his team at the Department of Genetics at
Stanford University published the ‘integrative Personal Omics Profile’
(iPOP) of a single individual, a 54-year-old male volunteer whom they
had closely monitored over the course of 14 months.36 This longitudinal
case study resulted in a comprehensive omics portrait (‘high resolution’),
combining ‘deep sequencing’ (of the subject’s genotype) with more than
3 billion measurements of molecules (i.e. the subject’s phenotype).
Although the research subject was a ‘healthy individual’, the project
evolved into a case history (Krankengeschichte) as two minor viral infec-
tions, together with (unexpected) evidence of the subject’s propensity for
diabetes, constituted the dramatic highlights of the story.
Soon, it turned out that the ‘male volunteer’ of this N = 1 experiment
(surrounded by qualified personnel and costly equipment) was none
other than Michael Snyder himself, the department chair, now acting as
his own research subject of choice, turning his body into an omics
laboratory. The experiment resulted in what has been referred to as the
Snyderome, or even the ‘narcissome’.37 Snyder himself made it known
that he plans to remain a study subject for life, adding new sources of
35 H. Zwart, ‘Next’ (Book review) (2007) 3(1) Genomics, Society & Policy, 48–51.
36 R. Chen, G. I. Mias, J. Li-Pook-Than et al., ‘Personal omics profiling reveals dynamic
molecular and medical phenotypes’ (2012) 148 Cell 1293–1307. doi:10.1016/j.
cell.2012.02.009.
37 C. Dennis, ‘The rise of the narciss-ome: Profiles of a researcher’s genes, proteins andmore
show personalized genomic medicine in action’ (2012) Nature News. doi:10.1038/
nature.2012.10240.
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information as the process unfolds, including data procured from body
samples such as breath, urine, faeces (‘stool microbiome’) and saliva.
Psychoanalytically speaking, the focus of molecularised self-tracking
consistently seems to be on bodily waste materials, released via various
erogenous zones.
But another, perhaps more striking parallel with psychoanalysis can be
pointed out as well. Insofar as the Snyderome can indeed be regarded as
a prototypical version of an emerging practice of the self, a window into
the future, an intriguing scenario evolves. Individuals will be requested to
monitor and report, with evenly poised attention, everything about
themselves, however trivial, embarrassing or indiscreet it may seem, so
that they may learn and communicate things about their moods and
bodies which even they do not know themselves. Such practices of self-
tracking adhere to the psychoanalytic rule that, in order to probe one’s
symptoms, everything, however trivial or personal, is relevant. Or, as
Freud himself phrased it: ‘We instruct the patient to . . . report to us
whatever internal observations he is able to make [taking care not to]
exclude any of them, whether on the ground that it is too disagreeable or
too indiscreet to say, or that it is too unimportant or irrelevant’.38
Seemingly trivial details (the bagatelle) often prove highly significant.
The Freudian credo that full coverage (full transparency) is essential, and
that nothing is too trivial or too embarrassing to report, applies to
microbiome research as well. But again, articulation and verbalisation
give way to measurements and quantification. Rather than on verbal
symptoms (slips of the tongue, word finding problems and the like) the
focus will be on peaks and dips in self-tracking diagrams.
As a case study ofMeMedicine, the Snyderome involves a self-tracking
pioneer, committed to measuring everything, even those dimensions of
bodily functioning that may seem too trivial, too personal or too unplea-
sant to record, resulting in an integrative Personal Omics Profile (iPOP),
a comprehensive omics portrait (extremely high resolution) of a single
individual. This portrait is highly personal and highly impersonal at the
same time, however, as the living individual is both captured and lost in
data.39 It is not a portrait in the sense of a recognisable image, but
38 Freud, S., ‘Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse’ in Gesammelte Werke XI
(London: Imago, 1917/1940), p. 297.
39 The Snyderome project is also a testbed for the latest omics technologies. Besides chairing
a prominent genetics department, Snyder is also involved in high-tech omics companies
such as Personalis, GenapSys and Illumina; Zwart, ‘The obliteration of life: depersonali-
sation and disembodiment in the terabyte age’.
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a decidedly technical and symbolic form of self-portrayal, so that the indivi-
dual involved runs the risk of becoming obliterated inmeaningless data litter.
Snyder’s idea is that, via high-resolution self-monitoring, future bio-
citizens will become the proactive managers of their own health condition
(rather than hypochondriacs). Longitudinal multi-omics analysis will
allow them to take medicine into their own hands, with doctors acting as
mere advisors (with whom we will communicate via websites and portals)
rather than as ‘dictators’. For those who want a look into the future of
health: visit the Stanford lab. Or, as science author Jon Cohen phrases it:
Michael Snyder takes axioms such as ‘know thyself’ and ‘heal thyself’ to the
next technological level by taking an extraordinarily detailed look at one’s
body, employing a slew of recent technological advances.40 The Snyder
experiment purports to provide a window into the future where indivi-
duals will not only monitor huge amounts of body molecules in a detailed
manner, but will also heavily wire themselves, so as to register pulse,
heartbeat, stress (transpiration) and numerous other indicators continu-
ously. Thus, the focus of attention is displaced from the familiar (domes-
ticated) weight scale to a plethora of high-tech wearable gadgets.
Measurements of thousands of factors can be integrated through devices
such as iPhones and compared with big data references, available 24/7 at
open-source repositories (vast science clouds), so that self-diagnostics can
be translated into every-day options (such as diet and exercise).
The Snyderome project suggests that especially the aetiology of mystery
symptoms (such as unexplained fatigue) can from now on be elucidated,
while expert science will become democratised into citizen science.
12.5 Citizen Health Science: An Enticing Future?
The Snyderome heralds the advent of a new form of self-directedness.
It exemplifies the idea of self-monitoring, self-tracking and data sharing
with the help of wearable devices, currently evolving into a new practice
of the Self known as ‘citizen health science’, a term which refers to non-
professionals providing professional scientists with observations and
measurements, notably by collecting health records on personal health
and wellness information.41 Fitness trackers, smart watches and other
40 Jon Cohen, ‘Examining his own body, Stanford geneticist stops diabetes in its tracks’,
Science (16 March 2012), www.sciencemag.org/news/2012/03/examining-his-own-body-
stanford-geneticist-stops-diabetes-its-tracks.
41 A. Bowser and L. Shanley, ‘New visions in citizen science’ (2013) Commons Lab:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; E. Vayena and J. Tasioulas, ‘We the
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health applications (or apps) claim to convert smartphones into electro-
nic stethoscopes, ultrasound machines, diagnostic hearing devices, skin
cancer detectors, blood test platforms and other medical devices (cf.
Huijer and Detweiler in this volume). This development is facilitated
by increased global connectivity and technological innovations such as
online crowd-sourcing, big data strategies and computational analytics in
combination with societal developments, such as the growing do-it-
yourself culture relying on smartphones and similar mobile technologies.
Thus, citizen health science is symptomatic of a high degree of global
internet penetration in combination with the conviction that citizens
should be empowered to actively participate in self-management and
scientific research.42
The challenge now is to provide a preliminary assessment or diag-
nostics of this development. In terms of neo-liberal Me Medicine, the
wave of high-resolution self-monitoring will be presented as empow-
erment, no doubt, although due attention will also be given to issues
such as privacy, informed consent, data management and other main-
stream bioethics items. What can a psychoanalytic (or depth ethics)
perspective add to such an analysis? In this final section, three aspects
of self-monitoring will be highlighted, as building blocks for
a psychoanalytical assessment, namely: (a) its focus on radical trans-
parency (as a molecular version of the Freudian maxim to give away
everything); (b) the specific attention that is given to sexuality and
excrements (i.e. the tendency of self-tracking practices to survey every-
day existence through genital and excremental grids); and finally (c)
the paradoxical (or rather: dialectical) relationship between self-
tracking egos and their molecularised conscience or superego, their
personalised panopticon.
First of all, as pointed out above, self-tracking techniques request
individuals to monitor and report (with evenly poised attention) every-
thing about themselves, however trivial or personal, embarrassing or
indiscreet it may seem. Thus, the Freudian maxim is transferred to the
physical wellness domain. And while Freudian psychotherapy has been
regarded as ‘automatic talking’, in reference to automatic writing
(écriture automatique, an artistic practice of the Self adopted by
scientists: a human right to citizen science’ (2015) 28 Philosophy and Technology 479–485.
doi:10.1007/s13347-015–0204-0; M. Rothstein, J. Wilbanks and K. Brothers, ‘Citizen
science on your smartphone: An ELSI research agenda’ (2015) 43(4) The Journal of
Law Medicine & Ethics 897–903.
42 Vayena and Tasioulas, ‘We the scientists: a human right to citizen science’.
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surrealists and modernist authors43), the self-reporting practices of the
present are becoming fully atomised, with the help of gadgets.
Somewhere in this stream of data something may show up that raises
our suspicion as a remarkable or even revelatory symptom, pointing to
something which the individuals themselves may be completely unaware
of (such as a subliminal viral infection or a propensity to diabetes).
Moreover, from a psychoanalytical perspective it is striking that,
besides physical exercise and food intake, sexual activity likewise has
become a key target for self-tracking. While Mozart’s Don Giovanni
relied on the services of his assistant Leporello to keep a quantified
account of his conquests and exploits (640 in Italy, 231 in Germany,
100 in France, 91 in Turkey and 1,003 in Spain), this role is now taken up
by digital automation, in the form of mobile apps employed to track
(specific features of) sexual behaviour, such as calories burned. This
association suggests that, in the neoliberal present, sexual activity is
seen as a kind of self-centred physical exercise, rather than as an aristo-
cratic game, and comparable to running or swimming.44
No less interesting, psychoanalytically speaking, are self-monitoring
practices concerning the gut microbiome, i.e. the millions of microor-
ganisms (E-coli and others) inhabiting our intestines, responsible for our
metabolism, functioning as benign intruders, but regarding us merely as
their ecosystem. A symptomatic exemplification of the emergence of
citizen health science is provided by the ubiome.com website, which
encourages individuals worldwide to explore their microbiome (the gut
dimension of their personal Snyderome), sharing the information and
becoming ‘part of the process’ (i.e. of massive health data collecting and
sharing). The website provides a sample kit containing ‘everything you
need to swab and submit your microbiome. Whether for your mouth,
ears, nose, gut or genitals, your kit will allow you to learn more about
your microbiome. You swipe the sample swab across the corresponding
site and send the kit back to us’.45 Not coincidentally, I would argue, these
‘corresponding sites’ happen to coincide with what psychoanalytic ter-
minology labels as ‘erogenous zones’. Indeed, visitors are persuaded to
join the initiative with nudging slogans such as ‘Compare yourself with
others who have a microbiome like yours’, ‘How does your microbiome
43 H. F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious (London: Lane/Penguin, 1970);
Zwart, ‘The genome as the biological unconscious’.
44 D. Lupton, ‘Quantifying the body: Monitoring and measuring health in the age of
mhealth technologies’ (2013) 23(4) Critical Public Health 393–403.
45 http://ubiome.com
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compare to cutting-edge scientific research?’ and ‘Explore Your
Microbiome, get sequenced’.46 For instance, users are enabled to follow
the effects of a vegetarian diet or exercise on their faeces.
Seen from a psychoanalytical perspective, it is especially remarkable
how, in recent years, human excrements have become a focal point of
attention in biomedical research, no less than in psychoanalytic case studies
of the past.47 Life scientists worldwide have taken to studying the gut
microbiome, and human stool is now increasingly used as a diagnostic
tool (for detecting colon cancer). The microbiome emerges as something
which is both ‘me’ and ‘notme’: both familiar and repellent, both detestable
and valuable, both an item of waste and a gift (a source of highly valuable
data), an assessment which concurs with psychoanalytic Freudian views.
Thus, self-monitoringmay be seen as a high-techmolecularised practice
of the Self, allowing individuals to take daily existence more emphatically
into their own hands by becoming more aware of things which so far had
been hidden. Once again, however, the paradox emerges. Rather than
allowing individuals to refashion their own lives, they are requested to
compare their daily performances with quantified expectations. Health
apps provide reference data (i.e. standards for normality) and can easily
become a ubiquitous electronic panopticon:48 a molecularised version of
the super-ego, the voice of conscience of the terabyte age. On a daily basis,
computer monitors will be telling individuals that they must change their
lives,49 representing the vertical dimension of human existence (oriented
towards systematically improving themselves). They must work on them-
selves and keep a close watch on themselves to optimise somatic function-
ing and to live up to health and normalcy standards, and/or to postpone
the impacts of unhealthy lifestyles and ageing.
Me Medicine aims to provide data-rich characterisations of indivi-
duals, at various stages of health and disease via a comprehensive, high-
density portrayal of a person’s health status, combining static data (e.g.
gene sequence) with dynamic information (concerning lifestyle,
responses and environmental challenges for instance). Whereas tradi-
tional medicine focuses on processes from the onset of illness towards
recovery or death, this new type of Me Medicine reverses the focus of
attention, closely monitoring the human body from wellness to early
onset stages of disease. In the near future, patients may even pay for their
46 Ibid. 47 Zwart, ‘“Extimate” technologies and techno-cultural discontent’.
48 M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
49 Sloterdijk, Du musst dein Leben ändern.
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healthcare (offered to them at no cost) with their data: the new currency
of the upcoming petabyte age.50
But again, rather than to practices of the Self, this development gives
rise to a digitalised and personalised panopticon: a molecularised version
of the voice of conscience; as computers from now on inform us (on
a daily basis) that we must change our life: the superego of the terabyte
age. And eventually perhaps, rather than achieving self-determination
(by translating continuous measurements into lifestyle options), indivi-
duals will rather be drowned in data, so that lifestyle options will sub-
merge in indigestible data litter.
In conclusion, self-monitoring may indeed be regarded as a new
chapter in the long history of practices of self-directedness and self-
observation. Moreover, in preliminary assessments of this emerging
development (discussed above), three positions can be distinguished.
Some voices (such as Francis Collins and Michael Snyder) emphasise
the knowledge dimension, i.e. the extent to which these techno-scientific
contrivances produce extremely high-resolution portraits of our selves:
much more detailed and reliable than previous sources of information
(such as introspection, spiritual exercises or personality tests). Others
(critics) will be inclined to emphasise the power dimension, however.
From this perspective, lifestyle gadgets easily become a personalised
panopticon, urging individuals to adapt themselves to societal expecta-
tions in their daily private lives. Finally, advocates or adepts of the Me
Medicine wave are likely to applaud this development in terms of self-
determination and empowerment. As Foucault51 convincingly argued,
however, phenomena such as self-monitoring can only be adequately
assessed if all three axes of analysis are included; if all three dimensions
are taken into consideration. Self-monitoring emerges at the intersection
of three types of practices: practices of knowledge, of power and of the
Self. Rather than concluding that we ought to be in favour of or against
self-monitoring devices, a differential assessment is called for, mapping
the interacting pros and cons in three directions. And precisely because
self-monitoring is part of a broader socio-cultural and techno-scientific
transition, such an assessment will become part of and contribute to
a comprehensive diagnostics of the present.
50 C. Elliott, White Coat, Black Hat: Adventures on the Dark Side of Medicine (Boston:
Beacon Press, 2011).
51 Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité 2.
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